Amit Behal and Others Vs State of Hp and Another

The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 30 of 2023, dated 22.09.2023, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A, 504 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) registered at Police Station Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P.

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that respondent No.2/informant made a complaint to the police asserting that she was married to Amit Behal on 23.01.2022 as per Hindu Rites and Customs. Her parents and relatives gave her gifts and ornaments at the time of her marriage. Her husband, father-in-law, and sister-in-law started compelling her to conceive a child three days after the marriage. She told them that her husband was serving in Bangalore, she had also passed M.Sc. Biotech, and she would think of conceiving a child after getting employment. Her father-in-law and sister-inlaw instigated her husband, who started beating and abusing her. Her father-in-law sent her to Bangalore in April, where she resided with her husband for one and a half months. Her husband used to taunt her on trivial matters. He used to send her videos to his father. His father used to instigate him, and he used to beat the informant. She was sent to Una. Her husband remained with her at Una for one and a half months. She became pregnant. She was not provided with food and balanced nutrition. She was also not taken to the hospital for her medical check-up. Her father-in-law used to hand over ₹ 100/- to her with a direction to visit the hospital. Her sister-in-law was a nurse in the hospital, but she never

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assisted the informant during her checkup. She used to incite the informant’s husband and father-in-law against her. She wanted to reside in Bangalore at the time of the delivery of the child, but she was not taken to Bangalore. She was sent to her parental home, where she delivered a baby girl. Her husband visited the hospital on the third day and left for Una the next morning. Her father-in-law and sister-in-law did not visit the hospital. Her husband, her father-in-law and sister-in-law used to tell her that she had not brought anything with her and her parents had sent her empty-handed. Surinder Kaur used to visit her matrimonial home. She also used to abuse and threaten her. Her father-in-law had an evil eye upon her. The police registered the FIR, conducted the investigation and filed a charge sheet against the petitioner Amit Behal, Hari Om and Vandana for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A, 504, and 506 read with Section 34 of IPC and Surinder Kaur for the commission of offences punishable under Section 504 and 506 read with Section 34 of IPC.

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Being aggrieved by the filing of the charge sheet, the petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing the FIR and consequent proceedings. It has been asserted that petitioner No.1 was posted at Bangalore. Respondent No.2 also resided with

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him for one and a half years at Bangalore. She was casually paying visits to her matrimonial home as she was not interested in visiting her matrimonial home. Petitioner No. 2 (since deceased) was aged 63 years, and he was suffering from various ailments. Petitioner No. 3-Vandana was married in the year 2015. She is residing in her matrimonial home in village Batala and is working as a female health worker at Health Sub Centre Jalgura, Tehsil and District Una. She is the mother of two children aged 6 and 2 years. She visited her parental home occasionally. Petitioner No.4 Surinder Kaur is a former Municipal Councillor. She has nothing to do with the affairs of petitioner No.1. The allegations against the petitioners are ambiguous without pinpointing any act of cruelty. Petitioner No.4 was wrongly arrayed as a party even though she has no concern with the family of petitioner No.1. The allegations in the FIR and the contents of the charge sheet do not make out any case against the petitioners. Petitioner No.1 Amit Behal has filed a divorce petition, which is pending before the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Una. He has also filed a complaint to the Home Minister of India against the false lodging of an FIR. The informant quarreled with petitioner No.1 on petty matters. She claimed that she was more educated than the

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petitioner No.1. She also told that she did not want to reside with petitioner No.1. She made false allegations against the petitioners. The allegations are not substantiated by any documents. They refer to the incidents which occur generally in the family. She has attempted to implicate all the family members to settle her score, therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the same be quashed.

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The petition is opposed by respondent No.1 by filing a reply making preliminary submissions regarding the lack of maintainability and the petitioners being estopped to file the present petition on account of their conduct, acts and omissions. The contents of the petition were denied on merits; however, it was admitted that a complaint was made by the informant to the police, on which an FIR was registered. It was asserted that police filed a charge sheet after the conclusion of the investigation and presented it in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur. The matter was listed on 19.10.2024 for the office report. The allegations were found to be correct during the investigation. The complaint was received from the Under Secretary (Home) to the Government of India, which was properly investigated. The

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Investigating Officer tried to contact petitioners No.1 and 3 telephonically. The mobile phone of the petitioner No.1 was found switched off, and the petitioner No.3 did not pick up the mobile phone. There is sufficient evidence against the petitioners to show their involvement in the commission of the crime; hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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A rejoinder denying the contents of the reply and affirming those of the petition was filed.

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I have heard Mr. Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Somesh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State and Mr. Yuyutsu Thakur, learned counsel for respondent No.2/Complainant.

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Mr. Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, submitted that respondent No.2/informant made a false complaint against the petitioners. The allegations in the FIR are vague and general. They do not contain any particulars of date and time. The continuation of the proceedings against the petitioners amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the

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FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the same be quashed. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kahkashan Kausar and others. vs. State of Bihar and ors, 2022 (6) SCC 599 and Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3682 in support of his submission.

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Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent No.1/State, submitted that the FIR contains specific allegations regarding the informant’s harassment. These allegations were corroborated by the statements of witnesses. Learned Trial Court is seized of the matter and this Court should not exercise the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. in the present case; hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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Mr. Yuyutsu Thakur, learned counsel for respondent No.2/informant, submitted that the petitioners had harassed the informant. She was not provided with the necessities of life. She was beaten at the instance of petitioner No.3. These allegations prima facie show the cruelty committed by the petitioners upon the informant, therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

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“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

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8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

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In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

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As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

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Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”

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This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

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Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

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“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

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9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing

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criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia , contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides ; ( ii ) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii ) no prima facie offence is made out; ( iv ) the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 )

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The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 286: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that the Court has to see that particulars of the offences committed by every accused and the role played by the accused in committing the offence are given in the complaint made to the police. It was observed: -

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“9. To lodge a proper complaint, the mere mention of the sections and the language of those sections is not the be-all and end-all of the matter. What is required to be brought to the notice of the court is the particulars of the offence committed by each and every accused and the role played by each and every accused in committing that offence .

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10. When we see the complaint, the complaint is sadly vague. It does not show as to which accused has committed what offence, and what is the exact role played by these appellants in the commission of the offence. There could be said something against Rajesh, as the allegations are made against him more precisely, but he is no more and has

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already expired. Under such circumstances, it would be an abuse of the process of law to allow the prosecution to continue against the aged parents of Rajesh, the present appellants herein, on the basis of a vague and general complaint which is silent about the precise acts of the appellants.” (Emphasis supplied)

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Similarly, it was held in Abhishek v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083: 2023 INSC 779 that the tendency of false implication by way of general omnibus allegations, if left unchecked, would result in the misuse of the process of law. It was observed:

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“13. Instances of a husband's family members filing a petition to quash criminal proceedings launched against them by his wife in the midst of matrimonial disputes are neither a rarity nor of recent origin. Precedents aplenty abound on this score. We may now take note of some decisions of particular relevance. Recently, in Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar [(2022) 6 SCC 599], this Court had occasion to deal with a similar situation where the High Court had refused to quash a FIR registered for various offences, including Section 498A IPC. Noting that the foremost issue that required determination was whether allegations made against the in-laws were general omnibus allegations which would be liable to be quashed, this Court referred to earlier decisions wherein concern was expressed over the misuse of Section 498A IPC and the increased tendency to implicate relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes. This Court observed that false implications by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial disputes, if left unchecked, would result in misuse of the process of law . On the facts of that case, it was found that no specific allegations were made against the in-laws by the wife, and it was held that allowing their prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against the in-laws would result in an

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abuse of the process of law. It was also noted that a criminal trial, leading to an eventual acquittal, would inflict severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise ought to be discouraged.

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14. In Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand [(2010) 7 SCC 667] , this Court noted that the tendency to implicate the husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon in complaints filed under Section 498A IPC. It was observed that the Courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases, such as allegations of harassment by the husband's close relations, who were living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided, would add an entirely different complexion and such allegations would have to be scrutinised with great care and circumspection .

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15. Earlier, in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti [(2009) 10 SCC 184] , this Court observed that the mere mention of statutory provisions and the language thereof for lodging a complaint is not the ‘be all and end all’ of the matter, as what is required to be brought to the notice of the Court is the particulars of the offence committed by each and every accused and the role played by each and every accused in the commission of that offence . These observations were made in the context of a matrimonial dispute involving Section 498A IPC.” (Emphasis supplied)

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It was held in Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 759:2024 INSC 369 that asking a person to face criminal allegations without any specific instance of criminal misconduct amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed:

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“18. The plain reading of the FIR and the chargesheet papers indicate that the allegations levelled by the First Informant are quite vague, general and sweeping,

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specifying no instances of criminal conduct. It is also pertinent to note that in the FIR, no specific date or time of the alleged offence/offences has been disclosed. Even the police thought fit to drop the proceedings against the other members of the Appellants' family. Thus, we are of the view that the FIR lodged by Respondent No. 2 was nothing but a counterblast to the divorce petition & also the domestic violence case.

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25. If a person is made to face a criminal trial on some general and sweeping allegations without bringing on record any specific instances of criminal conduct, it is nothing but an abuse of the process of the court. The court owes a duty to subject the allegations levelled in the complaint to thorough scrutiny to find out, prima facie, whether there is any grain of truth in the allegations or whether they are made only with the sole object of involving certain individuals in a criminal charge, more particularly when a prosecution arises from a matrimonial dispute .” (Emphasis supplied)

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It was further held that in matrimonial disputes, the

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parents, including the close relatives, make a mountain out of a molehill, and every matrimonial conduct amounting to nuisance does not constitute cruelty. It was observed: -

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“32. Many times, the parents, including the close relatives of the wife, make a mountain out of a molehill. Instead of salvaging the situation and making every possible endeavour to save the marriage, their action, either due to ignorance or on account of sheer hatred towards the husband and his family members, brings about the complete destruction of the marriage on trivial issues. The first thing that comes to mind of the wife, her parents and her relatives is the Police as if the Police is the panacea of all evil. No sooner the matter reaches up to the Police then even if there are fair chances of reconciliation between the spouses, they would get destroyed. The foundation of a

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sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another. Tolerance of each other's fault, to a certain bearable extent, has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty quibbles and trifling differences are mundane matters and should not be exaggerated and blown out of proportion to destroy what is said to have been made in heaven. The Court must appreciate that all quarrels must be weighed from that point of view in determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular case, always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the parties, their character and social status. A very technical and hyper-sensitive approach would prove to be disastrous for the very institution of marriage. In matrimonial disputes, the main sufferers are the children. The spouses fight with such venom in their hearts that they do not think even for a second that if the marriage would come to an end, then what will be the effect on their children? Divorce plays a very dubious role so far as the upbringing of the children is concerned. The only reason why we are saying so is that instead of handling the whole issue delicately, the initiation of criminal proceedings would bring about nothing but hatred for each other. There may be cases of genuine ill-treatment and harassment by the husband and his family members towards the wife. The degree of such ill-treatment or harassment may vary. However, the Police machinery should be resorted to as a measure of last resort and that too in a very genuine case of cruelty and harassment. The Police machinery cannot be utilised for the purpose of holding the husband at ransom so that he could be squeezed by the wife at the instigation of her parents, relatives or friends. In all cases where the wife complains of harassment or ill-treatment, Section 498A of the IPC cannot be applied mechanically. No FIR is complete without Sections 506(2) and 323 of the IPC. Every matrimonial conduct which may cause annoyance to the other may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations and quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount to cruelty”

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Similarly, it was held in Mamidi Anil Kumar Reddy v.

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State of A.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 127: 2024 (2) SCR 252 that the phenomenon of false implication by a general omnibus allegation in the case of a matrimonial dispute is not unknown to the Court. When the allegations are general and omnibus, the prosecution should not be continued. It was observed: -

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“14. In the considered opinion of this Court, there is significant merit in the submissions of the Learned Counsel for the Appellants. A bare perusal of the complaint, statement of witnesses and the charge sheet shows that the allegations against the Appellants are wholly general and omnibus in nature; even if they are taken in their entirety, they do not prima facie make out a case against the Appellants. The material on record neither discloses any particulars of the offences alleged nor discloses the specific role/allegations assigned to any of the Appellants in the commission of the offences.

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15. The phenomenon of false implication by way of general omnibus allegations in the course of matrimonial disputes is not unknown to this Court. In Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar (2022) 6 SCC 599 , this Court dealt with a similar case wherein the allegations made by the complainant-wife against her in-laws u/s. 498A and others were vague and general, lacking any specific role and particulars. The court proceeded to quash the FIR against the accused persons and noted that such a situation, if left unchecked, would result in the abuse of the process of law. xxxx

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17. Considering the dicta in Mahmood Ali (supra), we find that the High Court, in this case, has failed to exercise due care and has mechanically permitted the criminal proceedings to continue despite specifically finding that the

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allegations are general and omnibus in nature. The Appellants herein approached the High Court on inter alia grounds that the proceedings were re-initiated on vexatious grounds and even highlighted the commencement of divorce proceedings by Respondent No. 2. In these peculiar circumstances, the High Court had a duty to consider the allegations with great care and circumspection so as to protect against the danger of unjust prosecution.”

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2621, that general and vague allegations of cruelty made against the husband and his relatives are not sufficient to constitute cruelty. It was observed: -

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“10.1 The tendency to make general, vague, and omnibus allegations is noticed by this Court in many decisions. In Usha Chakraborty v. State of W.B. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90 , this court observed that:

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“16… the respondent alleged commission of offences under Sections 323, 384, 406, 423, 467, 468, 420 and 120B, IPC against the appellants. A bare perusal of the said allegation and the ingredients to attract them, as adverted to hereinbefore, would reveal that the allegations are vague and they did not carry the essential ingredients to constitute the alleged offences…. The ingredients to attract the alleged offence referred to hereinbefore and the nature of the allegations contained in the application filed by the respondent would undoubtedly make it clear that the respondent had failed to make specific allegations against the appellants herein in respect of the aforesaid offences. The factual position thus would reveal that the genesis as well as the purpose of

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criminal proceedings are nothing but the aforesaid incident, and further that the dispute involved is essentially of a civil nature. The appellants and the respondents have given a cloak of a criminal offence in the issue…”

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10.2 Similarly, dealing with allegations lacking in particulars and details, in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti (2009) 10 SCC 184 , this court observed that:

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“7. …what strikes us is that there are no particulars given as to the date on which the ornaments were handed over, as to the exact number of ornaments or their description and as to the date when the ornaments were asked back and were refused. Even the weight of the ornaments is not mentioned in the complaint, and it is a general and vague complaint that the ornaments were sometimes given in the custody of the appellants, and they were not returned. What strikes us more is that even in Para 10 of the complaint, where the complainant says that she asked for her clothes and ornaments, which were given to the accused, and they refused to give these back, the date is significantly absent.”

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xxxx

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12. The complaint also refers to a small incident where the complainant's brother accompanied her to the matrimonial house when appellants no. 1 and 3 are alleged to have refused to take her back, but on persuasion by her brother, she was allowed to stay. There is also a vague allegation that, when the complainant gave birth to a second child, appellants 1 and 2 came and “quarrelled” with the complainant, her brother, and her parents and threatened them. This Court had occasion to examine the phenomenon of general and omnibus allegations in the cases of matrimonial disputes. In Mamidi Anil Kumar Reddy v. State of A.P. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 127, this Court observed that:

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“14. …A bare perusal of the complaint, statement of witnesses and the charge sheet show that the

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allegations against the Appellants are wholly general and omnibus in nature; even if they are taken in their entirety, they do not prima facie make out a case against the Appellants. The material on record neither discloses any particulars of the offences alleged nor discloses the specific role/allegations assigned to any of the Appellants in the commission of the offences.

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The phenomenon of false implication by way of general omnibus allegations in the course of matrimonial disputes is not unknown to this Court. In Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar, this Court dealt with a similar case wherein the allegations made by the complainant-wife against her in-laws u/s. 498A and others were vague and general, lacking any specific role and particulars. The court proceeded to quash the FIR against the accused persons and noted that such a situation, if left unchecked, would result in the abuse of the process of law.”

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xxxx

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13.1 In Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar (2022) 6 SCC 599, this Court noticed the injustice that may be caused when parties are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial based on general and omnibus allegations. The relevant portion of the observation is as under:

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“11. … In recent times, matrimonial litigation in the country has also increased significantly, and there is greater disaffection and friction surrounding the institution of marriage now more than ever. This has resulted in an increased tendency to employ provisions such as Section 498-A IPC as instruments to settle personal scores against the husband and his relatives.

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… upon a perusal of the contents of the FIR dated 1-4-2019, it is revealed that general allegations are levelled against the appellants. The complainant

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alleged that “all accused harassed her mentally and threatened her of terminating her pregnancy”. Furthermore, no specific and distinct allegations have been made against either of the appellants herein, i.e. none of the appellants have been attributed any specific role in furtherance of the general allegations made against them. This simply leads to a situation wherein one fails to ascertain the role played by each accused in furtherance of the offence. The allegations are, therefore, general and omnibus and can, at best, be said to have been made out on account of small skirmishes… However, as far as the appellants are concerned, the allegations made against them, being general and omnibus, do not warrant prosecution.

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…it would be unjust if the appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial, i.e. general and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where the relatives of the complainant's husband are forced to undergo trial. It has been highlighted by this Court in varied instances that a criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise must, therefore, be discouraged.”

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This position was reiterated in Dara Lakshmi Narayana

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v. State of Telangana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3682, wherein it was

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observed:

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18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by respondent No. 2 are vague and omnibus. Other than claiming that appellant No. 1 harassed her and that appellant Nos. 2 to 6 instigated him to do so, respondent No. 2 has not provided any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. She has also not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the

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alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR lacks concrete and precise allegations.

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Similar is the judgment in Geddam Jhansi v. State of

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Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263, wherein it was observed:

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“31. Invoking criminal process is a serious matter with penal consequences involving coercive measures, which can be permitted only when the specific act(s) which constitute offences punishable under the Penal Code or any other penal statute are alleged or attributed to the accused and a prima facie case is made out. It applies with equal force when criminal laws are invoked in domestic disputes. Criminalising domestic disputes without specific allegations and credible materials to support the same may have disastrous consequences for the institution of family, which is built on the premise of love, affection, cordiality and mutual trust. The institution of family constitutes the core of human society. Domestic relationships, such as those between family members, are guided by deeply ingrained social values and cultural expectations. These relationships are often viewed as sacred, demanding a higher level of respect, commitment, and emotional investment compared to other social or professional associations. For the aforesaid reason, the preservation of family relationships has always been emphasised. Thus, when family relationships are sought to be brought within the ambit of criminal proceedings, rupturing the family bond, courts should be circumspect and judicious and should allow invocation of the criminal process only when there are specific allegations with supporting materials which constitute criminal offences.

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32. We have to keep in mind that in the context of matrimonial disputes, emotions run high, and as such in the complaints filed alleging harassment or domestic violence, there may be a tendency to implicate other members of the family who do not come to the rescue of the complainant or remain mute spectators to any alleged

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incident of harassment, which in our view cannot by itself constitute a criminal act without there being specific acts attributed to them. Further, when tempers run high and relationships turn bitter, there is also a propensity to exaggerate the allegations, which does not necessarily mean that such domestic disputes should be given the colour of criminality.

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33. It goes without saying that genuine cases of cruelty and violence in the domestic sphere, which do happen, ought to be handled with utmost sensitivity. Domestic violence typically happens within the four walls of the house and not in the public gaze. Therefore, such violence is not noticed by the public at large, except perhaps by the immediate neighbours. Thus, providing visible evidence by the victim of domestic violence may not be easily forthcoming and producing direct evidence may be hard and arduous, which does not necessarily mean that domestic violence does not occur. In fact, to deal with this pernicious phenomenon, stringent statutes like the Protection from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, have been enacted with a very expansive meaning and scope of what amounts to domestic violence. Since violence perpetrated within the domestic sphere by close relatives is now criminalised, entailing serious consequences on the perpetrators, the courts have to be careful while dealing with such cases by examining whether there are specific allegations with instances against the perpetrators and not generalised allegations. The purpose and mandate of the law to protect the victims of domestic violence is of paramount importance, and as such, a balance has to be struck by ensuring that while perpetrators are brought to book, all the family members or relatives are not indiscriminately brought within the criminal net in a sweeping manner.

¶120

34. For a matrimonial relationship which is founded on the basis of cordiality and trust to turn sour to an extent to make a partner hurl allegations of domestic violence and harassment against the other partner, would normally not happen at the spur of the moment and such acrimonious

¶121

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relationship would develop only in course of time. Accordingly, such a situation would be the culmination of a series of acts which turn, otherwise, an amicable relationship, into a fractured one. Thus, in such cases involving allegations of domestic violence or harassment, there would normally be a series of offending acts, which would be required to be spelt out by the complainant against the perpetrators in specific terms to rope such perpetrators in the criminal proceedings sought to be initiated against them. Thus, mere general allegations of harassment without pointing out the specifics against such perpetrators would not suffice, as is the case in respect of the present appellants.

¶123

35. We are, thus, of the view that in criminal cases relating to domestic violence, the complaints and charges should be specific, as far as possible, as against each and every member of the family who is accused of such offences and sought to be prosecuted, as otherwise, it may amount to misuse of the stringent criminal process by indiscriminately dragging all the members of the family. There may be situations where some of the family members or relatives may turn a blind eye to the violence or harassment perpetrated on the victim and may not extend any helping hand to the victim, which does not necessarily mean that they are also perpetrators of domestic violence unless the circumstances clearly indicate their involvement and instigation. Hence, implicating all such relatives without making specific allegations and attributing offending acts to them and proceeding against them without prima facie evidence that they were complicit and had actively collaborated with the perpetrators of domestic violence would amount to abuse of the process of law.”

¶124

In the present case, the informant made a specific allegation that her husband, father-in-law and sister-in-law started compelling her to conceive a child after three days of her

¶125

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marriage. When she expressed her desire to get employment, she was beaten by her husband at the instance of her father-in-law and sister-in-law. It further mentions that when the informant went to Bangalore to reside with her husband, her husband used to taunt her on trivial matters. He used to send her videos to her father-in-law, who used to instigate him. Her husband used to abuse and threaten her. He used to throw away the utensils, beat and abuse her. She further mentioned that she was not provided with proper food and a balanced meal. Her sister-in-law used to instigate her husband and her father-in-law. She wanted to reside in Bangalore, but she was not taken by her husband. Her husband visited the hospital after three days of the delivery, and no other person visited the hospital. Her husband, her father-in-law and sister-in-law asked her what she had brought, and told her that she was sent empty-handed.

¶127

These allegations mention the role played by each of the petitioners and the nature of the acts done by them. They do not mention specific dates, but the dates can be ascertained from the allegations, like after three days of her marriage, after one and a half months of her marriage, and during her pregnancy, etc. Therefore, it cannot be said that the allegations made against

¶128

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petitioner No.1 and petitioner No.3 are vague and uncertain. They contain specific particulars to prima facie establish their role in the commission of the crime. Hence, the FIR cannot be quashed qua petitioners Nos. 1 and 3.

¶130

The informant stated that petitioner No.4 used to abuse and harass her. She has not mentioned the abuses given by petitioner No.4. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vikram Johar v. State of U.P. , (2019) 14 SCC 207: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 795: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 609 that mere abuse is not sufficient to attract Section 504 of IPC. It was observed at page 217: -

¶131

21. Section 504 IPC came up for consideration before this Court in Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra [ Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra , (2013) 14 SCC 44: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] . In the said case, this Court had the occasion to examine the ingredients of Section 504 IPC, which need to be present before proceeding to try a case. The Court held that in the said case, the order issuing process was challenged by filing a criminal revision. This Court held that at the complaint stage, the Magistrate is merely concerned with the allegations made out in the complaint and has only to prima facie satisfy whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. In para 11, the following principles have been laid down: (SCC pp. 48-49)

¶132

“ 11 . We are, in this case, concerned only with the question as to whether, on a reading of the complaint, a prima facie case has been made out or not to issue process by the Magistrate. The law as regards the issuance of process in criminal cases is well settled. At the complaint stage, the Magistrate is merely

¶133

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concerned with the allegations made out in the complaint and has only to prima facie satisfy whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused, and it is not the province of the Magistrate to enquire into a detailed discussion on the merits or demerits of the case. The scope of enquiry under Section 202 is extremely limited in the sense that the Magistrate, at this stage, is expected to examine prima facie the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint. The Magistrate is not expected to embark upon a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case, but only consider the inherent probabilities apparent on the statement made in the complaint. In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi [Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, (1976) 3 SCC 736: 1976 SCC (Cri) 507] , this Court held that once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion in forming an opinion that there is ground for proceeding, it is not for the Higher Courts to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate. The Magistrate has to decide the question purely from the point of view of the complaint, without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have.”

¶135

22. In para 13 of the judgment, this Court has noticed the ingredients of Section 504 IPC, which are to the following effect: (Fiona Shrikhande case [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] , SCC p. 49)

¶136

“ 13 . Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz. ( a ) intentional insult, ( b ) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and ( c ) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that it should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who

¶137

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intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult, and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC.”

¶139

23. In another judgment, i.e. Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka [Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 132] , this Court has again occasion to examine the ingredients of Sections 503 and 506. In the above case also, a case was registered for the offence under Sections 353 and 506 IPC. After noticing Section 503, which defines criminal intimidation, this Court laid down the following in paras 11 and 12 : (SCC pp. 427-28)

¶140

“ 11 .***

¶141

A reading of the definition of “criminal intimidation” would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.

¶142

12 . In the instant case, the allegation is that the appellants have abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of

¶143

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“criminal intimidation”. The threat must be with the intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the mind of the second respondent causing obstruction in the discharge of his duty. As far as the comments posted on Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public, and the act of the appellants posting a comment on Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC.”

¶145

In the above case, the allegation was that the appellant had abused the complainant. The Court held that the mere fact that the allegation that the accused had abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 506 IPC.

¶146

24. Now, we revert back to the allegations in the complaint against the appellant. The allegation is that the appellant, with two or three other unknown persons, one of whom was holding a revolver, came to the complainant's house and abused him in filthy language and attempted to assault him, and when some neighbours arrived there, the appellant and the other persons accompanying him fled the spot. The above allegation, taking on its face value, does not satisfy the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 as has been enumerated by this Court in the above two judgments. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The mere allegation that the appellant came and abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients as laid down in para 13 of the judgment of this Court in Fiona Shrikhande [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of

¶147

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Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] . 25. This position was reiterated in B.V. Ram Kumar v. State

¶149

of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 275 wherein it was observed:

¶150

“19. For appreciating the necessary ingredients required to substantiate a charge under Section 504, IPC, a reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of this Court in Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 14 SCC 44 , wherein the Court discussed the essential ingredients of Section 504, IPC. The Court held as follows: —

¶151

“13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz. (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The person who intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC.”

¶152

We may also indicate that it is not the law that the actual words or language should figure in the complaint. One has to read the complaint as a whole and, by doing so, if the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie, that there has been an intentional insult so as to provoke any person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, that is sufficient to bring the complaint within the ambit of Section 504 IPC. It is not the law that

¶153

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a complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of provoking the other person to commit any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which they are used, the person or persons to whom they are addressed, the time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504 IPC.”

¶155

(emphasis supplied)

¶156

20. Thus, upon reading the complaint as a whole, if the Magistrate comes to a conclusion, prima facie , that there has been an intentional insult made by the accused to the complainant so as to provoke the latter to break the public peace or to commit any other offence, then only the act complained of would fall within the ambit of Section 504, IPC. The law does not mandate that the complainant should verbatim reproduce each word or words capable of provoking him/her to commit breach of peace or any other offence. The background facts, circumstances, the occasion, the manner in which the offending words are used, the person to whom they are addressed, the time, the conduct of the person who has indulged in such actions are all relevant factors to be borne in mind while examining a complaint lodged for initiating proceedings under Section 504, IPC.

¶157

21. Further, this Court in the case of Mohammad Wajid v. State of U.P. 2023 SCC Online SC 951 , while discussing Section 504, IPC, propounded the test for considering the circumstances wherein, an abusive language takes the form and shape of an intentional insult and held thus: —

¶158

“28. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section . But, the words of abuse in a

¶159

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particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised selfcontrol or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender . In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant.

¶161

29. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant.” (emphasis supplied)

¶162

22. Needless to say, that mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence does not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC. Furthermore, it would be immaterial that the person who has been insulted and

¶163

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provoked did not actually break the peace or commit any offence.

¶165

23. Section 504, IPC consists of two parts. Firstly, the actus reus - being the intentional insult which gives rise to the provocation. Secondly, the mens rea , i.e. , the intention or knowledge on the part of the accused that such intentional provocation is likely to cause the person insulted to break public peace or commit any other offence. The animus nocendi in Section 504, IPC is that the accused should ‘intentionally insult’ the other person with the intention or knowledge that the provocation caused by such insult is likely to result in the commission of breach of public peace or any other offence by the person who has been so insulted. The offence is said to be complete once the accused person makes ‘intentional insult’ with the aforesaid mens rea . Hence, intention or knowledge on the part of accused person that his actions of making ‘intentional insult’ have the potential to provoke the person insulted is sine qua non for the commission of the offence under Section 504, IPC.

¶166

24. The natural corollary of the above discussion is that if the accused does not intend to give provocation, the offence is not made out. An insult without an ‘intention to insult’ is not punishable under Section 504, IPC. Further, ‘intentional insult’ must be of such a degree that it has the potential to provoke a reasonable person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence.

¶167

25. It is trite that whether the person provoked further commits an illegal act or not is immaterial to draw the conclusion of culpability under Section 504, IPC. The ‘intentional insult’ and provocation must be so proximate and close that the accused has either the intention or the knowledge that the intentional insult made by him is likely to cause the provoked person to break public peace or commit some other offence. However, what would be the nature of ‘intentional insult’ causing provocation, to draw culpability under Section 504, IPC would depend upon the

¶168

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facts and circumstances of each case. The test to be applied to determine if the intentional insult made by the accused is sufficient to cause provocation is that of a reasonable person, i.e. , if the insult is sufficient to provoke any reasonable person to break peace or commit any other offence, only then the accused will be liable for the offence under Section 504, IPC.”

¶170

Therefore, in view of the binding precedent, the allegations of abuse are not sufficient. The police have also filed the charge sheet against petitioner No.4 for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC for criminal intimidation. Criminal intimidation is provided in Section 503 of IPC as under: -

¶171

503. Criminal intimidation

¶172

Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.

¶173

Explanation- A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested is within this section.

¶174

Section 503 requires that the threat of injury should

¶175

have been with an intent to cause alarm to a person, to do an act,

¶176

which a person is not legally bound to do or omit to do any act

¶177

which he is legally entitled to do. The informant did not state that

¶178

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any alarm was caused in her mind. She has not stated that she was prevented from doing something, which she was legally bound to do or omit to do something, which she was bound to do. Hence, the necessary ingredient of Section 506 of IPC is not satisfied.

¶180

It was laid down by the Hon’ble High Court in Inder Pratap Singh Versus State of Himachal Pradesh 2003 (1) Crimes 345 (HC) that the complainant should have been alarmed by the threat advanced by the accused to attract Section 506 of IPC. It was observed:

¶181

“21. Similarly, before an offence of criminal intimidation can be made out, it must be established prima facie, that the accused persons (like petitioners in the present case), intended to cause an alarm to the complainant party i. e., Jasbeer Singh. Mere threats, as alleged by him, extended by the petitioners, with a view to deter the complainant from interfering with what the petitioner believed to be his exclusive property would not constitute an offence of criminal intimidation.”

¶182

Similar is the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in

¶183

Vikram Johar (supra) wherein it was held at page 209:-

¶184

“25. Now, reverting back to Section 506, which is offence of criminal intimidation, the principles laid down by Fiona Shrikhande [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] has also to be applied when question of finding out as to whether the ingredients of offence are made or not. Here, the only allegation is that the appellant abused the complainant. For proving an offence under Section 506 IPC, what are the ingredients which have

¶185

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to be proved by the prosecution? Ratanlal & Dhirajlal on Law of Crimes , 27th Edn. with regard to proof of offence states the following:

¶187

“ … The prosecution must prove:

¶188

( i ) That the accused threatened some person.

¶189

( ii ) That such threat consisted of some injury to his person, reputation or property; or to the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was interested ;

¶190

( iii ) That he did so with intent to cause alarm to that person; or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat. ” (emphasis supplied)

¶191

A plain reading of the allegations in the complaint does not satisfy all the ingredients as noticed above.

¶192

In the present case, there is no allegation that the informant was alarmed by the threats advanced by petitioner no. 4; hence, no case is made out against petitioner No.4 for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC.

¶193

It was submitted that false averments were made in the

¶194

complaint made to the police. This Court cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643 wherein it was held : -

¶195

“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to

¶196

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the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at its face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint even if taken at its face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) .

¶198

14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060 :

¶199

“ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)

¶200

“ 16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj

¶201

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365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.”

¶204

It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC cannot conduct a minitrial. It was observed at page 397:

¶205

“17. This Court in a series of judgments has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 ]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)

¶206

“ 6 . … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …

¶207

7 . … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.”

¶208

Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the

¶209

truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR.

¶210

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¶211

It was submitted that the complaint was made to the Home Minister against the informant. The police specifically stated that they investigated into the complaint but found no truth in it. Otherwise also, the truthfulness or the falsity of the complaint is not to be adjudicated in these proceedings and the petitioners are free to prove the same during the trial.

¶212

A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed:

¶213

“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and charge-sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall

¶214

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look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.”

¶216