Dismissed

Ashwani Kumar v. the Baghat Urban Co-Operative Bank Ltd.

Himachal Pradesh HC1 Aug 2025CR.R/413/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In Cr. Revision No.413 of 2025, the High Court dismissed the revision filed by Ashwani Kumar challenging his conviction and sentence for cheque dishonour. The Court upheld the concurrent findings of conviction by the Trial Court and Sessions Judge, holding that the cheque was issued in discharge of a legal liability despite the accused's claim that it was a security cheque. The Court ruled that admission of the signature raised a presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act which must be rebutted by leading defence evidence, not mere statements under Section 313 CrPC. The revision was dismissed.

What the court decided

AI extract

Ashwani Kumar Vs the Baghat Urban Co-Operative… — Cheque Dishonour | Himachal Pradesh HC (2025)

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( 2025:HHC:25615 )

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. Revision No.413 of 2025 Reserved on: 23.07.2025 Date of Decision: 01.08.2025

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Ashwani Kumar ...Petitioner Versus The Bhagat Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd. ...Respondent

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Coram
*Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla,Judge.*
*Whether approved for reporting?¹No.*
For the Petitioner : Mr. Pavinder, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Ms. Meenakshi Sharma, Advocate.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 23.04.2025, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Solan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 18.12.2023 and order of sentence dated 28.03.2024, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.1, Solan, H.P. (learned Trial Court), were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the complainant filed a complaint against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the complainant is a Cooperative Bank engaged in banking activities. Complainant advanced a loan of ₹2,00,000/- to the accused on 29.05.2014. The accused defaulted on the repayment of the loan, and issued a cheque of ₹60,000/- to discharge his legal liability. The complainant presented the cheque to its bank, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement “funds insufficient”. The notice was served upon the accused, but the accused failed to repay the amount despite the receipt of the notice. Hence, a complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court to take action as per the law.

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The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared before the learned Trial Court, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The complainant examined K.C. Sharma (CW1) to prove

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its case.

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The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he had taken a loan of ₹2,00,000/from the complainant and he had issued a cheque. However, he claimed that he had issued the cheque as security. He claimed that his liability was ₹40,000/- and the complainant had misused the security cheque. He stated that he wanted to lead the defence evidence, but no defence evidence was produced despite having been granted many opportunities; hence, his right to lead defence evidence was closed by the learned Trial Court.

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Learned Trial Court held that the accused admitted the issuance of the cheque and taking of the loan. The accused was to repay the amount in 60 installments of ₹4,750/- as per the statement of account (Ex-CW1/L). He defaulted on the repayment of the loan. ₹60,000/- were outstanding. Even if the cheque was issued as security, the complainant had the right to fill in the amount and present it to the bank. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement “funds insufficient”. The notice was duly served upon the accused, but the accused failed to repay the

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amount; hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for 03 months and pay a compensation of ₹80,000/- to the complainant.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (I), Solan, District Solan (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the issuance of the cheque was not in dispute, and a presumption arose that the cheque was issued for consideration in discharge of the liability. The accused admitted that he had taken the loan. He asserted that the cheque was issued as security. The statement of account (Ex-CW1/L) showed that the accused owed a liability to the complainant, and the complainant could present the cheque, even if it was issued as security. The cheque was dishonoured with the endorsement “insufficient funds”. The accused failed to repay the amount despite the receipt of a valid notice of demand. All the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were satisfied. Learned Trial Court

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had rightly convicted and sentenced the accused. Hence, the appeal filed by the accused was dismissed.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The complainant misused the blank cheque issued by the accused. The amount of ₹2,30,662/was outstanding as per the statement of account (Ex-CW1/L). A cheque of ₹60,000/- was not issued in discharge of the legal liability. The bank had not taken any action against the surety. Complainant misused the security cheque; therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

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I have heard Mr. Pavinder, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Ms. Meenakshi Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant.

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Mr. Pavinder, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The statement of account (Ex-CW1/L) shows that an amount of ₹2,30,662/- was due, and

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the cheque of ₹60,000/- was not issued for discharging of the legal liability. The cheque was not dishonoured with an endorsement “funds insufficient”. The loan account number mentioned in the notice (Ex-CW1/H) was wrong. The learned Courts below failed to appreciate all these aspects. He prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

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Ms. Meenakshi Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant, supported the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below and submitted that no interference is required with them.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional court does not exercise an appellate jurisdiction and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: -

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“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent

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findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence, or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.

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This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

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Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

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14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

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15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] , where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

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“ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior

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court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

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13 . Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”

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16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit Kapoor case [ Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 ] has also laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228CrPC is sought for as under : ( Amit Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh

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Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 ], SCC pp. 482-83, para 27)

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“ 27 . Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, it will now be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but inherently impossible to state such principles with precision. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be.

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27.1 . Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection, and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

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27.2 . The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion, and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied, then the Court may interfere.

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27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

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***

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27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

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27.13 . Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records, but is an opinion formed prima facie.”

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17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate court and start appreciating the evidence by finding out inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses, and it is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge.

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This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

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Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

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error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

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“ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

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falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”

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“ 27 . Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, it will now be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but inherently impossible to state such principles with precision. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be.

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27.1 . Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

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27.2 . The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima

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facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion, and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied, then the Court may interfere.

27.13 . Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records, but it is an opinion formed prima facie.”

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It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda , (2018) 8 SCC

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165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:

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“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275] , while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

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“ 5 . … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

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13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19] . This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material; the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)

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“ 14 . … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”

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14. In the above case, also the conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [ Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its view. This Court set aside the High Court's order holding that the High

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Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis.

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This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar , (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:

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“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.

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17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457] , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.”

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The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The accused did not dispute his signatures on the cheque. He claimed that the cheque was issued as security at the time of taking the loan. It was laid down by this Court in Naresh Verma vs. Narinder Chauhan 2020(1) Shim. L.C. 398 that where the accused had not disputed his signatures on the cheque, the Court has to presume that it was issued in discharge of legal liability,

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and the burden would shift upon the accused to rebut the presumption. It was observed: -

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“8. Once signatures on the cheque are not disputed, the plea with regard to the cheque having not been issued towards discharge of lawful liability, rightly came to be rejected by the learned Courts below. Reliance is placed upon Hiten P. Dalal v. Bartender Nath Bannerji, 2001 (6) SCC 16 , wherein it has been held as under:

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"The words 'unless the contrary is proved' which occur in this provision make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by 'proof' and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible. A fact is said to be proved when its existence is directly established or when, upon the material before it, the Court finds its existence to be so probable that a reasonable man would act on the supposition that it exists. Unless, therefore, the explanation is supported by proof, the presumption created by the provision cannot be said to be rebutted......"

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S.139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.

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S imilar is the judgment in Basalingappa vs.

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Mudibasappa 2019 (5) SCC 418, wherein it was held:

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“26. Applying the proposition of law as noted above, in the facts of the present case, it is clear that the signature on the cheque, having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that the cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability.”

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This position was reiterated in Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283: (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 75, wherein it was held at page 289.

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“14. Once the 2nd appellant had admitted his signature on the cheque and the deed, the trial court ought to have presumed that the cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt. The trial court fell into error when it called upon the respondent complainant to explain the circumstances under which the appellants were liable to pay. Such an approach of the trial court was directly in the teeth of the established legal position as discussed above, and amounts to a patent error of law.”

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Similar is the judgment in APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers (2020) 12 SCC 724 , wherein it was observed: -

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“7.2. What is emerging from the material on record is that the issuance of a cheque by the accused and the signature of the accused on the said cheque are not disputed by the accused. The accused has also not disputed that there were transactions between the parties. Even as per the statement of the accused, which was recorded at the time of the framing of the charge, he has admitted that some amount was due and payable. However, it was the case on behalf of the accused that the cheque was given by way of security, and the same has been misused by the complainant. However, nothing is on record that in the reply to the statutory notice, it was the case on behalf of the accused that the cheque was given by way of security. Be that as it may, however, it is required to be noted that earlier the accused issued cheques which came to be dishonoured on the ground of “insufficient funds” and thereafter a fresh

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consolidated cheque of ₹9,55,574 was given which has been returned unpaid on the ground of “STOP PAYMENT”. Therefore, the cheque in question was issued for the second time. Therefore, once the accused has admitted the issuance of a cheque which bears his signature, there is a presumption that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability under Section 139 of the NI Act. However, such a presumption is rebuttable, and the accused is required to lead evidence to rebut such presumption. The accused was required to lead evidence that the entire amount due and payable to the complainant was paid.

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9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and considering the fact that the accused has admitted the issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque and that the cheque in question was issued for the second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that even according to the accused some amount was due and payable, there is a presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. Of course, such presumption is rebuttable in nature. However, to rebut the presumption, the accused was required to lead evidence that the full amount due and payable to the complainant had been paid. In the present case, no such evidence has been led by the accused. The story put forward by the accused that the cheques were given by way of security is not believable in the absence of further evidence to rebut the presumption, and more particularly, the cheque in question was issued for the second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured. Therefore, both the courts below have materially erred in not properly appreciating and considering the presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability as per Section 139 of the NI Act. It appears that both the learned trial court as well as the High Court have committed an error in shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove the debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act. As observed above, Section 139 of the Act is an example

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of reverse onus clause and therefore, once the issuance of the cheque has been admitted and even the signature on the cheque has been admitted, there is always a presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt or liability and thereafter, it is for the accused to rebut such presumption by leading evidence.”

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The presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act was

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explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Triyambak S. Hegde v. Sripad, (2022) 1 SCC 742: (2022) 1 SCC (Civ) 512: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 788 at page 747:

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“12. From the facts arising in this case and the nature of the rival contentions, the record would disclose that the signature on the documents at Exts. P-6 and P-2 are not disputed. Ext. P-2 is the dishonoured cheque based on which the complaint was filed. From the evidence tendered before the JMFC, it is clear that the respondent has not disputed the signature on the cheque. If that be the position, as noted by the courts below, a presumption would arise under Section 139 in favour of the appellant who was the holder of the cheque. Section 139 of the NI Act reads as hereunder:

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“ 139. Presumption in favour of the holder . —It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.”

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13. Insofar as the payment of the amount by the appellant in the context of the cheque having been signed by the respondent, the presumption for passing of the consideration would arise as provided under Section 118( a ) of the NI Act, which reads as hereunder:

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“ 118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments . — Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:

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( a ) of consideration : that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration.”

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14. The above-noted provisions are explicit to the effect that such presumption would remain until the contrary is proved. The learned counsel for the appellant in that regard has relied on the decision of this Court in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan [K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, (1999) 7 SCC 510: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1284] wherein it is held as hereunder: (SCC pp. 516-17, para 9)

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“ 9 . As the signature in the cheque is admitted to be that of the accused, the presumption envisaged in Section 118 of the Act can legally be inferred that the cheque was made or drawn for consideration on the date which the cheque bears. Section 139 of the Act enjoins the Court to presume that the holder of the cheque received it for the discharge of any debt or liability. The burden was on the accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption. The trial court was not persuaded to rely on the interested testimony of DW 1 to rebut the presumption. The said finding was upheld [ Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan v. K. Bhaskaran, Criminal Appeal No. 234 of 1995, order dated 23-101998 (Ker) ] by the High Court. It is not now open to the accused to contend differently on that aspect.”

¶120

15. The learned counsel for the respondent has, however, referred to the decision of this Court in Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa [Basalingappa v. Mudibasap pa, (2019) 5 SCC 418: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 571 ] wherein it is held as hereunder: (SCC pp. 432-33, paras 25-26)

¶121

“ 25 . We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in the above cases on Sections 118( a ) and 139,

¶122

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we now summarise the principles enumerated by this Court in the following manner:

¶124

25.1 . Once the execution of the cheque is admitted, Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability.

¶125

25.2 . The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption, and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.

¶126

25.3 . To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him, or the accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely.

¶127

25.4 . That it is not necessary for the accused to come into the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.

¶128

25.5 . It is not necessary for the accused to come into the witness box to support his defence.

¶129

26 . Applying the preposition of law as noted above, in the facts of the present case, it is clear that the signature on the cheque, having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that the cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability. The question to be looked into is as to whether any probable defence was raised by the accused. In the cross-examination of PW 1, when the specific question was put that a cheque was issued in relation to a loan of Rs 25,000 taken by the accused, PW 1 said that he does not remember. PW 1 in his evidence admitted that he retired in 1997, on which date he

¶130

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¶131

received a monetary benefit of Rs 8 lakhs, which was encashed by the complainant. It was also brought in evidence that in the year 2010, the complainant entered into a sale agreement for which he paid an amount of Rs 4,50,000 to Balana Gouda towards sale consideration. Payment of Rs 4,50,000 being admitted in the year 2010, and further payment of the loan of Rs 50,000 with regard to which Complaint No. 119 of 2012 was filed by the complainant, a copy of which complaint was also filed as Ext. D-2, there was a burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity. In the years 2010-2011, as per own case of the complainant, he made a payment of Rs 18 lakhs. During his cross-examination, when the financial capacity to pay Rs 6 lakhs to the accused was questioned, there was no satisfactory reply given by the complainant. The evidence on record, thus, is a probable defence on behalf of the accused, which shifted the burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity and other facts.”

¶132

16. In that light, it is contended that the very materials produced by the appellant and the answers relating to lack of knowledge of property details by PW 1 in his crossexamination would indicate that the transaction is doubtful, and no evidence is tendered to indicate that the amount was paid. In such an event, it was not necessary for the respondent to tender rebuttal evidence, but the case put forth would be sufficient to indicate that the respondent has successfully rebutted the presumption.

¶133

17. On the position of law, the provisions referred to in Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act, as also the enunciation of law as made by this Court, need no reiteration as there is no ambiguity whatsoever. In Basalingappav. Mudibasappa [Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 571 ] relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent, though on facts the ultimate conclusion therein was against raising presumption, the facts and circumstances are entirely different as the transaction

¶134

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¶135

between the parties as claimed in the said case is peculiar to the facts of that case where the consideration claimed to have been paid did not find favour with the Court keeping in view the various transactions and extent of amount involved. However, the legal position relating to the presumption arising under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act on signature being admitted has been reiterated. Hence, whether there is a rebuttal or not would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.”

¶136

This position was reiterated in Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant, (2022) 6 SCC 735: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 726: (2022) 3 SCC (Civ) 442: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 302, wherein it was held at page 739.

¶137

“8. It is true that this is a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 139 of the NI Act provides that the court shall presume that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. This presumption, however, is expressly made subject to the position being proved to the contrary. In other words, it is open to the accused to establish that there is no consideration received. It is in the context of this provision that the theory of “probable defence” has grown. In an earlier judgment, in fact, which has also been adverted to in Basalingappa [Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 571] , this Court notes that Section 139 of the NI Act is an example of reverse onus (see Rangappa v. Sri Mohan [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441: (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 477: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 184] ). It is also true that this Court has found that the accused is not expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof. It is accordingly that the principle has developed that all which the accused needs to establish is a probable defence. As to whether a probable defence has been established is a matter to be decided on the facts of each case on the conspectus of evidence and circumstances

¶138

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¶139

that exist...”

¶140

25. Similar is the judgment in P. Rasiya v. Abdul Nazer, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1131, wherein it was observed:

¶141

“As per Section 139 of the N.I. Act, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. Therefore, once the initial burden is discharged by the Complainant that the cheque was issued by the accused and the signature and the issuance of the cheque are not disputed by the accused, in that case, the onus will shift upon the accused to prove the contrary that the cheque was not for any debt or other liability. The presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act is a statutory presumption and thereafter, once it is presumed that the cheque is issued in whole or in part of any debt or other liability which is in favour of the Complainant/holder of the cheque, in that case, it is for the accused to prove the contrary.”

¶142

This position was reiterated in Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh,

¶143

(2023) 10 SCC 148: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1275, wherein it was observed at page 161:

¶144

33. The NI Act provides for two presumptions: Section 118 and Section 139. Section 118 of the Act inter alia directs that it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 of the Act stipulates that “unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed that the holder of the cheque received the cheque for the discharge of, whole or part of any debt or liability”. It will be seen that the “ presumed fact ” directly relates to one of the crucial ingredients necessary to sustain a conviction under Section 138. [The rules discussed hereinbelow are common to both the presumptions under Section 139 and Section 118 and are

¶145

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¶146

hence not repeated—reference to one can be taken as reference to another.]

¶147

34. Section 139 of the NI Act, which takes the form of a “ shall presume ” clause, is illustrative of a presumption of law. Because Section 139 requires that the Court “ shall presume ” the fact stated therein, it is obligatory for the Court to raise this presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising of the presumption has been established. But this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary, as is clear from the use of the phrase “ unless the contrary is proved” .

¶148

35. The Court will necessarily presume that the cheque had been issued towards the discharge of a legally enforceable debt/liability in two circumstances. Firstly , when the drawer of the cheque admits issuance/execution of the cheque and secondly , in the event where the complainant proves that the cheque was issued/executed in his favour by the drawer. The circumstances set out above form the fact(s) which bring about the activation of the presumptive clause. [ Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal [ Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal, (1999) 3 SCC 35 ]]

¶149

36. Recently, this Court has gone to the extent of holding that a presumption takes effect even in a situation where the accused contends that a blank cheque leaf was voluntarily signed and handed over by him to the complainant. [ Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40] ]. Therefore, the mere admission of the drawer's signature, without admitting the execution of the entire contents in the cheque, is now sufficient to trigger the presumption.

¶150

37. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by the accused for the discharge of debt, the presumptive device under Section 139 of the Act helps shifting the burden on

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¶152

the accused. The effect of the presumption, in that sense, is to transfer the evidential burden on the accused of proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability. Until this evidential burden is discharged by the accused, the presumed fact will have to be taken to be true, without expecting the complainant to do anything further.

¶153

38. John Henry Wigmore [John Henry Wigmore and the Rules of Evidence: The Hidden Origins of Modern Law] on Evidence states as follows:

¶154

“The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the Jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent but if the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the Judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption ‘disappears as a rule of law and the case is in the Jury's hands free from any rule’.”

¶155

39. The standard of proof to discharge this evidential burden is not as heavy as that usually seen in situations where the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of an accused. The accused is not expected to prove the nonexistence of the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused must meet the standard of “ preponderance of probabilities ”, similar to a defendant in a civil proceeding. [ Rangappa v. Sri Mohan [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441: (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 477: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 184: AIR 2010 SC 1898] ]

¶156

Therefore, the Court has to start with the presumption that the cheque was issued for valuable consideration in discharge of the legal liability, and the burden is upon the accused to rebut this presumption.

¶157

It was submitted that as per the statement of account (Ex-CW1/L), an amount of ₹2,30,662/- was due and a cheque of

¶158

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₹60,000/- was not issued for discharging of the legal liability. This submission is only stated to be rejected. A perusal of the account statement shows that an amount of ₹1,68,495/- was due from the accused on 11.01.2017; therefore, the accused was liable to pay ₹60,000/-, and the submission that the cheque was not issued in the discharge of the legal liability is not correct. This submission proceeds on the premise that the cheque has to be issued to discharge the complete liability and not to discharge the partial liability. There is nothing in law to prevent a person from issuing a cheque to discharge his partial liability. When the accused was liable to pay ₹ 1,68,495/-, he was certainly liable to pay ₹60,000/- on 11.01.2017.

¶160

It was submitted that the accused had issued a security cheque and the complainant had misused the same. This submission is not acceptable. K.C. Sharma (CW1) specifically denied in his cross-examination that the cheque was misused by the complainant at his convenience. A denied suggestion does not amount to any proof, and no advantage can be derived from the cross-examination of this witness. The accused did not appear in the witness box to support his version that he had issued a security cheque in favour of the complainant. He relied upon his statement

¶161

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recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC to establish this fact. It was held in Sumeti Vij v. Paramount Tech Fab Industries, (2022) 15 SCC 689: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 201 that the accused has to lead defence evidence to rebut the presumption and mere denial in his statement under Section 313 of Cr.PC is not sufficient to rebut the presumption. It was observed at page 700:

¶163

“20. That apart, when the complainant exhibited all these documents in support of his complaints and recorded the statement of three witnesses in support thereof, the appellant recorded her statement under Section 313 of the Code but failed to record evidence to disprove or rebut the presumption in support of her defence available under Section 139 of the Act. The statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code is not substantive evidence of defence, but only an opportunity for the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution's case against the accused. Therefore, there is no evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheques were issued for consideration ." (Emphasis supplied)”

¶164

Thus, a statement under Section 313 of the CrPC was not sufficient to prove the plea taken by the accused.

¶165

Even if the cheque was issued as security, it was rightly held by the learned Courts below that the complainant had a right to present the same to the bank, when the accused had a subsisting liability on the date of the issuance of the cheque. It was laid down by this Court in Hamid Mohammad Versus Jaimal Dass

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2016 (1) HLJ 456 , that even if the cheque was issued towards the security, the accused will be liable. It was observed:

¶168

“9. Submission of learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the revisionist that the cheque in question was issued to the complainant as security, and on this ground, the criminal revision petition be accepted is rejected being devoid of any force for the reasons hereinafter mentioned. As per Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, if any cheque is issued on account of other liability, then the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 would be attracted. The court has perused the original cheque, Ext. C- 1 dated 30.10.2008, placed on record. There is no recital in the cheque Ext. C-1, that cheque was issued as a security cheque. It is well-settled law that a cheque issued as security would also come under the provision of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881. See 2016 (3) SCC page 1 titled Don Ayengia v. State of Assam & another . It is well-settled law that where there is a conflict between former law and subsequent law, then subsequent law always prevails.”

¶169

It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao vs. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited 2016 (10) SCC 458 that issuing a cheque towards security will also attract the liability for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act. It was observed: -

¶170

“10. We have given due consideration to the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant as well as the observations of this Court in Indus Airways Private Limited versus Magnum Aviation Private Limited (2014) 12 SCC 53 with reference to the explanation to Section 138 of the Act

¶171

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and the expression “for the discharge of any debt or other liability” occurring in Section 138 of the Act. We are of the view that the question of whether a post-dated cheque is for “discharge of debt or liability” depends on the nature of the transaction. If on the date of the cheque, liability or debt exists or the amount has become legally recoverable, the Section is attracted and not otherwise .

¶173

Reference to the facts of the present case clearly shows that though the word “security” is used in clause 3.1(iii) of the agreement, the said expression refers to the cheques being used towards repayment of instalments. The repayment becomes due under the agreement, the moment the loan is advanced and the instalment falls due. It is undisputed that the loan was duly disbursed on 28th February 2002, which was prior to the date of the cheques. Once the loan was disbursed and instalments have fallen due on the date of the cheque as per the agreement, the dishonour of such cheques would fall under Section 138 of the Act. The cheques undoubtedly represent the outstanding liability.

¶174

Judgment in Indus Airways (supra) is clearly distinguishable. As already noted, it was held therein that liability arising out of a claim for breach of contract under Section 138, which arises on account of dishonour of a cheque issued, was not by itself at par with a criminal liability towards discharge of acknowledged and admitted debt under a loan transaction. Dishonour of a cheque issued for discharge of a later liability is clearly covered by the statute in question. Admittedly, on the date of the cheque, there was a debt/liability in praesenti in terms of the loan agreement, as against the case of Indus Airways (supra), where the purchase order had been cancelled and a cheque issued towards advance payment for the purchase order was dishonoured. In that case, it was found that the cheque had not been issued for the discharge of liability but as an advance for the purchase order, which was cancelled. Keeping in mind this fine, but the real distinction, the said judgment cannot be applied to a case of the present nature

¶175

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where the cheque was for repayment of a loan instalment which had fallen due, though such deposit of cheques towards repayment of instalments was also described as “security” in the loan agreement. In applying the judgment in Indus Airways (supra), one cannot lose sight of the difference between a transaction of the purchase order, which is cancelled and that of a loan transaction where the loan has actually been advanced and its repayment is due on the date of the cheque.

¶177

The crucial question to determine the applicability of Section 138 of the Act is whether the cheque represents the discharge of existing enforceable debt or liability, or whether it represents an advance payment without there being a subsisting debt or liability. While approving the views of different High Courts noted earlier, this is the underlying principle as can be discerned from the discussion of the said cases in the judgment of this Court.” (Emphasis supplied)

¶178

This position was reiterated in Sripati Singh v. State of

¶179

Jharkhand, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1002: AIR 2021 SC 5732 , and it was held that a cheque issued as security is not waste paper and a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act can be filed on its dishonour. It was observed:

¶180

“17. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper under every circumstance. 'Security' in its true sense is the state of being safe, and the security given for a loan is something given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the

¶181

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loan amount is not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the payment of the amount, the cheque which is issued as security would mature for presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present the same. On such presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138 and the other provisions of N.I.. Act would flow.

¶183

When a cheque is issued and is treated as 'security' towards repayment of an amount with a time period being stipulated for repayment, all that it ensures is that such cheque which is issued as 'security cannot be presented prior to the loan or the instalment maturing for repayment towards which such cheque is issued as security. Further, the borrower would have the option of repaying the loan amount or such financial liability in any other form, and in that manner, if the amount of the loan due and payable has been discharged within the agreed period, the cheque issued as security cannot thereafter be presented. Therefore, the prior discharge of the loan or there being an altered situation due to which there would be an understanding between the parties is a sine qua non to not present the cheque which was issued as security. These are only the defences that would be available to the drawer of the cheque in proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Therefore, there cannot be a hard and fast rule that a cheque, which is issued as security, can never be presented by the drawee of the cheque. If such is the understanding, a cheque would also be reduced to an 'ondemand promissory note' and in all circumstances, it would only be civil litigation to recover the amount, which is not the intention of the statute. When a cheque is issued even though as 'security' the consequence flowing therefrom is also known to the drawer of the cheque and in the circumstance stated above if the cheque is presented and dishonoured, the holder of the cheque/drawee would have the option of initiating the civil proceedings for recovery or the criminal proceedings for punishment in the fact

¶184

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situation, but in any event, it is not for the drawer of the cheque to dictate terms with regard to the nature of litigation.”

¶186

There is no evidence that the accused had paid the amount to the complainant, and the accused would be liable even if the cheque was issued as security.

¶187

It was submitted that the account number was wrongly mentioned as PL/15 in Para No.1 of the notice, whereas the account number is 005021000015. This submission will not help the petitioner. The loan application form (Ex-CW1/J) mentions the account no. PL/15. The cheque returning memo (Ex-CW1/D) also mentions PL/15, which shows that the loan account is being mentioned as PL/15 in the record of bank record. Hence, there is no error in the loan account no. PL/15 mentioned in the notice.

¶188

The accused claimed that he was liable to pay ₹40,000/- to the bank. The learned Courts below had rightly held that there was no proof of this fact. The statement of account (Ex-CW1/L) mentions the liability of the accused as ₹1,68,495/and not ₹40,000/-. The accused did not produce any record to show the payments made by him, and his plea was rightly rejected by the learned Courts below.

¶189

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¶190

K.C. Sharma (CW1) admitted in his cross-examination

¶191

that two guarantors were taken from the accused. It was submitted that the bank had not proceeded against the guarantor and only proceeded against the petitioner, which is impermissible. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in BRS Ventures Investments Ltd. v. SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd. , (2025) 1 SCC 456: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1767 that the liability of the guarantor and the principal is coextensive and the creditor can sue both or either of them. It was observed at page 471:

¶192

“Liability of guarantor/surety

¶193

16. As far as the guarantee is concerned, the law is very well-settled. The liability of the surety and the principal debtor is coextensive. The creditor has remedies available to recover the amount payable by the principal borrower by proceeding against both or any of them. The creditor can proceed against the guarantor first without exhausting its remedies against the principal borrower.”

¶194

Therefore, it was not necessary to take action against

¶195

the guarantor and the bank was justified in taking action against the principal debtor. Moreover, the accused, being a principal debtor, had issued the cheque and only he could have been liable for its dishonour in the proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the NI Act.

¶196

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¶197

Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused had failed to rebut the presumption attached to the cheque, and there is no infirmity in the findings recorded by the learned Courts below.

¶198

Column No. 1 of the memo of dishonour (Ex-CW1/C) mentioned that the cheque was dishonoured with the endorsement “funds insufficient”. Therefore, the submission that the cheque was not proved to be dishonoured for “funds insufficient” is not correct. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Nimesh B. Thakore , (2010) 3 SCC 83: (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 625: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1: 2010 SCC OnLine SC 155 that the memo issued by the Bank is presumed to be correct and the burden is upon the accused to rebut the presumption. It was observed at page 95:

¶199

24. Section 146, making a major departure from the principles of the Evidence Act, provides that the bank's slip or memo with the official mark showing that the cheque was dishonoured would, by itself, give rise to the presumption of dishonour of the cheque, unless and until that fact was disproved. Section 147 makes the offences punishable under the Act compoundable.

¶200

In the present case, no evidence was produced to rebut

¶201

the presumption, and the learned Courts below had rightly held

¶202

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¶203

that the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’.

¶204

K.C. Sharma (CW1) stated that a notice (Ex-CW1/H) was issued to the accused. The notice was issued at the same address, which is mentioned by the accused in the present revision petition; therefore, it was sent to the correct address. The acknowledgement (Ex-CW1/G) showed that it was duly served upon the accused. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the notice was served upon the accused.

¶205

In any case, it was laid down in C.C. Allavi Haji vs. Pala Pelly Mohd. 2007(6) SCC 555 that the person who claims that he had not received the notice has to repay the amount within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the summons from the Court, and in case of failure to do so, he cannot take the advantage of the fact that notice was not received by him. It was observed:

¶206

“It is also to be borne in mind that the requirement of giving of notice is a clear departure from the rule of Criminal Law, where there is no stipulation of giving of notice before filing a complaint. Any drawer who claims that he did not receive the notice sent by post, can, within 15 days of receipt of summons from the court in respect of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, make payment of the cheque amount and submit to the Court that he had made payment within 15 days of receipt of summons (by receiving a copy of the complaint with the

¶207

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¶208

summons) and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be rejected. A person who does not pay within 15 days of receipt of the summons from the Court along with the copy of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, cannot obviously contend that there was no proper service of notice as required under Section 138, by ignoring statutory presumption to the contrary under Section 27 of the G.C. Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act . In our view, any other interpretation of the proviso would defeat the very object of the legislation. As observed in Bhaskaran’s case (supra), if the giving of notice in the context of Clause (b) of the proviso was the same as the receipt of notice, a trickster cheque drawer would get the premium to avoid receiving the notice by adopting different strategies and escape from legal consequences of Section 138 of the Act.” (Emphasis supplied)

¶209

The accused has not paid any money to the complainant; hence, it was duly proved that the accused had failed to repay the money despite the receipt of the notice.

¶210

Therefore, it was duly proved before the learned Trial Court that the cheque was issued in discharge of legal liability. It was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘funds insufficient’, and the accused had failed to repay the amount despite the receipt of the notice of demand. Hence, the complainant had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act.

¶211

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¶212

The learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and pay compensation of ₹80,000/- to the complainant.

¶213

It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 138 that the penal provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act is deterrent in nature. It was observed at page 203:

¶214

“6. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable instruments, including cheques, and to encourage and promote the use of negotiable instruments, including cheques, in financial transactions. The penal provision of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intended to be a deterrent to callous issuance of negotiable instruments such as cheques without serious intention to honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same.”

¶215

Keeping in view the deterrent nature of the sentence to

¶216

be awarded, the sentence of three months’ imprisonment cannot be said to be excessive, and no interference is required with it.

¶217

Learned Trial Court had ordered the accused to pay a compensation of ₹80,000/- to the complainant. This order was announced by the learned Trial Court on 28.03.2024, whereas the cheque was issued on 10.01.2017. Thus, the order was announced

¶218

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after a lapse of 7 years from the date of issuance of the cheque. The complainant lost interest on the amount, which it would have gained by advancing a loan to other borrowers, and it had to pay the litigation expenses for filing the complaint. It was entitled to be compensated for the same. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283: (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 75 that the Courts should uniformly levy a fine up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum. It was observed at page 291: -

¶220

As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf of the respondent, we are conscious of the settled principles that the object of Chapter XVII of NIA is not only punitive but also compensatory and restitutive. The provisions of NIA envision a single window for criminal liability for the dishonour of a cheque as well as civil liability for the realisation of the cheque amount. It is also well settled that there needs to be a consistent approach towards awarding compensation, and unless there exist special circumstances, the courts should uniformly levy fines up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest @ 9% p.a. [ R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260, para 20: (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 79: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 520 ] ”

¶221