Pooja Devi Vs State of Hp

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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:20997 )

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. MP(M) No. 856 of 2025 Reserved on : 16.06.2025

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Cr.MP(M) No. 908 of 2025 Reserved on : 25.06.2025

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Cr. MP(M) Nos. 157, 161, 162, 165 & 166 of 2025 Reserved on: 26.06.2025

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Cr.MP(M) No. 857 of 2025 Reserved on :27.06.2025

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Date of Decision: 03.07.2025

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1. Cr.MP(M) No. 856 of 2025 Raj Kumar State of Himachal Pradesh	Versus	…Petitioner ....Respondent
___________________ 2. Cr.MP(M) No. 908 of 2025 Mohinder Singh State of Himachal Pradesh	_________ Versus	____________ …Petitioner ....Respondent
___________________ 3. Cr.MP(M) No. 157 of 2025 Karam Chand State of Himachal Pradesh	_________ Versus	____________ …Petitioner ....Respondent
___________________ 4. Cr.MP(M) No. 161 of 2025 Mohan Lal	_________ Versus	____________ …Petitioner
State of Himachal Pradesh		....Respondent
___________________ 5. Cr.MP(M) No. 162 of 2025 Bag Mohammad	_________	____________ …Petitioner

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State of Himachal Pradesh	Versus ....Respondent
__________________ 6. Cr.MP(M) No. 165 of 2025 Pooja Devi	______________________ …Petitioner Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh	....Respondent
7. Cr.MP(M) No. 166 of 2025 Vijay Kumar	…Petitioner Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh	....Respondent
__________________ 8. Cr.MP(M) No. 857 of 2025 Mohinder Singh	______________________ …Petitioner Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh __________________	....Respondent ______________________
__________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kai Whether approved for reporti	______________________ nthla, Judge. ng? No
For the Petitioner(s) :	Mr. Abhishek Barowalia, Advocate in Cr.MP(M) No. 856 of 2025.
	Mr. K.B.Khajuria, Advocate, in Cr.MP(M) Nos. 908, 157, 161, 162, 165 and 166 of 2025.
	Mr. B.P. Sharma, Sr. Advocate with
	Mr. Arun Kumar, Advocate in Cr.MP(M) No. 857 of 2025.
For the Respondent– State in all the petitions. :	Mr. Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioners have filed the present petitions seeking

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pre-arrest bail in FIR No. 02 of 2025, dated 03.01.2025, registered at

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Police Station Tissa, District Chamba, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

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It has been asserted that the petitioners are apprehending their arrest in the aforesaid FIR. The petitioners are respectable citizens of the society. They have very good antecedents. They are not in a position to tamper with the evidence. They will not give any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case. They would abide by all the terms and conditions which the Court may impose; hence, the petitions.

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The petitions are opposed by filing a status report asserting that the informant, Norang, made a complaint to the police, stating that the Panchayat representative and some employees got seven works of plantations sanctioned on 26.09.2022. Another work was sanctioned on 04.10.2022. The total amount of ₹1,17,16,032/- was to be spent on these projects. Mohan Lal Pradhan, Pooja Devi-Up Pradhan, Ward Member, Secretary Mohinder Singh, Junior Engineer Raj Kumar, and Block Development Officer Manish Kumar granted the administrative approval within seven days. The administrative approval for the 8^th

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project was not granted, and the forged bills of ₹88,00,000/- were taken in advance for the purchase of apples from Vijay Bhardwaj and the transportation of the apples from Bag Mohammad. The money was transferred on 04.11.2022 and 20.11.2022 without doing any work. A complaint was made to the Chief Secretary of Himachal Pradesh. An inquiry was conducted, and the allegations in the complaint were found to be correct. Directions were issued to take action; however, only Pradhan, Gram Panchayat was suspended, but no action was taken against the other persons. The money was also not recovered. Karam Chand had also kept around 5,000 apple plants near his house, which showed that he was the master mind behind this operation. Vijay Bhardwaj sold 48,500 plants to the Gram Panchayat Sanwal, whereas he was authorised to sell only 22500 plants. He had sold the apple plants to other people. The police conducted the preliminary investigation and found that Deputy Commissioner, Chamba, had suspended Panchayat Pradhan Sanwal. The account details of Bag Mohammad were obtained, and it was found that Bag Mohammad had transferred ₹12,43,000/- to the account of Karam Chand, ₹26,95,000/-to the account of Dhanni Devi wife of Karam Chand, ₹12,15,000/- to the account of Pooja Devi daughter of Karam chand and ₹10,00,000/- to the account of Kewal

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Krishan, brother of Karam Chand ₹4,00,000/- to the account of Gias Lal brother of Karam Chand, ₹23,70,000/- to the account of Roopi Devi, mother of Karam Chand and ₹20,91,000/- to the account of Mohammad Deen-Driver. ₹87,30,000/- were transferred to Vijay Bhardwaj. ₹82,000/- was transferred to the account of Bag Mohammad. All the bills were in the handwriting of Karam Chand. Mohan Lal, Pooja Devi, Maan Singh, Sahib Singh, Durgu, Kulsama and Raj Kumar had put their signatures on the bills. Mahinder Singh also put his signature and the stamps. The Horticulture Department disclosed that 22,400 plants were fit for sale with Vijay Kumar in the year 2022-23, whereas he sold 48500 plants to Sanwal Panchayat. He had also supplied plants to Churah and other gram panchayats. The spots were inspected, and it was found that there were uneven plantations of apple plants near the Primary School, Sanwal. 310 plants were planted in the land measuring 1 bigha owned by Dhyan Singh, whereas only 22 to 32 plants can be planted in one bigha. As per the report of the Inquiry Committee, 19387 plants were planted, and most of them had dried. Bag Mohammad revealed that the bills of transportation were prepared by Karam Chand. Karam Chand obtained the money for the benefit of himself and his family members. It was claimed that 7,346/- plants were damaged due to

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heavy rain; however, no heavy rains were found in the area. The beneficiaries stated that no plants were provided to them. Raj Kumar was interrogated, and he disclosed that he had only put the signatures on the forms. He stated that his specimen signatures were obtained. Raj Kumar had benefited Karam Chand, etc., by abusing his position. An action has been recommended against him and the other accused. The investigation is continuing; therefore, it was prayed that the present petitions be dismissed.

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I have heard Mr. Abhishek Barowalia, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused-Raj Kumar, Mr. K.B. Khajuria, learned counsel for the petitioners/accused-Mohinder Singh, Karam Chand, Mohan Lal, Bag Mohammad, Pooja Devi & Vijay Kumar, Mr. B.P. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Arun Kumar learned counsel for the petitioner/accused-Mahinder Singh and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State in all the petitions.

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Mr. Abhishek Barowalia, learned counsel for the petitioner Raj Kumar, submitted that the petitioner Raj Kumar is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The police had stated in the status report dated 13.05.2025 that no recovery or interrogation is to

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be made from Raj Kumar. The petitioner is a government servant, and he would cooperate with the investigation; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and that the petitioner be released on bail.

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Mr. K.B. Khajuria, learned counsel for the petitioners/accused-Mohinder Singh, Karam Chand, Mohan Lal, Bag Mohammad, Pooja Devi & Vijay Kumar submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. They cooperated with the investigation. Their custodial interrogation is not required. The prosecution’s case is based on the documents, and the petitioners cannot tamper with them. No recovery is to be effected from the petitioners. They would abide by all the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. FIRs shown to have been registered against the petitioner Karam Chand have been decided, and the pendency of the FIRs is no ground to deny bail; hence, he prayed that the present petitions be allowed and the petitioners be released on bail.

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Mr. B.P Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/accused-Mahinder Singh submitted that the petitioner Mahinder Singh is only a Secretary to the Gram Panchayat. He is

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bound to enter all the documents marked to him. He has not committed any offence and he was falsely implicated, therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on pre-arrest bail.

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Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioners had conspired to defraud the Government of a huge amount. The transfer made by Bag Mohammad to Karam Chand shows that Karam Chand was the ultimate beneficiary. No plantation was made. Fake certificates were given, and these were wrongly verified by the public officials. The money could not have been withdrawn without the certificate of the petitioner, Raj Kumar, and Raj Kumar actively participated in the fraud. The custodial interrogation of the petitioners is necessary. The investigation is continuing, and releasing the petitioners will affect the investigation; therefore, he prayed that the present petitions be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records of the case carefully.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24: (2019) 3

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SCC (Cri) 509: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1143 that the power of pre-arrest bail is extraordinary and should be exercised sparingly. It was observed:

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“69. Ordinarily, arrest is a part of the procedure of the investigation to secure not only the presence of the accused but also several other purposes. Power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is an extraordinary power, and the same has to be exercised sparingly. The privilege of pre-arrest bail should be granted only in exceptional cases. The judicial discretion conferred upon the court has to be properly exercised after application of mind as to the nature and gravity of the accusation; the possibility of the applicant fleeing justice and other factors to decide whether it is a fit case for the grant of anticipatory bail. Grant of anticipatory bail to some extent interferes in the sphere of investigation of an offence, and hence, the court must be circumspect while exercising such power for the grant of anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule, and it has to be granted only when the court is convinced that exceptional circumstances exist to resort to that extraordinary remedy.”

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This position was reiterated in Srikant Upadhyay v. State

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of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 282, wherein it was held:

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“25. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is extraordinary. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule, and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion of the Court, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the Court concerned

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has to be very cautious as the grant of interim protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to a miscarriage of justice and may hamper the investigation to a great extent as it may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that the Court shall not pass interim protection pending consideration of such application as the Section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest, and we say that such orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases.”

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It was held in Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana,

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(2023) 8 SCC 181: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 785 that the Courts should balance individual rights, public interest and fair investigation while considering an application for pre-arrest bail. It was observed:

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“21. The relief of anticipatory bail is aimed at safeguarding individual rights. While it serves as a crucial tool to prevent the misuse of the power of arrest and protects innocent individuals from harassment, it also presents challenges in maintaining a delicate balance between individual rights and the interests of justice. The tightrope we must walk lies in striking a balance between safeguarding individual rights and protecting public interest. While the right to liberty and presumption of innocence are vital, the court must also consider the gravity of the offence, the impact on society, and the need for a fair and free investigation. The court's discretion in weighing these interests in the facts and circumstances of each case becomes crucial to ensure a just outcome.”

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It was held in Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab ,

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(2025) 4 SCC 493: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 488 that pre-arrest bail can be

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granted in exceptional circumstances where the Court is of the view

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that the petitioner was falsely implicated in the case, and the presumption of innocence cannot be a reason to grant bail. It was observed at page 501:

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“21. The parameters for the grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence like corruption are required to be satisfied. Anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court is prima facie of the view that the applicant has been falsely enroped in the crime or the allegations are politically motivated or are frivolous. So far as the case at hand is concerned, it cannot be said that any exceptional circumstances have been made out by the petitioner-accused for the grant of anticipatory bail, and there is no frivolity in the prosecution.

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22. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a pronouncement in CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy [CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy, (2013) 7 SCC 452: (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 563] , wherein this Court expressed thus: (SCC p. 465, para 34)

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“ 34 . While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusation, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy itself as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt .” (emphasis in original and supplied)

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23. The presumption of innocence, by itself, cannot be the sole consideration for the grant of anticipatory bail. The presumption of innocence is one of the considerations which the court should keep in mind while considering the plea for anticipatory bail. The salutary rule is to balance the cause of the accused and the cause of public justice. Over solicitous homage to the accused's liberty can, sometimes, defeat the cause of public justice.

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The status report shows that the money was withdrawn

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in the names of Bag Mohammad and Vijay. Bag Mohammad transferred the money to the account of Karam Chand and his family members, which shows that Bag Mohammad was merely a conduit through which the money was being siphoned off by Karam Chand and his family members. Vijay was stated to have sold the plants, but he did not have the number of plants sold by him as per the report of the Horticulture Department. The plants were not supplied to the beneficiaries, and most of the plants had dried. These allegations prima facie show that only the bills were prepared and the money was transferred to the accounts of Bag Mohammad and Vijay, from whom it was ultimately transferred to Karam Chand and his family members. Raj Kumar had verified the bills showing that the work was executed. The inquiry report and the police investigation show that no work was executed. Therefore, the signatures were put without the work having been executed. These allegations prima

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facie show that Raj Kumar had misused his position to benefit Karam Chand and his family members. Therefore, prima facie, there is sufficient material to connect the petitioners with the commission of a crime.

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A perusal of the status report shows that the petitionerMahinder Singh was posted as a Secretary. He had put his signatures on EFMS form containing the endorsement regarding the completion of all codal formalities as per financial rules and entry of the material in the register at Sr. No.53, 32 and 122, respectively, however, the codal formalities were not completed and the pages were found to be blank. No such entry was recorded in it. This clearly shows that the petitioner Mahinder Singh had also conspired together with the other petitioners to make the false record to benefit the petitioner-Karam Chand. Otherwise, there was no justification for him to make a false entry containing a false certificate; hence, the submission that Mahinder Singh had acted as per the dictates of his office and had not acted in excess of the authority is not correct. Rather the issuance of the false certificate shows that he had made wrong entries to facilitate the commission of the crime, therefore, he is not entitled to the concession of prearrest bail.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Devinder Kumar Bansal (supra) that pre-arrest bail should not be granted in corruption cases to ensure a corruption-free society. It was observed at page 501:

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“24. If liberty is to be denied to an accused to ensure a corruption-free society, then the courts should not hesitate in denying such liberty. Where overwhelming considerations in the nature aforesaid require denial of anticipatory bail, it has to be denied. It is altogether a different thing to say that once the investigation is over and a charge-sheet is filed, the court may consider to grant regular bail to a public servant accused of indulging in corruption.

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25. Avarice is a common frailty of mankind, and Robert Walpole's famous pronouncement that all men have their price, notwithstanding the unsavoury cynicism that it suggests, is not very far from the truth. As far back as more than two centuries ago, it was Burke who cautioned: “Among a people generally corrupt, liberty cannot last long.” In more recent years, Romain Rolland lamented that France fell because there was corruption without indignation. Corruption has, in it, very dangerous potentialities. Corruption, a word of wide connotation, has, in respect of almost all the spheres of our day-to-day life, all the world over, the limited meaning of allowing decisions and actions to be influenced not by the rights or wrongs of a case but by the prospects of monetary gains or other selfish considerations.

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26. If even a fraction of what was the vox populi about the magnitude of corruption to be true, then it would not be far removed from the truth that it is the rampant corruption indulged in with impunity by highly placed persons that has led to economic unrest in this country. If one is asked to name one sole factor that effectively arrested the progress of our society to prosperity, undeniably, it is corruption. If the society in a developing country faces a menace greater than even the one from the hired assassins to its law and order,

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then that is from the corrupt elements at the higher echelons of the Government and of the political parties.

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27. In Manoj Narula v. Union of India [Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1] , this Court held that corruption erodes the fundamental tenets of the rule of law and quoted with approval its judgment in Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal v. State of Maharashtra [Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 642 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 737 : (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 187] and held as under : ( Manoj Narula case [Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1 ], SCC pp. 25-26, para 16)

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“ 16 . … ‘ 26 . It can be stated without any fear of contradiction that corruption is not to be judged by degree, for corruption mothers disorder, destroys societal will to progress, accelerates undeserved ambitions, kills the conscience, jettisons the glory of the institutions, paralyses the economic health of a country, corrodes the sense of civility and mars the marrows of governance .’ ( Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal case [Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 642: (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 737: (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 187] , SCC pp. 654-55, para 26)” (emphasis supplied)

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28. In Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh [Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1041: (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 666] this Court held as under: (SCC p. 100, para 68)

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“ 68 . Today, corruption in our country not only poses a grave danger to the concept of constitutional governance, but it also threatens the very foundation of Indian democracy and the Rule of Law. The magnitude of corruption in our public life is incompatible with the concept of a socialist, secular democratic republic. It cannot be disputed that where corruption begins, all rights end. Corruption devalues human rights, chokes development and undermines justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity, which are the core values in our preambular vision. Therefore, the duty of the court is that any anti-corruption law has to be interpreted and worked out in such a fashion as to strengthen the fight against corruption .” (emphasis supplied)

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29. In K.C. Sareen v. CBI [K.C. Sareen v. CBI, (2001) 6 SCC 584: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1186] , this Court observed thus: (SCC p. 589, para 12)

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“12 . Corruption by public servants has now reached a monstrous dimension in India. Its tentacles have started grappling with even the institutions created for the protection of the republic. Unless those tentacles are intercepted and impeded from gripping the normal and orderly functioning of the public offices, through strong legislative, executive, as well as judicial exercises, the corrupt public servants could even paralyse the functioning of such institutions and thereby hinder the democratic polity .” (emphasis supplied)

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30. While approving the judgment of Subramanian Swamy v. CBI [Subramanian Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 42 : (2014) 3 SCC (L&S) 36] , rendered by another Constitution Bench in Manoj Narula case [Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1] , a Constitution Bench of this Court, dealing with rampant corruption, observed as under : (SCC pp. 26-27, paras 17-18)

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“ 17 . Recently, in Subramanian Swamy v. CBI [Subramanian Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 42 : (2014) 3 SCC (L&S) 36] , the Constitution Bench, speaking through R.M. Lodha, C.J., while declaring Section 6-A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, which was inserted by Act 45 of 2003, as unconstitutional, has opined that : (SCC pp. 725-26, para 59)

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‘ 59 . It seems to us that the classification which is made in Section 6-A on the basis of status in the government service is not permissible under Article 14 as it defeats the purpose of finding prima facie truth into the allegations of graft, which amount to an offence under the PC Act, 1988. Can there be sound differentiation between corrupt public servants based on their status? Surely not, because irrespective of their status or position, corrupt public servants are corrupters of public power. The corrupt public servants, whether high or low, are birds of the same feather and must be confronted with the process of investigation and inquiry equally. Based on the position or status in

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service, no distinction can be made between public servants against whom there are allegations amounting to an offence under the PC Act, 1988 .’

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And thereafter, the larger Bench further said: (SCC p. 726, para 60)

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‘ 60 . Corruption is an enemy of the nation, and tracking down corrupt public servants and punishing such persons is a necessary mandate of the PC Act, 1988. It is difficult to justify the classification which has been made in Section 6-A because the goal of law in the PC Act, 1988 is to meet corruption cases with a very strong hand, and all public servants are warned through such a legislative measure that corrupt public servants have to face very serious consequences.’

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And again: (SCC pp. 730-31, paras 71-72)

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‘ 71 . The Office of Public Power cannot be the workshop of personal gain. The probity in public life is of great importance. How can two public servants against whom there are allegations of corruption of graft, or bribetaking, or criminal misconduct under the PC Act, 1988 can be made to be treated differently because one happens to be a junior officer and the other, a senior decision-maker

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Corruption is an enemy of the nation, and tracking down a corrupt public servant, however high he may be, and punishing such a person is a necessary mandate under the PC Act, 1988. The status or position of a public servant does not qualify such a public servant for exemption from equal treatment. The decision-making power does not segregate corrupt officers into two classes as they are common criminals and have to be tracked down by the same process of inquiry and investigation.’

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18 . From the aforesaid authorities, it is clear as noonday that corruption has the potentiality to destroy many a progressive aspect, and it has acted as the formidable enemy of the nation.” (emphasis supplied)

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It was submitted that the petitioners are not required for the investigation as per the earlier report; therefore, they are entitled to pre-arrest bail. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sumitha Pradeep v. Arun Kumar C.K. , (2022) 17 SCC 391: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1529 that pre-arrest bail cannot be granted because the charge sheet has been filed or the custodial interrogation is not required. It was observed at page 397:

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10. It may be true, as pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for Respondent 1, that the charge-sheet has already been filed. It will be unfair to presume on our part that the investigating officer does not require Respondent 1 for custodial interrogation for the purpose of further investigation.

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11. Be that as it may, even assuming it is a case where Respondent 1 is not required for custodial interrogation, we are satisfied that the High Court ought not to have granted discretionary relief of anticipatory bail.

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The status report shows that a systemic fraud causing

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loss to the Government and benefit to private persons was carried out by the petitioners. The investigation is continuing, and releasing the petitioners on bail at this stage would adversely affect the pending investigation. Therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to pre-arrest bail.

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