Dismissed¶52

Sulakhan Singh v. State of Hp

Suspension of sentence – Post-conviction bail

Himachal Pradesh HC2 May 2025CRMP/1177/2025

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Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Suspension of sentence; post-conviction bail; Section 430 BNSS 2023; Section 389 CrPC principles; NDPS Act Sections 21 and 29; 260 grams heroin commercial quantity; presumption of innocence erased on conviction; strong and compelling reasons; no re-appreciation of evidence at suspension stage; contradictions left for final hearing; Cr. MP No. 1177 of 2025 in Cr. Appeal No. 139 of 2025; High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla; decided 02.05.2025; Neutral Citation 2025:HHC:12642; Sulakhan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh; Tarlok Singh Chauhan and Sushil Kukreja, JJ.

What did the court decide?

None; application for suspension of sentence and release on bail dismissed. Appellant at liberty to move appropriate application(s) for early hearing of the appeal. ¶52

Sulakhan Singh Vs State of Hp — Narcotics (NDPS) | Himachal Pradesh HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

None; application for suspension of sentence and release on bail dismissed. Appellant at liberty to move appropriate application(s) for early hearing of the appeal.

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Issue for consideration

Whether the appellant/convict Sulakhan Singh is entitled to suspension of sentence and release on bail pending final hearing of his appeal against conviction and sentence under Section 21 read with Section 29 of the NDPS Act. +1 more

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Court's answer

Once a convict is convicted by a competent criminal court, the initial presumption of innocence is no longer available to him; the discretion to suspend sentence pending final hearing of the appeal must be exercised judiciously and not as a matter of course, keeping in view all facts and circumstances, the nature of the offence, and balancing the convict's right and liberty against the interest of society.

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Ratio / Principle

Contentions regarding contradictions in prosecution witnesses' statements and non-compliance with mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act cannot be gone into in detail at the stage of deciding an application for suspension of sentence; whether such contradictions are so glaring as to affect the core of the prosecution case can only be examined at the final hearing, and the appellate court should not re-appreciate evidence or pick lacunas at the Section 389 stage.

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Key takeaways

Keeping in mind the nature of the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court after a full-fledged trial (exclusive and conscious possession of 260 grams of heroin, a commercial quantity), the appellant/convict has miserably failed to carve out a strong case for suspension of sentence and release on bail; the application being misconceived is dismissed, with liberty to move appropriate application(s) for early hearing of the admitted appeal.ratio¶52

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Suspension of sentence — Post-conviction bail — Application under Section 430 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 by convict sentenced by the learned Special Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala (judgment dated 06.01.2025, Sessions Case No. 29-D/VII/2023) to ten years' rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- each under Section 21 read with Section 29 NDPS Act for possessing 260 grams of heroin, a commercial quantity — Held, relying on State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Wamanrao Smarth, Kishori Lal v. Rupa, Vasant Tukaram Pawar, Preet Pal Singh v. State of U.P., (NCT of Delhi) v. Lokesh Chadha and applying Omprakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary: upon conviction the initial presumption of innocence is no longer available; discretion to suspend sentence pending appeal must be exercised judiciously, not as a matter of routine, balancing the convict's liberty against the interest of society; contentions of contradictions in prosecution evidence and non-compliance with mandatory NDPS provisions cannot be examined in detail nor can evidence be re-appreciated at the suspension-of-sentence stage, such questions being left to the final hearing; applicant having miserably failed to carve out a strong case, application dismissed — Liberty granted to move for early hearing of the admitted appeal (Cr. Appeal No. 139 of 2025). Judgment authored by Sushil Kukreja, J. (Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan and Sushil Kukreja, JJ.), decided 02.05.2025.

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1 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:12642 )

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA

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Cr. MP No. 1177 of 2025 in Cr. Appeal No. 139 of 2025 Decided on: 02.05.2025 _____________________________________________________ Sulakhan Singh …..Appellant/applicant. Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ……Respondent/non-applicant. ____________________________________________________ Coram_ The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge. 1 Whether approved for reporting?

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_______________________ For the applicant:	________ Mr. Vijend	_______ er Katoc	_______ h, Advoc	________ ate.
For the non-applicant/State:	Mr. I.N. Advocate	Mehta, Gener	Senior al, Mr.	Additional Navlesh
	Verma a	nd Ms.	Sharm	ila Patial,
	Additional	Advoca	tes Gen	eral, with
	Mr. Raj General.	Negi,	Deputy	Advocate

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Sushil Kukreja, Judge.

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This order shall dispose of application, filed by the applicant/appellant Sulakhan Singh, under Section 430 of The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita , 2023, seeking suspension of sentence awarded by the learned Special Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., vide judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated, 06.01.2025, in Sessions Case No. 29-D/VII/2023, for the commission of offence punishable under

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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2 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:12642 )

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Section 21 read with Section 29 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “the NDPS Act”) and releasing him on bail.

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The learned Counsel for the appellant/applicant contended that the appellant/applicant had got a very good arguable case on merits, as the evidence relied upon by the learned Trial Court is shaky, thus not tenable in the eyes of law. He also contended that the prosecution has failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Act, which castes a doubt qua the alleged recovery from the conscious possession of the appellant/applicant. He further contended that there are material contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, which the learned Trial Court has lightly brushed aside. He also contended that the applicant is in custody for the last two years and the appeal is not likely to be heard in near future, therefore, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence imposed upon the appellant/application by the learned Trial Court be suspended in the interest of justice and fair play.

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Per contra the learned Additional Advocate General contended that the appellant/applicant is not entitled for suspension of sentence, as commercial quantity of 260 grams of

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3 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:12642 )

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heroin was recovered from the exclusive and conscious possession of the appellant/applicant and the learned Trial Court found him guilty. It is further contended that after the judgment of conviction, there is no presumption of innocence in favour of the appellant/applicant and the instant application, being devoid of merits, deserves to be dismissed.

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We have heard the learned counsel for the applicant/appellant as well as learned Additional Advocate General and have also gone through the material available on record.

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The perusal of the record reveals that learned Special Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., vide judgment of conviction and order of sentence, dated 06.01.2025, convicted the applicant/appellant Sulakhan Singh and other accused person, i.e., Inderjeet Singh under Section 21 read with Section 29 of the NDPS Act and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years each and to pay fine of Rs.1,00,000/- each for their alleged involvement in possessing 260 grams of heroin and in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months.

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Before adverting to the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/applicant as well as learned

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4 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:12642 )

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Additional Advocate General for the non-applicant/State, it would be beneficial to refer to the settled legal position, to the effect that when the appellant/applicant accused is convicted by the competent Criminal Court, the initial presumption of innocence is no more available to him.

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In State of Maharashtra vs. Madhukar Wamanrao Smarth, (2008) 5 SCC 721, the Hon'ble apex Court referred to the parameters delineated in Kishori Lal vs. Rupa & others, (2004) 7 SCC 638 to be observed by the High Court while dealing with an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail and

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reiterated the view taken in Vasant Tukaram Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 281 . The relevant part runs as under:

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“10. The parameters to be observed by the High Court while dealing with an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail have been highlighted by this Court in many cases. In Kishori Lal v. Rupa it was observed as follows:

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"4. Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”) deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed against. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.

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The above position was reiterated in Vasant Tukaram Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2005 (5) SCC 281)"

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In Preet Pal Singh v. State of U.P. & Anr. reported in

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5 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:12642 )

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(2020) 8 SCC 645, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that

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for grant of post-conviction bail to a convict under Section 389 of Code of Criminal Procedure, there has to be strong and compelling reasons and such strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail. The relevant para of the aforesaid judgments reads as under:

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"35. There is a difference between grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC and grant of bail, post conviction. In the earlier case, there may be presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception, as held by this Court in Dataram Singh v. State of U.P. (2018 3 SCC 22). However, in case of post-conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction upon trial. Rather, the court considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, is to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors. There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) CrPC.”

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9. In (NCT of Delhi) v. Lokesh Chadha, (2021) 5 SCC

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724 , it was held that the principle of bail being the rule and jail

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being an exception cannot be attracted, once there is conviction

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upon trial. The relevant para of the aforesaid judgment reads as

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under:

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"10. At this stage, we will refer to the decision of a twojudge Bench of this Court in Preet Pal Singh v. State of U.P. [Preet Pal Singh v. State of U.P., (2020) 8 SCC 645 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 897] where Indira Banerjee, J., speaking for the Court, observed as follows : (SCC p. 655, para 35)

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6 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:12642 )

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"35. There is a difference between the grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC in case of pre- trial arrest and suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC and the grant of bail, post- conviction. In the earlier case there may be a presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception, as held by this Court in Dataram Singh v. State of U.P. [Dataram Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC 22 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 675] However, in case of post-conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction upon trial. Rather, the court considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail is to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors. There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) CrPC.”

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It has further been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Omprakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary, (2023) 6 SCC 123 that while deciding the application for suspension of the sentence, the Court should consider whether the applicant has a fair chance of acquittal. The relevant para of the aforesaid judgment is extracted hereunder:

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"“23. The principle underlying the theory of criminal jurisprudence in our country is that an accused is presumed to be innocent till he is held guilty by a court of the competent jurisdiction. Once the accused is held guilty, the presumption of innocence gets erased. In the same manner, if the accused is acquitted, then the presumption of innocence gets further fortified.

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24. From perusal of Section 389 of the Cr. PC, it is evident that save and except the matter falling under the category of sub-Section 3 neither any specific principle of law is laid down nor any criteria has been fixed for consideration of the prayer of the convict and further, having a judgment of

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7 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:12642 )

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conviction erasing the presumption leaning in favour of the accused regarding innocence till contrary recorded by the court of the competent jurisdiction, and in the aforesaid background, there happens to be a fine distinction between the prayer for bail at the preconviction as well as the post-conviction stage, viz Sections 437, 438, 439 and 389(1) of the Cr. PC.

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25 to 32 xxx

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33. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law, the endeavour on the part of the Court, therefore, should be to see as to whether the case presented by the prosecution and accepted by the Trial Court can be said to be a case in which, ultimately the convict stands for fair chances of acquittal. If the answer to the above said question is to be in the affirmative, as a necessary corollary, we shall have to say that, if ultimately the convict appears to be entitled to have an acquittal at the hands of this Court, he should not be kept behind the bars for a pretty long time till the conclusion of the appeal, which usually take very long for decision and disposal. However, while undertaking the exercise to ascertain whether the convict has fair chances of acquittal, what is to be looked into is something palpable. To put it in other words, something which is very apparent or gross on the face of the record, on the basis of which, the Court can arrive at a prima facie satisfaction that the conviction may not be sustainable. The Appellate Court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 of the Cr. PC and try to pick up few lacunas or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution. Such would not be a correct approach.”

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11. Taking into consideration the position of law, as can be

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gathered from various judgments of the Supreme Court, it is very clear that discretion at the time of considering the plea of the accused for suspension of sentence pending final hearing of appeal has to be exercised judiciously and not as a matter of course as once the conviction is recorded, the presumption of innocence is no longer available to the appellant. The discretion to suspend the sentence vests in the court and it is required to be exercised judicially keeping in view all facts and circumstances and the nature of offence. The Court has to exercise this discretion with utmost care and caution, balancing one's right and liberty on one hand and the interest of the society on the other.

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8 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:12642 )

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In the instant case, the nature of the allegations against

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the accused are serious, as he, alongwith other co-accused, was found in exclusive and conscious possession of 260 grams of heroin , which is a commercial quantity. The learned counsel for the appellant/applicant highlighted some contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses and also contended that the prosecution had failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act, which castes a doubt qua the alleged recovery from the conscious possession of the appellant/applicant. However, the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/applicant cannot be gone into in detail at the stage of deciding the present application for suspension of sentence. Whether these contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are so glaring to affect the core of the prosecution case, can only be examined at the stage of final hearing. In Om Prakash Sahni’s case (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that the Appellate Court should not re-appreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 of the Cr.PC and try to pick up few lacunas or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution, which would not be a correct approach.

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In view of the aforesaid discussion and keeping in mind, the nature of conviction and sentence imposed by the

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9 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:12642 )

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learned Trial Court, that too, after a full-fledged trial, we feel our self persuaded to hold that the appellant/convict, at this stage, has miserably failed to carve out a strong case for suspension of sentence and his release on bail. The application for suspension of sentence and release of appellant/convict on bail, therefore being misconceived, is dismissed and stands disposed of accordingly.

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Since the appeal pertains to the year 2025 and already stands admitted, the appellant/applicant is at liberty to move appropriate application(s) for early hearing of the appeal.

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( Tarlok Singh Chauhan ) Judge

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( Sushil Kukreja )

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Judge

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2^nd May, 2025

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(virender)

Sulakhan Singh v. State of Hp

Case brief

What is this about?

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Sulakhan Singh v. State of Hp

Case brief

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