Man Singh Vs State of Hp

OA No 6884 of 2016 and upon abolition of State Administrative Tribunal, the matter stands transferred to this Court as CWPOA No 915 of 2020, seeking the following reliefs:-

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“7(i) That the impugned office order dated 18-5-2016 (Annexure-A/22) may kindly modified to the extent that the applicant may kindly be ordered to be promoted from the day his immediate junior has been promoted i.e. since the year 2012 on actual basis with all consequential benefits in the interest of law and justice.

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7(ii) That the respondents may kindly be directed to promote the applicant from due date or from the day his juniors

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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have been promoted i.e. w.e.f. year 2012 and to grant ACP (4-9-2014) from the day his juniors and similarly situated person have been granted.

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(iii) That the respondents may kindly be granted the Pay and Grade Pay to the applicant equivalent to the junior i.e. Khem Chand from due date and also consequently grant arrears, fixation, revision etc.”

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2. At the very outset, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, On Instructions, states that he does not press Reliefs (ii) and (iii). He confines his prayer for actual monetary benefits after the issuance of Office Order dated 18.05.2016 [Annexure A/22], by promoting him as Daftri [Class-IV], ‘on notional basis’, w.e.f. 04.03.2014 [Statement Taken on Record].

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FACTUAL MATRIX:

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3. Grievance of the petitioner is that he was appointed as Peon in Himachal Pradesh Secretariat in the year 1991. It is averred that the disciplinary p roceedings were initiated against the petitioner on 03.12.2010 [Annexure A/1] and he was placed under suspension on 04.11.2010 [Annexure A/2] and pursuant

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to Disciplinary Proceedings, an Order was passed on 01.04.2014 [Annexure A/8], imposing the penalty of withholding of two increments with cumulative

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effect. The Order of penalty dated 01.04.2014 stated that suspension period from 04.11.2010 to 31.12.2010 was treated as duty period and remaining period of suspension was to be finally determined after conclusion of d epartmental proceedings.

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3(i). Feeling aggrieved against the Order dated 01.04.2014 [Annexure A/8], imposing penalty, the petitioner submitted an Appeal under Rule 23 CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and the Chief Secretary, being the Appellate Authority passed an Order on 28.08.2014 [Annexure A/10], setting aside the penalty order dated 01.04.2014.

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3(ii). In addition to the Disciplinary Proceedings, the State Authorities registered an FIR under Sections 465, 468, 471, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, against five employees, including the petitioner-Man Singh and Kishori Lal also. The criminal p roceedings resulted in acquittal of the petitioner by Learned Special Judge [Forests], Shimla, on 01.06.2015 [Annexure A-11]. After setting aside of the p enalty dated 01.04.2014 [Annexure A-8]

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on 28.08.2014 [Annexure A-10], and upon acquittal in the criminal p roceedings on 01.06.2015 [Annexure A-11], the State Authorities convened a Departmental Promotion Committee for considering the petitioner for promotion from Peon to post of Daftri [Class-IV] and based on recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee, the State Authorities issued an Order on 18.05.2016 [Annexure A-22], promoting the petitioner as Daftri [Class-IV] w.e.f. 04.03.2014 ‘on notional basis’.

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In the above backdrop, the case set up by Learned Counsel for the petitioner is that once in the Disciplinary Proceedings, no penalty exists against the petitioner and in the Judicial Proceeding, the petitioner stands acquitted, therefore, Order dated 18.05.2016 [Annexure A-22] promoting the petitioner as Daftri [Class-IV] w.e.f. 04.03.2014 ‘on notional basis is bad in law, as the petitioner could not be denied the actual monetary benefits without considering the entire factual matrix and without recording reasons, which is asserted to be contrary to the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme

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Court in Union of India and others versus

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K.V. Jankiraman and others, (1991) 4 SCC 109 and in these circumstances, the petitioner has

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assailed the condition of notional promotion and has prayed for release of actual monetary benefits in instant proceedings.

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STAND OF STATE AUTHORITIES-RESPONDENTS:

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4. Pursuant to the issuance of notice, the

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State Authorities have filed a Reply-Affidavit of Deputy Secretary [SA], verified on 20.05.2017.

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4(i). Perusal of the Reply-Affidavit admits the factual matrix that Disciplinary Proceedings under Rule 14 of the CCS [CCA] Rules 1965 were initiated against petitioner on 03.12.2010. ReplyAffidavit indicates that petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dated 04.11.2010. Reply-Affidavit further indicates that on 04.07.2011, an FIR No. 71 of 2011, dated 16.06.2011 under Sections 465, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, was registered against the petitioner. Reply-Affidavit further indicates that the penalty

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of withholding of two increments was imposed on 01.04.2014 [Annexure A/8] against which, petitioner preferred an Appeal before the Appellate Authoritycum-Chief Secretary, leading to the passing of an Order on 28.08.2014 [Annexure A/10], whereby, the penalty was set aside. Reply-Affidavit indicates that Judicial-Criminal Proceedings resulted in acquittal on 01.06.2015 [Annexure A/11].

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4(ii). Reply-Affidavit indicates that after setting aside of Order of Penalty and upon acquittal in the criminal case, the petitioner was considered by Departmental Promotion Committee, for promotion to the post of Daftri, by acting upon the sealed cover in its meeting held on 19.02.2014 and based

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on the recommendations of Departmental Promotion Committee, the petitioner was promoted as Daftri w.e.f. 04.03.2014 from the date from which the immediate junior(s) were promoted as Daftri ‘on notional basis’ but the actual benefits were granted to the petitioner from date of joining after issuance

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of promotion Orders on 18.05.2016 [Annexure A/22].

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In this background, it is averred that promotion

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as Daftri stands given on 18.05.2016 [Annexure A/22]

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from the date the junior(s) were promoted as Daftri w.e.f. 04.03.2014 and the ACP is not admissible

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as the petitioner has already received three financial up-gradations in his service career. The claim for other benefits was denied in the Reply-Affidavit.

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REBUTTAL BY PETITIONER IN REJOINDER:

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5. Petitioner filed Rejoinder, stating that after exoneration in Disciplinary Proceedings and the

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acquittal in criminal case, the Respondents could not deny actual monetary benefits to the petitioner after issuance of Orders dated 18.05.2016 [Annexure A/22] promoting the petitioner as Daftri w.e.f. 04.03.2014 ‘on notional basis.

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6. Heard, Mr. Raju Ram Rahi, Learned Counsel, for the petitioner and Mr. Hemant K.

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Verma Learned Deputy Advocate General.

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ANALYSIS:

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7. Taking into account the entirety of facts and circumstances and the material on record, this Court is of the considered view, that the Impugned Order dated 18.05.2016 [Annexure A-22],

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promoting the petitioner on the post of Daftri

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[Class-IV] w.e.f. 04.03.2014, ‘on notional basis’, is liable to be interdicted by this Court, for the following reasons:-

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7(i). Admittedly, the petitioner was appointed as a Peon [Class-IV]. His next promotional post was that of Daftri [Class-IV] in pay band of Rs.495010680 plus Rs 1650 GP and Rs 320/- as Secretariat Pay. Material on record reveals that the petitioner was due for consideration for promotion as Daftri

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[Class-IV] on 04.03.2014. However, due to initiation of Disciplinary Proceedings against the petitioner on 03.12.2010 and the registration of FIR No.71 of 2011 and its pendency, the juniors were promoted and the consideration of petitioner was kept in a sealed cover. Reply-Affidavit indicates that Disciplinary Proceedings initiated on 03.12.2010 led to the imposition of penalty of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect vide Order dated 01.04.2014 [Annexure A/8]. Against the imposition of penalty, the petitioner submitted an Appeal under Rules 23 and 27 of the CCS [CCA] Rules, 1965 and

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Appellate Authority-cum-Chief Secretary issued an Order on 28.08.2014 [Annexure A/10], setting aside the order imposing penalty on 01.04.2014. Even in the Criminal-Judicial Proceedings, the petitioner was acquitted on 01.06.2015 [Annexure A/11]. A c ollective reading of the Order setting aside the penalty passed by the Appellate Authority and the order of acquittal in Judicial-Criminal Proceedings, led to re-consideration of the case of the petitioner for promotion after opening the sealed cover, which was done by Respondents. Consequently, the sealed cover was acted upon and petitioner was promoted as Daftri [Class-IV] in terms of the Office Order dated 18.05.2016 [Annexure A-22] w.e.f. 14.03.2024 ‘on notional basis’.

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7(ii). Learned Counsel for the petitioner states that the Order dated 18.05.2016 [Annexure A-22]

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promoting the petitioner as Daftri [Class-IV] w.e.f. 04.03.2014 ‘on notional basis’, and this order has resulted in depriving the petitioner of the actual monetary benefits from 04.03.2014 till 18.05.2016 without recording any reasons and such denial

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is not sustainable, in view of the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in Union of India and others Versus K.V. Jankiraman and others, (1991) 4 SCC 109, in the following terms:- -

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“9. In K.V. Jankiraman (supra), it has been held as under:-

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“26. We are, therefore, broadly in agreement with the finding of the Tribunal that when an employee is completely exonerated meaning thereby that he is not 'found blameworthy in the least and is not visited with the penalty even of censure, he has to be given the benefit of the salary of the higher post along with the other benefits from the date on which he would have normally been promoted but for the disciplinary/criminal proceedings. However, there may be cases' where the proceedings, whether disciplinary or criminal, are, for example, delayed at the instance of the employee or the clearance in the disciplinary proceedings or acquittal in the criminal proceedings is with benefit of doubt or on account of non-availability of evidence due to the acts attributable to the employee etc. In such circumstances, the concerned authorities must be vested with the power decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it. Life being complex, it is not possible to anticipate and enumerate exhaustively all the circumstances under which such consideration may become necessary. To ignore however, such circumstances

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when they exist and lay down' an inflexible rule that in every case when an employee is exonerated in disciplinary /criminal proceedings he should be entitled to all salary for the intervening period is to undermine discipline in the administration and jeopardize public interests. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the Tribunal that to deny the salary to an employee would in all circumstances be illegal . While, therefore, we do not approve of the said last sentence in the first subparagraph after clause (iii) of paragraph 3 of the said Memorandum, viz.. "but no arrears of pay shall be payable to him for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion", we direct that in place of the said sentence the following sentence be read in the Memorandum:-

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"However, whether the officer concerned will be entitled to any arrears of pay for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion, and if so to what extent, will be decided by the concerned authority by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the disciplinary proceeding /criminal prosecution.

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W here the authority denies arrears of salary or part of it, it will record its reasons for doing so."

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The mandate of law as declared in K.V. Jankiraman (supra) is clear and unambiguous. The right of petitioner to be provided with reasons for denial of monetary benefits for the period he held the promotional post, has clearly been denied in the case of petitioner.”

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7(iii). The case of the petitioner needs to be examined from another angle. Once the petitioner stands exonerated, upon setting aside of the Order of Penalty in Disciplinary Proceedings and petitioner stands acquitted in the Criminal Proceedings then, upon grant of retrospective promotion as per Order dated 18.05.2016 [Annexure A/22], w.e.f. 04.03.2014, the Respondents could not grant the promotion with ‘notional benefits’ resulting in depriving the petitioner of the actual monetary benefits arbitrarily. Once, the petitioner has been held entitled for promotion as Daftri from 04.03.2014 in terms of the Order dated 18.05.2016 [Annexure A/22], then, the actual monetary benefits could not be denied, without recording reasons, without issuing prior notice and without affording an opportunity of personal hearing before passing adversarial order of denying actual monetary benefits when, such denial has certainly visited the petitioner with civil consequences. In this backdrop, the Order granting notional promotion, resulting in denying the actual monetary benefits arbitrarily and without recording reasons cannot pass

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the test of judicial scrutiny. Action of the State Authorities in denying the actual monetary benefits upon exoneration in Disciplinary Proceedings and acquittal in Criminal Proceedings cannot sustain, for the reason, that after exoneration and acquittal , the State Authorities could deny actual monetary benefits only after recording reasons and after giving an opportunity to an employee to make representation in case the Departmental or Judicial Proceedings were delayed by an employee. The aforesaid mandate of Fundamental Rule 54-B (ii) (iii) and (vi) has been grossly violated by the Respondents in the instant case. It is not the case of the State Authorities that the monetary benefits upon grant of retrospective promotion as per Orders dated 18.05.2016 [Annexure A/22] w.e.f. 04.03.2014 have been denied to the petitioner, in view of the fact that the Disciplinary or Judicial Proceedings were delayed at the instance of the petitioner . In absence of such a stand of the State Authorities, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the Impugned Orders dated 18.05.2016 [Annexure A-22], denying the actual monetary benefits

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without recording reasons and without affording

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an opportunity to the petitioner to make representation against any such proposed denial, cannot stand the judicial scrutiny. The State action has to confirm to the Statutory Rules. In instant case, infraction or violation of Fundamental Rule 54-B (ii) (iii) and (vi) and intent thereof has been given to the winds by the Respondents. In these circumstances, denial of actual monetary benefits without recording reasons, without affording an opportunity to the petitioner to make representation and without taking into account the fact as to whether the delay in Disciplinary or Judicial Proceedings were attributable to the petitioner is sufficient to interdict the Impugned Orders.

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7(iv). Besides the above, Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a judgment passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in CWPOA No.1747 of 2020, titled as Kishori Lal versus State of H.P. and another , decided on 21.07.2025 to assert that in case of another employee [Kishori Lal], who was a co-accused with the petitioner

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in a Criminal Case but upon his acquittal by a common judgement, the aforesaid Kishore Lal was granted promotion as Superintendent Grade-II ‘ on notional basis’ and the actual monetary benefits were denied without recording reasons and without affording an opportunity to make representation as required by Statutory Rules and the mandate of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of K.V. Jankiraman [supra], but the order granting ‘notional benefits ’was interdicted by this Court, with the directions to the State Authorities to issue fresh orders strictly in terms of the mandate in the case of K.V. Jankiraman [supra], in the following

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terms:-

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“Clause (iv) of Para 3 of the Memorandum then lays down the procedure for adhoc appointment of the concerned officer when the disciplinary/court proceedings are not concluded even after the expiry of two years from the date of the DPC which first considered him for promotion and whose findings are kept in the sealed cover, provided however that the officer is not under suspension. It is not necessary to reproduce that clause in extenso here. Suffice it to say that

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the Memorandum urges that in making the ad hoc promotion in such cases, his case should be placed before the DPC which is held after the 798 expiry of the said period of two years, and the adhoc promotion has to be made on the basis of the totality of the record of service etc.

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Para 4 of the Memorandum states that if the officer concerned is acquitted in the court proceedings on the merits of the case or exonerated in departmental disciplinary proceedings, the adhoc promotion already made may be confirmed and the promotion treated as a regular one from the date of the adhoc promotion with all attendant benefits. In such cases, the sealed cover may be opened and the official may be assigned his place in the seniority list as he would have got in accordance with the recommendation of the DPC.”

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7(v). Notwithstanding the above, the condition of ‘notional benefits’ in the orders dated 18.05.2016 [Annexure A-22] as Daftri w.e.f. 04.03.2014 till actual joining as Daftri [ Class-IV] on 18.05.2016 is liable to be interdicted for the reasons, firstly,

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the aforesaid condition of notional benefits amounts to penalizing the petitioner without any fault

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attributable to him ; and secondly, in fact-situation of instant case, once the alleged stigma which had led to initiation of disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings necessitating consideration of case for promotion to be kept in sealed cover but after exoneration in the disciplinary proceedings and acquittal in the criminal case [after due trial], the action of the State Authorities in promoting the petitioner as Daftri [Class IV] on notional basis amounts to giving leverage or premium to the State Authorities by reinforcing the stigma which stood obliterated and washed away ; and thirdly, the condition of notional promotion cannot operate so to permit the respondents to take advantage of its own wrong ; and fourthly, insertion of the condition shall amount to victimizing or penalizing the petitioner for the inaction, faults and wrongs of the respondents ; and fifthly, the condition of notional promotion amounts to validating the inaction of the Respondents in not considering the petitioner for promotion from Peon to Daftri (Class IV) from due date ; and sixthly, the condition of notional

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promotion is a camouflage for denying the actual monetary benefits due to an employee in the normal course but for stigmatic action, which remained

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not proved and not established against the petitioner and denial of benefits without any fault attributable to the petitioner cannot sustain ; and seventhly, the condition of notional promotion has visited the petitioner with civil consequences without giving a prior notice and without affording personal hearing reveals unfairness and unreasonableness in State action ; and eighthly , upon grant of retrospective promotion as Daftri (Class IV) on 18.05.2016 [A-22], the petitioner had acquired a right to receive the legal entitlements i.e. pay and allowances as Daftri (Class IV) from 04.03.2014 till 18.05.2016 and the deprivation of the aforesaid legal entitlements which come within the ambit of property under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India without any authority of law cannot sustain; and lastly, the condition of notional promotion and the denial of pay and allowances from March, 2014 till 18.05.2016 upon grant of retrospective promotion as Daftri

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on 18.05.2016 [Annexure A-21] is contrary to the

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mandate of law of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as

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detailed here-in-below:-

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MANDATE OF LAW: GRANTING MONETARY BENEFITS UPON RETROSPECTIVE PROMOTION:

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7(vi). Learned State Counsel contends that the monetary benefits were denied to the petitioner in view of the principle of ‘no work no pay’.

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The above contention is misconceived for

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the reason that the principle of ‘no work no pay” is neither attracted nor applicable in fact-situation of instant case, in view of the fact that though the petitioner was eligible for post of Daftri (Class-IV) but was denied fundamental right of consideration for promotion as Daftri (Class IV) at the relevant time (in March 2014) and such a right was restored belatedly by issuing the promotion orders on 18.05.2016 [Annexure A-22]. Upon restoration

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of rights by granting the retrospective promotion, once the Respondents have deprived the petitioner of the right to work and to earn pay and allowances,

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which would have been admissible to him in the normal course, therefore, the denial of the actual

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monetary benefits was unsustainable.

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7(vi-a). In State of Andhra Pradesh Versus K.V.L. Narasimha Rao and others, (1999) 4 SCC

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181, the Honble Supreme Court has held that after grant of retrospective promotion, an employee who was deprived of the right to work earlier, shall be given all monetary benefits, in following

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terms:-

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“5. In normal circumstances when the retrospective promotions are effected all benefits flowing therefrom, including monetary benefits, must be extended to an officer who has been denied promotion earlier. However, on the reorganisation of States a large number of officers stood allotted from different

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States to the newly formed State and their services had to be intergrade on various principles and several agencies were involved in the same. The steps to be taken thereto were one of formulation of principles, publication of a provisional inter State seniority list, inviting objections thereto, consideration of those objections in consultation with the Central Govt. and acting upon its directions to the seniority list in conformity with such directions. This entire exercise involved a good deal of time and gave rise to extraordinary situation. It in those circumstances that Rules contained in the Fundamental 26 or Rule 40 of the Hyderabad Civil Services Regulations have been framed. As a matter of fact, rules of

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erstwhile State regarding seniority are not applicable in the new State as allottees are governed by the Act and seniority is finalised therein. Even so, we do not see that there is any impediment to frame new rules affecting conditions of service off such allottees but in conformity with the Act. Surely new rules cannot be brushed aside by saying that they are not applicable to cases coming under the Act. There is no contention either in the High Court or before us that they are formed in contravention of the Act. In this background we fail to see as to why the Rules are not applicable to the respondents as held by the High Court.”

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7(vi-b). In State of Kerala and others Versus E.K. Bhaskaran Pillai, (2007) 6 SCC 524 , it

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has been mandated that after according retrospective promotion, an employee who was denied promotion

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earlier, was entitled to all monetary benefits and the principle of “no work no pay”, cannot be invoked for denying such benefits, in the following terms:-

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“4. Learned counsel for the State has submitted that grant of retrospective benefit on promotional post cannot be given to the incumbent when he has not worked on the said post. Therefore, he is not entitled to any benefit on the promotional post from 15-6-1972. In support thereof, the learned counsel invited our attention to the decisions of this Court in Virender Kumar v. Avinash Chandra Chadha,

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State of Haryana v. O.P. Gupta, A.K. Soumini v. State Bank of Travancore and Union of India v. Tarsem Lal. As against this, the learned counsel for the respondent has invited our attention to the decisions given by this Court in Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, State of A.P. v. K.V.L. Narasimha Rao, State of A.P. v. K.V.L. Narasimha Rao, Vasant Rao Roman v. Union of India and State of U.P. v. Vinod Kumar Srivastava. We have considered the decisions cited on behalf of both the sides. So far as the situation with regard to monetary benefits with retrospective promotion is concerned, that depends upon case to case. There are various facets which have to be considered. Sometimes in a case of departmental enquiry or in criminal case it depends on the authorities to grant full back wages or 50 per cent of back wages looking to the nature of delinquency involved in the matter or in criminal cases where the incumbent has been acquitted by giving benefit of doubt or full acquittal. Sometimes in the matter when the person is superseded and he has challenged the same before Court or Tribunal and he succeeds in that and direction is given for reconsideration of his case from the date persons junior to him were appointed, in that case the Court may grant sometime full benefits with retrospective effect and sometimes it may not. Particularly when the administration has wrongly denied his due then in that case he should be given full benefits including monetary benefit subject to there being any change in law or some other supervening factors. However, it is very difficult to set down any hard and fast rule. The principle “no work no pay” cannot be accepted

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as a rule of thumb. There are exceptions where courts have granted monetary benefits also.

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5. However, so far as present case is concerned, as per directions given by the Court, petitioner's case was considered and it was found that persons junior to him were appointed and he was wrongly denied. Therefore, the petitioner was promoted from retrospective effect i.e. 15-9-1961 but he was not paid the benefit of promotion in terms of arrears of salary.

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7(vi-c). In Ramesh Kumar versus Union of

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India and others, (2015) 14 SCC 335, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has outlined that incase, an employee was not at fault but was denied the right to work by respondent then, upon grant of retrospective promotion such an employee is entitled to all service benefits, including monetary benefits and principle of “no work no pay”, is not applicable in such a case, in the following terms:-

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“13. The respondents have advanced the argument that the denial of pay and allowances is on the principle of “no work no pay” and no injustice has been done to the appellant since he has not actually worked in the promotional post of Naib Subedar during the aforesaid period. It was submitted that the benefit of pay and allowances was rightly awarded w.e.f. 13-11-2000, the date on which the appellant

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actually assumed the rank of Naib Subedar but his seniority was maintained so as to protect his interest in his further promotions.

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We are conscious that even in the absence of statutory provision, normal rule is “no work no pay”. In appropriate cases, a court of law may take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The principle of “no work no pay” would not be attracted where the respondents were in fault in not considering the case of the appellant for promotion and not allowing the appellant to work on a post of Naib Subedar carrying higher pay scale. In the facts of the present case when the appellant was granted promotion w.e.f. 01.01.2000 with the ante-dated seniority from 01.08.1997 and maintaining his seniority along with his batchmates, it would be unjust to deny him higher pay and allowances in the promotional position of Naib Subedar.”

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7(vi-d). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gowramma

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C. (Dead) by Legal Representatives versus Manager

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(Personnel), Hindustan Aeronautical Limited and

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another, (2022) 11 SCC 794, has mandated that

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where an employee was kept out of work and

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was denied the right to work on promotional post

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at relevant time then, upon retrospective promotion,

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such an employee cannot be denied the fruits

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due to him and therefore in such an eventuality, all monetary benefits flowing from retrospective promotion, have to be released to said employee, in the following terms:-

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“13. The most important question is whether the employee is at fault in any manner. If the employee is not at all at fault and she was kept out of work by reasons of the decision taken by the employer, then to deny the fruits of her being vindicated at the end of the day would be unfair to the employee. In such circumstances, no doubt, the question relating to alternative employment that the employee may have resorted to, becomes relevant. There is also the aspect of discretion which is exercised by the Court keeping in view the facts of each case. As we have already noticed, this is a case where apart from the charge of the employee having produced false caste certificate, there is no other charge. Therefore, we would think that interests of justice, in the facts of this, would be subserved, if we enhance the back wages from 50% to 75% of the full back wages, which she was otherwise entitled. The appeals are partly allowed. The impugned judgments will stand modified and the respondents shall calculate the amount which would be equivalent to 75% of the back wages and disburse the amount remaining to be paid under this judgment within a period of six weeks from today to the additional appellants.”

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7(vi-e). In Civil Writ Petition No. 3185 of 2022 , titled as Dina Nath & others versus State of Himachal Pradesh & Others, decided on 15.05.2023, the Division Bench of this Court has directed release of all consequential benefits, including monetary benefits from the date the promotion was due but was denied and was subsequently granted to an employee, in the following

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terms:-

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“4. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that being senior to respondent No.6, petitioner No.1. Dina Nath. was to be promoted on the date of which Roshan Lal, respondent No.6, was promoted vide order dated 31.03.2022 (Annexure P-4) and further, as now, claim of the petitioners has been found legal, just, valid and genuine and in place of respondent No.6, petitioner No.1 Dina Nath has been promoted, petitioner Dina Nath is also entitled for promotion with retrospective effect from the date from which his junior respondent No.6, Roshan Lal, was promoted.

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In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of Considered view that claim of the petitioner is genuine and valid and accordingly we direct to extend the benefits of promotion to petitioner Dina Nath with retrospective effect i.e. 31.03. 2022 alongwith all consequential benefits including monetary benefits from 31.03. 2022,

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the date from which his junior respondent No.6, Roshan Lal, was promoted in his place. Needful be done on or before 30.06.2023.”

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7(vi-f) . In CWP No.1319 of 2023 titled as

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Rakesh Kaplex versus State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. , decided on 03.08.2023, a Coordinate Bench of this Court, after relying upon the judgment in case of Ramesh Kumar [supra], has directed to release actual monetary benefits after granting of retrospective promotions, when, such an employee,

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cannot be made to suffer for no fault attributable to him in denying promotion from due date and in these circumstances, the condition of “Notional Benefits” was set aside, in the following terms:-

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“5(ii) In the facts of the case , admittedly the petitioner was not at fault for having not been promoted at the relevant time alongwith his juniors. Fault, if any, lay with the respondents. The pleaded stand of the respondents was that the petitioner was promoted vide order dated 06.03.2021, however, he failed to join under this order. But the fact is that the respondents have not been able to establish that the aforesaid promotion order dated 06.03.2021 was ever served upon the petitioner. The petitioner was due for promotion in the year 2020 and his case was accordingly considered by the DPC that was convened in December, 2020

¶152

[ 2025:HHC:35176 ]28

¶153

along with other incumbents. want of his ACRs, petitioner was left out at that time. All throughout petitioner has been representing to the respondents for his promotion to the post of TGT from due date. Had he been aware of his promotion to the post of TGT under order dated 06.03.2021 as is contended by the respondents, there would have been no occasion for him to continue to represent to the respondents or to file this writ petition his promotion as TGT. The order dated 06.03.2021, if issued, remained in office files of the respondents. It was never brought to the knowledge of petitioner. It never saw light of the day. This aspect stands duly established in view of various orders passed in this petition from time to time. It is for this reason that the respondents have now issued a fresh order dated 22.07.2023 promoting the as TGT retrospectively from 06.03.2021. Under the circumstances, petitioner is entitled for actual benefits of his retrospective promotion from 6.03.2021

¶154

and not notional . For the fault of the respondents, he cannot be made to suffer.

¶155

The petitioner in the given facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be denied financial benefits. Had been promoted by the respondents in accordance with law at the relevant time; had he been issued promotion order at the relevant time he would have served as TGT (N.M). Employer / respondent cannot be allowed to take advantage of its wrong and the employee/ petitioner cannot be made to suffer for the fault of the respondents/employer. Accordingly, this

¶156

[ 2025:HHC:35176 ]29

¶157

writ petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to release all due and admissible benefits on actual basis to the petitioner on account of his retrospective promotion to the post of TGT (N.M.) from 06.03.2021. This exercise be carried out by the respondents within four weeks from today.”

¶158

7(vi-g). In CWP No 3276 of 2023 titled as Sanjay Kumar Versus State of Himachal Pradesh

¶159

and Ors., decided on 31.10.2023, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has negativated that the plea of “no work no pay”, when, an employee who was eligible was deprived of consideration/promotion without any fault, then, upon grant of retrospective promotion, the action of denying all monetary benefits was deprecated, in the following terms:-

¶160

“3. The case as set-up by the petitioner is that he has been denied the promotion to the post of Lecturer from due date i.e. 04.10.2017, when his junior were promoted.

¶161

In its short reply, respondent No. 2 has stated that vide order dated 11.08.2023 i.e. after the filing of this petition, petitioner has been promoted as Lecturer (History) w.e.f. 04.10.2017, on notional basis. The claim of the petitioner for monetary benefits has been denied on the principle of ‘No work No pay’.

¶162

In view of the stand taken by the official respondents, only the question

¶163

[ 2025:HHC:35176 ]30

¶164

that survives for determination is with respect to the entitlement of petitioner to the monetary benefits of the post of Lecturer w.e.f. 04.10.2017.

¶165

Keeping in view the aforesaid exposition, petitioner cannot be denied the monetary benefits as available to the post of Lecturer (History) w.e.f 04.10.2017, as no fault has either been alleged or proved against the petitioner. The official respondents have further not been able to justify the delay in correction of the seniority position and consequential promotion to the post from due date.”

¶166

7(vi-h). This Court has set-aside the condition of

¶167

notional benefits upon grant of notional promotion as Superintendent Grade II in CWPOA No. 6977 of 2020 titled as Birbal versus State of Himachal

¶168

Pradesh and others, decided on 14.11.2024, in the following terms:

¶169

14(i). Even the condition of notional benefits in promotion orders dated 8.3.2019 [Annexure R-5] and in denial of actual monetary benefits as Supdt Gr-II for the period from 30.4.2011 till 2.10.2011 is illegal and arbitrary. Permitting this condition to operate shall amount to giving leverage to the State Authorities for their inactions. Such condition tantamounts to validating the illegality or omission committed by Respondents, by denying fundamental right of consideration for promotion as Supdt Gr-II against reserved post from April, 2011 {given on 3.10.2011] and

¶170

[ 2025:HHC:35176 ]31

¶171

after his retirement on 31.03.2014 the respondents convened a review DPC meeting on 22.08.2014, and after lapse of about 5 years, the retrospective promotion orders as Supdt Gr-II were issued on 08.03.2019 w.e.f. 30.4.2011 [Annexure R-5]. In this backdrop, once the petitioner was ready and willing to work but was denied/deprived of the right to work and to earn salary /pay and allowances which constitute “legal entitlement attached to the post” and that being so, it turns out to be the property of the petitioner under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Deprivation of such legal entitlement, “salary” merely by imposing a condition in the promotion orders dated 8.3.2019 without any authority of law is impermissible. Plea of “no work no pay” raised by the Learned state Counsel is neither attracted nor applicable in fact-situation of this case. Moreover, deprivation of monetary benefits is contrary to the mandate of law declared by the Honble Supreme Court in K V L Narsimha Rao, E K Bhaskaran Pillai, Ramesh Kumar Sharma, Gowramma C and the judgments of this Court as referred to above. Besides this, deprivation results in civil consequences by giving a complete go by to minimum requirements of fairness and reasonableness. Thus, the condition of notional benefits in the promotion orders dated 8.3.2019 [Annexure R-5], denying actual monetary benefits to the petitioner as Supdt Gr-II from 30.4.2011 to 2.10.2011, is declared inoperative, arbitrary and unconstitutional.

¶172

7(vi-i). While dealing with a similar fact-situation,

¶173

the condition of notional promotion, resulting in

¶174

[ 2025:HHC:35176 ]32

¶175

denying the actual monetary benefits was setaside by this Court in CWPOA 3530 of 2020, titled as Vikas versus State of Himachal Pradesh, decided on 12.09.2025.

¶176

Based on the above narration of facts

¶177

and the mandate of law, the action of the State Authorities in inserting the condition of notional promotion in orders dated 18.05.2016 [Annexure A-22], resulting in denying actual monetary benefits

¶178

to the petitioner, after grant of retrospective promotion as Daftri [Class-IV] w.e.f. 04.03.2014 to 18.05.2016 does not stand the test of judicial scrutiny and aforesaid adversarial condition is declared inoperative /inapplicable, qua the petitioner, for all intents and purposes.

¶179

DIRECTIONS:

¶180

8. In view of above discussion and for the

¶181

reasons recorded hereinabove, the instant petition, is allowed, in following terms :-

¶182

(i) Impugned Orders dated 18.05.2016 [Annexure A-22], inserting the condition of notional benefits on promotion as Daftri [Class-IV] w.e.f. 04.03.2014 is quashed and set-aside;

¶183

[ 2025:HHC:35176 ]33

¶184

(ii) State Authorities are directed to issue fresh orders in terms of the judgement in the case of K V Jankiraman (supra) and Fundamental Rule 54-B (ii) (iii) and (vi) , if so desired ;

¶185

(iii). In case, no fresh orders are passed as in direction No (ii) supra on or before 15.11.2025 as in case of Kishore Lal (supra); the State Authorities shall release all actual monetary benefits to the petitioner as Daftri (Class-IV) for period of retrospective promotion from 04.03.2014 to 18.05.2016 [Annexure A-22] on or before 31.12.2025;

¶186

(iv) Failure to release the actual monetary benefits before 31.12.2025 shall entitle the petitioner for interest @ 6% per annum on benefits as aforesaid; (v). Costs made easy for respective parties.

¶187

In aforesaid terms, the instant petition

¶188

and all pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of accordingly.

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(Ranjan Sharma) Judge

¶190

October 13, 2025 [tm/Bhardwaj]

Man Singh v. State of Hp

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Man Singh v. State of Hp

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