Dismissed¶112

Ranvir Singh @ Sanju v. State of Hp

Himachal Pradesh HC18 Nov 2025CRMPM/2454/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Regular bail dismissed; rape of minor victim; FIR 98/2024 PS Baijnath Kangra; BNS 2023 ss. 64, 65(1), 78, 332(c), 352, 351(2), 351(3), 126(2); POCSO ss. 4, 12; absconder secured via NBW 17.10.2024 and proclamation, arrested 24.03.2025; photograph-identification discrepancy rejected as bail ground; no trial delay (eight witnesses in about six months, order sheets not filed); bail parameters per Pinki (2025) 7 SCC 314; bail-not-jail per Balchand (1977) 4 SCC 308; Himachal Pradesh High Court; Justice Rakesh Kainthla; 18.11.2025.

What did the court decide?

The victim's specific allegation that the petitioner raped her in January 2024 has to be prima facie accepted as correct; the victim being a minor, the allegations against the petitioner are heinous and do not justify the grant of bail. ¶72

Ranvir Singh @ Sanju Vs State of Hp — Child Sexual Offences (POCSO) | Himachal Pradesh HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

¶112

Issue for consideration

Whether the petitioner is entitled to regular bail where the victim has made a specific allegation that he raped her in January 2024 and the victim is a minor, making the allegations heinous. +3 more

¶72

Court's answer

¶72

Ratio / Principle

The petitioner had earlier absconded and could be apprehended only after open non-bailable warrants and a proclamation were issued; his previous conduct shows that his appearance cannot be secured during the trial with reasonable certainty if he is released on bail, and he is therefore not entitled to bail on this consideration.

¶73

Key takeaways

The submission that the victim was unable to identify the petitioner by the photograph shown during her examination does not help the petitioner; a discrepancy in the victim's statement does not entitle the petitioner to bail, the Court exercising bail jurisdiction not appreciating contradictions in trial evidence.ratio¶93
Recording the statements of eight witnesses within about six months of the petitioner's arrest does not show any delay in the progress of the trial; moreover, the petitioner did not file the order sheets to demonstrate delay, so the plea that delay in the trial entitles him to bail cannot be accepted.ratio¶110
In view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Ranvir Singh @ Sanju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, Cr. MPM No. 2454 of 2025 (High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla; Rakesh Kainthla, J.; decision dated 18.11.2025) — Regular bail declined. Petition sought bail in F.I.R. No. 98 of 2024, dated 08.09.2024, Police Station Baijnath, District Kangra, under Sections 64, 65(1), 78, 332 (c), 352, 351(2), 351(3) and 126(2) BNS 2023 and Sections 4 and 12 POCSO Act 2012, alleging rape of a minor victim in January 2024 preceded by stalking and criminal intimidation. Held: (i) the victim's specific allegation is prima facie accepted; the allegations being heinous, they do not justify bail; (ii) the petitioner had absconded and could be secured only through open non-bailable warrants (17.10.2024) and a proclamation, so his appearance during trial cannot be secured with reasonable certainty (following Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re and Sanjay Chandra v. CBI on the object of bail); (iii) the victim's inability to identify the petitioner by photograph is not a ground for bail after commencement of trial (X v. State of Rajasthan; Suraj Singh v. State of H.P.); (iv) recording of eight witnesses within about six months of arrest shows no trial delay, and order sheets proving delay were not filed. Petition dismissed; observations confined to disposal of the petition without bearing on merits.

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2025:HHC:38828

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. MPM No. 2454 of 2025 Reserved on: 13.11.2025 Date of Decision 18.11.2025

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Ranvir Singh @ Sanju .... Petitioner

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Versus

¶6

State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No. For the Petitioner : Mr Vijender Katoch, Advocate. For the Respondent: Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional State Advocate General.

¶7

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

¶8

The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 98 of 2024, dated 08.09.2024, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 64, 65(1), 78, 332 (c), 352, 351(2), 351(3) and 126(2) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and Sections 4 and 12 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO), 2012, registered at Police Station Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P.

¶9

_________________________ 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the petitioner had been stalking the victim. He criminally intimidated her by threatening to abduct her. He raped her in January 2024. These allegations are false, and the petitioner has nothing to do with the commission of crime. The investigation is complete. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The matter is listed for prosecution’s evidence. The Trial has not concluded within one year as required under the POCSO Act. The petitioner is a permanent resident of District Kangra, H.P. and there is no chance of his absconding. No fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. He would abide by all the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

¶13

3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the informant made a complaint to the police, stating that the petitioner was harassing the victim. The petitioner stopped the victim on the way to her school on 06.09.2024 and threatened to abduct and kill her. The petitioner visited the victim’s house on 07.09.2024 and threatened the victim. The police registered the F.I.R. and investigated the

¶14

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matter. The police recorded the statement of the victim on 09.09.2024, and she disclosed that the petitioner had raped her. The petitioner had absconded, and open non-bailable warrants of arrest were obtained from the Court on 17.10.2024 for his arrest. A proclamation was issued by the Court returnable for 03.04.2025. The police arrested the petitioner on 24.03.2025 and filed the charge sheet. Statements of eight witnesses have been recorded. The matter was listed for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses on 16.10.2025. Hence, the status report.

¶17

4. I have heard Mr Vijender Katoch, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

¶18

5. Mr Vijender Katoch, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. He would abide by all the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate

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General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner

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is involved in the commission of a heinous offence. He had absconded and was apprehended after much efforts. He would again abscond in case of his release on bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

¶24

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

¶25

The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC

¶26

314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: -

¶27

( i ) Broad principles for the grant of bail

¶28

56. In GudikantiNarasimhuluv.High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 , Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)

¶29

“ 7 . It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

¶30

8 . Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being . [ Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”

¶31

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2025:HHC:38828

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(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

¶34

9 . Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance .” (emphasis supplied)

¶35

57. In Prahlad Singh Bhativ.State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674 , this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

¶36

“ 8 . The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words <reasonable grounds for believing= instead of <the evidence= which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a

¶37

¶38

2025:HHC:38828

¶39

genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge .” (emphasis supplied)

¶40

58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688 , speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

¶41

“ 3 . Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter .” (emphasis supplied)

¶42

59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkarv.Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977 , this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

¶43

60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkarv.Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765 , this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application

¶44

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¶46

of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

¶47

“ 9 . … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are :

¶48

( i ) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence ;

¶49

( ii ) nature and gravity of the accusation ;

¶50

( iii ) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction ;

¶51

( iv ) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail ;

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( v ) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused ;

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( vi ) likelihood of the offence being repeated ;

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( vii ) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

¶55

( viii ) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail .” (emphasis supplied)

¶56

xxxxxxx

¶57

62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Deviv. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170 , wherein a three-Judge Bench of

¶58

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2025:HHC:38828

¶60

this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order ( Pappu Kumarv. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singhv. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857 ) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: ( Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170] ), SCC p. 511, para 35)

¶61

“ 35 . While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused .” (emphasis supplied)

¶62

Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.

¶63

Balchand , (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC

¶64

261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the circumstances suggest fleeing from justice. It was observed at

¶65

page 308:

¶66

2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences

¶67

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or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.

¶70

3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….” 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the

¶71

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

¶72

The status report mentions that the victim made a specific allegation against the petitioner that he had raped her in January 2024. This statement has to be prima facie accepted as correct. The victim is a minor; therefore, the allegations against the petitioner are heinous and do not justify the grant of bail.

¶73

The status report further shows that the petitioner had absconded. He could not be apprehended, and open nonbailable warrants of arrest had to be issued to secure his presence. He could not be apprehended, and the Court had to issue a written proclamation requiring his presence before the Court. Thus, the previous conduct of the petitioner shows that his appearance cannot be secured during the trial with reasonable certainty in case of his release on bail. It was held by Hon’ble Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Nagendra

¶74

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Nath Chakravarti, In re, 1923 SCC OnLine Cal 318: 1924 Cri LJ 732: AIR 1924 Cal 476 that the primary purpose of granting bail is to secure the presence of the accused during the trial. It was observed:

¶77

“It is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld merely as a punishment. The requirements as to bail are to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial: R. v. Rose [(1898) 18 Cox. 717 . The proper test to be applied in the solution of the question, whether bail should be granted or refused, is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his, trial: Re Robinson [(1854) 23 L.J.Q.B. 286: 2 W.R. 424.], R. v. Scaife [(1841) 9 Dowling P.C. 553: 5 Jurist 700.] . The test is applied by reference to the following considerations:

¶78

( a ) The nature of the accusation: R. v. Barronet [(1852) 1 E. & B. 1: Dearsley 51.], R. v. Butler [(1861) 14 Cox. 530: 8 L.R. (Ir.) 39.] ;

¶79

( b ) The nature of the evidence in support of the accusation: Re Robinson [(1854) 23 L.J.Q.B. 286: 2 W.R. 424.], R. v. Butler [(1861) 14 Cox. 530 : 8 L.R. (Ir.) 39.] , R. v. McCormick; [(1864) 17 Ir. C.L.R. 411.]

¶80

( c ) The severity of the punishment which conviction will entail: Re Robinson [(1854) 23 L.J.Q.B. 286: 2 W.R. 424.] , and this explains the reluctance of Courts to grant bail on charges of murder: Re Barthelemy [(1852) 1 B. & B. 8: Dearsley 60.], R. v. Andrews [(1844) 2 D. & L. 10: 13 L.J.M.C. 113.] . In this connection, we may recall that in England, bail in treason or felony is discretionary in the High Court or Courts having jurisdiction to try the offence: R. v. McCartie [(1859) 11 Ir. C.L.R. 188, 192.] , R. v. Platt [(1777) 1 Leach 157.] ; on the other hand, bail in misdemeanour is said to be of right at Common Law: R. v. Spilsbury [[1898] 2 Q.B. 615.]; R. v. Badger [(1843) 4 Q.B. 468, 472: D. & M. 375: 4 St. T.N.S. 1387.];

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¶83

Re Frost [(1888) 4 T.L.R. 757.]; see also R. v. Crowe [(1829) 4 C. & P. 251.]; R. v. Beardmore [(1836) 7 C. & P. 497.] ; R. v. Osborn [(1837) 7 C. & P. 799.] King v. Fortier [(1902) 13 Quebec K.B. 251: 9 Canada Cr. Cas. 191: 1 Ann. Cas. 10.] . This distinction is reflected in sections 496 and 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which respectively treat of the grant of bail in cases of what are described in the phraseology of the Indian Legislature as bailable and non-bailable offences.”

¶84

A similar view was taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri)

¶85

26: (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 397: 2011 SCC OnLine SC 1502, wherein it

¶86

was observed at page 52:

¶87

“21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by a reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.”

¶88

In the present case, the conduct of the petitioner shows that his appearance cannot be secured; therefore, he is

¶89

not entitled to bail on this consideration as well.

¶90

It was submitted that the victim was unable to identify the petitioner by the photograph shown to her during

¶91

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2025:HHC:38828

¶93

her examination; therefore, there is no material against him. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in X Vs. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/1267/2024 that ordinarily, the Trial Court or the High Court should not entertain the bail application of the accused in serious offences after the commencement of the trial and grant bail because of some discrepancy in the testimony. It was

¶94

observed: -

¶95

“14. Ordinarily, in serious offences like rape, murder, dacoity, etc., once the trial commences and the prosecution starts examining its witnesses, the Court, be it the Trial Court or the High Court, should be loath in entertaining the bail application of the Accused.

¶96

Over a period of time, we have noticed two things, i.e., (i) either bail is granted after the charge is framed and just before the victim is to be examined by the prosecution before the trial court, or (ii) bail is granted once the recording of the oral evidence of the victim is complete by looking into some discrepancies here or there in the deposition and thereby testing the credibility of the victim.

¶97

We are of the view that the aforesaid is not a correct practice that the Courts below should adopt. Once the trial commences, it should be allowed to reach its conclusion, which may either result in the conviction of the Accused or the acquittal of the Accused. The moment the High Court exercises its discretion in favour of the Accused and orders the release of the Accused on bail by looking into the deposition of the victim, it will have its own impact on the pending trial when it comes to appreciating the oral evidence of the victim. It is only if the trial gets unduly

¶98

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¶100

delayed and that, too, for no fault on the part of the Accused, the Court may be justified in ordering his release on bail on the ground that the right of the Accused to have a speedy trial has been infringed.”

¶101

Similarly, it was held by this Court in Suraj Singh v.

¶102

State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 268 that the Court exercises

¶103

bail jurisdiction cannot appreciate the contradictions in the evidence. It was observed:

¶104

10. Petitioner has placed reliance on the statements of witnesses already recorded by the learned Special Judge, in support of his argument to the effect that, from perusal of these statements, reasonable grounds can be entertained for concluding prima facie innocence of the petitioner. The arguments raised on behalf of the petitioner deserve to be rejected for the reason that this Court, while dealing with the bail application, will not appreciate the evidence being recorded during the trial. Undisputedly, only some of the witnesses out of the entire list of witnesses relied upon by the prosecution have been examined. In these circumstances, it is not prudent to form any opinion as to the innocence or guilt of the petitioner on the basis of such partial evidence.

¶105

Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to

¶106

bail because of the discrepancy in the victim’s statement.

¶107

It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of the trial. The petitioner is entitled to bail on this consideration. This submission cannot be accepted. The status report shows that the petitioner was apprehended on

¶108

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2025:HHC:38828

¶110

24.03.2025, and the charge-sheet was filed before the Court on 14.05.2025. The statements of eight witnesses have been recorded. Recording of the statements of eight witnesses within six months does not show any delay in the progress of the trial. Moreover, the petitioner has not filed the order sheets to demonstrate the delay in the progress of the trial. Hence, the plea of the petitioner that there is a delay in the progress of the trial and he is entitled to bail on this consideration cannot be accepted.

¶111

19. No other point was urged.

¶112

In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.

¶113

The observations made hereinabove are regarding

¶114

the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits.

¶115

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

¶116

18^th November 2025. (ravinder)

Issues for consideration

4 issues framed by the court

AI extract

1.
Whether the petitioner is entitled to regular bail where the victim has made a specific allegation that he raped her in January 2024 and the victim is a minor, making the allegations heinous.¶72
The court held
The victim's specific allegation that the petitioner raped her in January 2024 has to be prima facie accepted as correct; the victim being a minor, the allegations against the petitioner are heinous and do not justify the grant of bail.ratio¶72
2.
Whether the petitioner's previous conduct of absconding, necessitating open non-bailable warrants and a proclamation, shows that his appearance during the trial cannot be secured and disentitles him to bail.¶73
The court held
The petitioner had earlier absconded and could be apprehended only after open non-bailable warrants and a proclamation were issued; his previous conduct shows that his appearance cannot be secured during the trial with reasonable certainty if he is released on bail, and he is therefore not entitled to bail on this consideration.ratio¶73
3.
Whether the discrepancy in the victim's statement, namely her inability to identify the petitioner by the photograph shown during her examination, entitles the petitioner to bail.¶93
The court held
The submission that the victim was unable to identify the petitioner by the photograph shown during her examination does not help the petitioner; a discrepancy in the victim's statement does not entitle the petitioner to bail, the Court exercising bail jurisdiction not appreciating contradictions in trial evidence.ratio¶93
4.
Whether the alleged delay in the progress of the trial entitles the petitioner to bail.¶107
The court held
Recording the statements of eight witnesses within about six months of the petitioner's arrest does not show any delay in the progress of the trial; moreover, the petitioner did not file the order sheets to demonstrate delay, so the plea that delay in the trial entitles him to bail cannot be accepted.ratio¶110

Ranvir Singh @ Sanju v. State of Hp

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Ranvir Singh @ Sanju v. State of Hp

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

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