Shyam Lal Vs State

The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 07.03.2008, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Shimla (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 19.06.2007 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jubbal, Camp at Chopal,

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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(learned Trial Court) were upheld (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A, 323, and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”). It was asserted that informant/ victim Bina Devi (PW1) was married to Shyam Lal (accused), and two sons were born to her. Her husband (the present petitioner/ accused) used to beat her in a state of intoxication. The matter was settled in the presence of respectable persons from the panchayat; however, the behaviour of the accused did not improve. He used to tell the informant to leave her matrimonial home with her children or bring ₹20,000/- from her parents. Both the accused had extramarital affairs with each other. The co-accused (name being withheld to protect her identity) used to instigate the present accused to evict the informant from her matrimonial home. The accused used to beat the informant and demand ₹20,000/- at the instance of the co-accused. The accused Shyam

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Lal and the co-accused visited the field where the informant was working on 28.09.2005 at 06.30 PM and gave her beatings. The matter was reported to the police, and an FIR (Ex. PW1/A) was registered in the police station. ASI Dandu Ram (PW11) investigated the matter. He went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW11/A). He picked up the broken pieces of the bangle (Ex. P2) lying on the spot, put them in a cloth parcel (Ex.P1), and seized them vide memo (Ex PW1/B). He filed an application (Ex. PW5/A) for conducting the informant’s medical examination. Dr. Surinder (PW5) conducted the informant’s medical examination and found that she had sustained simple injuries which could have been caused by a hard, blunt substance. He issued MLC (Ex. PW5/B). The marriage certificate of Bina Devi (Ex. PW10/A) was seized vide memo (Ex.PW10/B). Statements of prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

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Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, charges were framed against them for the commission of offences punishable

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under Sections 323, 506, read with Section 34 IPC and Sections 498A and 120 B IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined eleven witnesses to prove its case. Bina Devi (PW1) is the informant/ victim. Banu Devi (PW2), Mangat Ram (PW3), Surinder Singh (PW4), Relu Ram (PW6), Devi Ram (PW8), and Nain Singh (PW9) are the witnesses to the informant’s harassment. Dr. Surinder (PW5) examined the informant. Sukh Ram (PW7) did not support the prosecution’s case. Usha Devi (PW10) produced the marriage certificate. ASI Dandu Ram (PW11) investigated the matter.

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The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. They claimed that they had long-standing enmity and rivalry with the informant and other villagers. A false case was made against them due to the enmity. Statement of Shyam Lal (clerk) (DW1) was recorded in defence.

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Learned Trial Court held that the informant’s testimony was duly corroborated by the statements of other prosecution witnesses. Even the father and brother of the

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accused, Shyam Lal, stated that he used to beat the informant and demand ₹20,000/- from her. The other eyewitnesses also proved the prosecution’s case. However, the prosecution evidence was not sufficient to show the involvement of the coaccused, hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the co-accused but convicted the accused Shyam Lal of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 506, 498A of IPC and sentenced him as under:-

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Under Section 323 IPC	To undergo simple imprisonment of one month.
Under Section 506 IPC	To undergo simple imprisonment of one month.
Under Section 498A IPC	To undergo simple imprisonment of three years and to pay a fine of
	₹10,000/- and in default of
	payment of fine to undergo further
	simple imprisonment of one month.
	All the substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by

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the learned Trial Court, the accused preferred an appeal which

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was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Shimla, District Shimla (HP) (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court, that the informant’s testimony was satisfactory, and it was duly corroborated by the statements of other witnesses. The plea taken by the accused that the villagers wanted to falsely implicate him was not believable. The medical evidence also showed the injuries sustained by the informant. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was adequate, and no interference was required with it. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.

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Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below did not appreciate the evidence properly. The witnesses and the informant belong to the same community, whereas the accused belongs to a different community. They had filed a complaint against the co-accused, and they wanted the co-accused to leave the village. The father and brother of the accused, Shyam Lal, are inimical to him. They falsely deposed against him. There were material contradictions in the statements of the

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prosecution witnesses, which made the prosecution’s case suspect. An FIR was lodged against the informant and other women of the village, and the present FIR was lodged as a counterblast to the FIR lodged by the co-accused. The statements of the prosecution witnesses are hearsay, and learned Courts below erred in relying upon them. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court, be set aside.

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I have heard Mr. Sativ Chauhan and Mr. Ankit Kaloti, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.

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Mr. Sativ Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. The relationship between the accused and the informant is strained, and a false case was made against him by the informant in connivance with the villagers. The allegations made by the informant are vague and insufficient to constitute any cruelty; therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and judgments and order passed by the

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learned Courts below be set aside. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Chaddha vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 INSC 671 , in support of his submission.

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Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/ State, submitted that the allegations against the accused were supported by his brother and father, who had no reason to depose against him and support the informant. It was duly proved on record that the accused Shyam Lal had extra extramarital relationship with the co-accused. He used to beat the informant after being instigated by the co-accused. The eyewitnesses supported the prosecution’s case. Specific allegations were made against the petitioner that he had beaten the informant and demanded ₹20,000/- from her. This Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by the learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204:

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(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional

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court does not exercise an appellate jurisdiction and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: -

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“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence, or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.

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This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

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Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC

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1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

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14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect

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or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

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15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] , where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

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“ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

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13 . Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where

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the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of a charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”

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16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit Kapoor case [ Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 ] has also laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228CrPC is sought for as under : ( Amit Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 ], SCC pp. 482-83, para 27)

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“ 27 . Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, it will now be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but inherently impossible to state such principles with precision. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be.

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27.1 . Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The

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power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection, and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

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27.2 . The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion, and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied, then the Court may interfere.

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27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in a conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

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27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

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27.13 . Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that

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initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records, but is an opinion formed prima facie.”

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17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate court and start appreciating the evidence by finding out inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses, and it is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge.

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This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

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14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

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15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] , where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

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“ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may

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not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

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13 . Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of a charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”

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16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit Kapoor case [ Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 ] has also laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228CrPC is sought for as under : ( Amit Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 ], SCC pp. 482-83, para 27)

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“ 27 . Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, it will now be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but inherently impossible to state such principles with precision. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be.

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27.1 . Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

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27.2 . The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion, and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied, then the Court may interfere.

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27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in a conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

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27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

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27.13 . Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records, but is an opinion formed prima facie.”

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17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate court and start appreciating the evidence by finding out inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses, and it is not legally permissible. The High Court ought to be cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge.

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It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda , (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:

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“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the

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revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275] , while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

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“ 5 . … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

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13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19] . This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional

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jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material; the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)

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“ 14 . … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is nonconsideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power of the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”

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14. In the above case, also the conviction of the accused was also recorded, and the High Court set aside [ Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its view. This Court set aside the High Court's order, holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis.

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This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar , (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:

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“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.

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17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457] , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.”

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The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The informant Bina Devi (PW1) stated that she was married to the accused Shyam Lal ten years before the date of deposition. The accused Shyam Lal used to beat her. He used to demand ₹20,000/- from her and tell her to leave her matrimonial home. The co-accused was instigating the accused, Shyam Lal, to quarrel with her. She (the informant) was cutting the grass on 28.09.2005 at 06.30 PM when both the accused came. Accused Shyam Lal caught hold of her hands. The co-

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accused caught her hair and gave her beatings. Banu Devi, Sukh Ram and Nain Singh came to the spot and asked the accused to leave her. The accused ran away after seeing them. She sustained injuries. She reported the matter to the police and was medically examined. Her bangles were broken in the incident, which were seized by the police.

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She stated in her cross-examination that she was not aware that the accused had attended a hearing on 28.09.2025 in the Court at Chopal. She was not aware that an FIR was lodged against her on 29.09.2005 regarding the beatings given to the co-accused. She admitted that the co-accused had filed a case against her in the Court of learned SDM. She denied that she had beaten the co-accused and instituted a false complaint.

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Her version is duly corroborated by Dr. Surinder (PW5), who conducted her medical examination and found simple injuries on her person which could have been caused by kick blows. He admitted in his cross-examination that the injuries could be caused by way of a fall or they could be selfinflicted; however, that is merely an alternate possibility and will not make the prosecution’s case suspect. It was laid down by

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the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai , (2003) 12 SCC 395: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1086, that when the testimonies of the witnesses are found credible, the medical evidence pointing to alternative possibilities is not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. It was observed at page 404:

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22. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses' account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged, making any other evidence, including the medical evidence, the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.

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Therefore, the prosecution’s case cannot be rejected due to alternative possibilities in the medical evidence.

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Banu Devi (PW2) also supported the informant’s version. She stated that the victim was cutting the grass in her field. She heard the cries of the victim. She went to the spot and

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saw that Shyam Lal had caught the neck of the victim, and the co-accused had caught her hand. They were beating the victim. She shouted for help. Nain Singh and Sukh Ram came to the spot. The accused ran away after seeing them. The accused, Shyam Lal, threatened to kill the informant. The informant sustained injuries. The accused used to beat the informant and demand ₹20,000/- from her. She stated in her crossexamination that she had attended the hearing in a case titled State vs. Bimla. She admitted that the victim had also filed a complaint against the accused in which she had appeared as a witness. She admitted that it becomes dark at 06.30 PM in September. She denied that she was not present on the spot and that no incident had taken place in her presence.

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It was submitted that her testimony is contrary to the statement of the informant. The informant stated that the accused Shyam Lal had caught hold of her hand, and the coaccused had given her beatings. This witness stated, on the other hand, that the co-accused had caught hold of the victim’s hand, and accused Shyam Lal caught hold of the victim’s neck. This contradiction is not significant because the human memory fades with time, and the contradictions are bound to occur when

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the incident is recalled after some time. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025) SCC Online SC 69 that the discrepancies are not sufcient fi to discard the prosecution case unless they are material. It was observed: -

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“ 51. As we proceed to examine this crucial aspect, it may be apposite to keep in mind certain observations made by this Court relating to discrepancies in the accounts of eyewitnesses.

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In Leela Ram (Dead) through Duli Chand v. State of Haryana, (1999) 9 SCC 525 , it was observed as follows:

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“9. Be it noted that the High Court is within its jurisdiction, being the first appellate court to reappraise the evidence, but the discrepancies found in the ocular account of two witnesses, unless they are so vital, cannot affect the credibility of the evidence of the witnesses. There are bound to be some discrepancies between the narrations of different witnesses when they speak on details, and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but variations by reason thereof should not render the evidence of eyewitnesses unbelievable. Trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate otherwise acceptable evidence. In this context, reference may be made to the

¶145

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decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony [(1985) 1 SCC 505: 1985 SCC (Cri) 105] . In para 10 of the Report, this Court observed: (SCC pp. 514-15)

¶148

‘10. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. If the court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be

¶149

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proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. Even honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because the power of observation, retention and reproduction differ with individuals.’

¶152

In a very recent decision in Rammi v. State of M.P. [(1999) 8 SCC 649: 2000 SCC (Cri) 26], this Court observed: (SCC p. 656, para 24)

¶153

‘24. When an eyewitness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true witness can escape making some discrepant details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored can successfully make his testimony totally non-discrepant. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. But too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.’

¶154

This Court further observed: (SCC pp. 656-57, paras 25-27)

¶155

‘25. It is a common practice in trial courts to make out contradictions from the previous statement of a witness to confront him during cross-

¶156

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examination. Merely because there is an inconsistency in evidence, it is not sufficient to impair the credit of the witness. No doubt, Section 155 of the Evidence Act provides scope for impeaching the credit of a witness by proof of an inconsistent former statement. But a reading of the section would indicate that all inconsistent statements are not sufficient to impeach the credit of the witness. The material portion of the section is extracted below:

¶159

“ 155. Impeaching the credit of a witness .—The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following ways by the adverse party, or, with the consent of the court, by the party who calls him

¶160

(1)-(2) ***

¶161

(3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted;”

¶162

A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Only such an inconsistent statement, which is liable to be “contradicted”, would affect the credit of the witness. Section 145 of the Evidence Act also enables the cross-examiner to use any former statement of the witness, but it cautions that if it is intended to “contradict” the witness, the cross-

¶163

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examiner is enjoined to comply with the formality prescribed therein. Section 162 of the Code also permits the cross-examiner to use the previous statement of the witness (recorded under Section 161 of the Code) for the only a limited purpose, i.e. to “contradict” the witness.

¶166

To contradict a witness, therefore, must be to discredit the particular version of the witness. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the present statement, even if the latter is at variance with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that witness (vide Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. [AIR 1959 SC 1012: 1959 Cri LJ 1231] ).”

¶167

52. Further, this Court also cautioned about attaching too much importance to minor discrepancies of the evidence of the witnesses in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 as follows:

¶168

“5. … We do not consider it appropriate or permissible to enter upon a reappraisal or reappreciation of the evidence in the context of the minor discrepancies painstakingly highlighted by the learned counsel for the appellant. Overmuch importance cannot be attached to minor discrepancies. The reasons are obvious:

¶169

(1) By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the mental screen.

¶170

(2) Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The

¶171

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witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.

¶174

(3) The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another.

¶175

(4) By and large, people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder.

¶176

(5) In regard to the exact time of an incident or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person.

¶177

(6) Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on.

¶178

(7) A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court

¶179

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atmosphere and the piercing crossexamination made by the counsel and, out of nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him— perhaps it is a sort of psychological defence mechanism activated on the spur of the moment.”

¶182

53. To the same effect, it was also observed in Appabhai v. State of Gujarat 1988 Supp SCC 241 as follows:

¶183

“13. … The court, while appreciating the evidence, must not attach undue importance to minor discrepancies. The discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution's case may be discarded. The discrepancies which are due to normal errors of perception or observation should not be given importance. The errors due to lapse of memory may be given due allowance. The court, by calling into aid its vast experience of men and matters in different cases, must evaluate the entire material on record by excluding the exaggerated version given by any witness. When a doubt arises in respect of certain facts alleged by such a witness, the proper course is to ignore that fact only unless it goes to the root of the matter to demolish the entire prosecution story. The witnesses nowadays go on adding embellishments to their version, perhaps for

¶184

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fear that their testimony will be rejected by the court. The courts, however, should not disbelieve the evidence of such witnesses altogether if they are otherwise trustworthy. Jaganmohan Reddy, J. speaking for this Court in Sohrab v. State of M.P. [(1972) 3 SCC 751: 1972 SCC (Cri) 819 ] observed: [SCC p. 756, para 8: SCC (Cri) p. 824, para 8]

¶187

‘8. … This Court has held that falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not a sound rule for the reason that hardly one comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or, at any rate, exaggeration, embroidery or embellishments. In most cases, the witnesses, when asked about details, venture to give some answer, not necessarily true or relevant, for fear that their evidence may not be accepted in respect of the main incident which they have witnessed, but that is not to say that their evidence as to the salient features of the case, after cautious scrutiny, cannot be considered….’”

¶188

Therefore, this contradiction by itself is not sufficient to discard her testimony.

¶189

It was submitted that this witness had appeared in favour of the victim in an earlier case filed by her against the accused. Therefore, she is a convenient witness, and her testimony cannot be relied upon. This submission is also not

¶190

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acceptable. Her name was mentioned in the FIR, and her presence cannot be doubted. The fact that she had appeared as a witness against the accused would put the Court on guard, but it is not sufficient to discard her testimony.

¶193

Nain Singh (PW9) stated that he and Sukh Ram were coming from Sarahan. They heard some noise and went to the spot. They saw the victim lying on the ground. The accused left after seeing him. The informant revealed that the accused had given beatings to her. The police picked up the broken bangles the next day. He stated in his cross-examination that he is a farmer. His village is located at a distance of one kilometre. Sukh Ram reached after some time. The houses of other people are located at a distance of 200 meters. Banu Devi and 3-4 persons were present on the spot. He denied that he was making a false statement against the accused because he did not like the relationship between them.

¶194

There is nothing in his cross-examination to show that he was making a false statement. He categorically stated that the victim was lying on the ground when he reached the spot. The informant said that the accused had beaten her. This

¶195

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statement was made immediately after the incident and forms part of the same transaction. Therefore, his testimony corroborates the informant’s statement in material particulars.

¶198

Sukh Ram (PW7) stated that he was coming with Nain Singh. He heard some noise and went to the spot. He saw that Banu Devi had caught hold of Bina. Shyam Lal and the coaccused were going towards their home. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that he saw the accused beating Bina Devi. He admitted that the accused are residing together as husband and wife. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police.

¶199

Nain Singh stated that Sukh Ram arrived after some time. Therefore, Sukh Ram would not have been a witness to the beatings given by the accused to the informant. He specifically stated about the presence of the accused on the spot, which corroborates the informant’s testimony regarding the presence of the accused.

¶200

Mangat Ram (PW3) stated that the accused Shyam Lal frequently beats the informant. The matter was settled by the respectable persons of the panchayat. The accused used to

¶201

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demand ₹20,000/- from the informant. He came to know on 28.09.2005 that the accused had given beatings to the victim. The police recovered the broken bangles the next day. He admitted in his cross-examination that the co-accused had filed a complaint against him and other villagers, which was inquired into by Dy.SP Theog and SP Shimla. He admitted that he belongs to the brahmin caste, whereas the co-accused is a dalit. The matter was not reported to the police on the same day because it was night. Both the accused were residing together for about one year before the incident. He denied that villagers had an enmity with the accused, and he was deposing falsely due to the enmity.

¶204

The testimony of this witness shows that he was not present on the spot at the time of the incident. He came to know subsequently about the incident; therefore, his testimony regarding the incident dated 28.09.2005 is hearsay and cannot be relied upon. However, his testimony regarding the beatings of the informant and the demand of ₹20,000/- from her can be relied upon.

¶205

Surinder Singh (PW4) is the elder brother of the accused Shyam Lal. He stated that the accused Shyam Lal used to

¶206

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give beatings to the informant after consuming alcohol. He also used to demand money from her and tell her that she would be thrown out of her matrimonial home in case the money was not brought by her. Respectable persons of the society tried to reconcile the matter. The accused gave beatings to the victim on 28.09.2005. The police seized the broken bangles the next day. He admitted in his cross-examination that he is the real brother of the accused Shyam Lal. He admitted that the co-accused had filed a complaint against him, his father and uncle, and Shyam Lal had deposed in her favour. He also admitted that he belongs to the brahmin caste, whereas the co-accused is a dalit. He admitted that he had not seen the accused giving beatings to Bina, but he had heard about this fact.

¶209

There is nothing in his cross-examination to show that he was making a false statement. He is the real brother of the accused Shyam Lal and has no reason to depose against him. He is residing with the informant and accused Shyam Lal; therefore, he is the best person to depose about the incident occurring inside the house, and his testimony that accused Shyam Lal used to beat the informant and demand ₹20,000/from her has to be accepted as correct. The fact that the co-

¶210

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accused had filed a complaint against him would furnish a motive to depose against the co-accused, but he would have no motive to depose against his brother. Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly relied upon his testimony.

¶213

Devi Ram (PW8) is the father of the accused Shyam Lal. He stated that the accused Shyam Lal used to beat the victim. He also used to threaten his family members that he would set the house on fire. Accused Shyam Lal and the coaccused gave beatings to the informant. He stated in his crossexamination that Shyam Lal and Surender are his sons. He admitted that the co-accused is a Dalit, whereas he belongs to the Brahmin caste. He volunteered to say that the caste has no concern with the present case. He was at home on the date of the incident. He denied that he was against the relationship between the accused, because they belong to different castes.

¶214

This witness admitted that he was at home at the time of the incident; therefore, his testimony regarding the beatings given by the accused to the victim is hearsay and cannot be admitted. It was suggested to him that he had disinherited the accused Shyam Lal, but he denied this fact. He is

¶215

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the father of the accused and has no reason to depose against him, and in the informant’s favour. He would be aware of the incident taking place inside the house and learned Courts below had rightly relied upon his testimony.

¶218

Relu Ram (PW6) is the informant’s father. He stated that the informant was married to the accused, Shyam Lal. The accused used to demand ₹20,000/- from the informant and beat her. The informant demanded the money from him, but he expressed his inability to provide the money. The victim was residing with her parents-in-law. He admitted that Daulat Ram is his brother and Bina is the daughter of Daulat Ram. He volunteered to say that they have performed a common marriage, and Bina is the daughter of both brothers. He denied that the accused Shyam Lal is not his son-in-law.

¶219

The informant admitted in her cross-examination that there was a custom of Polyandry in her village, which corroborates the statement of this witness regarding the common marriage by him and his brother. He, being the informant’s father, is the best person to depose about the demand of dowry. He also stated that the accused had demanded

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₹20,000/- from the informant. The informant told him about the demand, but he was unable to provide anything because of his poverty. His testimony corroborates the informant’s statement regarding the demand of ₹20,000/- from the victim.

¶223

ASI Dandu Ram (PW11) conducted the investigation. He visited the spot and found the broken pieces of bangles on the spot and seized him. This corroborates the informant’s testimony regarding the beatings given to her.

¶224

The accused examined Shyam Lal (DW1), who proved on record the proceedings initiated by the co-accused against the informant and other persons under Section 107 read with Section 150 of the Cr.P.C., regarding the incident which occurred on 01.09.2005 at 07.00 PM. This evidence will not help the accused because the enmity is a double-edged weapon; while it furnishes a motive for false implication, it also furnishes a motive for the commission of a crime. Thus, not much advantage can be derived from this evidence. Moreover, the coaccused has already been acquitted, and the enmity with the coaccused will not mean that the case against the present accused is also false.

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It was submitted that incidents of cruelty are vague and do not provide the details of time, date and place. Therefore, these allegations cannot be looked into. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Chaddha (supra) . There can be no quarrel with the proposition of law that the allegations against the accused have to be specific with particulars of time, date and place. However, in the present case, the brother and father of the accused Shyam Lal categorically deposed about the frequent beatings given by the accused to the informant and the demand of ₹20,000/-. The demand of ₹20,000/- is supported by Relu Ram, the informant’s father. The parties and the witnesses are the villagers engaged in the occupation of farming. The informant had studied up to the 5^th class. The witnesses were unable to specify the dates by referring to the calendar and stated that the incident occurred in ‘Asauj’, which shows the level of their education. Therefore, in these circumstances, their testimonies cannot be discarded simply because they were unable to mention the date and time of the beatings. Moreover, the witnesses stated that the accused had given beatings to the victim frequently, and it would be difficult to mention the exact date in such a situation. Therefore,

¶228

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the submission that the prosecution’s case has to be discarded because the witnesses failed to mention the date, time and place is not acceptable.

¶231

It was duly proved by the statement of the victim, Devi Ram, Relu Ram and Surender that the accused used to frequently beat the victim and demanded ₹20,000/- from her. Hence, the accused was rightly convicted by the learned Trial Court of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 498A of the IPC. The statement of the victim, Nain Singh and the medical evidence proved that the accused had beaten the informant, hence he was rightly convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 323 of the IPC. The accused had threatened to kill the victim, and he was rightly convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC.

¶232

Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for three years and pay a fine of ₹10,000/- for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC. Three years is the maximum imprisonment prescribed under Section 498A of the IPC. No reason was

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assigned as to why the maximum punishment was awarded. The learned Trial Court held that the father, brother, wife and father-in-law of the accused had deposed against him, but that cannot be a reason for imposing the maximum sentence. It had also come in evidence that the accused was not residing in his matrimonial home for about one year before the incident. Thus, the danger to the informant was removed. Therefore, the imposition of the maximum sentence was not justified, and the sentence awarded by the learned Trial Court is to be modified. Keeping in view the circumstances of the case, including the fact that the accused had left his home, the sentence of imprisonment is reduced from three years to one year, and the fine of ₹10,000/- is reduced to ₹5,000/-, but the default sentence of one month is upheld. The learned Trial Court had imposed a punishment of one month each for the commission of offences punishable under Section 323 and 506 of the IPC, which is not excessive and no interference is required with them.

¶236

In view of the above, the present revision is partly allowed and the accused is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of ₹5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for

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one month for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 498A of the IPC. Subject to this modification, the rest of the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court, is upheld. Modified warrant be prepared accordingly.

¶240

Records of the learned Courts below alongwith copy of the judgment be sent back forthwith. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

¶241

( Rakesh Kainthla)

¶242

Judge

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01^st September 2025

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(Anurag)

Shyam Lal v. State

Case brief

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Shyam Lal v. State

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