Dismissed¶89

Ashish Sharma and Another v. State of Hp and Another

Himachal Pradesh HC10 Jul 2025CRMMO/494/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Quashing of FIR on compromise denied — robbery (Section 309(4) BNS) held non-quashable in exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Cr. MMO No. 494 of 2025, High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla (Rakesh Kainthla, Judge), decided 10.07.2025 [2025:HHC:22065]. FIR No. 12 of 2025 dated 11.1.2025 under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 351(2), 309(4) and 3(5) BNS 2023; Section 482 CrPC inherent powers; Bhajan Lal categories; Gian Singh; Ramgopal; Laxmi Narayan; Narinder Singh; petition dismissed.

What did the court decide?

In view of the binding precedent, the offence involving robbery cannot be quashed in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction, even though the parties have compromised and the informant/victim does not wish to proceed. ¶88

Ashish Sharma and Another Vs State of Hp and Another — Himachal Pradesh HC (2025) — LawSathi Research

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2025:HHC:22065

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. MMO No. 494 of 2025 Reserved on: 3.07.2025 Date of Decision: 10.07.2025.

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Ashish Sharma and another ...Petitioners Versus State of H.P. and another ...Respondents

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Coram

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Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge.

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Whether approved for reporting?¹ No.

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For the Petitioners :	M/s Parav Sharma and Shekhar Badola, Advocates.
For Respondent No.1/State:	Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General.
For Respondent No.2 :	Mr. Shivam Sharma, Advocate.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 12 of 2025, dated 11.1.2025, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 351(2), 309(4) and 3(5) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 based on the compromise effected between the

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parties.

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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When the matter was listed on 17.6.2025, the Court noticed that the offence punishable under Section 309(4) of BNS is regarding robbery, and it was highly doubtful that such an offence could be quashed in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction; therefore, the matter was listed for consideration.

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I have heard M/s Parav Sharma and Shekhar Badola, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent No.1-State and Mr. Shivam Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.2/complainant.

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Mr. Parav Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the matter has been compromised between the parties, and the informant/victim does not want to proceed further with the case because of the compromise. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Ranjeet Kumar v. State of H.P. and others, Cr.MMO No. 648 of 2023, decided on 8.12.2023 in support of his submission.

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Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the offence of robbery

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affects society at large and is not a private offence. Therefore, the same should not be quashed.

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Mr. Shivam Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.2/complainant adopted the stand taken by learned counsel for the petitioners.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

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“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise

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to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned

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Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

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8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

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In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

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As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

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Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”

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This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

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“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,

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may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

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9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia , contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides ; ( ii ) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii ) no prima facie offence is made out; ( iv ) the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 )

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The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303, that the offence affecting the public at large, like robbery, dacoity, could not be quashed based on the compromise effected between the parties. It was observed:-

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48. A five-judge Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab [(2007) 4 CTC 769 ] was called upon to determine, inter alia, the question whether the High Court has the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings or allow the compounding of the offences in the cases which have been specified as noncompoundable offences under the provisions of Section 320 of the Code. The five-Judge Bench referred to quite a few decisions of this Court including the decisions in Madhu Limaye [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10], Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], L. Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC 699: 1977 SCC (Cri) 404], Simrikhia [(1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327], B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] and Ram Lal [(1999) 2 SCC 213: 1999 SCC (Cri) 123] and framed the following guidelines : ( Kulwinder Singh case [(2007) 4 CTC 769], CTC pp. 783-84, para 21)

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“ 21 . … ‘( a ) Cases arising from matrimonial discord, even if other offences are introduced for aggravation of the case.

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( b ) Cases pertaining to property disputes between close relations, which are predominantly civil in nature, and they have a genuine or belaboured dimension of criminal liability. Notwithstanding a touch of criminal liability, the settlement would bring lasting peace and harmony to a larger number of people.

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( c ) Cases of dispute between old partners or business concerns with dealings over a long period, which are predominantly civil and are given or acquire a criminal dimension, but the parties are essentially seeking a redressal of their financial or commercial claim.

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( d ) Minor offences under Section 279 IPC may be permitted to be compounded on the basis of a legitimate settlement between the parties. Yet another offence which remains non-compoundable is Section 506(II) IPC, which is punishable with 7 years imprisonment. It is the judicial experience that an offence under Section 506 IPC, in most cases, is based on the oral declaration with different shades of intention. Another set of offences,

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which ought to be liberally compounded, are Sections 147 and 148 IPC, more particularly where other offences are compoundable. It may be added here that the State of Madhya Pradesh vide M.P. Act 17 of 1999 (Section 3) has made Sections 506(II) IPC, 147 IPC and 148 IPC compoundable offences by amending the schedule under Section 320 CrPC.

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( e ) The offences against the human body other than murder and culpable homicide where the victim dies in the course of the transaction would fall in the category where compounding may not be permitted. Heinous offences like highway robbery, dacoity or a case involving clear-cut allegations of rape should also fall in the prohibited category. Offences committed by public servants purporting to act in that capacity, as also offences against public servants while the victims are acting in the discharge of their duty, must remain noncompoundable. Offences against the State enshrined in Chapter VII (relating to the army, navy and air force) must remain non-compoundable.

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( f ) That, as a broad guideline, offences against the human body other than murder and culpable homicide may be permitted to be compounded when the court is in the position to record a finding that the settlement between the parties is voluntary and fair.

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While parting with this part, it appears necessary to add that the settlement or compromise must satisfy the conscience of the court. The settlement must be just and fair, besides being free from undue pressure; the court must examine the cases of weaker and vulnerable victims with necessary caution.’

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To conclude, it can safely be said that there can never be any hard and fast category which can be prescribed to enable the court to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC. The only principle that can be laid down is the one which has been incorporated in the section itself, i.e. ‘to prevent abuse of the process of any court’ or ‘to secure the ends of justice’.”

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12. In Ranjeet Kumar (supra) , this Court quoted the

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judgment of Ramgopal v. State of M.P., (2022) 14 SCC 531: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 834 , wherein it was held at page 538: -

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10. The compendium of these broad fundamentals structured in more than one judicial precedent, has been recapitulated by another three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan [State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688 , para 15: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706] elaborating : (SCC pp. 704-705, para 15)

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“ 15 . … 15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

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15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.

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15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of a compromise between the victim and the offender; 15.4. ***

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15.5.While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and

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the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc. ”

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(emphasis supplied) 11. True it is that offences which are “noncompoundable” cannot be compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its powers under Section 320CrPC. Any such attempt by the court would amount to alteration, addition and modification of Section 320CrPC, which is the exclusive domain of the legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity in the language of Section 320CrPC, which may justify its wider interpretation and include such offences in the docket of “compoundable” offences, which have been consciously kept out as noncompoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction to compound an offence within the framework of Section 320CrPC is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested in it under Section 482CrPC. The High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for justifiable reasons, can press Section 482CrPC in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any court and/or to secure the ends of justice.

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12. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482CrPC, even if the offences are non-compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach to ensure that the felony, even if it goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyse the very object of the administration of the criminal justice system.

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13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of a private nature, can be annulled irrespective of the fact that the trial has already been concluded or the appeal stands dismissed against conviction. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering justice. The societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without saying, that the cases where compromise is struck post-conviction, the High Court ought to exercise such discretion with rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and after the incidence. The touchstone for exercising the extraordinary power under Section 482 of the CrPC would be to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hardand-fast line constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial justice. A restrictive construction of inherent powers under Section 482CrPC may lead to rigid or specious justice, which, in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injustice. On the other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as cautiously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 , para 29 : ( 2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] and Laxmi Narayan [State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688 , para 15 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706].

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14. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and moral fabric of the society or involve matters concerning public policy, cannot be construed betwixt two individuals or groups only, for such offences have the potential to impact the society at large. Effacing abominable offences through the quashing process would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may

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also accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a “settlement” through duress, threats, social boycotts, bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that “let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided”.

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Therefore, in view of the binding precedent, the

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offence involving the robbery cannot be quashed in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

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Hence, the present petition fails, and the same is

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dismissed.

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The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

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( Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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10^th July, 2025 (Chander)

Ashish Sharma and Another v. State of Hp and Another

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Ashish Sharma and Another v. State of Hp and Another

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