Sunil Kumar Vs State of Hp

The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 04.07.2013 passed by the learned Sessions Judge (Forests), Shimla, (learned Appellate Court), vide which judgment of conviction dated 20.10.2009 and order of sentence dated 23.10.2009, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Theog, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court), were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

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Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 181of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (M.V. Act). It was asserted that the victim Nirmla Devi (PW-1) was walking towards the left side of the road on National Highway 22 near Bhekalti on 09.12.2007 when a vehicle bearing registration No. HP-02A-0260 hit her from the rear. She sustained an injury on her left leg. Rajesh Kumar (PW-6) and Naresh Kumar (PW-2) took her to the Hospital. An intimation was given to the Police. An entry (Ext.PW4/A) was recorded in the daily diary. ASI Kamal Dutt (PW-4) went to the Hospital for verification. The informant/victim made a statement (PW-1/A), which was sent to the Police Station, where F.I.R. (Ext.PW-3/A) was registered. ASI Kamal Dutt (PW-4) went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW4/B). He seized the vehicle alongwith its documents vide memo (Ext.PW-4/C). D. Ashok Chauhan (PW-8) conducted the medical examination of the injured and found grievous injuries on her person, which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. He issued MLC (Ext.PW-8/A). Constable Rajender Singh (PW-9) conducted mechanical examination of the vehicle. He

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found that there was no defect in the vehicle which could have led to the accident and that the indicator on the driver’s side of the vehicle was damaged. He issued his report (Ext.PW-9/A). The accused could not produce his driving licence. Hence, an offence punishable under Section 181 of the M.V.Act was added. Statements of prosecution of witnesses were recorded as per their version. After the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

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Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon

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the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Section 279, 337 & 338 of the IPC and Section 181 of the M.V. Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecutionexamined eleven witnesses to prove its case. Nirmla Devi (PW-1) is the victim/informant. Naresh Kumar (PW-2), Rajesh Kumar (PW-6), and Kuldeep Singh (PW-11) are the eyewitnesses. ASI Brijender Singh (PW-3) signed the F.I.R. ASI Kamal Dutt (PW-4) investigated the matter. Vidya Devi (PW-5) is the owner of the vehicle. Jai Ram (PW-7) produced the key and documents of the vehicle. Dr Ashok Chauhan (PW-8) conducted the

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medical examination of the injured. Constable Rajinder Singh (PW9) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. Constable Surat Singh (PW-10) proved the entry in the diary.

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The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.,admitted that he had no driving license. He denied the rest of the prosecution’s case. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.

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6 Learned Trial Court held that the victim’s testimony was duly corroborated by the statements of Naresh Kumar (PW-2), Rajesh Kumar (PW-6) and Kuldeep Kumar (PW-11). It was duly proved that the vehicle had hit the informant/victim. The Medical Officer proved that the informant /victim had sustained multiple injuries. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. The accused did not have a driver's license. Therefore, the accused was convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 & 338 of IPC and Section 181 of M.V.Act. and was sentenced as under:-

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*Sections*		Se	*ntences*
279 of IPC	The accused	was	sentenced	to	undergo
	imprisonment	for thre	e months,	pay	a fine of
	₹500/- and, in	default	ofpayment	of t	he fine, to

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	undergo further simple imprisonment for fifteen days.
338 of IPC	The accused was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for three months, to pay a fine of ₹500/- and in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for fifteen days.
181 of the M.V. Act	The accused was sentenced to pay ₹500/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for ten days. It was ordered that all the substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal. Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. The statements of Nirmla Devi (PW-1) and Rajesh Kumar (PW-6) proved that the accused was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, which led to the accident. The Medical Officer proved that the victim/informant had sustained multiple injuries. The accused was rightly convicted and sentenced by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.

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Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the

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petitioner/accused preferred the present appeal, asserting that the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below are based upon conjectures and surmises. There was no evidence of rashness or negligence of the accused. The prosecution relied upon statements of interested witnesses. No independent witness was examined despite opportunity and availability. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed, and the judgments and order passed by the learned courts below be set aside.

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I have heard Mr N.S.Chandel, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by M/s Vinod Gupta and Shewetima Dogra, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

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Mr N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that there is no evidence of the negligence of the accused. As per the prosecution’s case, the victim was walking towards her left side of the road. The vehicle hit her from the rear side but she sustained injury on her left leg, which is not possible. The exact manner of the accident has not been established, and rashness or negligence of the accused cannot be inferred. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed

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and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

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Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the accused admitted that he was driving the vehicle without a valid driving license. This by itself constitutes negligence. The discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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13 It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207:-

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“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the

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correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.

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This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. DilipsinhKishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

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“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

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15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 , where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

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“ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law.

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If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

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13 . Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”

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It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda , (2018) 8

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SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC

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OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the

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absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:

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“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. PuttumanaIllathJathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275] , while

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considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

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5 . … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

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13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in SanjaysinhRamrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19] . This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)

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“ 14 . … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”

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This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh

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Kumar , (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at

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page 205:

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“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.

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17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that

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the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.”

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The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

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It was specifically stated in the statement recorded under Section 154 ofCr.P.C. (Ext.PW-1/A) that the victim was walking towards the left side of the road, and the vehicle hit her from the rear. Nirmla Devi (PW-1) stated that she was walking on the National Highway towards the left side. A vehicle came from Theog and hit her. She sustained an injury on her left leg. Naresh Kumar (PW-2) stated that Nirmla Devi (PW-1) was walking towards the left side of the road. She was hit by a Tata Sumo coming from Theog. Rajesh Kumar (PW-6) stated that he was standing near his courtyard when he saw that a Tata Sumo came at a high speed from Theog and hit a woman, who fell. Thus, the prosecution’s evidence established that the victim was walking towards the left side of the road and the Tata Sumo hit her from the rear.

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Site plan (Ext.PW-4/B) shows Bhekalti towards the southern side, and Theog towards the northern side. Both

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Nirmala Devi (PW-1) and Tata Sumo were going towards Bhekalti, and both were towards their left side. In such a situation, the right side of the informant/victim was exposed to the road, and she should have sustained injury on her right side rather than on the left side. A vehicle could not hit her left side without hitting her right side.

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Dr. Ashok Chauhan (PW-8) found a lacerated wound on the left ankle and a superficial abrasion on the left lower leg with tenderness. He did not notice any other injury. The absence of injury on the informant’s right side of the body makes the prosecution suspect that the Tata Sumo had hit the informant when she was walking towards the left side of the road.

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Kuldeep Singh (PW-11) stated that he was travelling in the Tata Sumo. A vehicle came from the opposite side, and the accused moved his vehicle towards the left side. One woman was hit by a Tata Sumo and was taken to the Hospital. He could not say whose negligence led to the accident. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that the victim was walking towards the left side of the road.

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He volunteered to say that the victim had fallen on the road. He denied that the accused was driving the vehicle at a high speed, and he could not control the vehicle. He denied his previous statement recorded by the police.

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The testimony of this witness only proves that the vehicle had hit the victim, but he has not explained the exact manner of the accident; therefore, no advantage can be derived from his testimony.

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Statements of Naresh Kumar (PW-2), Rajesh Kumar (PW-6) show that the vehicle had hit the victim on the left side of the road, but this version is made doubtful by the absence of injuries on the right side of the victim. Hence, their testimonies do not explain the accident.

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It was submitted that the accused was driving the vehicle at a high speed, which was the proximate cause of the accident. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the

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witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was

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observed:

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“Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.”

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This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs.

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Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, wherein it was held:

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“Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present

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case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.”

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26. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2003

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Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging

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rashness or negligence. It was observed: -

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“It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.”

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27. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh

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Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: -

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“Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.”

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28. Thus, the accused cannot be held liable merely because

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the witnesses have stated that he was driving the vehicle at a high speed.

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29. Learned Trial Court held that the accused was driving

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the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. These terms are not the same. The terms rashness or negligence were explained by the

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Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahadev Prasad Kaushik v. State of U.P. , (2008) 14 SCC 479: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 834: 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1551,

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at page 487:-

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26. Though the term “negligence” has not been defined in the Code, it may be stated that negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do.

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25. In Empress of India v. Idu Beg [ILR (1881) 3 All 776] Straight, J. made the following pertinent observations which have been quoted with approval by various courts, including this Court: (ILR p. 780)

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“… criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury, but without intention to cause injury, or knowledge that it will probably be caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted.”

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Therefore, the learned Courts below were required to determine whether there was a breach of duty to take care or the accused acted recklessly. No such finding was recorded.

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A heavy reliance was placed upon the fact that the accused was driving the vehicle without a valid driver's license. It

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was submitted that driving a vehicle without a driver's license constitutes negligence. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down in State Government v. Bhawanesh Kumar, 1957 SCC OnLine MP 102, that the absence of a driving licence does not constitute rashness or negligence. It was observed:

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“15. We are equally clear that from the mere fact that the accused-respondent did not possess a driving licence, it cannot be positively inferred that he was guilty of rashness or negligence in driving a heavy vehicle like a truck. There is evidence of Jabbar (D. W. 1), which shows that the accused is in charge of the Sarodha Head Workshop, and he has been testing and driving motor vehicles for 1½ years. According to him, he is an experienced motor driver, and consequently, there is nothing to show that in undertaking to drive a heavy motor vehicle like a truck, he was undertaking a risk for which there was no justification whatsoever. Whether he drives a vehicle with a licence or without a licence, the law expects him to be neither rash nor negligent in the performance of his task, and we will judge his conduct in the matter as if he were the most qualified driver who brings to his task the ordinary reasonable competency of persons driving heavy motor vehicles.”

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This position was reiterated in Suleman Rehiman Mulani

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v. State of Maharashtra, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 337 : (1968) 2 SCR 515: AIR

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1968 SC 829, wherein it was observed:

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12… .There is no presumption in law that a person who possesses only a learner's licence or possesses no licence at all does not know how to drive. For various reasons, not excluding sheer indifference, he might not have taken a regular licence. The prosecution’s evidence that Appellant 1 had driven the jeep to various places on the day previous to

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the occurrence is proof of the fact that he knew how to drive. There was no basis for the conclusion that it was a sheer stroke of good fortune that he did not meet with any accident on that day.

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14… .In the present case, we do not know what was the proximate cause of the accident. We cannot rule out the possibility of the accident having been caused by the fault of the deceased. The question of whether Appellant 1 was proficient in driving a Jeep or not does not resolve the issue. His proficiency in driving might furnish a defence, which a learner could not have, but the absence of proficiency did not make him guilty. The only question was whether, in point of fact, he was not competent to drive and his incompetence was the cause of the death of the person concerned.

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Therefore, the accused cannot be held liable simply

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because he did not possess a valid driving license.

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It was submitted that Nirmla Devi (PW-1), Naresh Kumar (PW-2) and Rajesh Kumar (PW-6) specifically stated that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. These statements are not sufficient to infer the negligence of the accused. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington

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v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 at 595 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed :-

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“It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.”

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Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009

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Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held:

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“It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis of evidence led before the Court.”

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Therefore, the statements of these witnesses that

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accused was negligent will not help the prosecution’s case.

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No other negligence was attributed to the accused; the accused was driving the vehicle towards his own sideas per the prosecution’s version, andthe mere fact that an accident had occurred is not sufficient to convict him. The prosecution was required to prove the negligence or rashness of the accused, which was not proved as shown above.Therefore, the learned Courts below erred in convicting and sentencing the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 338 of the IPC.

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The accused admitted that he was driving the vehicle without a valid driving license; therefore, he was rightly convicted for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 181 of the M.V.Act. He was sentenced to pay a fine of ₹500/-, which cannot be said to be excessive. Thus, no interference is required with the conviction and sentence for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 181 of the M.V.Act.

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No other point was urged.

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In view of the above, the present revision is partly allowed, and judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court convicting and sentencing the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 338 of IPC are ordered to be set aside, while conviction and sentence imposed for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 181 of M.V.Act are upheld.

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The fine amount, if deposited by the petitioner/accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 338 of IPC,shall be refunded to him after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation in case of no further appeal, and in case of

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appeal, the same shall be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Apex Court.

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42 In the aforesaid terms, the present revision is disposed of accordingly, so also the pending application, if any.

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43. The records of the learned Courts below be returned with

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a copy of this judgment for the information

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(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge