Naresh Tomar Alias Bunty Vs State of Hp

The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 54 of 2025, dated 30.06.2025 registered at Police Station, Rajgarh, District Sirmour for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 326(g), 109, 115(2) and 238 (b) read with Section 3 (5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Section 3 of Public Property (Prevention of Damage) Act, 1985 ( PDP Act).

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1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?Yes

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It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the victim was staying at Forest Rest House, Thandidhar, District Sirmour. She heard the dog barking on 03.06.2025 at about 12:30 A.M. She noticed the smell of petrol. The rest house was engulfed in fire after about five minutes. She escaped along with her brother. The fire could not be contained, and the forest rest house was completely gutted by it. The matter was reported to the police. The police registered the FIR, arrested the petitioner and investigated the matter. The petitioner is innocent, and he was falsely implicated. The investigation is complete, and no recovery is to be made from the petitioner. The petitioner is ready and willing to abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, the petition.

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The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the victim was posted as 'Vanmitra' in the forest department. The beat guard directed her to carry out patrolling in Thandidhar. She could not go to her home due to heavy rain and had to stay in the rest house. She heard the dog barking at about 12:30 A.M. She woke up and came out. She released the dog, but the dog did not return. She smelled the petrol. She tried to call her neighbour. She also awakened her brother. She saw after five minutes that the fire had started. She and her brother

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came out of the rest house. Shubham also came to the spot. Sonu, a neighbour, was called to the spot, and all of them tried to extinguish the fire, however, the fire could not be contained. The matter was reported to the police. The informant saw the indicators of a vehicle. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The police seized the burnt electricity wire. The police found, after investigation, that the petitioner was involved in the commission of crime. The police arrested him. The petitioner had beaten the informant's brother before the incident. The petitioner revealed on inquiry that he, Varun, Brahmanand and Anil Kumar had gone to the spot in a vehicle bearing registration No. DL13C-3371 to steal the wood kept outside the rest house. The petitioner asked Brahmanand, the victim's brother, to help in the transportation of timber, but he declined. The petitioner got suspicious and asked Brahmanand whether he had told his sister about their plan, but he denied. The petitioner also gave beatings to Brahmanand. The petitioner burnt the rest house in anger. The police recorded the petitioner’s statement under Section 23(2) of Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) and recovered an empty plastic bottle containing some petrol. Varun was found to be a juvenile, and he was handed over to his father. The forest department

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sustained a loss of ₹40,55,000/-. The challan was prepared and presented before the Court on 22.08.2025. As per the report of analysis, the inflammable material (petrol) was detected in the parcel (Ex. P3), but no inflammable material could be detected in other articles. No evidence of an electric short circuit was found. The petitioner has been in custody since 09.07.2025. Hence, the status report.

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I have heard Mr Hemant Vaid and Mr Ayush Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State.

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Mr Hemant Vaid, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The prosecution’s story is highly improbable and suspicious. A false FIR was lodged against the petitioner because of the dispute between the petitioner and the victim's brother. The police have filed the charge sheet, and custodial interrogation of the petitioner is not required. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General,

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for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner had put the forest rest house on fire with the intent to burn the informant. The allegations against the petitioner are serious. The petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous crime. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: -

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(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail

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In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 , Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)

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“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

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Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [ Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

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Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)

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In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674 , this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

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“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the

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presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)

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This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688 , speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

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“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in the society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)

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In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977 , this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

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In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765 , this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

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“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

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(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

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(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

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(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

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(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;

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(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

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(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

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(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)

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xxxxxxx

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One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170 , wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order ( Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857 ) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: ( Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170] ), SCC p. 511, para 35)

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“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied)

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The present petition has to be decided as per the

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parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The victim had not seen anyone putting the rest house on fire. She saw the indicator of the vehicle near the place of the incident. The police recovered the plastic bottle containing some petrol at the instance of the petitioner. The police also collected the samples from the spot, and as per the analysis, no traces of petrol were found in any of the articles except the petrol recovered by the police from the petitioner. As per the prosecution, the petitioner went to steal the timber kept outside the forest rest house. If it were so, there was no necessity to set the forest rest house on fire. This would frustrate the purpose of the petitioner to carry out the theft. Therefore, prima facie, there is insufficient material to conclude that the petitioner had sprinkled the petrol and set the rest house on fire.

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The police have filed the charge-sheet, and the matter is pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, for committal proceedings. Therefore, the petitioner’s detention is not justified.

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The petitioner asserted that he is a resident of district Sirmour, and it was not stated to be incorrect in the

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status report filed by the police. It means that the petitioner has roots in society, and there is no chance of his absconding.

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Therefore, in view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following terms and conditions: -

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(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever;

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(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments;

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(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court;

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(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and

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(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change.

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