Satyabhan Singh and Others Vs State of Hp and Others

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. MMO No. 1300 of 2024 Reserved on: 22.04.2025 Date of Decision: 06.05.2025.

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Satyabhan Singh and others ...Petitioners Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others ...Respondents

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Coram

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Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹ No.

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For the Petitioners	: Mr. Advo	Sanjeev Kumar Suri, cate.
For the Respondents/State	: Mr.	Lokender Kutlehria,
	Addi	tional Advocate General.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 16 of 2021, dated 13.6.2021, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 323, 406 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), at Women Police Station, Una, District Una, H.P.

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police

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Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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that she was married to Sahil Jaswal as per Hindu Rites and Customs. Her parents fulfilled all the demands made by the petitioners; however, the petitioners started harassing her by saying that her parents were so poor that they could not provide a refrigerator, washing machine and car in the dowry. The informant was the only daughter of her parents. Her father was posted in the Punjab Forest Department. He was unable to provide the articles demanded by the petitioners. The petitioners started abusing and quarrelling with the informant. The informant’s husband gave beatings to her on 11.6.2021 at about 12.00 PM and asked her to bring ₹6.00 lacs to buy a Swift car. The informant told him that her father was a poor person who was unable to provide any dowry. The petitioners and the informant’s husband gave beatings to her. The informant sustained multiple injuries. The petitioners threatened to kill the informant in case their demands were not met. The informant was compelled to commit suicide by the acts of the petitioners. She informed the police, and the police officials visited the spot. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. A charge sheet was filed before the Court after the completion of the investigation.

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Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and the filing of the charge sheet, the petitioners have filed the present petition, asserting that the allegations against the petitioners are false. The Investigating Agency had not verified the petitioners’ version. The petitioners had preferred an application before the Gram Panchayat Deoli regarding the informant’s behaviour and a threat to commit suicide. The matter was compromised between the parties. The police visited the spot on 11.6.2021 and recorded the statement of the informant. The matter was sent to the CDPO, Gagret for taking action under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. The informant submitted another application, and FIR No. 16 of 2021 was registered. The informant has not been residing in the petitioners’ house for a long time, and no demand for dowry was ever made from her. The contents of the complaint taken on their face value do not constitute the commission of any offence. The criminal proceedings were maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive to wreak vengeance upon the petitioners. The informant attempted to commit suicide by consuming medicines on 21.5.2019, and petitioners took her to the hospital. This shows the conduct of the informant. The contents of Entry No. 51, dated 11.6.2021, falsify the allegations

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made in the FIR. The allegations are vague and do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequent proceedings be quashed.

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The State/respondent has filed a status report asserting that the police registered the FIR and conducted an investigation. The informant sustained multiple injuries. She was medically examined, and the nature of her injuries was stated to be simple. The petitioners are not returning the informant’s stridhan. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court, and the matter was listed for prosecution evidence on 26.3.2025.

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I have heard Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State.

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Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. The allegations made by the petitioners, even if accepted on their face value, do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court.

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Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be ordered to be quashed.

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Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the allegations in the FIR constitute the commission of a cognizable offence. The learned Trial Court has already framed charges against the petitioners. The matter is listed for prosecution evidence, and this Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR in these circumstances. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

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“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

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8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

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In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

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As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

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Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal

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proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”

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This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

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Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

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“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

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9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby preempting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia , contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides ; ( ii ) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii ) no prima facie offence is made out; ( iv ) the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 )

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The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 286: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that the Court has to see that particulars of the offences committed by every accused and the role played by the accused in committing the offence are given in the complaint made to the police. It was observed: -

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“9. To lodge a proper complaint, the mere mention of the sections and the language of those sections is not the be-all and end-all of the matter. What is required to be brought to the notice of the court is the particulars of the offence committed by each and every accused and the role played by each and every accused in committing that offence .

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10. When we see the complaint, the complaint is sadly vague. It does not show as to which accused has committed what offence, and what is the exact role played by these appellants is in the commission of the offence. There could be said that something is against Rajesh, as the allegations are made against him more precisely, but he is no more and has already expired. Under such circumstances, it would be an abuse of the process of law to allow the prosecution to continue against the aged parents of Rajesh, the present appellants herein, on the basis of a vague and general complaint which is silent about the precise acts of the appellants.” (Emphasis supplied)

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Similarly, it was held in Abhishek v. State of M.P., 2023

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SCC OnLine SC 1083: 2023 INSC 779 that the tendency of false implication by way of general omnibus allegations, if left unchecked, would result in the misuse of the process of law. It was observed:

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“13. Instances of a husband's family members filing a petition to quash criminal proceedings launched against them by his wife in the midst of matrimonial disputes are neither a rarity nor of recent origin. Precedents aplenty abound on this score. We may now take note of some decisions of particular relevance. Recently, in Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar [(2022) 6 SCC 599], this Court had occasion to deal with a similar situation where the High Court had refused to quash an FIR registered for various offences, including Section 498A IPC. Noting that the foremost issue that required determination was whether allegations made against the in-laws were general omnibus allegations which would be liable to be quashed, this Court referred to earlier decisions wherein concern was expressed over the misuse of Section 498A IPC and the increased tendency to implicate relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes. This Court observed that false implications by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial disputes, if left unchecked, would result in misuse of the process of law . On the facts of that case, it was found that no specific allegations were made against the in-laws by the wife, and it was held that allowing their prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against the in-laws would result in an abuse of the process of law. It was also noted that a criminal trial, leading to an eventual acquittal, would inflict severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise ought to be discouraged.

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14. In Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand [(2010) 7 SCC 667] , this Court noted that the tendency to implicate the husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon in complaints filed under Section 498A IPC. It was observed that the Courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases, such as allegations of harassment by the husband's close relations, who were living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided, would add an entirely different

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complexion and such allegations would have to be scrutinised with great care and circumspection .

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15. Earlier, in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti [(2009) 10 SCC 184] , this Court observed that the mere mention of statutory provisions and the language thereof for lodging a complaint is not the ‘be all and end all’ of the matter, as what is required to be brought to the notice of the Court is the particulars of the offence committed by each and every accused and the role played by each and every accused in the commission of that offence . These observations were made in the context of a matrimonial dispute involving Section 498A IPC.” (Emphasis supplied)

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It was held in Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC

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OnLine SC 759:2024 INSC 369 that asking a person to face criminal allegations without any specific instance of criminal misconduct

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amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed:

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“18. The plain reading of the FIR and the chargesheet papers indicates that the allegations levelled by the First Informant are quite vague, general and sweeping, specifying no instances of criminal conduct. It is also pertinent to note that in the FIR, no specific date or time of the alleged offence/offences has been disclosed. Even the police thought fit to drop the proceedings against the other members of the Appellants' family. Thus, we are of the view that the FIR lodged by Respondent No. 2 was nothing but a counterblast to the divorce petition & also the domestic violence case.

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25. If a person is made to face a criminal trial on some general and sweeping allegations without bringing on record any specific instances of criminal conduct, it is nothing but an abuse of the process of the court. The court owes a duty to subject the allegations levelled in the complaint to thorough scrutiny to find out, prima facie, whether there is any grain of truth in the allegations or whether they are made only with the

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sole object of involving certain individuals in a criminal charge, more particularly when a prosecution arises from a matrimonial dispute .” (Emphasis supplied)

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It was further held that in matrimonial disputes, the parents, including the close relatives, make a mountain out of a molehill, and every matrimonial conduct amounting to nuisance does not constitute cruelty. It was observed: -

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“32. Many times, the parents, including the close relatives of the wife, make a mountain out of a molehill. Instead of salvaging the situation and making every possible endeavour to save the marriage, their action, either due to ignorance or on account of sheer hatred towards the husband and his family members, brings about the destruction of the marriage over trivial issues. The first thing that comes to mind for the wife, her parents and her relatives is the Police as if the Police is the panacea of all evil. No sooner does the matter reach the Police than even if there are fair chances of reconciliation between the spouses, they would get destroyed. The foundation of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another. Tolerance of each other's faults, to a certain bearable extent, has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty quibbles and trifling differences are mundane matters and should not be exaggerated and blown out of proportion to destroy what is said to have been made in heaven. The Court must appreciate that all quarrels must be weighed from that point of view in determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular case, always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the parties, their character and social status. A very technical and hypersensitive approach would prove to be disastrous for the very institution of marriage. In matrimonial disputes, the main sufferers are the children. The spouses fight with such venom in their hearts that they do not think even for a second that if the marriage would come to an end, then

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what would be the effect on their children? Divorce plays a very dubious role so far as the upbringing of the children is concerned. The only reason why we are saying so is that instead of handling the whole issue delicately, the initiation of criminal proceedings would bring about nothing but hatred for each other. There may be cases of genuine ill-treatment and harassment by the husband and his family members towards the wife. The degree of such ill-treatment or harassment may vary. However, the Police machinery should be resorted to as a measure of last resort and that too in a very genuine case of cruelty and harassment. The Police machinery cannot be utilised for the purpose of holding the husband to ransom so that he could be squeezed by the wife at the instigation of her parents, relatives or friends. In all cases where the wife complains of harassment or ill-treatment, Section 498A of the IPC cannot be applied mechanically. No FIR is complete without Sections 506(2) and 323 of the IPC. Every matrimonial conduct which may cause annoyance to the other may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations and quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-today married life, may also not amount to cruelty”

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Similarly, it was held in Mamidi Anil Kumar Reddy v.

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State of A.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 127: 2024 (2) SCR 252 that the phenomenon of false implication by a general omnibus allegation in the case of a matrimonial dispute is not unknown to the Court.

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When the allegations are general and omnibus, the prosecution should not be continued. It was observed: -

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“14. In the considered opinion of this Court, there is significant merit in the submissions of the Learned Counsel for the Appellants. A bare perusal of the complaint, statement of witnesses and the charge sheet shows that the allegations against the Appellants are wholly general and

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omnibus in nature; even if they are taken in their entirety, they do not prima facie make out a case against the Appellants. The material on record neither discloses any particulars of the offences alleged nor discloses the specific role/allegations assigned to any of the Appellants in the commission of the offences.

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15. The phenomenon of false implication by way of general omnibus allegations in the course of matrimonial disputes is not unknown to this Court. In Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar (2022) 6 SCC 599 , this Court dealt with a similar case wherein the allegations made by the complainant-wife against her in-laws u/s. 498A and others were vague and general, lacking any specific role and particulars. The court proceeded to quash the FIR against the accused persons and noted that such a situation, if left unchecked, would result in the abuse of the process of law.

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17. Considering the dicta in Mahmood Ali (supra), we find that the High Court, in this case, has failed to exercise due care and has mechanically permitted the criminal proceedings to continue despite specifically finding that the allegations are general and omnibus in nature. The Appellants herein approached the High Court on inter alia grounds that the proceedings were re-initiated on vexatious grounds and even highlighted the commencement of divorce proceedings by Respondent No. 2. In these peculiar circumstances, the High Court had a duty to consider the allegations with great care and circumspection so as to protect against the danger of unjust prosecution.”

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

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Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC

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OnLine SC 2621, that general and vague allegations of cruelty

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made against the husband and his relatives are not sufficient to constitute cruelty. It was observed: -

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“10.1 The tendency to make general, vague, and omnibus allegations is noticed by this Court in many decisions. In Usha Chakraborty v. State of W.B. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90 , this court observed that:

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“16… the respondent alleged commission of offences under Sections 323, 384, 406, 423, 467, 468, 420 and 120B, IPC against the appellants. A bare perusal of the said allegation and the ingredients to attract them, as adverted to hereinbefore, would reveal that the allegations are vague and they do not carry the essential ingredients to constitute the alleged offences…. The ingredients to attract the alleged offence referred to hereinbefore and the nature of the allegations contained in the application filed by the respondent would undoubtedly make it clear that the respondent had failed to make specific allegations against the appellants herein in respect of the aforesaid offences. The factual position thus would reveal that the genesis as well as the purpose of criminal proceedings are nothing but the aforesaid incident, and further that the dispute involved is essentially of a civil nature. The appellants and the respondents have given a cloak of a criminal offence in the issue…”

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10.2 Similarly, dealing with allegations lacking in particulars and details, in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti (2009) 10 SCC 184 , this court observed that:

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“7. …what strikes us is that there are no particulars given as to the date on which the ornaments were handed over, as to the exact number of ornaments or their description and as to the date when the ornaments were asked back and were refused. Even the weight of the ornaments is not mentioned in the complaint, and it is a general and vague complaint

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that the ornaments were sometimes given in the custody of the appellants, and they were not returned. What strikes us more is that even in Para 10 of the complaint, where the complainant says that she asked for her clothes and ornaments, which were given to the accused, and they refused to give these back, the date is significantly absent.”

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12. The complaint also refers to a small incident where the complainant's brother accompanied her to the matrimonial house when appellants no. 1 and 3 are alleged to have refused to take her back, but on persuasion by her brother, she was allowed to stay. There is also a vague allegation that, when the complainant gave birth to a second child, appellants 1 and 2 came and “quarrelled” with the complainant, her brother, and her parents and threatened them. This Court had occasion to examine the phenomenon of general and omnibus allegations in the cases of matrimonial disputes. In Mamidi Anil Kumar Reddy v. State of A.P. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 127, this Court observed that:

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“14. …A bare perusal of the complaint, statement of witnesses and the charge sheet shows that the allegations against the Appellants are wholly general and omnibus in nature; even if they are taken in their entirety, they do not prima facie make out a case against the Appellants. The material on record neither discloses any particulars of the offences alleged nor discloses the specific role/allegations assigned to any of the Appellants in the commission of the offences.

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The phenomenon of false implication by way of general omnibus allegations in the course of matrimonial disputes is not unknown to this Court. In Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar, this Court dealt with a similar case wherein the allegations made by the complainant-wife

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against her in-laws u/s. 498A and others were vague and general, lacking any specific role and particulars. The court proceeded to quash the FIR against the accused persons and noted that such a situation, if left unchecked, would result in the abuse of the process of law.”

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13.1 In Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar (2022) 6 SCC 599, this Court noticed the injustice that may be caused when parties are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial based on general and omnibus allegations. The relevant portion of the observation is as under:

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“11. …in recent times, matrimonial litigation in the country has also increased significantly, and there is greater disaffection and friction surrounding the institution of marriage now more than ever. This has resulted in an increased tendency to employ provisions such as Section 498-A IPC as instruments to settle personal scores against the husband and his relatives.

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… upon a perusal of the contents of the FIR dated 1-4-2019, it is revealed that general allegations are levelled against the appellants. The complainant alleged that “all accused harassed her mentally and threatened her with terminating her pregnancy”. Furthermore, no specific and distinct allegations have been made against either of the appellants herein, i.e. none of the appellants has been attributed any specific role in furtherance of the general allegations made against them. This simply leads to a situation wherein one fails to ascertain the role played by each accused in furtherance of the offence. The allegations are, therefore, general and omnibus and can, at best, be said to have been made out on account of small skirmishes… However, as far as the appellants are concerned, the allegations made

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against them, being general and omnibus, do not warrant prosecution.

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…it would be unjust if the appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial, i.e. general and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where the relatives of the complainant's husband are forced to undergo trial. It has been highlighted by this Court in varied instances that a criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise must, therefore, be discouraged.”

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This position was reiterated in Dara Lakshmi Narayana

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v. State of Telangana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3682, wherein it was observed:

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18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by respondent No. 2 are vague and omnibus. Other than claiming that appellant No. 1 harassed her and that appellant Nos. 2 to 6 instigated him to do so, respondent No. 2 has not provided any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. She has also not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR lacks concrete and precise allegations.

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This position was reiterated in Geddam Jhansi v. State

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of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263, wherein it was observed:

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“31. Invoking criminal process is a serious matter with penal consequences involving coercive measures, which can be permitted only when the specific act(s) which constitute offences punishable under the Penal Code or any other penal statute are alleged or attributed to the accused and a prima facie case is made out. It applies with equal force when criminal laws are invoked in domestic disputes. Criminalising domestic disputes without specific

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allegations and credible materials to support the same may have disastrous consequences for the institution of family, which is built on the premise of love, affection, cordiality and mutual trust. The institution of family constitutes the core of human society. Domestic relationships, such as those between family members, are guided by deeply ingrained social values and cultural expectations. These relationships are often viewed as sacred, demanding a higher level of respect, commitment, and emotional investment compared to other social or professional associations. For the aforesaid reason, the preservation of family relationships has always been emphasised. Thus, when family relationships are sought to be brought within the ambit of criminal proceedings, rupturing the family bond, courts should be circumspect and judicious and should allow invocation of the criminal process only when there are specific allegations with supporting materials which clearly constitute criminal offences.

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32. We have to keep in mind that in the context of matrimonial disputes, emotions run high, and as such in the complaints filed alleging harassment or domestic violence, there may be a tendency to implicate other members of the family who do not come to the rescue of the complainant or remain mute spectators to any alleged incident of harassment, which in our view cannot by itself constitute a criminal act without there being specific acts attributed to them. Further, when tempers run high and relationships turn bitter, there is also a propensity to exaggerate the allegations, which does not necessarily mean that such domestic disputes should be given the colour of criminality.

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33. It goes without saying that genuine cases of cruelty and violence in the domestic sphere, which do happen, ought to be handled with utmost sensitivity. Domestic violence typically happens within the four walls of the house and not in the public gaze. Therefore, such violence is not noticed by the public at large, except perhaps by the immediate neighbours. Thus, providing visible evidence by

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the victim of domestic violence may not be easily forthcoming and producing direct evidence may be hard and arduous, which does not necessarily mean that domestic violence does not occur. In fact, to deal with this pernicious phenomenon, stringent statutes like the Protection from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, have been enacted with a very expansive meaning and scope of what amounts to domestic violence. Since violence perpetrated within the domestic sphere by close relatives is now criminalised, entailing serious consequences on the perpetrators, the courts have to be careful while dealing with such cases by examining whether there are specific allegations with instances against the perpetrators and not generalised allegations. The purpose and mandate of the law to protect the victims of domestic violence is of paramount importance, and as such, a balance has to be struck by ensuring that while perpetrators are brought to book, all the family members or relatives are not indiscriminately brought within the criminal net in a sweeping manner.

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34. For a matrimonial relationship which is founded on the basis of cordiality and trust to turn sour to an extent to make a partner hurl allegations of domestic violence and harassment against the other partner, would normally not happen at the spur of the moment and such acrimonious relationship would develop only in course of time. Accordingly, such a situation would be the culmination of a series of acts which turn, otherwise, an amicable relationship, into a fractured one. Thus, in such cases involving allegations of domestic violence or harassment, there would normally be a series of offending acts, which would be required to be spelt out by the complainant against the perpetrators in specific terms to rope such perpetrators in the criminal proceedings sought to be initiated against them. Thus, mere general allegations of harassment without pointing out the specifics against such perpetrators would not suffice, as is the case in respect of the present appellants.

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35. We are, thus, of the view that in criminal cases relating to domestic violence, the complaints and charges should be specific, as far as possible, as against each and every member of the family who is accused of such offences and sought to be prosecuted, as otherwise, it may amount to misuse of the stringent criminal process by indiscriminately dragging all the members of the family. There may be situations where some of the family members or relatives may turn a blind eye to the violence or harassment perpetrated on the victim and may not extend any helping hand to the victim, which does not necessarily mean that they are also perpetrators of domestic violence unless the circumstances clearly indicate their involvement and instigation. Hence, implicating all such relatives without making specific allegations and attributing offending acts to them and proceeding against them without prima facie evidence that they were complicit and had actively collaborated with the perpetrators of domestic violence would amount to abuse of the process of law.”

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In the present case, it was specifically mentioned in

¶141

the complaint made to the police that the petitioners had given beatings to the informant on 11.6.2021 at 12.00 PM. They demanded ₹6.00 lacs to enable the informant’s husband to purchase the Swift Car. The informant’s medical examination revealed simple injuries on her person. The correctness or otherwise of these allegations is to be seen during the trial, however, it cannot be said, at this stage, that no specific allegation was made against the petitioners.

¶142

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¶144

It was submitted that the allegations are false, which is evident from the fact that no such allegations were made in the statement made to the police and were not recorded in the general diary. The attention of the Court was invited to the contents of the entries in the daily diary; however, it is not permissible for this Court to compare the allegations in the general diary to the allegations made in the FIR to determine whether there is some improvement or not because this Court cannot determine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR while exercising inherent jurisdiction. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, wherein it was held : -

¶145

“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) .

¶146

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¶148

14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060 :

¶149

“ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)

¶150

“ 16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, chargesheet, documents, etc. or not.”

¶151

It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

¶152

Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:

¶153

2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court, while exercising

¶154

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¶156

jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC, cannot conduct a mini-

¶157

trial. It was observed at page 397:

¶158

“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 ]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)

¶159

6 . … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …

¶160

7 . … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.”

¶161

A similar view was taken in Dineshbhai Chandubhai

¶162

Patel v. State of Gujarat , (2018) 3 SCC 104: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 683: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 6 , wherein it was observed at page 111:

¶163

“29 [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018 dated 31-12018.]. The High Court, in our view, failed to see the extent of its jurisdiction, which it possesses to exercise while examining the legality of any FIR complaining commission of several cognizable offences by the accused persons. In order to examine as to whether the factual contents of the FIR disclose any prima facie cognizable offences or not, the High Court cannot act like an investigating agency and nor can it exercise the powers like an appellate court. The

¶164

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¶166

question, in our opinion, was required to be examined keeping in view the contents of the FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof.

¶167

30 [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018 dated 31-1-2018.] . At this stage, the High Court could not appreciate the evidence, nor could it draw its own inferences from the contents of the FIR and the material relied on. It was more so when the material relied on was disputed by the complainants and vice versa. In such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the court to examine the questions once the charge sheet is filed, along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material.

¶168

31. In our considered opinion, once the court finds that the FIR does disclose the prima facie commission of any cognizable offence, it should stay its hand and allow the investigating machinery to step in to initiate the probe to unearth the crime in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code.

¶169

32. The very fact that the High Court, in this case, went into the minutest details in relation to every aspect of the case and devoted 89 pages of judgment to quash the FIR in part led us to draw a conclusion that the High Court had exceeded its powers while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. We cannot concur with such an approach of the High Court.

¶170

33. The inherent powers of the High Court, which are obviously not defined as being inherent in its very nature, cannot be stretched to any extent and nor can such powers be equated with the appellate powers of the High Court defined in the Code. The parameters laid down by this Court while exercising inherent powers must always be kept in mind, else it would lead to committing a jurisdictional error in deciding the case. Such is the case here.

¶171

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¶173

34. On perusal of the three complaints and the FIR mentioned above, we are of the considered view that the complaint and FIR, do disclose a prima facie commission of various cognizable offences alleged by the complainants against the accused persons and, therefore, the High Court instead of dismissing the application filed by the accused persons in part should have dismissed the application as a whole to uphold the entire FIR in question.”

¶174

Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the

¶175

truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR.

¶176

It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983 that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC must believe the contents of the FIR to be true. It was observed:

¶177

“29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where noninterference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice.”

¶178

It was specifically mentioned in the charge sheet that

¶179

the matter is listed for prosecution evidence, which means that charges have been framed. It was laid down in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar (1994) 4 SCC 142: 1994 SCC (Cri) 1181 that once the

¶180

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¶182

competent Court has framed the charges, the person aggrieved may invoke the revisional jurisdiction, and the High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., except in the rare cases. It was observed on page 145: -

¶183

“7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been made out — as has been done in the instant case — the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume that he had committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied can quash the charges framed against him. To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC the High Court In its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course . We hasten to add even in such exceptional cases the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence.” (Emphasis supplied)

¶184

It was submitted that there is insufficient material to

¶185

convict the petitioners. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1503 that the High Court exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness,

¶186

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¶188

sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence. It was observed:

¶189

21. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed under Section 173(2)CrPC on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482CrPC and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the trial court at the time of trial. This position is evident from the decisions referred to supra.

¶190

22. In the decision in M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita [ M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita , ( 2023) 12 SCC 821: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1300: JT (2002) 3 SC 89] , this Court held that while considering the question of quashing of FIR the High Court would not be entitled to appreciate by way of sifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC.

¶191

23. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51] , a two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161CrPC, being wholly inadmissible in evidence, could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings, in that case, was on the basis of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC, it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in

¶192

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¶194

evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. It was also held that the High Court committed an error in quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC.”

¶195

Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR and the

¶196

proceedings on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

¶197

A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed:

¶198

“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.”

¶199

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¶201

No other point was urged.

¶202

Consequently, the present petition fails and is

¶203

dismissed.

¶204

The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

¶205

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

¶206

6^th May, 2025

¶207

(Chander)

Satyabhan Singh and Others v. State of Hp and Others

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