Ashwani Gupta Vs State of Hp and Another

For the Petitioner : Mr. Sudhir Thakur, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Somesh Sharma, Advocate. : For Respondent No. 1 Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. For Respondent No.2 : None

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No.44 of 2023, dated 04.04.2023 registered at Police Station Parwanoo, District Solan, H.P. for the commission of

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Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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offences punishable under Sections 504 and 506 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 3(1)(s) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC&ST) Act and the consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R.

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It has been asserted that the petitioner is working as a Bank Manager in Punjab National Bank, Kot-Beja, Tehsil Kasauli, District Solan. The informant was desirous of availing a loan without completing any codal formalities. The petitioner did not agree to this. The informant got angry and threatened to register a false case against the petitioner. The petitioner had earlier made a complaint regarding this fact to the Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat, who forwarded it to the police. The police filed a complaint under Section 107/150 of Cr.P.C. As per the FIR, the informant was going with Manish Gupta and Lakshender Singh for his work. He asked the petitioner for money due to him, and the petitioner is stated to have used caste related words. These allegations do not satisfy the condition laid down in Section 3(1)(s)

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of the SC&ST Act. The intent to humiliate the member of SC&ST in a public place within public view is missing. The continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court; hence, the petition.

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The petition is opposed by the State by filing a reply admitting that the police had received a letter from the Gram Panchayat Kot-Beja, Block Dharampur, District Solan, H.P., forwarding the petitioner’s complaint to the police. The police conducted the investigation and filed a complaint under Section 107/150 of Cr.P.C. The complaint was a counterblast to the FIR registered by the informant. The allegations in the FIR constitute the commission of a cognizable offence. The police filed a charge sheet before the Court on 19.07.2023, and the matter is pending before the learned Trial Court; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have heard Mr. Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Somesh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner

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and Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State. None appeared for the respondent No.2, therefore, none could be heard.

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Mr. Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was falsely implicated. The allegations in the FIR do not constitute the commission of a cognizable offence. The intent to humiliate the informant based on his caste is missing. The continuation of the proceedings would amount to the abuse of the process of the Court; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. He relied upon the judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramawatar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2022 (13) SCC 635, Gulam Mustafa vs. State of Karnataka and ors, AIR 2023 SC 2999, Shajan Skaria vs. State of Kerala and ors., 2024 (3) Crimes 427(SC), Ramesh Chandra Vaishya vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and anr, in SLP (Crl) No. 1249 of 2023 decided on 19.05.2023 and Hitesh Verma vs

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State of Uttarakhand and anr in SLP (Crl.) No. 3585 of 2020 decided on 05.11.2020 in support of his submission.

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Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State, submitted that the allegations in the FIR show the commission of a cognizable offence. Merely because the petitioner had made a complaint does not mean that the FIR against him is false. The Court exercising inherent jurisdiction should not conduct a mini-trial to determine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. The charge sheet has been filed before the learned Trial Court, and the learned Trial Court should be left to adjudicate the same. He prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

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“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their

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face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code

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or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

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8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

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In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

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As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

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Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”

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This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

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Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

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“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

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9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia , contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides ; ( ii ) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii ) no prima facie offence is made out; ( iv ) the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 ).

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It was held in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977)

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2 SCC 699: 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 that the High Court can quash the

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criminal proceedings if they amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed on page 703:

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“ 7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose, which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests, and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law, though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.”

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The term abuse of the process was explained in Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy , (2013) 6 SCC 740: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 447: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 450 at page 761:

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33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is a well-established and recognised doctrine both by the English courts and

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courts in India. There are some established principles of law which bar the trial when there appears to be an abuse of the process of the court.

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34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964 AC 1254: (1964) 2 WLR 1145: (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL)] , observed: (AC pp. 1301-02)

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“There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. … A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process.

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The power (which is inherent in a court's jurisdiction) to prevent abuses of its process and to control its procedure must in a criminal court include a power to safeguard an accused person from oppression or prejudice.”

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In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same case observed that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial.

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35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR 495 : (1991) 3 All ER 897 (PC)] , the Privy Council defined the word “abuse of process” as something so unfair and wrong with the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly supportable case.

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36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42: (1993) 3 WLR 90: (1993) 3 All ER 138 (HL)] , on the application of the abuse of process, the court confirms that an abuse of process justifying the stay of prosecution could arise in the following circumstances:

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( i ) where it would be impossible to give the accused a fair trial; or

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( ii ) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of the process because it offends the court's sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of the particular case.

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37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr App R 164 (DC)] , Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated:

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“It may be an abuse of process if either ( a ) the prosecution has manipulated or misused the process of the court to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a technicality, or ( b ) on the balance of probability the defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable.”

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38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R 94: 1995 RTR 251 (CA)] , observed that:

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“The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many different circumstances. Nevertheless, two main strands can be detected in the authorities: ( a ) cases where the court concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair

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trial; ( b ) cases where the court concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried.”

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What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine on the individual facts of each case.

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It was held in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P. , (2023) 15 SCC

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488: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 that where the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, the Court owes a duty to quash them. However, the Court cannot appreciate the material while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. It was observed at page 498:

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13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, try to read in between the lines. The Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution, need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take, for instance, the case at hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances that the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the

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issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge, as alleged.

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14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805] , a two-judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held : ( Golconda Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805] , SCC p. 527, paras 5-7)

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“ 5 . … Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent the promotion of justice. In the exercise of its powers court would be justified in quashing any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of the court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out, even if the allegations are accepted in toto .

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6 . In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866] , this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings: (SCC OnLine SC para 6)

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( i ) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance, e.g. want of sanction;

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( ii ) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

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( iii ) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge .

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7 . In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether, on a reasonable appreciation of it, the accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge . The judicial process, no doubt, should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration

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before issuing the process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.” (emphasis supplied)

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The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The FIR reads that the informant was going to Solan on 04.04.2023 with Manish Gupta and Lakshender Singh. He reached Sector 6 when he saw the vehicle of the petitioner. The informant had carried out the work in the petitioner’s house, and the money was due to him. The informant asked for the money from the petitioner. The petitioner became infuriated. He insulted the informant by abusing him in the name of his caste and told him that he would not pay any money to the informant. The petitioner abuses the informant in the name of his caste whenever a demand is made from him.

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The police registered the FIR for the commission of an

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offence punishable under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC&ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, which reads as under:-

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“ 3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.

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(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe—

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Xxxx

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(s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;

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shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years and with a fine.”

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It is apparent from the bare perusal of the Section that if

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a person abuses a member of the Scheduled Caste by caste name in

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any place within the public view, the offence is committed. This

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Section does not require an intent to humiliate a member of the Scheduled Caste in a public place within public view. Therefore, the

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submission that no offence is made out because of the absence of the intent to humiliate the informant is not acceptable. This intent

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would have been relevant for an offence punishable under Section 3(1)(r), but is not relevant for an offence punishable under Section 3(1)(s). The judgments in Shajan Skaria (supra), Ramesh Chandra Vaishya (supra) and Hitesh Verma (supra) deals with Section 3(1) (x)/Section 3(1)(r) and are not relevant in the present case.

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Gulam Mustafa (supra) deals with an offence punishable under Section 3(1)(xv) and will not help in the interpretation of Section 3(1)(s).

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Ramawatar ( supra) deals with the quashing of the FIR based on the compromise and is not relevant for the interpretation of Section 3(1)(s).

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It was submitted that the petitioner had filed a complaint against the informant, and the FIR is a counterblast to the complaint filed by the petitioner. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction does not conduct a mini-

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trial to determine the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed :-

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“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) .

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14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060 :

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“ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this

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submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)

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“ 16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.”

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC. It was observed at page 397:

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“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 ]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)

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6 . … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …

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7 . … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.”

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It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025

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SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising the inherent jurisdiction should accept the allegations made in the FIR to be true. It was observed: -

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“29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held

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that, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice.”

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Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to

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determine the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR.

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It is undisputed that the police have filed the chargesheet before the learned Trial Court; hence, the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed:

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“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the

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Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.”

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No other point was urged.

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Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed.

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The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the miscellaneous applications, if any.

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The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

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(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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7^th July 2025. ( saurav pathania )

Ashwani Gupta v. State of Hp and Another

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Ashwani Gupta v. State of Hp and Another

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