State of Hp and Others Vs Aastha Katoch and Others

2. We have perused the application and the impugned judgment dated 10.05.2023, whereby the petitioner was given the relief to pay the fee in terms of Annexure P-3, i.e. an amount of Rs.5,50,000/-, as tuition fee, for the academic session 2017-18, but for the subsequent session i.e. 2018-19 onwards, they would be liable to pay the same fee as has been charged by the respondent/State from the candidates, who were admitted against NIR Quota Seats, i.e. fee structure at par with State Government Medical College-State Quota seats. Necessary action was made by Department on 27.05.2023, when the

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Department wrote allegedly to appellant No.4, vide communication dated 01.06.2023, as has been mentioned in the application. The reference of appellant No.4 has been made repeatedly in the application but memo of parties does not mention appellant No.4 as such. It is mentioned that the Government had raised some queries on 24.07.2023 and same was apprised on 02.09.2023. The fresh query was answered on 18.09.2023 and eventually it was decided on 22.02.2024 to file the LPA.

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3. It transpires that even the certified copy of judgment had not been received and apparently the same was then applied only on 03.04.2024 and delivered on

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22.04.2024, which led to the filing of the appeal on 29.06.2024.

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4. We are of the considered opinion that there is no explanation, as such, between September 2023 to February 2024, as to what steps were taken. It is apparent that inaction and negligence on the part of appellants cannot be accepted, though a feeble attempt has been made by learned counsel for State that contrary to the decision impugned in a similar circumstance’s, the Coordinate Bench had dismissed the Writ Petition.

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5. We have also perused the stand taken by the State. Even if the Coordinate Bench had dismissed the Writ Petition of similarly situated students earlier on 31.03.2021, however, apparently the said fact was never brought to the notice of learned Single Judge, when the matter was decided.

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6. In support of her contention, learned State Counsel has relied upon the following law laid down by Apex Court and prayed that delay in filing the appeal may be condoned.

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6(i). In G. Ramegowda Major and others Versus Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore alongwith connected matter, (1988) 2 SCC 142, wherein it has

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been held as under:-

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“17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes 'sufficient cause' for purposes of Section 5 it might, perhaps, be some what unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have 'a little play at the joints'. Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning-of course, within a reasonable limits-is necessary if the judicial approach is not rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law-officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of these cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its lawofficers. Lindley, M.R., in In Re: National Bank of Wales Ltd., observed, though in a different context:

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"Business cannot be carried on, upon principles of distrust. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those above them, as well as by those below them, until there is reason to distrust them."

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In the opinion of the High Court, it took quite sometime for the Government to realise that the law-officers failed that trust.

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18. While a private person can take instant decision a "bureaucratic or democratic organ" it is said by a learned Judge "hesitates and debates, consults and considers, speaks through paper, moves horizontally and vertically till at last it gravitates towards a conclusion, unmindful of time and impersonally." Now at the end, should we interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court? Shri Datar criticised that the delay on the part of Government even after 20.1.1971 for over an year cannot be said to be either bonafide or compelled by reasons beyond its control. This criticism is not without substance. Government could and ought to have moved with greater diligence and dispatch consistent with the urgency of the situation. The conduct of Government was perilously close to such inaction as might, perhaps, have justified rejection of its prayer for condonation. But as is implicit in the reasoning of the High Court, the unarticulated thought, perhaps was that in the interest of keeping the stream of justice pure and clean the awards under appeal should not be permitted to assume finality without an examination of their merits. The High Court noticed that the Government pleader who was in office till 15.12.1970 had applied for certified

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copies on 20.7.1970, but the application was allowed to be dismissed for default. In one case, however, he appears to have taken away the certified copy even after he ceased to be a Government Pleader. In a similar context where delay had been condoned by the High Court, this Court declined to interfere and observed: (SCC p. 472, para 5)

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"Having regard to the entirety of the circumstances, the High Court thought that the State should not be penalised for the lapses of some of its officers and that in the particular circumstances there were sufficient grounds justifying the condonation of delay in filing the appeals. It was a matter for the discretion of the High Court. We are unable to say that the discretion was improperly exercised .. "

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We think in the circumstances of this case, we should also decline to interfere. Appeals are dismissed, but without an order as to costs.”

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6(ii). In Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal

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Representatives and others Versus Union of India and another, (2023) 10 SCC 531, it has been held as under:-

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“30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability

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of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial.

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31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’. An ‘explanation’ is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must however be taken to distinguish an ‘explanation’ from an ‘excuse’. Although people tend to see ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’ as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.”

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6(iii). In Mool Chandra Versus Union of India and

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another, (2025) 1 SCC 625, it has been held as under by holding that the delay had been sufficiently explained:-

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“20. Be that as it may. On account of liberty having been granted to the appellant to pursue his remedy in accordance with law, yet another O.A. No.2066 of 2020 along with an application for condonation of delay came to be filed. The delay was not condoned by the Tribunal on the ground that it was filed more than one year

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after the impugned order came to be passed. No litigant stands to benefit in approaching the courts belatedly. It is not the length of delay that would be required to be considered while examining the plea for condonation of delay, it is the cause for delay which has been propounded will have to be examined. If the cause for delay would fall within the four corners of “sufficient cause”, irrespective of the length of delay same deserves to be condoned. However, if the cause shown is insufficient, irrespective of the period of delay, same would not be condoned.

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21. In this background when we turn our attention to the facts on hand, it would emerge from the records that appellant being aggrieved by the dismissal of the O.A. No.2066 of 2020 on the ground of delay had approached the Delhi High Court challenging the same. The High Court on the ground of penalty imposed being a minor penalty, refused to entertain the writ petition or in other words confirmed the order impugned before the Tribunal on merits.

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22. This Court in Commmr. V. Labour Commr. has taken a view that while deciding an application for condonation of delay the High Court ought not to have gone into the merits of the case. It has been further held (SCC p. 526, para 5):-

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“5. While deciding an application for condonation of delay, it is well settled that the High Court ought not to have gone into the merits of the case and would have only seen whether sufficient cause had been shown by the appellant for condoning the delay in filing

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the appeal before it. We ourselves have also examined the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act before the High Court and, in our opinion, the delay of 178 days has been properly explained by the appellant. That being the position, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court. Consequently, the appeal filed before the High Court is restored to its original file. The High Court is requested to decide the appeal on merit in accordance with law after giving hearing to the parties and after passing a reasoned order.”

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23. If negligence can be attributed to the appellant, then necessarily the delay which has not been condoned by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court deserves to be accepted. However, if no fault can be laid at the doors of the appellant and cause shown is sufficient then we are of the considered view that both the Tribunal and the High Court were in error in not adopting a liberal approach or justice oriented approach to condone the delay. This Court in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Anr. Vs. Shah Hyder Beig has held : (SCC p. 51, para 6)

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“6. Incidentally this point of delay and laches was also raised before the High Court and on this score the High Court relying upon the decision in Abhyankar case (N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India [(1995) 1 Mah LJ 503] ) observed that it is not an inflexible rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must and necessarily refuse to entertain the petition filed after a period of three years or more which is the normal period of limitation for filing a suit. The Bombay High Court in Abhyankar case [(1995) 1 Mah LJ 503] stated that the question is one of discretion to be followed in the facts and circumstances of each case and further stated:

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“22. ...The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time as such but

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the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where the petitioner has moved the writ court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.”

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24. Applying the aforesaid principles which we are in complete agreement to the facts on hand and test the same it would not detain us for too long to set aside the impugned orders, in as much as the delay of 425 days in filing fresh O.A. No.2066 of 2020 has been succinctly explained by the appellant before the Tribunal, namely, it has been contended that there was no intimation of withdrawal of the earlier OA by his counsel and the order of withdrawal dated 10.08.2018 does not reflect that such withdrawal was based on any memo duly signed by the appellant. Further, The High Court has proceeded to confirm the order of the Tribunal on the footing that penalty imposed on appellant is only a minor penalty namely withholding of one increment without cumulative effect, by completely ignoring the fact that in the earlier round of litigation it had been clearly held that punishment of dismissal imposed on the appellant was totally disproportionate to the alleged act.

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25. In the normal circumstances we would have remitted the matter back to the Tribunal or High Court or to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration of the matter but we desist from doing so for reasons more than one firstly, the

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age of the appellant is 68 years (as on date); and, secondly, there being no evidence whatsoever available on record to arrive at a conclusion that appellant is guilty of the charge; Thirdly, the complainant herself had withdrawn the complaint made and she was not even examined on behalf of the employer to prove the charge. Thus, the findings of the enquiry officer cannot be sustained by any stretch of imagination as it is contrary to the facts and records on hand. There cannot be judicial review of nature of penalty to be imposed by disciplinary authority. Hence, we set aside the impugned orders and hold that appellant is entitled for all consequential benefits flowing from the setting aside of the orders of penalty and respondents are directed to take steps in this regard expeditiously and at any rate within 3 months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Accordingly appeals stand allowed with no order as to costs.”

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7. In Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd

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versus Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation

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and another (2010) 5 SCC 459, it was held that law of limitation is founded on public policy and resultantly the appeal was allowed and the order condoning the delay as such of four years in filing of the appeal was set aside by holding that in the absence of any plausible/tangible explanation for long delay of more than four years in filing

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of appeal, there was no valid reasons to condone the delay.

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7(i). In Chief Postmaster General and others versus Living Media India Limited and another (2012) 3 SCC 563, the principles as such have been laid down that the department could not take advantage of impersonal machinery or the inherited bureaucratic methodology and the law of limitation binds everybody including the Government. The relevant paras of the said judgment reads as under:-

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“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

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Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of

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various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

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29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.”

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7(ii). In Maniben Devraj Shah versus Municipal

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Corporation of Brihan Mumbai (2012) 5 SCC 157, it has

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been held that a litigant acquire certain rights and if the Court finds that there is negligence in prosecuting the case then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.

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7(iii). In B. Madhuri Goud versus B. Damodar

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Reddy (2012) 12 SCC 693, it was noticed that there is a life span for such legal remedy for the redressal of such injuries so suffered and unending period lead to unending certainty and consequential anarchy. The Rules of limitation were held not meant to destroy the rights of the parties.

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7(iv). In Esha Bhattacharjee versus Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others (2013) 12 SCC 649 , the principles of limitation were culled out as under:

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“i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justiceoriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

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ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining factsituation.

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iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

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iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

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v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

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vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

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vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

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viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

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ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance

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of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

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x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

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xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

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xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

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xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.”

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7(v). Recently, in Civil Appeal No.317 of 2025,

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titled as H. Guruswamy & Ors. Versus A. Krishnaiah

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Since deceased by LRs, decided on 08.01.2025, the following observations have come forth:-

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“16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of

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instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

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17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time.”

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8. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion

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that State cannot turn around to submit that the matter

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was duly covered, when the facts were not brought before the learned Single Judge and in view of the total inaction on its part for a period of 6 months from middle of September 2023 to end February 2024.

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9. Resultantly, we dismiss the application for

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condonation of delay. Consequently, the appeal also

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