Krishan Dutt v. State of Hp and Others

Himachal Pradesh HC21 Nov 2025CRMMO/525/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Quashing of FIR on compromise; stare decisis and horizontal precedent; refusal to refer to Larger Bench; Sections 279, 337, 338 IPC; Sections 181, 187 MV Act; regulatory offence objection by State; voluntary compromise affirmed by informant and injured; Cr.MMO No. 525 of 2025; High Court of Himachal Pradesh; Rakesh Kainthla, J.; Pankaj Dhiman; Anoop/Anup Gupta; Madan Lal; Arjun/Arun; Gopal Verma; Waman Rao; Sakshi; Total Environment Building Systems.

What did the court decide?

Quashing of FIR No. 110 of 2024, dated 23.6.2024, registered at Police Station Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P. for offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 IPC, and of the consequential proceedings arising out of the said FIR. ¶163

Krishan Dutt Vs State of Hp and Others — Motor Accident Claims | Himachal Pradesh HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

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Issue for consideration

Whether FIR No. 110 of 2024, dated 23.6.2024, registered at Police Station Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P. for offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 IPC, should be quashed on the basis of the compromise between the parties. +1 more

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Court's answer

The informant Ashok Kumar and injured Jagdish Kumar entered into the compromise voluntarily, without any influence from any person, and did not want to proceed further with the matter after the compromise.

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Ratio / Principle

The doctrine of stare decisis demands that a long-standing decision consistently followed by the Courts of law should not be lightly upset: this Court has consistently spoken through different Benches that offences punishable under Sections 181 and 187 of the MV Act, inter alia, can be quashed based on compromise, and this long line of decision should not be upset merely because the State now feels the offence is regulatory; the State is free to amend the law or to challenge the judgments before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, but it would be unwise to unsettle the long line of authorities which has caused no prejudice and on which people have acted for a long time.

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Key takeaways

The Court respectfully agreed with the judgments of the Coordinate Benches and declined to refer the matter to a Larger Bench, because doing so would result in unsettling the settled position, which is not justified in the present case.ratio¶159
The petition is allowed: FIR No. 110 of 2024, dated 23.6.2024, registered at Police Station Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P. for offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC, and the consequential proceedings arising out of the said FIR, are quashed.ratio¶160

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Approved for reporting. Quashing petition (Cr. MMO No. 525 of 2025, decided 21.11.2025, Rakesh Kainthla, J.) allowed. Krishan Dutt sought quashing of FIR No. 110 of 2024, P.S. Nahan, District Sirmour (Sections 279, 337, 338 IPC), on the basis of a compromise arrived at on 1.10.2024; the informant (Ashok Kumar) and the injured (Jagdish Kumar) affirmed on 20.6.2025 that the compromise was voluntary and that they did not wish to proceed further. The State opposed, submitting that investigation revealed the petitioner drove without a valid driving licence, a regulatory offence enacted for public benefit, which should not be quashed on compromise. The Court surveyed the consistent coordinate-Bench line (Anup Gupta; Madan Lal; Arun; Gopal Verma; and Pankaj Dhiman, which indicated that an offence under Section 181 MV Act is regulatory and prima facie cannot be quashed on compromise, yet quashed while leaving the question open) and, invoking the doctrine of stare decisis as explained in Waman Rao, Sakshi and Total Environment (and Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer), held that a long-standing, consistently followed line of decisions should not be lightly upset merely because the State now contends the offence is regulatory; the State remains free to amend the law or to challenge the precedents before the Supreme Court. Reference to a Larger Bench was declined as unjustified, and the FIR and consequential proceedings were quashed.

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2025:HHC:39280

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. MMO No. 525 of 2025 Reserved on: 29.10.2025 Date of Decision: 21.11.2025.

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Krishan Dutt ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. and others ...Respondents

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Coram
*Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthl*	a,Ju	*dge.*
*Whether approved for reporting?*¹		*Yes.*
For the Petitioner	:	Mr Karan Singh Kanwar, Advocate.
For Respondents No.1 to 3/State	:	Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General.
For Respondents No.4 and 5	:	Ms Shrutika Chauhan, Advocate, vice Mr Dheeraj K. Vashisht, Advocate.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioner has 昀椀led the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 110 of 2024, dated 23.6.2024. registered at Police Station Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P. for the commission of o昀昀ences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) based on the compromise between the

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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parties. It has been asserted that the parties have settled the matter on 1.10.2024 with the intervention of the respectable persons of the society. The informant/injured does not want to proceed further with the matter after the compromise. Hence the petition.

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The statements of the informant Ashok Kumar and injured Jagdish Kumar were recorded on 20.6.2025, in which they stated that they had entered into a compromise voluntarily without any in昀氀uence from any person, and they did not want to proceed further with the matter after the compromise.

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I have heard Mr Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondents No.1 to 3-State and Ms Shrutika Chauhan, learned vice counsel representing respondents No.4 and 5.

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Mr Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the parties have entered into a compromise between themselves. No fruitful purpose would be served by continuing the present proceedings. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be

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quashed based on the compromise. He relied upon the judgments of Pankaj Dhiman Vs. State of H.P. and others 2025:HHC:25362, Anoop Gupta Vs. Vandana and another, along with connected matter 2019:HHC:8041, Madan Lal and another Vs. State of H.P. and others 2018:HHC:8226, Arjun Vs. State of H.P. and another, Cr.MMO No. 1306 of 2022, decided on 3.4.2023 and Gopal Verma Vs. State of H.P. and others 2024:HHC:1734 in support of his submission.

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Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the police found after investigation that the petitioner was driving the vehicle without a valid driving licence, which is a regulatory o昀昀ence that has been enacted for the bene昀椀t of the public. It should not be quashed based on a compromise. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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Ms Shrutika Chauhan, learned vice counsel representing respondents No.4 and 5, adopted the submissions of Mr Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the petitioner.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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This Court had quashed the FIR registered for the commission of o昀昀ences punishable under Sections 181 and 187 of the MV Act in Anup Gupta Vs. Vandana 2019:HHC:8041 , Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act, inter alia, in Madan Lal Vs. State of H.P. 2018:HHC(8)226 , Arun Vs. State of HP, Cr.MMO No. 1306 of 2022, decided on 3.4.2023 and Gopal Verma v. State of H.P. 2024:HHC:1734 . This Court indicated in Pankaj Dhiman Vs State of HP:2025:HHC25362 that the o昀昀ence punishable under Section 181 of MV Act is regulatory, which prima facie cannot be quashed on the compromise; however, as advised, the Court was bound by the precedents and proceeded to quash the matter. The question whether the o昀昀ence punishable under Section 181 of the MV Act could be quashed based on a compromise was left open to be decided in an appropriate case.

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The principle stare decisis (stand by the thing decided) demands that a Court should decide a matter in the same way that it had decided in the past, even if the membership of the Court had changed or some members had changed their minds. It has been stated in Thinking Like a Lawyer- A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning, Frederick Schauer, Harvard University Press (2009) that

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in most matters it is more important that the question be settled than that it be decided right. It was observed: -

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“In addition to being obliged to follow the decisions of courts above them in the judicial hierarchy, courts are also, although less obviously and sometimes more controversially, expected to follow their own earlier decisions. Here, the relationship is horizontal, because the obligation is between some court now and the same court in the past. Horizontal precedent is thus not a matter of higher or lower courts, but rather an arti昀椀cial or imposed hierarchy from earlier to later. The earlier decision is superior not because it comes from a higher court; rather, the earlier decision becomes superior just because it is earlier. This obligation of a court to follow its own previous decisions is typically known as stare decisis—Latin for “stand by the thing decided”—and it is a distinct form of constraint by precedent. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, a court is expected to decide issues in the same way that it has decided them in the past, even if the membership of the court has changed, or even if the same members have changed their minds. Like vertical precedent, stare decisis—horizontal precedent—is about following the decisions of others. But although both vertical and horizontal precedents involve following the decisions of others, the distinction between a court’s following the decision of a higher court and its following its own previous decisions is important enough in numerous contexts to be worth emphasizing even before we see just what the obligation to follow entails, and before we examine the complications that are involved when these obligations arise in actual practice. (page 37)

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Yet as Holmes at other times recognised, even if Bentham did not, stare decisis does have something to be said for it. One argument in its favour was recognised by Justice Brandeis when he observed, famously, that “in most

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matters it is more important that [the question] be settled than that it be decided right.”[ Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) ] In life, and especially in law, it is often valuable to have things settled so that others can rely on those decisions and guide their behaviour accordingly. A company planning a commercial transaction needs to know which transactions are legally permissible and which are not, and this con昀椀dence and reliance would be lost were the risks too great that the relevant legal rules would be continually subject to change. From the perspective of those who are subject to law’s constraints, the gains from marginal improvements in the law are rarely su昀케cient to outweigh the losses that would come from being unable to rely even on imperfect legal rules and imperfect precedents. (page 43)

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Brandeis recognised that just as it is sometimes more important that things be settled than that they be settled correctly, so too is it sometimes more important that things be settled correctly than that they be settled in correctly or imperfectly just for the sake of settlement. However important it is on occasion to be right, following the past without regard to its rightness is pivotal to how law operates. Stare decisis, far from being a silly appendage to a decision-making system whose principal aim is to make the right decision now, in fact re昀氀ects something deep and enduring about a decision-making system that often serves the values of stability, consistency, settlement, and respect for the past just as other branches of government and other decision-making systems remain more 昀氀exible, less stable, less predictable, and more focused on the future. (page 44)

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The backwards-looking aspect of these modes of legal thinking is closely related to the concept of authority, for rules and precedents not only pull us backwards, but also force us away from our own best judgment in favour of

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someone else’s. When a court follows a rule, it does not decide for itself whether the rule is a good or a bad one. Nor does the court decide whether, in this case, to obey the rule. Instead, rules function as rules by excluding or preempting what would otherwise be good reasons for doing one thing or another. Judges following a rule look to the rule instead of the intrinsic merits of the case. (page 61)

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In these situations, it is su昀케cient that the precedent exists, for the very existence of a (binding) precedent precludes reevaluation of its wisdom and forecloses deciding whether following the precedent will produce the best result in the instant case. With respect to both rules and precedents, the key idea is that they are authoritative. Their force derives not from their soundness but from their status, and philosophers of law refer to this feature of authority as content-independence. When a rule (or a command, an order, or an instruction) is authoritative, its subjects are expected to obey regardless of their own opinions of its wisdom. In other words, what the rule says does not matter; where it comes from makes all the di昀昀erence. (Page 62)

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And so too in law, where the legal system demands that its judges—and the rest of us as well—follow even those rules and precedents that they think mistaken. Law’s subjects are expected to obey the rules and precedents because of their source and status, regardless of whether they are persuaded by the content of their reasoning, and even if they are not persuaded by the content of their reasoning. (page 64)

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This principle was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme

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Court in Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362, by stating that the legal system should furnish a clear guide for conduct so

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that the people may plan their a昀昀airs with assurance against surprise. Many times, it is more important that the law be settled than that it be settled right. It was observed:-

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“36. The doctrine of stare decisis is the basis of common law. It originated in England and was used in the colonies as the basis of their judicial decisions. According to Dias [ R.W.M. Dias: Jurisprudence, 4^th Edn. (1976), p. 166 ], the genesis of the rule may be sought in factors peculiar to English legal history, amongst which may be singled out the absence of a Code. The Normans forbade imposing an alien code on a half-conquered realm, but sought instead to win as much widespread con昀椀dence as possible in their administration of law by the application of near-uniform rules. The older the decision, the greater its authority and the more truly was it accepted as stating the correct law. As the gulf of time widened, says Dias, judges became increasingly reluctant to challenge old decisions. The learned Author cites the example of Bracton and Coke, who always preferred older authorities. In fact, Bracton had compiled a notebook of some two thousand cases as material for his treatise and employed some 昀椀ve hundred of them.

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37. The principle of stare decisis is also 昀椀rmly rooted in American jurisprudence. It is regarded as a rule of policy which promotes predictability, certainty, uniformity and stability. The legal system, it is said, should furnish a clear guide for conduct so that people may plan their a昀昀airs with assurance against surprise. It is important to further fair and expeditious adjudication by eliminating the need to relitigate every proposition in every case. [ See Harold J. Grilliot: Introduction to Law and the Legal System, 2nd Ed. (1979) , p. 132] When the weight of the volume of the decisions on a point of general public importance is heavy enough, courts are inclined to abide by the rule of stare decisis, leaving it to the legislature to change longstanding

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precedents if it so thinks it expedient or necessary. In Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co. [285 US 393, 406] Justice Brandeis stated that “stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right”.

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38. While dealing with the subject of stare decisis, Shri H.M. Seervai in his book on Constitutional Law of India [ 2nd Ed (1975), Vol. I, pp. 59-61 ] has pointed out how important it is for judges to conform to a certain measure of discipline so that decisions of old standing are not overruled for the reason merely that another view of the matter could also be taken. The learned Author has cited an Australian case in which it was said that, though the court has the power to reconsider its own decisions, that should not be done upon a mere suggestion that some or all of the members of the later court may arrive at a di昀昀erent conclusion if the matter were res integra. [ The Tramways case (No. 1), (1914) 18 CLR 54, per Gri昀케th CJ at p. 58 ] The learned Author then refers to two cases of our Supreme Court in which the importance of adherence to precedents was stressed. Jagannadhadas, J. said in the Bengal Immunity case [Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1955) 2 SCR 603: AIR 1955 SC 661 : (1955) 6 STC 446 ] that the 昀椀nality of the decisions of the Supreme Court, which is the Court of last resort, will be greatly weakened and much mischief done if we treat our own judgments, even though recent, as open to reconsideration. B.P. Sinha, J. said in the same case that if the Supreme Court were to review its own previous decisions simply on the ground that another view was possible, the litigant public may be encouraged to think that it is always worthwhile taking a chance with the highest Court of the land. In ITO v.T.S.D. Nadar [AIR 1968 SC 623: 68 ITR 252: (1968) 2 SCR 33 ] Hegde, J. said in his dissenting judgment that the Supreme Court should not overrule its decisions except under compelling circumstances. It is only when the court is fully convinced that the public interest of a substantial character would be

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jeopardised by a previous decision that the court should overrule that decision. Reconsideration of the earlier decisions, according to the learned Judge, should be con昀椀ned to questions of great public importance. Legal problems should not be treated as mere subjects for mental exercise. An earlier decision may therefore he overruled only if the court comes to the conclusion that it is manifestly wrong, not upon a mere suggestion that if the matter were res integra, the members of the later court may arrive at a di昀昀erent conclusion.

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39. These decisions and texts are of high authority and cannot be overlooked. In fact, these decisions are themselves precedents on the binding nature of precedents.”

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It was held in Sakshi v. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 518,

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that a rule of law, when clearly announced and established by the

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Court, should not be lightly disregarded. It was observed:-

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23. Stare decisis is a well-known doctrine in legal jurisprudence. The doctrine of stare decisis, meaning to stand by decided cases, rests upon the principle that law by which men are governed should be 昀椀xed, de昀椀nite and known, and that, when the law is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction authorised to construe it, such declaration, in absence of palpable mistake or error, is itself evidence of the law until changed by competent authority. It requires that the rules of law, when clearly announced and established by a court of last resort, should not be lightly disregarded and set aside, but should be adhered to and followed. What it precludes is that where a principle of law has become established by a series of decisions, it is binding on the courts and should be followed in similar cases. It is a wholesome doctrine that gives certainty to law and guides the people to mould their a昀昀airs in future.

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24. In Mishri Lal v. Dhirendra Nath [(1999) 4 SCC 11] importance of this doctrine was emphasised for the purpose of avoiding uncertainty and confusion, and paras 14, 15, 16 and 21 of the Report read as under: (SCC pp. 18-19 & 20-21)

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“ 14 . This Court in Maktul v. Manbhari [AIR 1958 SC 918] explained the scope of the doctrine of stare decisis with reference to Halsbury's Laws of England and Corpus Juris Secundum in the following manner:

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‘The principle of stare decisis is thus stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, 2^nd Edn .:

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“Apart from any question as to the courts being of coordinate jurisdiction, a decision which has been followed for a long period of time, and has been acted upon by persons in the formation of contracts or in the disposition of their property, or in the general conduct of a昀昀airs, or in legal procedure or in other ways, will generally be followed by courts of higher authority than the court establishing the rule, even though the court before whom the matter arises afterwards might not have given the same decision had the question come before it originally. But the Supreme Appellate Court will not shrink from overruling a decision, or series of decisions, which establish a doctrine plainly outside the statute and outside the common law, when no title and no contract will be shaken, no persons can complain, and no general course of dealing can be altered by the remedy of a mistake.”

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The same doctrine is thus explained in Corpus Juris Secundum —

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“Under the stare decisis rule, a principle of law which has become settled by a series of decisions generally is binding on the courts and should be followed in similar cases. This rule is based on expediency and public policy, and, although generally it should be strictly adhered to by the courts, it is not universally applicable.” ’

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15 . Be it noted, however, that the Corpus Juris Secundum adds a rider that

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‘previous decisions should not be followed to the extent that grievous wrong may result; and accordingly, the courts ordinarily will not adhere to a rule or principle established by previous decisions which they are convinced is erroneous. The rule of stare decisis is not so imperative or in昀氀exible as to preclude a departure therefrom in any case, but its application must be determined in each case by the discretion of the court, and previous decisions should not be followed to the extent that error may be perpetuated and grievous wrong may result.’

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16 . The statement, though, deserves serious consideration in the event of a de昀椀nite 昀椀nding as to the perpetration of a grave wrong, but that by itself does not denude the time-tested doctrine of stare decisis of its e昀케cacy. Taking recourse to the doctrine would be an imperative necessity to avoid uncertainty and confusion. The basic feature of law is its certainty, and in the event of there being uncertainty as regards the state of law, the society would be in utter confusion, the resultant e昀昀ect of which would bring about a situation of chaos — a situation which ought always to be avoided.

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21 . In this context, reference may also be made to two English decisions:

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( a ) In Admiralty Commrs. v. Valverda (Owners) [1938 AC 173: (1938) 1 All ER 162 (HL) ] (AC at p. 194) wherein the House of Lords observed that even long-established conveyancing practice, although not as authoritative as a judicial decision, will cause the House of Lords to hesitate before declaring it wrong, and

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( b ) In Button v. Director of Public Prosecution [1966 AC 591: (1965) 3 All ER 587 (HL)] the House of Lords observed:

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‘In Corpus Juris Secundum , a contemporary statement of American law, the stare decisis rule has been stated to be a principle of law which has become settled by a series of decisions generally, is binding on the courts and should be followed in similar cases. It has been stated that this rule is based on expediency and public policy and should be strictly adhered to by the courts. Under this rule, courts are bound to follow the common law as it has been judicially declared in previously adjudicated cases and rules of substantive law should be reasonably interpreted and administered. This rule has to preserve the harmony and stability of the law and to make as steadfast as possible judicially declared principles a昀昀ecting the rights of property, it being indispensable to the due administration of justice, especially by a court of last resort, that a question once deliberately examined and decided should be considered as settled and closed to further argument. It is a salutary rule, entitled to great weight and ordinarily should be strictly adhered

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to by the courts. The courts are slow to interfere with the principle announced by the decision, and it may be upheld even though they would decide otherwise were the question a new one, or equitable considerations might suggest a di昀昀erent result and although it has been erroneously applied in a particular case. The rule represents an element of continuity in law and is rooted in the psychological need to satisfy reasonable expectations, but it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder and veri昀椀ed by experience.’ ”

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It was held in Total Environment Building Systems v.

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CCT, (2022) 16 SCC 219 that before reviewing its earlier decision, the Court itself must satisfy itself whether it is necessary to do so in the interest of the pubic or for any other compelling reason. It was observed: -

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“24. While considering the prayer made on behalf of the Revenue to review and/or revisit the earlier decision of this Court in Larsen & Toubro [CCE & Customs v. Larsen & Toubro Ltd., (2016) 1 SCC 170] , a few decisions on the principle of stare decisis are required to be referred to and considered.

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25. In Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra [Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 8 SCC 1] , after considering the earlier decision of the seven-Judge

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Constitution Bench in Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT [Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 80 : (1965) 56 ITR 365: AIR 1965 SC 1636 : (1965) 2 SCR 908] , it is observed and held that before reviewing and revising its earlier decision the Court must satisfy itself whether it is necessary to do so in the interest of public good or for any other compelling reason and the Court must endeavour to maintain certainty and continuity in the interpretation of the law in the country.

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26. After discussing the law on the principle of stare decisis, it is observed and held that the relevance and signi昀椀cance of the principle of stare decisis have to be kept in mind and that, in law, certainty, consistency and continuity are highly desirable features. While holding so, in paras 453 to 456, it is observed and held as under:

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( Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil case [Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 8 SCC 1], SCC pp. 23941 )

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“ 453 . The seven-Judge Constitution Bench judgment in Keshav Mills [Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 80 : (1965) 56 ITR 365: AIR 1965 SC 1636 : (1965) 2 SCR 908 ] has unanimously held that before reviewing and revising its earlier decision the Court must itself satisfy whether it is necessary to do so in the interest of public good or for any other compelling reason and the Court must endeavour to maintain a certainty and continuity in the interpretation of the law in the country.

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454 . In Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta [Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta, (2018) 10 SCC 396 : (2019) 1 SCC (L&S) 86] , the prayer to refer the Constitution Bench judgment in M. Nagaraj [M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 1013] was rejected by the Constitution Bench relying on the law as laid down in Keshav Mills

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case [Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 80 : (1965) 56 ITR 365: AIR 1965 SC 1636 : (1965) 2 SCR 908] . In para 9, the following has been laid down : ( Jarnail Singh case [Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta, (2018) 10 SCC 396 : (2019) 1 SCC (L&S) 86] , SCC pp. 410-11)

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‘ 9 . Since we are asked to revisit a unanimous Constitution Bench judgment, it is important to bear in mind the admonition of the Constitution Bench judgment in Keshav Mills [Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 80 : (1965) 56 ITR 365: AIR 1965 SC 1636 : (1965) 2 SCR 908] . This Court said:

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“ 23 . … in reviewing and revising its earlier decision, this Court should ask itself whether, in the interests of the public good or for any other valid and compulsive reasons, it is necessary that the earlier decision should be revised. When this Court decides questions of law, its decisions are, under Article 141, binding on all courts within the territory of India, and so, it must be the constant endeavour and concern of this Court to introduce and maintain an element of certainty and continuity in the interpretation of law in the country. Frequent exercise by this Court of its power to review its earlier decisions on the ground that the view pressed before it later appears to the Court to be more reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law uncertain and introduce confusion, which must be consistently avoided. That is not to say that if on a subsequent occasion, the Court is satis昀椀ed that its earlier decision was clearly erroneous, it should hesitate to

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correct the error; but before a previous decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the Court must be satis昀椀ed with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its members that a revision of the said view is fully justi昀椀ed. It is not possible or desirable, and in any case, it would be inexpedient to lay down any principles which should govern the approach of the Court in dealing with the question of reviewing and revising its earlier decisions. It would always depend upon several relevant considerations — What is the nature of the in昀椀rmity or error on which a plea for a review and revision of the earlier view is based? On the earlier occasion, did some patent aspects of the question remain unnoticed, or was the attention of the Court not drawn to any relevant and material statutory provision, or was any previous decision of this Court bearing on the point not noticed? Is the Court hearing such a plea fairly unanimous that there is such an error in the earlier view? What would be the impact of the error on the general administration of law or on public good? Has the earlier decision been followed on subsequent occasions either by this Court or by the High Courts? And, would the reversal of the earlier decision lead to public inconvenience, hardship or mischief? These and other relevant considerations must be carefully borne in mind whenever this Court is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction to review and revise its earlier decisions. These considerations become still more

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signi昀椀cant when the earlier decision happens to be a unanimous decision of a Bench of 昀椀ve learned Judges of this Court.” ’

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455 . The principle of stare decisis also commends us not to accept the submissions of Shri Rohatgi. The Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat [State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534] , explaining the principle of stare decisis, laid down the following in paras 111 and 118 : (SCC pp. 589 & 591)

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‘ 111 . Stare decisis is a Latin phrase which means “to stand by decided cases; to uphold precedents; to maintain former adjudication”. This principle is expressed in the maxim “ stare decisis et non quieta movere ”, which means to stand by decisions and not to disturb what is settled. This was aptly put by Lord Coke in his classic English version as “Those things which have been so often adjudged ought to rest in peace”. However, according to Frankfurter, J., the doctrine of stare decisis is not “an imprisonment of reason” ( Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyer, 3rd Edn. 2005, Vol. 4, p. 4456 ). The underlying logic of the doctrine is to maintain consistency and avoid uncertainty. The guiding philosophy is that a view which has held the 昀椀eld for a long time should not be disturbed only because another view is possible.

¶110

¶111

118 . The doctrine of stare decisis is generally to be adhered to because well-settled principles of law founded on a series of authoritative pronouncements ought to be followed. Yet, the demands of the changed facts and circumstances, dictated by

¶112

¶113

2025:HHC:39280

¶114

forceful factors supported by logic, amply justify the need for a fresh look.’

¶115

456 . The Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney [Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217: 1992 SCC (L&S) Supp 1] speaking through B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. has held that the relevance and signi昀椀cance of the principle of stare decisis have to be kept in mind. It was reiterated that in law, certainty, consistency and continuity are highly desirable features. Following are the exact words in para 683 : (SCC p. 657)

¶116

‘ 683 . … Though we are sitting in a larger Bench, we have kept in mind the relevance and signi昀椀cance of the principle of stare decisis . We are conscious of the fact that in law, certainty, consistency and continuity are highly desirable features. Where a decision has stood the test of time and has never been doubted, we have respected it … unless, of course, there are compelling and strong reasons to depart from it. Where, however, such uniformity is not found, we have tried to answer the question on principle, keeping in mind the scheme and goal of our Constitution and the material placed before us.’ ”

¶117

27. In Shah Faesal v. Union of India [Shah Faesal v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 1] , the Constitution Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the principle of stare decisis and the law of precedents/reconsideration/review of earlier decisions. After considering the decision of this Court in Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P. [Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P., (2002) 4 SCC 234: 2002 SCC (L&S) 496] , SCC para 22, it is observed and held by this Court that doctrines of precedents and stare decisis are the core values of our legal system. They form the tools which further the goal of certainty, stability and continuity in our legal system. When a decision is rendered by this Court, it acquires a reliance interest, and society organises itself based on the

¶118

¶119

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¶120

present legal order. By observing and holding so, it is observed in paras 17 to 19 as under : (SCC p. 10)

¶121

“ 17 . This Court's jurisprudence has shown that usually the courts do not overrule the established precedents unless there is a social, constitutional or economic change mandating such a development. The numbers themselves speak of restraint and the value this Court attaches to the doctrine of precedent. This Court regards the use of precedent as indispensable bedrock upon which this Court renders justice. The use of such precedents, to some extent, creates certainty upon which individuals can rely and conduct their a昀昀airs. It also creates a basis for the development of the rule of law. As the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, John Roberts observed during his Senate con昀椀rmation hearing, ‘ It is a jolt to the legal system when you overrule a precedent. Precedent plays an important role in promoting stability and even-handedness . [ Congressional Record-Senate, Vol. 156, Pt. 7, 10018 (7-6-2010).]

¶122

18 . Doctrines of precedents and stare decisis are the core values of our legal system. They form the tools which further the goal of certainty, stability and continuity in our legal system. Arguably, Judges owe a duty to the concept of certainty of law; therefore, they often justify their holdings by relying upon the established tenets of law.

¶123

19 . When a decision is rendered by this Court, it acquires a reliance interest, and the society organises itself based on the present legal order. When substantial judicial time and resources are spent on references, the same should not be made in a casual or cavalier manner. It is only when a proposition is contradicted by a subsequent judgment of the same Bench, or it is shown that the proposition laid down has become unworkable or contrary to a wellestablished principle, that a reference will be made

¶124

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¶126

to a larger Bench. In this context, a 昀椀ve-Judge Bench of this Court in Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P. [Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P., (2002) 4 SCC 234: 2002 SCC (L&S) 496 ], after considering a series of earlier rulings, reiterated that : (SCC p. 245, para 22)

¶127

‘ 22 . … The doctrine of binding precedent is of utmost importance in the administration of our judicial system. It promotes certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. Judicial consistency promotes con昀椀dence in the system; therefore, there is a need for consistency in the enunciation of legal principles in the decisions of this Court .’ ”(emphasis in original)

¶128

28. It is observed and held in the aforesaid decision that even the rule of overruling the judgments should be applied with great caution, and only when the previous decision is manifestly wrong, as, for instance, if it proceeded upon a mistaken assumption of the continuance of a repealed or expired statute, or is contrary to a decision of another court which the court is bound to follow; not, upon a mere suggestion, that some or all of the members of the court might later arrive at a di昀昀erent conclusion if the matter was res integra. It is further observed that otherwise there would be great danger of want of continuity in the interpretation of law. It is further observed and held that the decisions rendered by a coordinate Bench are binding on the subsequent Benches of equal or lesser strength, and a coordinate Bench of the same strength cannot take a contrary view than what has been held by another coordinate Bench unless it is shown to be per incuriam.

¶129

29. At this stage, a few decisions of this Court on consistency, certainty and uniformity also deserve consideration, which are as under.

¶130

30. This Court in State of A.P. v. A.P. Jaiswal [State of A.P. v. A.P. Jaiswal, (2001) 1 SCC 748: 2001 SCC (L&S) 316] has observed as under : (SCC p. 761, para 24)

¶131

¶132

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¶133

“ 24 . Consistency is the cornerstone of the administration of justice. It is consistency that creates con昀椀dence in the system, and this consistency can never be achieved without respect for the rule of 昀椀nality. It is with a view to achieving consistency in judicial pronouncements, the courts have evolved the rule of precedents, the principle of stare decisis, etc. These rules and principles are based on public policy.…”

¶134

The aforesaid observations are equally, if not more, meaningful and relevant to tax matters.

¶135

31. This Court, in the Constitution Bench judgment in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh [Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 754] , on the question of the merit of promoting certainty and consistency in judicial decisions, had observed that this enables an organic development of law, besides assuring the individuals as to the consequences of transactions forming part of his daily a昀昀airs, and, therefore, there is a need for clear and consistent enunciation of legal principles in the decision of a court.

¶136

32. In K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India [K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 473: 1997 SCC (L&S) 1520] , this Court again emphasised the aspect of consistency, certainty and uniformity in the 昀椀eld of judicial decisions as it sets a pattern upon which future conduct may be based. One of the basic principles of the administration of justice is that identical/similar cases should be decided alike. This is the foundation of the doctrine of precedent, which has considerable bene昀椀ts and advantages. Emphasis on the law of precedent, which promotes certainty and consistency, was also noticed in SundarjasKanyalal Bhatija v. Collector [SundarjasKanyalal Bhatija v. Collector, (1989) 3 SCC 396] , by emphasising that it is the duty of the courts to make the law more predictable. The law must be made more e昀昀ective as a guide to behaviour; otherwise, the lawyers or, for that matter, laymen would be in a predicament and would not know how to advise or conduct themselves. The general

¶137

¶138

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¶139

public should not be in a dilemma to obey or not to obey such a law.

¶140

33. In Medley Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. CCE [Medley Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. CCE, (2011) 2 SCC 601] , the question before this Court was whether “physicians’ samples” are excisable goods, considering that they are prohibited from being sold under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Observing that since this Court has consistently held that the medical supplies supplied to the doctors are liable to excise duty, the issue involved in this case was no longer res integra. Relying on the Constitution Bench decision in Waman Rao v. Union of India [Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362 ], it was held : ( Medley Pharmaceuticals case [Medley Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. CCE, (2011) 2 SCC 601] , SCC pp. 617-18, para 43)

¶141

“ 43 . It is settled law that this Court should follow an earlier decision that has withstood the changes in time, irrespective of the rationale of the view taken. It was held by a Constitution Bench in Waman Rao v. Union of India [Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362] : (SCC p. 393, para 40)

¶142

‘ 40 . It is also true to say that for the application of the rule of stare decisis, it is not necessary that the earlier decision or decisions of longstanding should have considered and either accepted or rejected the particular argument which is advanced in the case on hand. Were it so, the previous decisions could more easily be treated as binding by applying the law of precedent, and it would be unnecessary to take resort to the principle of stare decisis. It is, therefore, su昀케cient for invoking the rule of stare decisis that a certain decision was arrived at on a question which arose or was argued, no matter on what reason the decision rests or what is the basis of the decision. In other words, for the purpose of applying the rule of stare decisis, it is

¶143

¶144

2025:HHC:39280

¶145

unnecessary to enquire or determine as to what was the rationale of the earlier decision which is said to operate as stare decisis.’ ”

¶146

34. In Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2001) 1 SCC 91] this Court refused to indulge on the question of delegated legislation in taxing statute since the authority of the legislature in introducing the statute in question i.e. Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 could not be doubted and in any event, was a settled proposition of law for more than a decade.

¶147

35. Applying the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court rejected the plea to reconsider the decision in State of M.P. v. Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills Ltd. [State of M.P. v. Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills Ltd., 1995 Supp (1) SCC 642] in the following words : ( Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries case [Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries Ltd.v. Union of India, (2001) 1 SCC 91 ], SCC p. 117, para 35)

¶148

“ 35 . In the wake of the aforesaid, we do feel it expedient to record that taking recourse to the doctrine as above would be an imperative necessity, so as to avoid uncertainty and confusion, since the basic feature of law is its certainty and in the event of any departure therefrom the society would be in utter confusion and the resultant e昀昀ect of which would be legal anarchy and judicial indiscipline — a situation which always ought to be avoided. The Central Legislature introduced the legislation (MMRD Act) in the year 1957, and several hundreds and thousands of cases have already been dealt with on the basis thereof, and the e昀昀ect of a declaration of a contrary law would be totally disastrous, a昀昀ecting the very basics of the Revenue jurisprudence. It is true that the doctrine has no statutory sanction, but it is a rule of convenience, expediency, prudence and above all, the public policy. It is to be observed in its

¶149

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observance rather than in its breach to serve the people and subserve the ends of justice.”

¶152

36. What was said by the Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India [Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217: 1992 SCC (L&S) Supp 1] and Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT [Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 80 : (1965) 56 ITR 365: AIR 1965 SC 1636 : (1965) 2 SCR 908] , on the principle of stare decisis clearly bind us. The judgment of this Court in Larsen & Toubro [CCE & Customs v. Larsen & Toubro Ltd., (2016) 1 SCC 170] has stood the test of time and has never been doubted earlier. As observed hereinabove, the said decision has been followed consistently by this Court as well as by various High Courts and the Tribunals. Therefore, if the prayer made on behalf of the Revenue to reconsider and/or review the judgment of this Court in Larsen &Toubro [CCE & Customs v. Larsen & Toubro Ltd., (2016) 1 SCC 170] is accepted, in that case, it will a昀昀ect so many other assesses in whose favour the decisions have already been taken relying upon and/or following the decision of this Court in Larsen & Toubro [ CCE & Customs v. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. , (2016) 1 SCC 170] and it may unsettle the law, which has been consistently followed since 2015 onwards. There are all possibilities of contradictory orders. Therefore, on the principle of stare decisis, we are of the 昀椀rm view that the judgment of this Court in Larsen & Toubro [CCE & Customs v. Larsen & Toubro Ltd., (2016) 1 SCC 170] , neither needs to be revisited, nor referred to a larger Bench of this Court as prayed for i.e. after a period of almost seven years and as observed hereinabove when no e昀昀orts were made to 昀椀le any review application requesting to review the judgment on the grounds, which are now canvassed before this Court.”

¶153

Therefore, the doctrine of stare decisis demands that a

¶154

long-standing decision consistently followed by the Courts of law

¶155

should not be lightly upset. The judgments cited at bar and many

¶156

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¶158

other judgments show that this Court has consistently spoken through di昀昀erent Benches that o昀昀ences punishable under Sections 181 and 187 of the MV Act, inter alia, can be quashed based on compromise. This long line of decision should not be upset merely because the State now feels that the o昀昀ence is regulatory and should not be allowed to be quashed. The State is free to amend the law to get over the consistent decisions of this Court or to challenge the judgment before the Hon’ble Supreme Court; however, it would be unwise to unsettle the long line of authorities when it has not caused any prejudice to any person, and the people have acted upon such an authority for a long time.

¶159

Therefore, I respectfully agree with the judgments of the Coordinate Benches of this Court and decline to refer the matter to a Larger Bench, because doing so would result in unsettling the settled position, which is not justi昀椀ed in the present case.

¶160

In view of the above, the present petition is allowed and FIR No. 110 of 2024, dated 23.6.2024. registered at Police Station Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P. for the commission of o昀昀ences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC

¶161

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and consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. are quashed.

¶164

Petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so also pending applications, if any.

¶165

Parties are permitted to produce a copy of this judgment, downloaded from the webpage of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, before the authorities concerned, and the said authorities shall not insist on the production of a certi昀椀ed copy,

¶166

but if required, may verify passing of the order from the Website of the High Court.

¶167

( Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

¶168

21^st November, 2025 (Chander)

Krishan Dutt v. State of Hp and Others

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Krishan Dutt v. State of Hp and Others

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