Jeeva Nand Vs Kanti Bhushan

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( 2026:HHC:20642 )

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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CMPMO No. 131 of 2026 Date of Decision: 21.05.2026

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__________________________________________________ Jeeva Nand ...Petitioner. Versus Kanti Bhushan ...Respondent.

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Coram

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The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?

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For the petitioner : Mr. Hitender K. Thakur, Advocate. For the respondent : Respondent already ex-parte. 4._________________________________________________ Romesh Verma, Judge

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The present petition arises out of the order dated 04.12.2025, as passed by learned Civil Judge, Karsog, District Mandi, H.P., whereby an application filed by the present petitioner/defendant for rejection of the plaint has been dismissed.

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The facts of the case are that the respondent/plaintiff filed a suit for declaration, confirmation of possession, and permanent prohibitory injunction along with mandatory injunction against the present petitioner/defendant. It has been averred in the plaint that on 10.06.2015, the defendant executed a registered sale deed of the suit land for valuable

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2 ( 2026:HHC:20642 )

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consideration in the presence of witnesses, and thereafter the defendant relinquished his entire share pertaining to the suit land in favour of the plaintiff.

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Thereafter, the defendant sold some part of the suit land to Sh. Kushal Singh, which is on the western side of the plaintiff’s shop. On the eastern side, there exists a path, and on the southern side, there is a main road. On the northern side, there exists the shop area of Kushal Singh. It has been averred that the plaintiff has a preferential right, therefore, the suit was filed to acquire ownership rights over and above the slab consisting of a room over the existing shop of the plaintiff. The plaintiff prayed that the defendant may be directed to execute the sale deed of the room in favour of the plaintiff for valuable consideration.

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It has further been prayed that the defendant may be directed to execute the sale deed of the room in favour of the plaintiff. Further, the defendants, along with their family members, agents, and servants, be restrained by way of permanent prohibitory injunction from damaging or breaking the brick wall of the room. Relief of confirmation of

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3 ( 2026:HHC:20642 )

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possession, injunction, and mandatory injunction has also been sought by the plaintiff.

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The plaint was filed by the plaintiff on 25.07.2023. The defendant filed the written statement refuting all the averments and allegations made in the plaint. Pursuant to the

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filing of the written statement, the defendant filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the CPC for rejection of the plaint.

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The said application was resisted by the plaintiff/respondent by raising various objections. The learned trial court, vide its impugned order dated 04.12.2025, rejected the application filed by the petitioner/defendant.

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Feeling dissatisfied, the petitioner/defendant has approached this Court by filing the instant petition. This Court issued notice to the respondent on 02.04.2026. The case was listed before this Court on 27.04.2026 and, on the said date, based upon the report of the Registry, it was pointed out that the respondent stands duly served; however, none appeared for the said respondent. Consequently, the respondent was proceeded against ex parte.

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4 ( 2026:HHC:20642 )

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It is contended by Sh. Hitender K. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the impugned order passed by the learned trial court is erroneous and liable to be quashed and set aside. He has specifically pointed out that the impugned order is a non-speaking order, as no reasons have

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been assigned by the learned trial court while rejecting the application. He submits that upon allowing the present petition, the application filed by the defendant/petitioner deserves to be allowed.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the case file.

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The respondent/plaintiff filed a suit for declaration, confirmation of possession, and permanent and mandatory injunction against the present petitioner. Though various reliefs have been sought in the plaint, the averments and allegations made therein have been refuted by the petitioner/defendant. The application instituted by the present petitioner states that the plaintiff does not have any cause of action to institute the suit against the present petitioner. It is the case of the defendant that he is the absolute owner of the suit property, in which the plaintiff is claiming rights without

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any right, title, or interest. Therefore, the respondent does not have any locus standi to file the suit, and there is no cause of action in favour of the plaintiff.

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Therefore, on that ground, the defendant/petitioner has sought rejection of the plaint. It is contended by Mr. Hitender K. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the learned trial court, after reproducing the facts of the case, relied upon the judgments in paragraphs 9, 10, and 11 and thereafter abruptly dismissed the application filed by the defendant. No reasons have been assigned by the learned trial court for rejecting the same.

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This Court is in agreement with the contention as raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The assertions and the grounds on which the present defendant filed the application for rejection of the plaint have not been discussed or dealt with by the learned trial court. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order is a non-speaking order is correct, and this Court is of the opinion that the learned trial court, while deciding the application, has not passed a speaking order.

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6 ( 2026:HHC:20642 )

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The Court below was required to assign reasons for

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deciding the application either way. The Hon’ble Apex Court in its various decisions have repeatedly held that while deciding the case, it is incumbent upon the court to assign reasons for deciding the application.

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The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that the reasons are required to be assigned while passing the orders. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2010) 4 SCC 785, titled as Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department, Works Contract & Leasing, Kota vs. M/s Shukla & Brothers, decided on 15.04.2010, held as follows:

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“24. Reason is the very life of law. When the reason of a law once ceases, the law itself generally ceases (Wharton's Law Lexicon). Such is the significance of reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons furthers the cause of justice as well as avoids uncertainty. As a matter of fact it helps in the observance of law of precedent. Absence of reasons on the contrary essentially introduces an element of uncertainty, dissatisfaction and give entirely different dimensions to the questions of law raised before the higher/appellate courts. In our view, the court should provide its own grounds and reasons for rejecting claim/prayer of a party whether at the very threshold i.e. at admission stage or after regular hearing, howsoever precise they may be.

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30. In light of the judgments referred to and relied upon by the parties including the judgment of this Court, it is true that requirement of stating reasons for judicial orders necessarily does not mean a very detailed or lengthy order, but there should be some reasoning recorded by the Court for declining or granting relief to the petitioner. The purpose, as already noticed, is to make the litigant aware of the reasons for which the relief is declined as well as to help the higher Court in assessing the correctness of

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the view taken by the High Court while disposing off a matter. May be, while dealing with the matter at the admission stage even recording of short listening dealing with the merit of the contentions raised before the High Court may suffice, in contrast, a detailed judgment while matter is being disposed off after final hearing, but in both events, in our view, it is imperative for the High Court to record its own reasoning however short it might be.”

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Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2010) 9 SCC 486 titled as M/s. Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. Sh. Masood Ahmed Khan & Others, decided on 08.09.2010 , held as follows:

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“22. In Woolcombers of India Ltd. vs. Workers Union and another, AIR 1973 SC 2758, this Court while considering an award under Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act insisted on the need of giving reasons in support of conclusions in the Award. The Court held that the very requirement of giving reason is to prevent unfairness or arbitrariness in reaching conclusions. The second principle is based on the jurisprudential doctrine that justice should not only be done, it should also appear to be done as well. The learned Judges said that a just but unreasoned conclusion does not appear to be just to those who read the same. Reasoned and just conclusion on the other hand will also have the appearance of justice. The third ground is that such awards are subject to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court and in the absence of reasons, it is difficult for this Court to ascertain whether the decision is right or wrong.

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28. In Gurdial Singh Fijji vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1979) 2 SCC 368, this Court, dealing with a service matter, relying on the ratio in Union of India vs. Mohan lal Capoor, (1973) 2 SCC 836, held that "rubber-stamp reason" is not enough and virtually quoted the observation in Capoor (supra) to the extent that:

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28...Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions."

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From the above discussion of law, it is clear that it

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was incumbent upon the learned trial court to assign reasons

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while deciding the application. However, in the present case, the learned trial court has erred by not following the principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court.

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Consequently, this Court has no other option but to quash and set aside the impugned order, restoring the application filed by the petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC to its original number by directing the learned trial court to decide the application afresh, after affording an opportunity to both parties, by passing a reasoned order.

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Before parting, it is made clear that any observation made here-in-above shall not be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of the main case and the same shall be adjudicated upon uninfluenced by any observation made here- in-above, which are only for the purpose of the instant petition.

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Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed off.

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(Romesh Verma) 21^st May, 2026 Judge (Nisha)

Jeeva Nand v. Kanti Bhushan

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Jeeva Nand v. Kanti Bhushan

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