Virender Singh Vs the UOI and Others

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2025:HHC:41620

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA

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CWP No.17766 of 2025

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Decided on: 01st December , 2025

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__________________________________________________ Virender Singh ....Petitioner

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Versus

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Union of India and others ...Respondents __________________________________________________ Coram_ Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge Whether approved for reporting?¹ For the petitioner: Mr. Imran Khan, Advocate. For the respondents: Ms. Sheetal Vyas, Central Government Standing Counsel, for respondent No.1UOI. Ms. Archna Dutt, Advocate, for respondents No.2 to 4.

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G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice (Oral)

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The consideration is sought against the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal dated 11.11.2025 (Annexure P-11) wherein interim relief has not been granted against the order passed on 13.08.2025, whereby the services of the petitioner were prematurely repatriated to his parent department namely Director General, Technical Education Department, Haryana, Panchkula.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently submitted that it is a punitive action without jurisdiction and the

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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2

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Tribunal should have granted the relief, but it has kept the matter pending for consideration for 13.01.2026 for completion of pleadings. It is thus submitted that irreparable loss and injury would be caused to the petitioner, if the order repatriating him dated 13.08.2025 is allowed to come into force, since it was treated as mandated three months’ notice. It is thus submitted that during the pendency of the Original Application before the Tribunal, he should be allowed to continue.

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It is not disputed that the petitioner was deputed vide order dated 28.08.2024 (Annexure P-1) to the post of Director in Khadi & Village Industries Commission under the Ministry of Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises in the relevant pay matrix for a initial period of three years.

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As per Clauses 5 & 8 of the appointment order, the right was also there to repatriate at any point of time before the completion of tenure of 3 years, however, with the condition that it would not be before completion of one year of service. Clauses 5 and 8 of the said order reads as under:-

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“5. Their performance in the post of Director will be reviewed and this office reserves the right to repatriate them to their department at any point of time before the completion of tenure of 3 years.

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8. The officer will have to give advance notice of 3 months if they desire for repatriation to their parent department. No repatriation or forwarding of application shall be considered before completion of one year service.”

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It is thus apparent that vide the impugned order, the petitioner has been given the necessary three months notice since the order was passed on 13.08.2025 and it would come into force on 12.11.2025.

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In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion, keeping in view the principles that govern a deputationist and the fact that the office where he was deputed is not willing to keep him, we do not find any plausible reason as such to force the employer as such to retain an employee whom he does not wish to keep, for reasons only which the employer can feel. The present petitioner can thus have no vested right to continue with the respondents. We are otherwise of the considered opinion that no irreparable loss and injury would be caused since he is only being repatriated back to his parent department. The order itself repatriating him does not show that there is any reference to any stigmatic behaviour as such, which anyways would be an issue to be considered on merits when pleadings are complete before the learned Tribunal.

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Keeping in view the fact that there is a tripartite agreement, reference can be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Punjab vs. Inder Singh and others, 1997 8 SCC 372 and the judgment of Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana

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4

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High Court in Gurinder Pal Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and others, 2005 1 SLR 629, that the borrowing department cannot be forced to keep an employee. The relevant portion of the judgment in Gurinder Pal’s case reads as under:-

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“12. In service jurisprudence, “deputation” is described as an assignment of an employee of one department or cadre to another department or cadre. The necessity for sending on deputation arises in “public interest” to meet the exigencies of “public service”. The concept of deputation is based upon consent and voluntary decision of the employer to lend the services of his employee, corresponding acceptance of such service by the borrowing employer and the consent of the employee to go on deputation. A deputation subsists so long as the parties to this tripartite arrangement do not abrogate it. However, if any one of the parties repudiate the agreement, the other two have no legally enforceable right to insist upon continuance of the deputation. Even in the cases where deputationists continue for a pretty long period and options for their “absorption” in the borrowing department were taken, yet their repatriation to the parent department was upheld by the Apex Court in Rattilal B. Soni v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1990 SC 1132 : [1991 (3) SLR 77 (SC)] after holding that “the appellants being on deputation, they could be repatriated to their parent cadre at any time and they do not get any right to be absorbed on the deputation post.”

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“Deputation” per se being a contractually made ad hoc arrangement, seldom confers any right upon a deputationist, either for completion

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of the term of deputation or regularisation of such top-gap arrangement. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the College in this regard squarely answer the controversy.”

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In such circumstances, we are of the considered

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opinion that the order passed by the Tribunal is not liable to be interfered with, since it has exercised its discretion in accordance with law, keeping in view the rights of both the parties. Even otherwise, the present writ petition is directed against the interim order and therefore, we do not find any plausible reason to interfere with the same. Needless to say, any observation made herein are only for the purpose of the decision of the present writ petition.

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Resultantly, the present writ petition is dismissed. All pending applications stand disposed of accordingly.

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( G.S. Sandhawalia ) Chief Justice

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01st December , 2025 ( Jiya Lal Bhardwaj ) (ankit) Judge

Virender Singh v. the UOI and Others

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Virender Singh v. the UOI and Others

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