Dismissed¶71

Dev Raj and Others v. State of Hp and Another

Himachal Pradesh HC11 Aug 2025CRMMO/515/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Quashing of FIR refused; Cr. MMO 515/2025; FIR No. 08 of 2025, Women Police Station Shimla; Sections 85, 115(2), 351(2) BNS 2023 dowry cruelty allegations; DV Act complaint (Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 23) and criminal FIR can continue simultaneously; two-FIR principle inapplicable to DV Act proceedings; Section 482 inherent powers; Bhajan Lal categories; allegations taken at face value at threshold; Geeta Kapoor followed; Samta Naidu, Krishna Lal Chawla, Parwez Samuel Koul distinguished; petition dismissed 11.08.2025; 2025:HHC:27065.

What did the court decide?

A court exercising inherent jurisdiction must take the allegations in the FIR as correct; falsity alleged by the petitioners does not help them, and the court cannot embark on an enquiry into the reliability or genuineness of the allegations at the quashing stage. ¶48

Dev Raj and Others Vs State of Hp and Another — Domestic Violence | Himachal Pradesh HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

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Issue for consideration

Whether FIR No. 08 of 2025, registered at Women Police Station Shimla against the petitioners for offences under Sections 85, 115(2) and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, should be quashed. +1 more

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Court's answer

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Ratio / Principle

The allegations in the FIR prima facie show that the petitioners treated the informant with cruelty; therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR.

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Key takeaways

The complaint under the DV Act and the FIR serve entirely different purposes — the DV Act complaint sought a restraint order against physical or mental torture, maintenance of Rs. 65,000/- and return of Stridhan, whereas the FIR seeks action as per law — so the registration of the FIR on the basis of the same allegations is permissible.ratio¶59
The principle that two FIRs cannot be lodged regarding the same incident does not apply where one proceeding is a complaint under the DV Act; accordingly, the judgments cited at the bar in support of that principle (including the Supreme Court judgments relied on by the petitioners) are not applicable to the present case.ratio¶66
The observations made in the judgment are confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

High Court of Himachal Pradesh (Rakesh Kainthla, J.) dismissed a petition seeking quashing of FIR No. 08 of 2025 (Women Police Station Shimla, dated 25.04.2025) registered under Sections 85, 115(2) and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Held: (i) a court exercising inherent jurisdiction must take the allegations in the FIR as correct and cannot test their truthfulness at the quashing stage (relying on Punit Beriwala and Maneesha Yadav, applying the Bhajan Lal categories); (ii) a complaint under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act and an FIR based on the same allegations have entirely different purposes — the former sought a restraint order, maintenance of Rs. 65,000/- and return of Stridhan, the latter action under law — and can proceed simultaneously; the principle that two FIRs cannot be lodged for the same incident does not apply, following Geeta Kapoor (P&H HC), and the precedents urged by the petitioners (Samta Naidu, Krishna Lal Chawla, Parwez Samuel Koul) were held not applicable. The FIR allegations prima facie disclosed cruelty, making quashing impermissible. Observations confined to the disposal of the petition without bearing on the merits.

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2025:HHC:27065 )

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. MMO No. 515 of 2025. Reserved on: 01.08.2025 Date of Decision: 11.08.2025.

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Dev Raj and others ...Petitioners Versus State of H.P. and another ...Respondents Coram

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Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹ yes

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For Petitioners	: Mr. Advo	Ajay cate.	Kumar Dhiman,
For Respondent No. 1/State	: Mr.	Jiten	der K. Sharma,
	Addi	tional	Advocate General.Ji

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 08 of 2025, dated 25.04.2025, registered at Women Police Station Shimla, District Shimla, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 85, 115(2) and 351(2) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) against the petitioners.

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police

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that she was married to Amit Bharti as per Hindu Rites and Customs on 06.02.2024. The informant and her parents were told that no dowry was to be given. The parents-in-law of the informant started making demands for clothes, ornaments and gifts after the distribution of the cards. The informant’s parents and brother gave a diamond ring and a gold chain to her husband. Gold rings were also gifted to the informant’s parents-in-law, and a gold chain was gifted to the informant’s brother-in-law. Gold earrings and silver ornaments were provided to the informant’s mother-in-law. The informant’s relatives were compelled to provide the clothes to the relatives of the informant’s husband. A huge amount was spent by the informant’s relatives at the time of her marriage. Informant’s ornaments were taken by her mother-in-law. Her mother-inlaw started taunting her by saying that the condition of her parents and brother was not financially good. Clothes were demanded from the informant for her mother-in-law and sisters in law. The informant brought the clothes, but she was told that these were of inferior quality. The informant’s mother-in-law

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pulled the informant’s hair, and her father-in-law slapped her. They threatened to kill the informant. The gifts were demanded during the festivals of Karwachauth and Dipawali. Her husband used to remain in a state of intoxication and treat the informant with cruelty. The informant was studying at H.P. University. The relatives of the informant’s husband visited her hostel on 01.12.2024 and forced her to leave the hostel. The matter was reported to the police. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation.

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Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the petitioners have filed the present petition, asserting that the informant resided in her matrimonial home for about 02 months. She filed a false complaint against the petitioners, as she was not allowed to accompany her husband to Germany. The FIR is an abuse of the process of the Court. She had filed a complaint to the Vice Chancellor, H.P. University, Shimla. She also filed a complaint under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20 and 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (in short “DV Act”) before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla. Filing of the complaints under the DV Act and IPC is not permissible.

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Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed.

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I have heard Mr. Ajay Kumar Dhiman, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1-State.

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Mr. Ajay Kumar Dhiman, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false. The informant had filed a complaint under the DV Act. She filed an FIR containing the same allegations as were made in the complaint filed under the DV Act. The filing of the complaint under the DV Act and IPC is impermissible. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed; the FIR and consequent proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed. He relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Samta Naidu & Anr. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr [Criminal Appeal Nos. 367-368 of 2020, decided on 02.03.2020], Krishna Lal Chawla & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr [Criminal Appeal No.283 of 2021, decided on 08.03.2021] and judgment of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar in Parwez Samuel Koul & Ors. Vs. UT & J&K through

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Principal Secretary & Ors [ CRM(M) No.112/2020 c/w CRM(M) N. 28/2020, decided on 07.02.2023], in support of his submission.

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Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent No.1-State, submitted that the complaint under the DV Act is not criminal. It is filed to seek maintenance and other reliefs. The principle that two FIRs cannot be registered regarding the same incident does not apply to the complaint filed under the DV Act and the FIR registered regarding the cruelty. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

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“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

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8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

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In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

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As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

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Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal

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proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”

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This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

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Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

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“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

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9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby preempting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia , contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides ; ( ii ) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii ) no prima facie offence is made out; ( iv ) the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 )

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The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false. This submission will not help the petitioner. The Court exercising inherent jurisdiction has to take the allegations in the FIR as correct. This position was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: -

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“29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where noninterference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice.”

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It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P.,

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2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed : -

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“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the

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cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) .

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14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060 :

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“ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)

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“ 16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, chargesheet, documents, etc. or not.”

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It was submitted that the petitioner had filed a complaint under the DV Act, and the registration of the FIR on the basis of the same allegations is impermissible. This submission cannot be accepted. The complaint under the DV Act was filed to seek a restraint order not to commit any physical or mental torture, maintenance of ₹65,000/- and return of the Stridhan, whereas the FIR has been filed for taking action as per the law. The purpose of the two proceedings is entirely different. It was laid down by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Geeta Kapoor v. State of Haryana, 2013 SCC OnLine P&H 21610, that the proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act and the IPC are different, and they can continue simultaneously. It was observed:

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Point No.(ii)

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The next point to be decided is as to whether, on the same set of facts, two separate proceedings, one under Section 198-A IPC and the other under the D.V. Act, 2005, are maintainable or not.

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The Domestic Violence Act is a social welfare legislation, and the proceedings have to be construed as civil in nature. As far as reliefs are concerned, only if the reliefs ordered are not obeyed, the provision comes into effect and proceedings are initiated as criminal. But the proceedings under Section 498-A IPC are of a criminal nature because it is an offence under the Penal Code, 1860, on which procedure under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act is applicable. Under Section 498-A IPC, only

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punishment provided under the Code is awarded to the offender. In a complaint under the D.V. Act, the rights of a woman granted under various statutes are protected and implemented. A woman need not file different cases for various reliefs such as custody of children, maintenance, right of residence, etc., but she can claim different reliefs by filing proceedings under the D.V. Act. So, both cases are of a different nature and have no bearing upon each other. However, a Magistrate in proceedings under the D.V. Act can also add Section 498-A IPC in order to inflict punishment upon the offender. The proceedings under the D.V. Act are of a summoning nature, and immediate relief is to be granted to a victim. The main object of the D.V. Act is to provide protection to a helpless woman so that she is not ousted from the husband's house or she is compelled to leave her in-laws’ house by the Acts of her in-laws' family members. Besides, allowing shelter in her in-laws’ house, she is also granted financial support from the coffers of her husband, but it is not provided under Section 498-A of the Code.

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So, keeping in view the intention of our law framers, it is held that both proceedings are of a different nature and can be filed separately. In this case, the proceedings under the D.V Act can continue on the same set of facts of a case under Section 406, 498-A IPC.

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Therefore, the principle that two FIRs cannot be lodged regarding the same incident does not apply to the present case, and the judgments cited at the bar in support of this principle are also not applicable to the present case.

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The allegation in the FIR, prima facie , shows that the petitioners had treated the informant with cruelty. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR.

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