Partly allowed

Gurbhajan Alias Ghunnu v. State of Hp

Himachal Pradesh HC19 Aug 2025CR.A/474/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court allowed the criminal appeal in part, upholding the conviction for possession of poppy husk under the NDPS Act. The court rejected challenges regarding Section 50 non-compliance and lack of independent witnesses. However, it found the original sentence disproportionate and reduced it.

What did the court decide?

Impugned judgment upheld except reduction of sentence to imprisonment already undergone and modification of fine to ₹10,000 and default imprisonment to three months.

Gurbhajan Alias Ghunnu Vs State of Hp — Narcotics (NDPS) | Himachal Pradesh HC (2025)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. Appeal No. 474 of 2024 Reserved on: 05.08.2025 Date of Decision: 19.08.2025

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Gurbhajan alias Ghunu ...Appellant Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent

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Coram

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Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹ No For the Appellant. : Mr. Arsh Chuhan, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 24.08.2024 passed by learned Special Judge, Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. vide which the appellant (accused before the learned Trial Court) was convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 15 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in short ‘NDPS Act’) and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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years, pay a fine of ₹ 20,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for six months for the commission of aforesaid offence. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 15 of the NDPS Act. It was asserted that ASI Pawan Kumar (PW-13), HC Rashpal Singh (PW-2), HHC Balkar Singh (PW-1) and HHC Raj Kumar (PW-3) were present near the water tank Barota on 16.01.2014. They met Jugal Kishore (PW-4), Up Pradhan Gram Panchayat Paral. Police also associated him. They saw the accused coming from a liquor vend towards them at 3:15 p.m. with a carry bag. The accused returned after seeing the police party and started running towards the fields. The police apprehended him. He revealed his name as Gurbhajan Singh. The police checked the carry bag and found Poppy Husk kept in a polythene packet. ASI Pawan Kumar weighed the Poppy Husk and found its weight to be 1 killo 200 grams. The Popply Husk was put in the polythene packet, the packet was put in the carry bag, which was tied with a string, and put in a cloth parcel.

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The parcel was sealed with six seal impressions of seal ‘B’. Seal impression (Ext.MO-1) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. NCB-1 Form (Ext.P-13/PW-13) was prepared, and the seal impression was put on the Form. The seal was handed over to Jugal Kishore (PW-4) after its use. The parcel was seized vide memo (Ext.PW-1/B). Intimation under Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act (Ext.PW-11/PW-12) was reduced into writing and was sent to Sub Divisional Police Officer (SDPO), Nurpur, H.P., through HHC Balkar Singh (PW-1). ASI Pawan Kumar (PW-13) prepared the rukka (Ext.P-14/PW-13) and sent it to the Police Station through HHC Raj Kumar (PW-3). F.I.R. (Ext.PW-3/A) was registered in the police station. ASI Pawan Kumar (PW-13) conducted the investigation. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-15/PW-13) and recorded the statements of the prosecution witnesses as per their versions. He arrested the accused vide memo (Ext.PW-2/B). He produced the case property, case file, and accused before Inspector Balbir Singh (PW-11), who resealed the parcel with two seal impressions of seal ‘Y’. He put the seal ‘Y’ on the NCB-1 form and issued a Re-Sealing certificate (Ext.PW-9/A). He handed over the case property to ASI Mohinder Singh (PW-10), who made an entry at Sl. No. 1276 of Malkhana Register (Ext.PW-10/B) and deposited the case property

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in Malkhana. He sent the parcel, NCB-1 form in triplicate and sample seals to the State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL), Himachal Pradesh, Junga, through HHC Raj Kumar vide RC No. 235/21 (Ext.PW-10/C). HHC Raj Kumar deposited all the articles at SFSL, Junga and handed over the receipt to the MHC. The intimation under Section 42 of the NDPS Act (Ext.P-11/PW-12) was handed over to Rajeev Attri, SDPO, Nurpur, H.P., on 16.01.2014 at 7:40 p.m. Rajeev Attri made an endorsement and handed it over to his Reader ASI Ashok Kumar (PW-12), who made an entry at Sl. No. 7 in the Register. Special Report (Ext.PW-5/A) was prepared and sent to SDPO, Nurpur, H.P. Rajeev Attri, SDPO Nurpur, H.P., who made an endorsement on the Special Report and handed it over to ASI Ashok Kumar (PW-12), who made an entry at Sl. No.80 in the Special Report Register (Ext.P-12/PW-12). The result of the analysis (Ext.PX) was issued, stating that the Exhibit was a sample of Poppy Straw and indicated the presence of Opium Poppy (Papaver Somniferum L.). The statements of remaining witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court.

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Learned Trial Court charged the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 15 of the NDPS Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined thirteen witnesses to prove its case. HHC Balkar Singh (PW-1), ASI Rashpal (PW-2), HC Raj Kumar (PW-3), and Jugal Kishore (PW-4) are the witnesses to the recovery. HHC Ashok Kumar (PW-5) carried the Special Report to SDPO, Nurpur, H.P. HHC Gurdeep Singh (PW-6) proved the entry in the daily diary. Shivdyal Singh (PW-7) did not support the prosecution case. HHC Sanjay Kumar (PW-8) proved the entry in the daily diary. HC Hans Raj (PW-9) is the witness to the resealing of the parcel. ASI Mohinder Singh (PW10) was working as MHC with whom the case property was deposited. Balbir Chand (PW-11) was working as the SHO, who resealed the case property. ASI Ashok Kumar (PW-12) was working as a Reader to SDPO, to whom the Special Report and intimation under Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act were handed over. SI Pawan Kumar (PW-13) investigated the case.

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The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution case in its entirety. He claimed

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that he was innocent and the witnesses deposed against him falsely. He did not produce any evidence in defence.

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Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution witnesses deposed consistently about the apprehension of the accused and recovery of Poppy Husk from him. Section 50 of the NDPS Act does not apply to the present case because no recovery was effected from the personal search. The failure to join independent witnesses was not material. Section 42 of the NDPS Act did not apply to the present case; however, its requirement was duly complied with by the police. The integrity of the case property was established. Hence, the accused was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid.

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Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused preferred the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing him. The judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court are based on conjectures and surmises. The personal search of the accused was conducted, but he was not taken to the Magistrate or the Gazetted Officer. The place where the accused stated to have been apprehended was located in a thickly populated area, but no independent witness was associated. There

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were material contradictions in the statements of witnesses, which made them highly suspect. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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I have heard Mr. Arsh Chuhan, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.

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Mr. Arsh Chuhan, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the appellant is innocent and was falsely implicated. The police did not comply with the requirement of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. The accused was not taken to the Magistrate or the Gazetted Officer. The place where the accused was stated to have been apprehended was located in a thickly populated area, and no efforts were made to join any independent witness. There are material contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses regarding the method of weighing the opium poppy husk and the recovery of the polythene, which made the prosecution’s case doubtful. Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate these aspects. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set

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aside. He submitted in the alternative that the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court is disproportionate and the same be modified.

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Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, submitted that no recovery was effected from the personal search of the accused and there was no requirement to comply with the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. The incident had taken place in the year 2014, whereas the statements were recorded in the year 2018 and onwards. Minor contradictions were bound to come with time. These cannot be used for discarding the prosecution’s case. It was a case of a chance recovery, and one independent witness, Jugal Kishore (PW-4), associated by the police, supported the prosecution version. The learned Trial Court had rightly convicted and sentenced the accused. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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HHC Balkar Singh (PW-1) stated in his crossexamination that a personal search of the accused was carried out by the police. ASI Rashpal (PW-2) also admitted in his cross-

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examination that a personal search of the accused was carried out by the police officials.

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It was submitted based on these statements that the police were bound to comply with the requirement of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. There is insufficient evidence to show that the requirement of Section 50 of the NDPS Act was complied with. Therefore, the accused is entitled to an acquittal because of the violation of the mandatory provisions of law. This submission is not acceptable. It is not the case of the prosecution that recovery was effected from the personal search of the accused. The recovery was effected from the carry bag being carried by the accused. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab Versus Baljinder Singh & another, (2019) 10 SCC 473, that where the recovery was effected from the bag, briefcase, etc., non-compliance with Section 50 of NDPS Act is not fatal. It was observed:

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“14. The law is thus well settled that an illicit article seized from the person during a personal search conducted in violation of the safeguards provided in Section 50 of the Act cannot by itself be used as admissible evidence of proof of unlawful possession of contraband. But the question is, if there be any other material or article recovered during the investigation, would the infraction with respect to personal search also affect the qualitative value of the other material circumstance?

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At this stage, we may also consider the following observations from the decision of this Court in Ajmer Singh v. State of Haryana [(2010) 3 SCC 746] : (2010 AIR SCW 1494, Para 16).]

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"15. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the provision of Section 50 of the Act would also apply while searching the bag, briefcase, etc., carried by the person, and its non-compliance would be fatal to the proceedings initiated under the Act. We find no merit in the contention of the learned counsel. It requires to be noticed that the question of compliance or non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act is relevant only where a search of a person is involved, and the said section is not applicable or attracted where no search of a person is involved. Search and recovery from a bag, briefcase, container, etc., do not come within the ambit of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, because firstly, Section 50 expressly speaks of the search of a person only. Secondly, the section speaks of taking of the person to be searched by the gazetted officer or a Magistrate for the purpose of the search. Thirdly, this issue, in our considered opinion, is no more res Integra in view of the observations made by this Court in Madan Lai v. State of H.P. [(2003) 7 SCC 465] : (AIR 2003 SC 3642) . The Court has observed: (SCC p. 471, para 16) (at p. 3645, para 17 of AIR)

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"16. A bare reading of Section 50 shows that it only applies in the case of a personal search of a person. It does not extend to a search of a vehicle or a container or a bag or premises (see Kalema Tumba v. State of Maharashtra[(1999) 8 SCC 257]: (AIR 2000 SC 402), State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh [(1999) 6 SCC 172] : (AIR 1999 SC 2378) and Gurbax Singh v. State of Haryana [(2001) 3 SCC 28]): (AIR 2001 SC 1002) . The language of Section 50 is implicitly clear that the search has to be in relation to a person as contrasted to a search of premises, vehicles or articles. This position was settled beyond doubt by the Constitution Bench in the Baldev

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Singh case . Above being the position, the contention regarding non-compliance with Section 50 of the Act is also without any substance."

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As regards the applicability of the requirements under Section 50 of the Act is concerned, it is well settled that the mandate of Section 50 of the Act is confined to "personal search" and not to search of a vehicle or a container or premises.

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The conclusion (3) as recorded by the Constitution Bench in para 57 of its judgment in Baldev Singh (AIR 1999 SC 2378) clearly states that the conviction may not be based "only" on the basis of possession of an illicit article recovered from personal search in violation of the requirements under Section 50 of the Act but if there be other evidence on record, such material can certainly be looked into.

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In the instant case, the personal search of the accused did not result in the recovery of any contraband. Even if there was any such recovery, the same could not be relied upon for want of compliance of the requirements of Section 50 of the Act. But the search of the vehicle and recovery of contraband pursuant thereto having stood proved, merely because there was noncompliance of Section 50 of the Act as far as "personal search" was concerned, no benefit can be extended so as to invalidate the effect of recovery from the search of the vehicle. Any such idea would be directly in the teeth of conclusion (3) as aforesaid.

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The decision of this Court in Dilip's (AIR 2007 SC 369) case, however, has not adverted to the distinction as discussed herein above and proceeded to confer an advantage upon the accused even in respect of recovery from the vehicle, on the ground that the requirements of Section 50 relating to personal search were not complied with. In our view, the decision of this Court in said judgment in Dilip's case is not correct and is opposed to the law laid down by this Court in Baldev Singh (AIR 1999 SC 2378) and other judgments.

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Since in the present matter, seven bags of poppy husk each weighing 34 kgs. were found from the vehicle which was being driven by accused Baljinder Singh with the other accused accompanying him, their presence and possession of the contraband material stood completely established.”

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This position was reiterated in Kallu Khan Vs State, AIR

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2022 SC 50, and it was observed:-

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“15. Simultaneously, the arguments advanced by the appellant regarding non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act are bereft of any merit because no recovery of contraband from the person of the accused has been made, to which compliance with the provision of Section 50 NDPS Act has to follow mandatorily. In the present case, in the search for a motorcycle at a public place, the seizure of contraband was made, as revealed. Therefore, compliance with Section 50 does not apply in the present case. It is settled in the case of Vijaysinh (supra) that in the case of the personal search only, the provisions of Section 50 of the Act are required to be complied with but not in the case of the vehicle as in the present case, following the judgments of Surinder Kumar (supra) and Baljinder Singh (supra). Considering the facts of this Court, the argument of non-compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act advanced by the counsel is hereby repelled.”

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Similar is the judgment in Dayalu Kashyap versus State of Chhattisgarh, 2022 (1) RCR(Cri) 815(SC) wherein it was observed:-

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“5. Learned counsel submits that the option given to the appellant to take a third choice other than what is prescribed as the two choices under sub-Section (1) of Section 50 of the Act is something which goes contrary to the mandate of the law and in a way affects the protection provided by the said Section to the accused. To support his contention, he has relied upon the judgment of the State of Rajasthan v. Parmanand & Anr., 2014 5 SCC 345 , more specifically, para 19.

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The judgment, in turn, relied upon a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, 1999 6 SCC 172 to conclude that if a search is made by an empowered Officer on prior information without informing the person of his right that he has to be taken before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate for search and in case he so opts, failure to take his search accordingly would render the recovery of the illicit article suspicious and vitiate the conviction and sentence of the accused where the conviction has been recorded only the on basis of possession of illicit articles recovered from his person. The third option stated to be given to the accused to get himself searched by the Officer concerned, not being part of the statute, the same could not have been offered to the appellant, and thus, the recovery from him is vitiated.

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6. In the conspectus of the facts of the case, we find the recovery was in a polythene bag which was being carried on a Kanwad. The recovery was not in person. Learned counsel seeks to expand the scope of the observations made by seeking to contend that if the personal search is vitiated by a violation of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, the recovery made otherwise also would stand vitiated and thus, cannot be relied upon. We cannot give such an extended view as is sought to be contended by learned counsel for the appellant.”

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This judgment was followed in Ranjan Kumar Chadha v.

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State of H.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1262 : AIR 2023 SC 5164, and it was observed:

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“126. As such, there is no direct conflict between SK. Raju (supra) and Baljinder Singh (supra). It is pertinent to note that in SK. Raju (supra), the contraband was recovered from the bag which the accused was carrying, whereas in Baljinder Singh (supra), the contraband was recovered from the vehicle. This makes a lot of difference even while applying the concept of any object being “inextricably linked

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to the person”. Parmanand (supra) relied upon the judgment in Dilip (supra) while taking the view that if both the person of the accused as well as the bag are searched and the contraband is ultimately recovered from the bag, then it is as good as the search of a person and, therefore, Section 50 would be applicable. However, it is pertinent to note that Dilip (supra) has not taken into consideration Pawan Kumar (supra), which is of a larger Bench. It is also pertinent to note that although in Parmanand (supra) the Court looked into Pawan Kumar (supra), yet ultimately it followed Dilip (supra) and took the view that if the bag carried by the accused is searched and his person is also searched, Section 50 of the NDPS Act will have application. This is something travelling beyond what has been stated by the large Bench in Pawan Kumar (supra). Baljinder Singh (supra), on the other hand, says that Dilip (supra) does not lay down good law.

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127. In the facts of the present case, there is no scope for applying the ratio of Parmanand (supra) and SK. Raju (supra). At the cost of repetition, we may state that in the case at hand, there is nothing to indicate that the search of the person of the accused was also undertaken along with the bag which he was carrying on his shoulder.

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128. We do not propose to say anything further as regards SK. Raju (supra) as well as Baljinder Singh (supra). We adhere to the principles of law as explained by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh (supra) and the larger Bench answering the reference in Pawan Kumar (supra).”

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17 . In view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act do not

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apply to the present case, and the submission that the case of the prosecution is to be rejected because of the violation of Section 50 of the NDPS Act is not acceptable.

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18. The prosecution witnesses HHC Balkar Singh (PW-1), Rashpal (PW-2), Raj Kumar (PW-3), Jugal Kishore (PW-4) and SI Pawan Kumar (PW-13) consistently deposed that the accused was found with a carry bag in his hand. The police apprehended him and checked the carry bag. The police recovered one polythene bag containing poppy husk, which was weighed and its weight was found to be 1kill 200 grams. The police put the carry bag containing poppy husk in a parcel and seized the parcel. It was submitted that there are major contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, which made them highly suspect. The following contradictions were highlighted:-

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i) HHC Balkar Singh (PW-1) stated in is examination-in chief stated that Investigating Officer took out a weighing machine from his I.O. Kit and weighed the poppy husk. ASI Rashpal (PW-2, Raj Kumar (PW-2) and Jugal Kishore (PW-3) stated that in their examination-in-chief the poppy husk was weighed with the help of Taraji.

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ii). HHC Balkar Singh (PW-1) mentioned that cloth bag was opened and checked and Chura Post (Bhukki) was found. He omitted to mention the polythene packet, which was mentioned by Rashpal (PW-2), Raj Kumar (PW-3) and Jugal Kishore (PW-4).

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iii) ASI Pawan Kumar stated in his crossexamination that he stitched the parcel on the spot with a needle and thread. He admitted that two sides of the parcel was stitched with the machine.

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In the present case, the incident had taken place on 16.01.2014. Statements of HHC Balkar Singh (PW-1), ASI Rashpal (PW-2), Raj Kumar (PW-3), Jugal Kishore (PW-4) and ASI Pawan Kumar (PW-13) were recorded on 18.01.2018, 15.01.2019 and 18.06.2024, respectively. Thus, sufficient time had elapsed since the date of the incident till the date of recording the statements of these witnesses. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that human memory fails with time and mere contradictions are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025) SCC Online SC 69 that the discrepancies are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case unless they are material. It was observed: -

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“ 51. As we proceed to examine this crucial aspect, it may be apposite to keep in mind certain observations made by this Court relating to discrepancies in the account of eyewitnesses.

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In Leela Ram (Dead) through Duli Chand v. State of Haryana, (1999) 9 SCC 525 , it was observed as follows:

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“9. Be it noted that the High Court is within its jurisdiction, being the first appellate court to reappraise the evidence, but the discrepancies found in the ocular account of two witnesses, unless they are so vital, cannot affect the credibility of the evidence of the witnesses. There are bound

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to be some discrepancies between the narrations of different witnesses when they speak on details, and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but variations by reason thereof should not render the evidence of eyewitnesses unbelievable. Trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate otherwise acceptable evidence. In this context, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony [(1985) 1 SCC 505: 1985 SCC (Cri) 105] . In para 10 of the Report, this Court observed: (SCC pp. 514-15)

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‘10. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. If the court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor

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variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. Even honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because the power of observation, retention and reproduction differ with individuals.’

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10. In a very recent decision in Rammi v. State of M.P. [(1999) 8 SCC 649: 2000 SCC (Cri) 26], this Court observed: (SCC p. 656, para 24)

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‘24. When an eyewitness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true witness can escape from making some discrepant details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored can successfully make his testimony totally nondiscrepant. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. But too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.’

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This Court further observed: (SCC pp. 656-57, paras 25-27)

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‘25. It is a common practice in trial courts to make out contradictions from the previous statement of a witness to confront him during cross-examination. Merely because there is an inconsistency in evidence, it is not sufficient to impair the credit of the witness. No doubt, Section 155 of the Evidence Act provides scope for impeaching the credit of a witness by proof of an inconsistent former statement. But a reading of the section would indicate that all inconsistent statements are not sufficient to impeach the credit of the witness. The material portion of the section is extracted below:

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“ 155. Impeaching the credit of a witness .—The credit of a witness may be impeached in the

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following ways by the adverse party, or, with the consent of the court, by the party who calls him—

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(1)-(2) ***

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(3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted;”

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26. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Only such an inconsistent statement, which is liable to be “contradicted”, would affect the credit of the witness. Section 145 of the Evidence Act also enables the cross-examiner to use any former statement of the witness, but it cautions that if it is intended to “contradict” the witness, the cross-examiner is enjoined to comply with the formality prescribed therein. Section 162 of the Code also permits the cross-examiner to use the previous statement of the witness (recorded under Section 161 of the Code) for the only a limited purpose, i.e. to “contradict” the witness.

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27. To contradict a witness, therefore, must be to discredit the particular version of the witness. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the present statement, even if the latter is at variance with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that witness (vide Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. [AIR 1959 SC 1012: 1959 Cri LJ 1231] ).”

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52. Further, this Court also cautioned about attaching too much importance to minor discrepancies of the evidence of the witnesses in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 as follows:

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“5. … We do not consider it appropriate or permissible to enter upon a reappraisal or reappreciation of the evidence in the context of the minor discrepancies painstakingly highlighted by the learned counsel for the appellant.

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Overmuch importance cannot be attached to minor discrepancies. The reasons are obvious:

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(1) By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the mental screen.

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(2) Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.

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(3) The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another.

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(4) By and large, people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder.

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(5) In regard to the exact time of an incident or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person.

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(6) Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on.

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(7) A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination made by the counsel and, out of

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nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him—perhaps it is a sort of psychological defence mechanism activated on the spur of the moment.”

¶106

53. To the same effect, it was also observed in Appabhai v. State of Gujarat 1988 Supp SCC 241 as follows:

¶107

“13. … The court, while appreciating the evidence, must not attach undue importance to minor discrepancies. The discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution's case may be discarded. The discrepancies which are due to normal errors of perception or observation should not be given importance. The errors due to lapse of memory may be given due allowance. The court, by calling into aid its vast experience of men and matters in different cases, must evaluate the entire material on record by excluding the exaggerated version given by any witness. When a doubt arises in respect of certain facts alleged by such a witness, the proper course is to ignore that fact only unless it goes to the root of the matter to demolish the entire prosecution story. The witnesses nowadays go on adding embellishments to their version, perhaps for fear that their testimony being rejected by the court. The courts, however, should not disbelieve the evidence of such witnesses altogether if they are otherwise trustworthy. Jaganmohan Reddy, J. speaking for this Court in Sohrab v. State of M.P. [(1972) 3 SCC 751: 1972 SCC (Cri) 819 ] observed: [SCC p. 756, para 8: SCC (Cri) p. 824, para 8]

¶108

‘8. … This Court has held that falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not a sound rule for the reason that hardly one comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or, at any rate, exaggeration, embroideries or embellishments. In most cases, the witnesses when asked about details venture to give some answer, not necessarily true or relevant for fear that their

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evidence may not be accepted in respect of the main incident which they have witnessed but that is not to say that their evidence as to the salient features of the case after cautious scrutiny cannot be considered….”

¶111

20. Hence, the testimonies of the witnesses have to be

¶112

examined to determine whether the contradictions are real or apparent, material or minor.

¶113

21. The contradiction regarding the weighing machine and Taraju can occur due to the failure of memory with time, and is not sufficient to discard the prosecution case. The documents prepared on the spot clearly show that a weighing scale (Taraju) was used for weighing the opium poppy husk. The other witnesses also deposed about the use of Taraju. Thus, the fact that HHC Balkar Singh (PW-1) stated about the weighing machine will not make the prosecution’s case doubtful.

¶114

22. HHC Balkar Singh (PW-1) did not mention the polythene packet; however, he specifically stated that the Investigating Officer placed the contraband in the plastic bag and sealed it in a cloth parcel, which shows that a plastic packet was available on the spot. The other witnesses consistently stated that a plastic bag containing opium poppy husk was found inside the carry bag. Thus, the mere fact that HHC Balkar Singh (PW-1) did not specifically state that a

¶115

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plastic bag was found inside the carry bag (when he mentioned it subsequently) does not show that there was no plastic bag. Hence, this contradiction is more apparent than the real.

¶117

23. SI Pawan Kumar (PW-13) did not state that he had stitched all sides of the parcel with needle and thread; therefore, the fact that two sides of the parcel were stitched with a machine does not show that the parcel was not prepared on the spot. One side of the parcel was stitched by hand, as was deposed by SI Pawan Kumar (PW-13). Therefore, this contradiction is no contradiction at all and cannot be used to discard the prosecution’s case.

¶118

HHC Balkar Singh (PW-1) stated that the Investigating Officer took a weighing machine from his I.O. kit and weighed it, which was found to be 1 killo 200 grams of Charas. It was submitted that the prosecution’s case was that the accused had opium poppy husk. Therefore, the use of the term Charas by HHC Balkar Singh makes the prosecution case highly suspect. This submission cannot be accepted. HHC Balkar Singh (PW-1) stated that the carry bag was opened, and Churra Post Bhukki was found in it. He identified the case property. Thus, he was quite categorical in stating that the accused was found in possession of opium poppy husk. The use of the

¶119

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term Charas while mentioning the weight was merely a slip of the tongue or clerical error, which cannot be read in isolation to discard the prosecution case.

¶121

25. Jugal Kishore (PW-4) admitted in his cross-examination

¶122

that SI Pawan Kumar (PW-13) was known to him for about six months prior to 16.01.2024. It was submitted that he is a stock witness known to the police and cannot be called to be an independent witness. These submissions cannot be accepted . It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Zakaullah, (1998) 1 SCC 557: 1998 SCC (Cri) 456 , that acquaintance with the police will not destroy a man’s independent outlook. Every person is to be presumed to be an independent person unless it is proved to be otherwise. It was observed at page 561: -

¶123

10. The necessity for “independent witness” in cases involving police raid or police search is incorporated in the statute not for the purpose of helping the indicated person to bypass the evidence of those panch witnesses who have had some acquaintance with the police or officers conducting the search at some time or the other. Acquaintance with the police by itself would not destroy a man's independent outlook. In a society where police involvement is a regular phenomenon, many people would get acquainted with the police. But as long as they are not dependent on the police for their living or liberty, or any other matter, it cannot be said that those are not independent persons. If the police, in order to carry out official duties, have sought the help of any other person, he would not forfeit his independent character by

¶124

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giving help to police action. The requirement to have an independent witness to corroborate the evidence of the police is to be viewed from a realistic angle. Every citizen of India must be presumed to be an independent person until it is proved that he was a dependant of the police or other officials for any purpose whatsoever. [ Hazari Lal v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1980) 2 SCC 390: 1980 SCC (Cri) 458: (1980) 2 SCR 1053] .]

¶126

In the present case, Jugal Kishore (PW-4) was up Pardhan of Gram Panchayat Paral. Being a public representative, the acquaintance with the police was natural and his acquaintance with the police officials does not show that he is not an independent person.

¶127

Jugal Kishore (PW-4) stated in his cross-examination that there are twenty residential houses in the Harijan Basti. There was a Primary School and a Liquor Vend. It was submitted that the police did not associate any independent witness from the Harijan Basti, Primary School or the Liquor Vend, which makes the prosecution case highly suspect. This submission is not acceptable. The prosecution witnesses consistently stated that the accused returned after seeing the police and started running towards the fields. There is no evidence that police had any prior information regarding the possession of opium poppy husk by the accused. Hence, it was a case of chance recovery.

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The term chance recovery was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Sunil Kumar, (2014) 4 SCC 780: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 449: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 205, and it was held that chance recovery means a recovery made by chance or by accident or unexpectedly. When the police were not looking for the drugs nor expected to find the drugs, any recovery is a chance recovery. It was observed at page 784:

¶130

“13. The expression “chance recovery” has not been defined anywhere, and its plain and simple meaning seems to be a recovery made by chance or by accident or unexpectedly. In Mohinder Kumar v. State [(1998) 8 SCC 655: 1999 SCC (Cri) 79], this Court considered a chance recovery as one when a police officer “stumbles on” narcotic drugs when he makes a search. In Sorabkhan Gandhkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat [(2004) 13 SCC 608: (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 508], the police officer, while searching for illicit liquor, accidentally found some charas. This was treated as a “chance recovery”.

¶131

14. Applying this to the facts of the present appeal, it is clear that the police officers were looking for passengers who were travelling ticketless and nothing more. They accidentally or unexpectedly came across drugs carried by a passenger. This can only be described as a recovery by chance since they were neither looking for drugs nor expecting to find drugs carried by anybody.

¶132

15. It is not possible to accept the view of the High Court that since the police officers conducted a random search and had a “positive suspicion” that Sunil Kumar was carrying contraband, the recovery of charas from his person was not a chance recovery. The recovery of contraband may not have been unexpected, but the recovery of charas certainly was unexpected, notwithstanding the submission that drugs are easily available in the Chamba area. The police officers had no

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reason to believe that Sunil Kumar was carrying any drugs, and indeed, that is also not the case set up in this appeal. It was plainly a chance or accidental, or unexpected recovery of charas—Sunil Kumar could well have been carrying any other contraband, such as smuggled gold, stolen property or an illegal firearm or even some other drug.

¶135

In the present case, the police had no prior information

¶136

about the accused carrying the opium poppy husk by the accused. They became suspicious of the conduct of the accused, and the present case will fall within the meaning of chance recovery.

¶137

It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kashmira Singh Versus State of Punjab 1999 (1) SCC 130 that the police party is under no obligation to join independent witnesses while going on patrolling duty, and the association of any person after effecting the recovery would be meaningless. It was observed:

¶138

“3. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the evidence recorded by the prosecution, as also the judgment under appeal. Except for the comment that the prosecution is supported by two police officials and not by any independent witness, no other comment against the prosecution is otherwise offered. This comment is not of any value since the police party was on patrolling duty, and they were not required to take along independent witnesses to support recovery if and when made. It has come to the evidence of ASI Jangir Singh that after the recovery had been effected, some people had passed by. Even so, obtaining their counter-signatures on the documents already prepared would not have lent any further credence to the prosecution version.”

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¶140

In similar circumstances, it was laid down by this Court in Chet Ram Vs State Criminal Appeal no. 151/2006 decided on 25.7.2018 that when the accused was apprehended after he tried to flee on seeing the police, there was no necessity to associate any person from the nearby village. It was observed: -

¶141

“(A)appellant was intercepted, and a search of his bag was conducted on suspicion, when he turned back and tried to flee, on seeing the police. Police officials did not have any prior information, nor did they have any reason to believe that he was carrying any contraband. They overpowered him when he tried to run away and suspected that he might be carrying some contraband in his bag. Therefore, the bag was searched, and Charas was recovered. After the recovery of Charas, there was hardly any need to associate any person from the nearby village because there remained nothing to be witnessed .

¶142

It is by now well settled that non-association of independent witnesses or non-supporting of the prosecution version by independent witnesses where they are associated, by itself, is not a ground to acquit an accused. It is also well-settled that the testimony of official witnesses, including police officials, carries the same evidentiary value as the testimony of any other person. The only difference is that Courts have to be more circumspect while appreciating the evidence of official witnesses to rule out the possibility of false implication of the accused, especially when such a plea is specifically raised by the defence. Therefore, while scrutinising the evidence of official witnesses, in a case where independent witnesses are not associated, contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of such witnesses are required to be taken into account and given due weightage unless satisfactorily explained. Of course, it is only the material contradictions and not the trivial ones, which assume significance.” (Emphasis supplied)

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India

¶145

in Raveen Kumar v. State of H.P., (2021) 12 SCC 557: (2023) 2 SCC (Cri) 230: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 869 that non-association of the independent witnesses will not be fatal to the prosecution case. However, the Court will have to scrutinise the statements of prosecution witnesses carefully. It was observed at page 566:

¶146

(C) Need for independent witnesses

¶147

19. It would be gainsaid that the lack of independent witnesses is not fatal to the prosecution's case. [ Kalpnath Rai v. State, (1997) 8 SCC 732: 1998 SCC (Cri) 134: AIR 1998 SC 201 , para 9] However, such omissions cast an added duty on courts to adopt a greater degree of care while scrutinising the testimonies of the police officers, which if found reliable can form the basis of a successful conviction.”

¶148

This position was reiterated in Rizwan Khan v. State of

¶149

Chhattisgarh, (2020) 9 SCC 627: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 730, wherein it

¶150

was observed at page 633:

¶151

“12. It is settled law that the testimony of the official witnesses cannot be rejected on the ground of noncorroboration by independent witnesses. As observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions, examination of independent witnesses is not an indispensable requirement and such non-examination is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution case [see Pardeep Kumar [State of H.P. v. Pardeep Kumar, (2018) 13 SCC 808: (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 420] ].

¶152

13. In the recent decision in Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab [Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563: (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 767] , while considering somewhat similar submission of non-examination of independent witnesses,

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while dealing with the offence under the NDPS Act, in paras 15 and 16, this Court observed and held as under: (SCC p. 568)

¶155

“ 15 . The judgment in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2011) 3 SCC 521: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1191] , relied on by the counsel for the respondent State, also supports the case of the prosecution. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that merely because the prosecution did not examine any independent witness would not necessarily lead to a conclusion that the accused was falsely implicated. The evidence of official witnesses cannot be distrusted and disbelieved merely on account of their official status.

¶156

16 . In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil, (2001) 1 SCC 652: 2001 SCC (Cri) 248] , it was held as under: (SCC p. 655)

¶157

‘It is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. It is time now to start placing at least initial trust in the actions and the documents made by the police. At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the other way around. That official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature.”

¶158

34. Similar is the judgment of this Court in Balwinder Singh

¶159

&Anr. Vs State of H.P., 2020 Criminal L.J. 1684 , wherein it was held: -

¶160

“3. (iii) Learned defence counsel contended that in the instant case, no independent witness was associated by the Investigating Officer; therefore, the prosecution case cannot be said to have been proved by it in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Learned defence counsel, in support of

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his contention, relied upon the titled Krishan Chand versus State of H.P.,2017 4 CriCC 531

¶163

3(iii)(d). It is by now well settled that a prosecution case cannot be disbelieved only because the independent witnesses were not associated.”

¶164

This position was reiterated in Kallu Khan v. State of

¶165

Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 197: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1223 , wherein it was held at page 204: -

¶166

“17. The issue raised regarding conviction solely relying upon the testimony of police witnesses, without procuring any independent witness, recorded by the two courts, has also been dealt with by this Court in Surinder Kumar [Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563: (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 767] holding that merely because independent witnesses were not examined, the conclusion could not be drawn that the accused was falsely implicated. Therefore, the said issue is also well settled and in particular, looking at the facts of the present case, when the conduct of the accused was found suspicious, and a chance recovery from the vehicle used by him is made from a public place and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant cannot avail any benefit on this issue. In our view, the concurrent findings of the courts do not call for interference.”

¶167

A similar view was taken in Kehar Singh v. State of H.P.,

¶168

2024 SCC OnLine HP 2825, wherein it was observed:

¶169

16. As regards non-association of the independent witnesses, it is now well settled that non-association of the independent witnesses or non-supporting of the prosecution version by independent witnesses itself is not a ground for acquittal of the Appellants/accused. It is also well-settled that the testimonies of the official witnesses, including police officials, carry the same evidentiary value as the testimony of any other person. The only difference is

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that the Court has to be most circumspect while appreciating the evidence of the official witnesses to rule out the possibility of false implication of the accused, especially when such a plea is specifically raised by the defence. Therefore, while scrutinising the evidence of the official witnesses, in cases where independent witnesses are not associated, contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimonies of such witnesses are required to be taken into account and given due weightage unless satisfactorily explained. However, the contradiction must be a material and not a trivial one, which alone would assume significance.

¶172

17. Evidently, this is a case of chance recovery; therefore, the police party was under no obligation to join independent witnesses while going on patrolling duty, and the association of any person after effecting the recovery would be meaningless.

¶173

Xxxx

¶174

19. A similar reiteration of law can be found in the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Avtar @ Tarri v. State of H.P., (2022) Supreme HP 345 , wherein it was observed as under: —

¶175

“24. As regards the second leg of the argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant, it cannot be said to be of much relevance in the given facts of the case. The factual situation was that the police party had laid the ‘nakka’ and immediately thereafter had spotted the appellant at some distance, who got perplexed and started walking back. The conduct of the appellant was sufficient to raise suspicion in the minds of police officials. At that stage, had the appellant not been apprehended immediately, the police could have lost the opportunity to recover the contraband. Looking from another angle, the relevance of independent witnesses could be there when such witnesses were immediately available or had already been associated at the place of ‘nakka’. These, however, are not

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mandatory conditions and will always depend on the factual situation of each and every case. The reason is that once the person is apprehended and is with the police, a subsequent association of independent witnesses may not be of much help. In such events, the manipulation, if any, cannot be ruled out.”

¶178

Xxxx

¶179

22. A similar reiteration of law can be found in a very recent judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Cr. A. No. 202 of 2020, titledDillo Begum v. State of H.P., decided on 27.03.2024 .”

¶180

Thus, in view of the binding precedents of this Court and

¶181

the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the non-association of independent witnesses is not fatal, and the prosecution's case cannot be discarded due to the non-association of independent witnesses. However, the Court will have to carefully scrutinise the testimonies of the police officials.

¶182

Nothing was suggested to the police officials or Jugal Kishore (PW-4) to show that they had any motive to depose against the accused. The accused did not explain in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that police officials had any enmity with him, which would compel them to falsely implicate the accused. Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly accepted the testimonies of official witnesses. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Goverdhan (supra) that the Appellate Court should not interfere

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with the findings regarding the credibility of the witnesses recorded by learned Trial Court unless there is some illegality in it. It was observed: -

¶185

“83. The trial court, after recording the testimony of the PW-10, and on consideration of the same, found her evidence trustworthy and credible. We see no reason to question the assessment about the credibility of the witness by the Trial Court, which had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witness and all other witnesses. Nothing has been brought to our notice of any serious illegality or breach of fundamental law to warrant taking a different view of the evidence of PW-10.

¶186

In this regard, we may keep in mind the valuable observations made by this Court in Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi, (2008) 10 SCC 497 , in the following words:

¶187

“28. At the same time, however, the appellate court is expected, nay bound, to bear in mind a finding recorded by the trial court on oral evidence. It should not be forgotten that the trial court had an advantage and opportunity of seeing the demeanour of witnesses and, hence, the trial court's conclusions should not normally be disturbed. No doubt, the appellate court possesses the same powers as the original court, but they have to be exercised with proper care, caution and circumspection. When a finding of fact has been recorded by the trial court mainly on appreciation of oral evidence, it should not be lightly disturbed unless the approach of the trial court in the appraisal of evidence is erroneous, contrary to well-established principles of law or unreasonable.

¶188

29. …………………………………..

¶189

3 0. In Sara Veeraswami v. Talluri Narayya [(1947-48) 75 IA 252: AIR 1949 PC 32] the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, after referring to relevant decisions on

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the point, stated [ Quoting from Watt v. Thomas, [1947] 1 All ER 582 , pp. 583 H-584 A.]: (IA p. 255)

¶192

“…but if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at at the trial, and especially if that conclusion has been arrived at on conflicting testimony by a tribunal which saw and heard the witnesses, the appellate court will bear in mind that it has not enjoyed this opportunity and that the view of the trial Judge as to where credibility lies is entitled to great weight. This is not to say that the Judge of the first instance can be treated as infallible in determining which side is telling the truth or is refraining from exaggeration. Like other tribunals, he may go wrong on a question of fact, but it is a cogent circumstance that a Judge of first instance, when estimating the value of verbal testimony, has the advantage (which is denied to courts of appeal) of having the witnesses before him and observing how their evidence is given.”

¶193

39. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the testimonies

¶194

of the police officials cannot be discarded simply because they happened to be police officials. The presumption that an official act is done regularly applies to the acts done by police officials as well. It was laid down by this Court in Budh Ram Versus State of H.P. 2020 Cri.L.J.4254 that the testimonies of the police officials cannot be discarded on the ground that they belong to the police force. It was observed:

¶195

“11. It is a settled proposition of law that the sole testimony

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of the police official, which if otherwise is reliable, trustworthy, cogent and duly corroborated by other admissible evidence, cannot be discarded only on the ground that he is a police official and may be interested in the success of the case. There is also no rule of law which lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of a police officer, even if such evidence is otherwise trustworthy. The rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence. Wherever the evidence of a police officer, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form the basis of conviction, and the absence of some independent witness of the locality does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case. No infirmity attaches to the testimony of the police officers merely because they belong to the police force.”

¶198

40. Similar is the judgment in Karamjit Singh versus State,

¶199

AIR 2003 S.C. 3011, wherein it was held:

¶200

“The testimony of police personnel should be treated in the same manner as the testimony of any other witness, and there is no principle of law that, without corroboration by independent witnesses, their testimony cannot be relied upon. The presumption that a person acts honestly applies as much in favour of police personnel as of other persons, and it is not a proper judicial approach to distrust and suspect them without good grounds. It will all depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and no principle of general application can be laid down.” (Emphasis supplied)

¶201

This position was reiterated in Sathyan v. State of Kerala,

¶202

2023 SCC OnLine SC 986, wherein it was observed:

¶203

22. Conviction being based solely on the evidence of police officials is no longer an issue on which the jury is out. In other words, the law is well settled that if the evidence of such a police officer is found to be reliable, trustworthy, then

¶204

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basing the conviction thereupon cannot be questioned, and the same shall stand on firm ground. This Court in Pramod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2013 (6) SCC 588 after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil Singh [1988 Supp SCC 686: 1989 SCC (Cri) 48], State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil [(2001) 1 SCC 652: 2001 SCC (Cri) 248] and Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar [(2006) 13 SCC 229 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 626] has laid down recently in Kashmiri Lal v. State of Haryana [(2013) 6 SCC 595: AIR 2013 SCW 3102] that there is no absolute command of law that the police officers cannot be cited as witnesses and their testimony should always be treated with suspicion. Ordinarily, the public at large shows their disinclination to come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinising the evidence, the court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the court may disbelieve him, but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the police Department of Police should be viewed with distrust. This is also based on the principle that the quality of the evidence outweighs the quantity of evidence.

¶206

23. Referring to State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil 2001 (1) SCC 652 , in Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC 674 , this court held that: —

¶207

“23. … That apart, the case of the prosecution cannot be rejected solely on the ground that independent witnesses have not been examined when, on the perusal of the evidence on record, the Court finds that the case put forth by the prosecution is trustworthy. When the evidence of the official witnesses is trustworthy and credible, there is no reason not to rest the conviction on the basis of their evidence.”

¶208

24. We must note that in the former it was observed: —

¶209

“21… At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the

¶210

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presumption should be the other way around. That official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature… If the court has any good reason to suspect the truthfulness of such records of the police, the court could certainly take into account the fact that no other independent person was present at the time of recovery. But it is not a legally approvable procedure to presume the police action as unreliable to start with, nor to jettison such action merely for the reason that police did not collect signatures of independent persons in the documents made contemporaneous with such actions.”

¶212

25. Recently, this Court in Mohd. Naushad v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2023 SCC OnLine 784 had observed that the testimonies of police witnesses, as well as pointing out memos, do not stand vitiated due to the absence of independent witnesses. 26. It is clear from the above propositions of law, as reproduced and referred to, that the testimonies of official witnesses can nay be discarded simply because independent witnesses were not examined. The correctness or authenticity is only to be doubted on “any good reason”, which, quite apparently, is missing from the present case. No reason is forthcoming on behalf of the Appellant to challenge the veracity of the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2, which the courts below have found absolutely to be inspiring in confidence. Therefore, basing the conviction on the basis of testimony of the police witnesses as undertaken by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court vide the impugned judgment, cannot be faulted with.”

¶213

Jugal Kishore (PW-4) stated that the seal was handed

¶214

over to him after its use; however, he did not produce the seal before the Court. It was submitted that the non-production of the

¶215

seal is fatal to the prosecution's case. This submission is not

¶216

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acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Fredrick George v. State of Himachal Pradesh , 2002 SCC OnLine HP 73: 2002 Cri LJ 4600 that there is no requirement to produce the seal before the Court. It was observed at page 4614:

¶218

“62. It is a fact that the seals used for sealing and re-sealing the bulk case property and the samples have not been produced at the trial. In Manjit Singh's case (2001 (2) Cri LJ (CCR) 74) (supra), while dealing with the effect of nonproduction of the seal, this Court held as under:

¶219

“In the absence of any mandatory provision in the law/Rules of procedure relating to sealing of the case property, that the seal used in sealing the case property must be produced at the trial, it cannot be said that failure to produce such seal at the trial will be fatal to the case of the prosecution. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case whether, by nonproduction of the seal at the trial, any doubt is raised about the safe custody of the case property or not.”

¶220

63. In view of the above position in law and the conclusion we have already arrived at hereinabove that there is unchallenged and trustworthy evidence that the case property was not tampered with at any stage, the nonproduction of the seals used for sealing and re-sealing of the bulk case property of the samples is also of no help to the accused.”

¶221

43. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

¶222

Varinder Kumar v. State of H.P., (2020) 3 SCC 321 that failure to produce the seal in the Court is not fatal. It was observed:-

¶223

“6. We have considered the respective submissions. PW10 is stated to have received secret information at 2.45 P.M. on 31.03.1995. He immediately reduced it into writing and sent

¶224

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¶225

the same to PW8, Shri Jaipal Singh, Dy. S.P., C.I.D., Shimla. At 3.05 P.M., PW7, Head Constable Surender Kumar, stopped PW5, Naresh Kumar and another independent witness, Jeevan Kumar, travelling together, whereafter the appellant was apprehended at 3.30 P.M. with two Gunny Bags on his Scooter, which contained varying quantities of ‘charas’. PW8, Shri Jaipal Singh, Dy.S.P., C.I.D., Shimla, who had arrived by then, gave notice to the appellant and obtained his consent for carrying out the search. Two samples of 25 gms. Each was taken from the two Gunny Bags and sealed with the seals ‘S’ and given to PW5. PW2, Jaswinder Singh, the Malkhana Head Constable, resealed it with the seal ‘P’. The conclusion of the Trial Court that the seal had not been produced in the Court is, therefore, perverse in view of the two specimen seal impressions having been marked as Exhibits PH and PK. It is not the case of the appellant that the seals were found tampered with in any manner.”

¶226

44. It was specifically held in Varinder Kumar (supra) that

¶227

when the sample seals were produced before the Court, the conclusion of the Trial Court that the seals were not produced before the Court was perverse.

¶228

45. In the present case, seal impressions were obtained on the NCB-I form (Ext.P-13/PW-13). Sample seal ‘B’ (Ext. MO-1) and sample seal of re-seal ‘Y’ were produced before the Court. When the case property was produced during the examination of HHC Balkar Singh (PW-1), the Court noticed that the parcel had four seal impressions of SFSL and six impressions of seal ‘B’. Seals were intact. Therefore, the Court had the specimen seal impressions to

¶229

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¶230

compare the seal impressions on the parcel and failure to produce the original seal before the Court will not be fatal to the prosecution case.

¶231

46. It was submitted that the case property was not produced before the learned Magistrate, which is violative of the mandatory provisions of Section 52A of the NDPS Act. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down in Sandeep Kumar Vs State of H.P., 2022 Law Suits (HP) 149 , that the provisions of Section 52-A of the NDPS Act is not mandatory and its non-compliance is not fatal to the prosecution case. It was observed:-

¶232

“24. It has also been strenuously argued on behalf of the appellants that the investigating agency had failed to comply with the provisions of Section 52-A of the NDPS Act and thus cast a shadow of doubt on its story. The contention raised on behalf of the appellants is that the rules framed for investigations under the NDPS Act are mandatory and have to be strictly followed. Neither the required sample was taken on the spot, nor were the samples preserved by complying with Section 52-A of the Act. It has been argued that compliance with Section 52-A of the Act is mandatory…..

¶233

xxxxxx

¶234

The precedent relied upon on behalf of the appellants, however, did not lay down the law that non-compliance with Section 52-A of the Act is fatal to the prosecution's case under the NDPS Act. On the other hand, in State of Punjab vs. Makhan Chand, 2004 (3) SCC 453 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the question of the effect of noncompliance of Section 52-A, has held as under: -

¶235

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This contention, too, has no substance for two reasons. Firstly, Section 52A, as the marginal note indicates, deals with the "disposal of seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances". Under Sub-section (1), the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, is empowered to specify certain narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances having regard to the hazardous nature, vulnerability to theft, substitution, constraints of proper storage space and such other relevant considerations, so that even if they are material objects seized in a criminal case, they could be disposed of after following the procedure prescribed in Sub-sections (2) & (3). If the procedure prescribed in Sub-sections (2) & (3) of Section 52A is complied with and upon an application, the Magistrate issues the certificate contemplated by Subsection (2), then Subsection (4) provides that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, such inventory, photographs of narcotic drugs or substances and any list of samples drawn under Sub-section (2) of Section 52A as certified by the Magistrate, would be treated as primary evidence in respect of the offence. Therefore, Section 52A(1) does not empower the Central Government to lay down the procedure for the search of an accused, but only deals with the disposal of seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

¶237

Secondly, when the very same standing orders came up for consideration in Khet Singh v. Union of India, 2002 (4) SCC 380 , this Court took the view that they are merely intended to guide the officers to see that a fair procedure is adopted by the Officer-in-Charge of the investigation. It was also held that they were not inexorable rules, as there could be circumstances in which it may not be possible for the seizing officer to prepare the mahazar at the spot if it is a chance recovery, where the officer may not have the facility to prepare the seizure mahazar at the spot itself. Hence,

¶238

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we do not find any substance in this contention.”

¶240

47. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

¶241

Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3848, that the violation of Section 52-A does not entitle a person to be released on bail. It was observed:

¶242

“39. The upshot of the above discussion may be summarised as under:

¶243

(i) The provisions of the NDPS Act are required to be interpreted keeping in mind the scheme, object and purpose of the Act, as also the impact on society as a whole. It has to be interpreted literally and not liberally, which may ultimately frustrate the object, purpose and Preamble of the Act.

¶244

(ii) While considering the application for bail, the Court must bear in mind the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which are mandatory in nature. Recording of findings as mandated in Section 37 is sine qua non is known for granting bail to the accused involved in the offences under the NDPS Act.

¶245

(iii) The purpose of the insertion of Section 52A, laying down the procedure for disposal of seized Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, was to ensure the early disposal of the seized contraband drugs and substances. It was inserted in 1989 as one of the measures to implement and give effect to the International Conventions on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

¶246

(iv) Sub-section (2) of Section 52A lays down the procedure as contemplated in sub-section (1) thereof, and any lapse or delayed compliance thereof would be merely a procedural irregularity which would neither entitle the accused to be released on bail nor would it vitiate the trial on that ground alone.

¶247

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¶248

(v) Any procedural irregularity or illegality found to have been committed in conducting the search and seizure during the course of investigation or thereafter would, by itself, not make the entire evidence collected during the course of investigation inadmissible. The Court would have to consider all the circumstances and find out whether any serious prejudice has been caused to the accused.

¶249

(vi) Any lapse or delay in compliance with Section 52A by itself would neither vitiate the trial nor would it entitle the accused to be released on bail. The Court will have to consider other circumstances and the other primary evidence collected during the course of the investigation, as also the statutory presumption permissible under Section 54 of the NDPS Act.”

¶250

48. This judgment was followed in Bharat Aambale v. State of

¶251

Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 110, and it was held that noncompliance with Section 52-A of the ND&PS Act does not vitiate the trial. It was observed:

¶252

“50. We summarise our conclusion as under:—

¶253

(I) Although Section 52A is primarily for the disposal and destruction of seized contraband in a safe manner yet it extends beyond the immediate context of drug disposal, as it serves a broader purpose of also introducing procedural safeguards in the treatment of narcotics substance after seizure inasmuch as it provides for the preparation of inventories, taking of photographs of the seized substances and drawing samples therefrom in the presence and with the certification of a magistrate. Mere drawing of samples in the presence of a gazetted officer would not constitute sufficient compliance of the mandate under Section 52A sub-section (2) of the NDPS Act.

¶254

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(II) Although there is no mandate that the drawing of samples from the seized substance must take place at the time of seizure as held in Mohanlal (supra), yet we are of the opinion that the process of inventorying, photographing and drawing samples of the seized substance shall as far as possible, take place in the presence of the accused, though the same may not be done at the very spot of seizure.

¶256

(III) Any inventory, photographs or samples of seized substance prepared in substantial compliance of the procedure prescribed under Section 52A of the NDPS Act and the Rules/Standing Order(s) thereunder would have to be mandatorily treated as primary evidence as per Section 52A subsection (4) of the NDPS Act, irrespective of whether the substance in the original is actually produced before the court or not.

¶257

(IV) The procedure prescribed by the Standing Order(s)/Rules in terms of Section 52A of the NDPS Act is only intended to guide the officers and to see that a fair procedure is adopted by the officer in-charge of the investigation, and as such, what is required is substantial compliance with the procedure laid therein.

¶258

(V) Mere non-compliance of the procedure under Section 52A or the Standing Order(s)/Rules thereunder will not be fatal to the trial unless there are discrepancies in the physical evidence rendering the prosecution's case doubtful, which may not have been there had such compliance been done. Courts should take a holistic and cumulative view of the discrepancies that may exist in the evidence adduced by the prosecution and appreciate the same more carefully, keeping in mind the procedural lapses.

¶259

(VI) If the other material on record adduced by the prosecution, oral or documentary inspires confidence and satisfies the court as regards the recovery as well as conscious possession of the contraband from the accused persons, then even in such cases, the courts

¶260

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can without hesitation proceed to hold the accused guilty notwithstanding any procedural defect in terms of Section 52A of the NDPS Act.

¶262

(VII) Non-compliance or delayed compliance of the said provision or rules thereunder may lead the court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution; however, no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when such inference may be drawn, and it would all depend on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.

¶263

(VIII) Where there has been a lapse on the part of the police in either following the procedure laid down in Section 52A of the NDPS Actor the prosecution in proving the same, it will not be appropriate for the court to resort to the statutory presumption of commission of an offence from the possession of illicit material under Section 54 of the NDPS Act, unless the court is otherwise satisfied as regards the seizure or recovery of such material from the accused persons from the other material on record.

¶264

(IX) The initial burden will lie on the accused to first lay the foundational facts to show that there was noncompliance of Section 52A, either by leading evidence of its own or by relying upon the evidence of the prosecution, and the standard required would only be preponderance of probabilities.

¶265

(X) Once the foundational facts laid indicate noncompliance of Section 52A of the NDPS Act, the onus would thereafter be on the prosecution to prove by cogent evidence that either (i) there was substantial compliance with the mandate of Section 52A of the NDPS Act OR (ii) satisfy the court that such noncompliance does not affect its case against the accused, and the standard of proof required would be beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶266

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49. The matter is squarely covered by the judgment of Sandeep Kuamr (supra), which has held that Section 52A of the NDPS Act does not apply when the whole bulk is sent for analysis. Thus, the submission that the prosecution case is to be discarded due to non-compliance with Section 52-A of the NDPS Act is not acceptable.

¶268

50. The case property was sent to SFSL. The report of the analysis (Ext.PX) shows that the cloth parcel was sealed with six seals of ‘B’ and two seals of ‘Y’. The seals were found intact and tallied with the specimen seals sent by the forwarding authority and seal impressions impressed on the NCB-I form. This report establishes the integrity of the case property. It was held in Baljit Sharma vs. State of H.P 2007 HLJ 707, that where the report of analysis shows that the seals were intact, the case of prosecution that the case property remained intact is to be accepted as correct. It was observed:

¶269

“A perusal of the report of the expert Ex.PW8/A shows that the samples were received by the expert in a safe manner, and the sample seal was separately sent, tallied with the specimen impression of a seal taken separately. Thus, there was no tampering with the seal, and the seal impressions were separately taken and sent to the expert also.”

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¶271

51. Similar is the judgment in Hardeep Singh vs State of Punjab 2008(8) SCC 557, wherein it was held:

¶272

“It has also come to evidence that to date, the parcels of the sample were received by the Chemical Examiner, and the seal put on the said parcels was intact. That itself proves and establishes that there was no tampering with the previously mentioned seal in the sample at any stage, and the sample received by the analyst for chemical examination contained the same opium, which was recovered from the possession of the appellant. In that view of the matter, a delay of about 40 days in sending the samples did not and could not have caused any prejudice to the appellant.”

¶273

In State of Punjab vs Lakhwinder Singh 2010 (4) SCC 402,

¶274

the High Court had concluded that there could have been tampering

¶275

with the case property since there was a delay of seven days in sending the report to FSL. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the case property was produced in the Court, and there was no evidence of tampering. Seals were found to be intact, which would rule out the possibility of tampering. It was observed:

¶276

“The prosecution has been able to establish and prove that the aforesaid bags, which were 35 in number, contained poppy husk, and accordingly, the same were seized after taking samples therefrom, which were properly sealed. The defence has not been able to prove that the aforesaid seizure and seal put on the samples were in any manner tampered with before it was examined by the Chemical Examiner. There was merely a delay of about seven days in sending the samples to the Forensic Examiner, and it is not proved as to how the aforesaid delay of seven days has affected the said examination, when it could not be proved that the seal of the

¶277

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¶278

sample was in any manner tampered with. The seal having been found intact at the time of the examination by the Chemical Examiner and the said fact having been recorded in his report, a mere observation by the High Court that the case property might have been tampered with, in our opinion, is based on surmises and conjectures and cannot take the place of proof.

¶279

We may at this stage refer to a decision of this Court in Hardip Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2008) 8 SCC 557 in which there was a delay of about 40 days in sending the sample to the laboratory after the same was seized. In the said decision, it was held that in view of cogent and reliable evidence that the opium was seized and sealed and that the samples were intact till they were handed over to the Chemical Examiner, the delay itself was held to be not fatal to the prosecution case. In our considered opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case in this regard.

¶280

The case property was produced in the Court, and there is no evidence to show that the same was ever tampered with. 53. Similar is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

¶281

Surinder Kumar vs State of Punjab (2020) 2 SCC 563 , wherein it was

¶282

held: -

¶283

“10. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant, Joginder Singh, ASI, to whom Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), handed over the case property for producing the same before the Illaqa Magistrate and who returned the same to him after such production was not examined, as such, the link evidence was incomplete. In this regard, it is to be noticed that Yogi Raj, SHO, handed over the case property to Joginder Singh, ASI, for production before the Court. After producing the case property before the Court, he returned the case property to Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), with the seals intact. It is also to be noticed that Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in possession of the seals of either the investigating officer or Yogi Raj, SHO. He

¶284

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produced the case property before the Court on 13.09.1996 vide application Ex.P-13. The concerned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, after verifying the seals on the case property, passed the order Ex.P-14 to the effect that since there was no judicial malkhana at Abohar, the case property was ordered to be kept in safe custody, in Police Station Khuian Sarwar, till further orders. Since Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in possession of the seals of either the SHO or the Investigating Officer, the question of tampering with the case property by him did not arise at all.

¶286

Further, he has returned the case property, after production of the same, before the Illaqa Magistrate, with the seals intact, to Yogi Raj, SHO. In that view of the matter, the Trial Court and the High Court have rightly held that the non-examination of Joginder Singh did not, in any way, affect the case of the prosecution. Further, it is evident from the report of the Chemical Examiner, Ex.P-10, that the sample was received with seals intact and that the seals on the sample tallied with the sample seals. In that view of the matter, the chain of evidence was complete .” (Emphasis supplied)

¶287

54. Therefore, the submission that the integrity of the case

¶288

property has not been established cannot be accepted.

¶289

The result of the analysis shows that the sample stated as poppy husk was a sample of poppy straw. Since the integrity of the case property was established; therefore, it was duly proved that the accused was found in possession of 1.200 kgs of poppy husk, and the learned Trial Court rightly convicted the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 15 of the NDPS Act.

¶290

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¶291

Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years, pay a fine of ₹20,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment of six months. The Central Government has notified 50 kg of poppy straw as a commercial quantity, which means that a person possessing 50 kg of poppy straw can be sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period which shall not be less than ten years and to a fine which shall not be less than ₹1 lakh. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Uggarsain v. State of Haryana , (2023) 8 SCC 109: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 755 that the Courts have to apply the principle of proportionality while imposing sentence. It was observed at page 113:

¶292

10. This Court has, time and again, stated that the principle of proportionality should guide the sentencing process. In Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed v. State of Gujarat [Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 7 SCC 254 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 368 : (2009) 8 SCR 719] it was held that the sentence should “ deter the criminal from achieving the avowed object to (sic break the) law, ” and the endeavour should be to impose an “ appropriate sentence .” The Court also held that imposing “ meagre sentences ” merely on account of lapse of time would be counterproductive. Likewise, in Jameel v. State of U.P. [Jameel v. State of U.P., (2010) 12 SCC 532 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 582 : (2009) 15 SCR 712] while advocating that sentencing should be fact dependent exercises, the Court also emphasised that : ( Jameel case [Jameel v. State of U.P.,

¶293

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¶294

(2010) 12 SCC 532 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 582 : (2009) 15 SCR 712 ], SCC p. 535, para 15)

¶295

“ 15 . … the law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on a factual matrix. By deft modulation, the sentencing process is stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration .”(emphasis supplied)

¶296

11. Again, in Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka [Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 734: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 594 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 972 : (2012) 8 SCR 189] the Court stressed that: (SCC p. 744, para 33)

¶297

“ 33 . … It is the duty of the court to see that an appropriate sentence is imposed, regard being had to the commission of the crime and its impact on the social order ”(emphasis supplied)

¶298

and that sentencing includes “ adequate punishment ”. In B.G. Goswami v. Delhi Admn. [B.G. Goswami v. Delhi Admn., (1974) 3 SCC 85: 1973 SCC (Cri) 796 : (1974) 1 SCR 222] , the Court considered the issue of punishment and observed that punishment is designed to protect society by deterring potential offenders as well as prevent the guilty party from repeating the offence; it is also designed to reform the offender and reclaim him as a law-abiding citizen for the good of the society as a whole. Reformatory, deterrent and punitive aspects of punishment thus play their due part in judicial thinking while determining the question of awarding appropriate sentences.

¶299

12. In Sham Sunder v. Puran [Sham Sunder v. Puran, (1990) 4 SCC 731: 1991 SCC (Cri) 38: 1990 Supp (1) SCR 662] , the appellant-accused was convicted under Section 304 Part I IPC. The appellate court reduced the sentence to the term of

¶300

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imprisonment already undergone, i.e. six months. However, it enhanced the fine. This Court ruled that the sentence awarded was inadequate. Proceeding further, it opined that : (SCC p. 737, para 8)

¶302

“ 8 . … The court, in fixing the punishment for any particular crime, should take into consideration the nature of the offence, the circumstances in which it was committed, and the degree of deliberation shown by the offender. The measure of punishment should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence. The sentence imposed by the High Court appears to be so grossly and entirely inadequate as to involve a failure of justice. We are of the opinion that to meet the ends of justice, the sentence has to be enhanced .”(emphasis supplied)

¶303

This Court enhanced the sentence to one of rigorous imprisonment for five years. This Court has emphasised, in that sentencing depends on the facts, and the adequacy is determined by factors such as “ the nature of crime, the manner in which it is committed, the propensity shown and the brutality reflected ” [ Ravada Sasikala v. State of A.P. [Ravada Sasikala v. State of A.P., (2017) 4 SCC 546: (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 436: (2017) 2 SCR 379] ]. Other decisions, like: State of M.P. v. Bablu [State of M.P. v. Bablu, (2014) 9 SCC 281 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 1 : (2014) 9 SCR 467]; Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar [Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar, (2013) 9 SCC 516 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 159 : (2013) 5 SCR 979] and State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi [State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751 : (2015) 3 SCR 590] too, have stressed on the significance and importance of imposing appropriate, “adequate” or “proportionate” punishments.

¶304

Learned Trial Court held that the offences involving

¶305

narcotics affect a large number of people and are detrimental to society. The learned Trial Court took a lenient view and sentenced

¶306

the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years.

¶307

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Learned Trial Court failed to notice the principle of proportionality, which would show that a person possessing 1 killo 200 grams of poppy straw cannot be held liable for four years’ rigorous imprisonment when a person possessing 50 kg of opium poppy straw is liable for imprisonment of ten years. Therefore, the sentence of four years imposed by the learned Trial Court is not justified.

¶309

The judgment passed by the learned Trial Court shows that the accused was arrested on 16.01.2014 and was released on bail on 25.02.2014. He was taken into custody after the imposition of the sentence and has been in custody since then. He has already undergone imprisonment for about one year, which is more than sufficient considering the principle of proportionality. Hence, he is sentenced to undergo the imprisonment for the period already undergone by him and pay a fine of ₹10,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment of three months for the commission of the offence punishable under Section 15(b) of the NDPS Act.

¶310

In view of above, the present appeal is partly allowed and the accused is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for the period

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already undergone by him, pay a fine of ₹10,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further simple imprisonment of three months for the commission of offence punishable under Section 15(b) of the NDPS Act. Subject to this modification, the rest of the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is upheld.

¶313

60. The modified warrant be prepared accordingly.

¶314

61. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith,

¶315

along with a copy of this judgment.

¶316

( Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 19^th August 2025 ( ravinder )

Gurbhajan Alias Ghunnu v. State of Hp

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Gurbhajan Alias Ghunnu v. State of Hp

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