Dismissed¶73

Sita Ram v. State of Hp

Himachal Pradesh HC5 Sept 2025CRMPM/2113/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Anticipatory/pre-arrest bail dismissed; Sections 354 and 376 IPC; FIR 58/2025 dated 25.08.2025, PS Kasauli, District Solan, H.P.; custodial interrogation required; false-implication plea rejected; delay in reporting sexual exploitation explained by victim's statements to husband and mother-in-law (S. 183 BNSS); pre-arrest bail an extraordinary power to be exercised sparingly; Cr.M.P.(M) No.2113 of 2025; Justice Rakesh Kainthla; High Court of Himachal Pradesh; decided 05.09.2025.

What did the court decide?

The plea that the victim made a false complaint at the instance of interested persons cannot be prima facie accepted: the petitioner named no such person, and being closely related to the victim she would normally have sided with him rather than a stranger. ¶51

Sita Ram Vs State of Hp — Anticipatory Bail | Himachal Pradesh HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

¶73

Issue for consideration

Whether pre-arrest bail should be granted to the petitioner in F.I.R. No. 58/2025 (Sections 354 and 376 IPC, Police Station Kasauli, District Solan). +3 more

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Court's answer

The petition for pre-arrest bail fails and is dismissed; the observations made are confined to the disposal of the petition and have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.

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Ratio / Principle

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Key takeaways

The delay in reporting the matter to the police does not, prima facie, cast doubt on the victim's version, since in her statement under Section 183 BNSS she stated that she had complained to her husband and mother-in-law but was asked to remain quiet to protect the family's honour.ratio¶52
Custodial interrogation of the petitioner is necessary, and where custodial interrogation is required, pre-arrest bail should not be granted.ratio¶59

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Pre-arrest bail refused — rape/molestation FIR (Ss. 354, 376 IPC). Petitioner sought anticipatory bail in F.I.R. No. 58/2025 dated 25.08.2025 (P.S. Kasauli, District Solan, H.P.), pleading false implication at the instance of interested persons. Held: (i) the false-implication plea is not prima facie acceptable — no interested person was named and the petitioner is closely related to the victim, who would normally have sided with him; (ii) the 6-7 year delay in reporting does not prima facie cast doubt on the victim's version, she having stated under Section 183 BNSS that she had complained to her husband and mother-in-law but was asked to remain quiet to protect the family's honour; (iii) custodial interrogation of the petitioner is necessary, and pre-arrest bail should not be granted where it is required. Relying on P. Chidambaram, Srikant Upadhyay, Pratibha Manchanda, Devinder Kumar Bansal, Ms X, Anil Sharma and Mukesh Khurana, the petition was dismissed, the observations being confined to the disposal of the petition without bearing on the merits. (Rakesh Kainthla, J.)

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1 (2025:HHC:30403 )

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr.M.P.(M) No.2113 of 2025

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Reserved on: 01.09.2025 Decided on: 05.09.2025

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S…… ...…. Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh …...Respondent

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Coram

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The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

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Whether approved for reporting?^{1 No}

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For the Petitioner: Mr. P.S. Goverdhan, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Rakesh Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondent: Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioner has filed the present petition for

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seeking pre-arrest bail in F.I.R. No. 58/2025 dated 25.08.2025, registered at Police Station, Kasauli, District Solan, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 354 and 376

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of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It has been asserted that the petitioner is working as a beldar in H.P.P.W.D. He belongs to a respectable family. The victim has made a false complaint

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Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?Yes

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(2025:HHC:30403 )

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against him regarding sexual exploitation at the instance of interested persons, who are inimical to the petitioner. The petitioner is innocent, and he has nothing to do with the commission of the crime. The petitioner shall abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the victim (name being withheld to protect her identity) made a complaint to the police that the petitioner was sexually exploiting her for 5-6 years. The petitioner had molested the victim on 22.08.2025 at 1:00-1:30 P.M. She went to her parental home and narrated the incident to her mother. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. No external injury was found on the victim’s body. The investigation is continuing. The petitioner did not join the investigation. His interrogation is required. Hence, the status report.

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I have heard Mr. P.S. Goverdhan, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Rakesh Thakur, learned counsel for the

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(2025:HHC:30403 )

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petitioner and Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State.

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Mr. P.S. Goverdhan, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. A false FIR was registered by the victim against the petitioner at the instance of some interested persons. The petitioner will join the investigation as and when called upon to do so. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on pre-arrest bail.

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Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous offence and his custodial interrogation is required. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24: (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 509: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1143 that the power

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(2025:HHC:30403 )

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of pre-arrest bail is extraordinary and should be exercised

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sparingly. It was observed:

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“69. Ordinarily, an arrest is a part of the procedure of the investigation to secure not only the presence of the accused but also several other purposes. Power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is an extraordinary power, and the same has to be exercised sparingly. The privilege of pre-arrest bail should be granted only in exceptional cases. The judicial discretion conferred upon the court has to be properly exercised after application of mind as to the nature and gravity of the accusation; the possibility of the applicant fleeing justice, and other factors to decide whether it is a fit case for the grant of anticipatory bail. Grant of anticipatory bail to some extent interferes with the sphere of investigation of an offence, and hence, the court must be circumspect while exercising such power for the grant of anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule, and it has to be granted only when the court is convinced that exceptional circumstances exist to resort to that extraordinary remedy.”

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8. This position was reiterated in Srikant Upadhyay v.

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State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 282, wherein it was held:

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“25. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is extraordinary. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule, and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion of the Court, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious, as the grant of interim protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to a miscarriage of justice and may hamper the investigation to a great extent, as it may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that the Court shall not pass interim protection pending consideration of such application as the Section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest, and we say that such orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases.”

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(2025:HHC:30403 )

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It was held in Pratibha Manchanda v. State of

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Haryana, (2023) 8 SCC 181: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 785 that the Courts should balance individual rights, public interest and fair investigation while considering an application for pre-arrest bail. It was observed:

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“21. The relief of anticipatory bail is aimed at safeguarding individual rights. While it serves as a crucial tool to prevent the misuse of the power of arrest and protects innocent individuals from harassment, it also presents challenges in maintaining a delicate balance between individual rights and the interests of justice. The tightrope we must walk lies in striking a balance between safeguarding individual rights and protecting public interest. While the right to liberty and presumption of innocence are vital, the court must also consider the gravity of the offence, the impact on society, and the need for a fair and free investigation. The court's discretion in weighing these interests in the facts and circumstances of each case becomes crucial to ensure a just outcome.”

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It was held in Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab, (2025) 4 SCC 493: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 488 that prearrest bail can be granted in exceptional circumstances where the Court is of the view that the petitioner was falsely implicated in the case, and the presumption of innocence cannot be a reason to grant bail. It was observed at page 501:

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“21. The parameters for the grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence like corruption are required to be satisfied. Anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court is prima facie of the view

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(2025:HHC:30403 )

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that the applicant has been falsely implicated in the crime or the allegations are politically motivated or frivolous. So far as the case at hand is concerned, it cannot be said that any exceptional circumstances have been made out by the petitioner-accused for the grant of anticipatory bail, and there is no frivolity in the prosecution.

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In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a pronouncement in CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy [CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy, (2013) 7 SCC 452: (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 563] , wherein this Court expressed thus: (SCC p. 465, para 34)

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“34. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusation, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy itself as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.” (emphasis in original and supplied)

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The presumption of innocence, by itself, cannot be the sole consideration for the grant of anticipatory bail. The presumption of innocence is one of the considerations which the court should keep in mind while considering the plea for anticipatory bail. The salutary rule is to balance the cause of the accused and the cause of public justice. Over solicitous homage to the accused's liberty can, sometimes, defeat the cause of public justice.

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(2025:HHC:30403 )

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It is undisputed that the petitioner is related to the victim. He asserted that the victim had made a complaint against him at the instance of some interested person. However, he has not named any person who was interested in falsely implicating him and at whose instance the victim would have made a false complaint. The petitioner is closely related to the victim, and normally, she would have sided with him rather than a stranger. Hence, this plea cannot be prima facie accepted.

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It was submitted that the incident was continuing for 6-7 years, and no complaint was made by the victim, which makes it difficult to place reliance upon her testimony. This submission will not help the petitioner. The victim stated in her statement recorded under Section 183 of Bharitya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) that she had made complaints to her husband and mother-in-law, but she was asked to remain quiet to protect the family’s honour. Her husband used to accompany her to her parental home, and she could not narrate the incident to anyone. Therefore, prima facie, the victim’s version cannot be doubted because of the delay in reporting the matter to the police.

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(2025:HHC:30403 )

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

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Ms X versus State of Maharashtra and another, 2023 STPL 3386 SC, [2023(2) Crimes 66 (SC)] that pre-arrest bail cannot be granted in an offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC. It was observed:

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“22. Surprisingly, none of the aforesaid aspects have been touched upon in both the impugned orders. The nature and gravity of the alleged offence have been disregarded. So has the financial stature, position and standing of the accused vis-a-vis the appellant/prosecutrix been ignored. The High Court has granted anticipatory bail in favour of the respondent No. 2/accused in a brief order of three paragraphs, having been swayed by the 'star variations in the narration of the prosecutrix' implying thereby that what was originally recorded in the FIR, did not make out an offence of rape, as defined in Section 375 IPC, which is an erroneous assumption. Even if the first Supplementary statement of the appellant/prosecutrix recorded in the evening hours of 6th August 2022, the date on which the FIR had been registered against the respondent No.2/accused in the first half of the same day, her second Supplementary statement recorded on 6th September 2022 and the Medico-Legal Report of the doctor who had examined the appellant/prosecutrix on 8th August 2022, are kept aside for a moment, we find that there was still sufficient material in the FIR that would prima facie attract the provision of Section 376, IPC. In our opinion, these factors ought to have dissuaded the High Court from exercising its discretion in favour of respondent No.2/accused for granting him anticipatory bail.

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It has been submitted that custodial interrogation of

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the petitioner is necessary. This has to be accepted as correct. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State Versus

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(2025:HHC:30403 )

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Anil Sharma (1997) 7 SCC 187 that where custodial interrogation is required, pre-arrest bail should not be granted. It was observed: -

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“6. We find force in the submission of the CBI that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation-oriented than questioning a suspect who is well-ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438 of the Code. In a case like this, effective interrogation of a suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disintering many useful information and also materials which would have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often, interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of the person being subjected to third-degree methods need not be countenanced, for such an argument can be advanced by all accused in all criminal cases. The Court has to presume that responsible Police Officers would conduct themselves in a responsible manner and that those entrusted with the task of disinterring offences would not conduct themselves as offender”

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A similar view was taken by the Delhi High Court in

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Mukesh Khurana v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1032, wherein it was observed: -

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“13. One of the signifcant factors in determining this i question would be the need for custodial interrogation. Without a doubt, custodial interrogation is more ef f ective to question a suspect. The cocoon of protection af f orded by a bail order insulates the suspect, and he could thwart interrogation, reducing it to futile rituals. But it must also be kept in mind that while interrogation of a suspect is one of the basic and ef f ective methods of crime solving, the liberty of an individual also needs to be balanced out.”

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(2025:HHC:30403 )

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It was held in P Chidambaram (supra) that the grant

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of pre-arrest bail may hamper the investigations. It was observed:

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“83. Grant of anticipatory bail at the stage of investigation may frustrate the investigating agency in interrogating the accused and in collecting useful information, and also the materials which might have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the accused knows that he is protected by the order of the court. Grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in economic offences, would definitely hamper the effective investigation. Having regard to the materials said to have been collected by the respondent Enforcement Directorate and considering the stage of the investigation, we are of the view that it is not a fit case to grant anticipatory bail.”

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No other point was urged.

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In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. The observations made heretofore shall

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remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

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(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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05th September 2025. (yogesh)

Sita Ram v. State of Hp

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Sita Ram v. State of Hp

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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