Vijay Kumar Vs State of Hp

The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 09.07.2014 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.10.2013 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. (2), Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) 1. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes

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were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338, and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (M.V. Act). It was asserted that the informant Jagjit Singh (PW5) was running a hotel at Padyalag. A tractor bearing registration No. HP 69-0314 came towards Padyalag, and a motorcycle bearing registration No. HP23B - 1052 came from Padyalag at about 11 am. Vijay Kumar (accused) was driving the tractor at a high speed and hit the motorcycle bearing registration No. HP23B-1052. The motorcyclist, Sikander Kumar, died on the spot, and the pillion rider, Jai Kumar, sustained injuries. Jai Kumar was taken to the hospital, and intimation was given to the police. An entry (Ext.PW17/A) was recorded in the police station. SI/SHO Dugalu Ram (PW16), Constable Rajesh Kumar and Constable Sanjay Kumar went to the spot for verification. Dugalu Ram (PW16) recorded the statement of the informant (Ext.PW5/A) as per his version and sent

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it to the police station, where FIR (Ext.PW16/A) was registered. Ranjeet Singh (PW14) took the photographs of the spot (Ext.PW14/A to Ext.PW14/G). Dugalu Ram conducted the inquest of the dead body and prepared the postmortem report (Ext.PW16/C). He filed an application (Ext.PW12/E) for conducting the postmortem examination of the deceased. Doctor Kamlesh Sharma (PW12) conducted the postmortem examination of Sikander Kumar and found that he had sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused in a Motor Vehicle accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW12/D). He also medically examined Jai Kumar (PW13) and found that Jai Kumar had sustained simple and grievous injuries. He issued the MLC (Ext.PW12/B) and referred the injured to IGMC, Shimla, for further treatment. Dugalu Ram (PW16) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW16/D) and seized the motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-23B-1052 vide memo (Ext.PW1/A) and the tractor bearing registration No. HP69-0314 vide memo (Ext.PW1/B). Kashmir Singh (PW10) mechanically examined the tractor and the motorcycle and did not find any defect in them which could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW10/A). Vijay Kumar produced his driving license, insurance, and permit for the tractor, which were seized vide memo

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(Ext.PW9/A). The registration certificate and insurance of the motorcycle were seized vide memo (Ext.PW8/A). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

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Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of the IPC and Section 192 of the MV. Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined twenty witnesses to prove its case. Lekh Ram (PW-1), Rajesh Kumar (PW2) and Dila Ram (PW3), Kartar Singh (PW8), Sunita Devi (PW9) and Raj Kumar (PW15) witnessed the recovery. Kamlesh Kumar (PW4), Rakesh Kumar (PW6) and Jagat Ram (PW11) are the eyewitnesses. Jagjit Singh (PW5) and Sunil Kumar (PW7) did not support the prosecution’s case. Kashmir Singh (PW10) mechanically examined the vehicles. Dr Kamlesh Sharma (PW12) conducted the medical examination of the injured and the post-mortem examination of the deceased. Jai Kumar (PW13) was a pillion rider. Ranjeet Singh (PW14) took the

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photographs. Dugalu Ram (PW16) investigated the matter. HC Hem Raj (PW17) proved the entries in the daily diary. ASI Mulakh Raj (PW18) signed the FIR. Dr Pawan Thakur (PW19) and Dr Rajesh Sood (PW20) treated the injured at IGMC.

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The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he was driving a tractor on 04.08.2006 at about 11 PM. He denied the rest of the prosecution’s case. He stated that he had no fault, and a false case was made against him. He stated that he wanted to lead defence evidence; however, he did not lead any evidence in his defence.

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Learned Trial Court held that the accused had not disputed the fact that he was driving the tractor on the date of the incident. The evidence on record showed that the tractor of the accused was taken to the extreme right side of the road, where it collided with the motorcycle. The accused did not explain how the tractor had gone towards the wrong side of the road. There was no mechanical defect in the vehicle which could have led to the accident. The mere fact that independent witnesses had not supported the prosecution’s case was not sufficient to doubt it. The

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accused had failed to produce the insurance certificate; therefore,

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the accused was convicted and sentenced as under:

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*Sections*	*Sentences*
279 of IPC	Simple imprisonment for six months.
337 of IPC	Simple imprisonment for six months and fine to the tune of ₹500/-. In default of payment of fine the accused shall further undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days.
338 of IPC	Simple imprisonment for one year and fine to the tune of ₹500/-. In default of payment of fine the accused shall further undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days.
304-A of IPC	Simple imprisonment for two years and fine to the tune of ₹1000/-. In default of payment of fine the accused shall further undergo simple imprisonment for one month.
It was ordered t shall run concurr	hat all the substantive sentences of imprisonment ently.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused

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was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. He had taken the tractor towards the wrong side of the road, which was the proximate cause of the accident. The mere fact that the Driving License of the motorcyclist was not taken into possession was not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. The negligence of the accused led to the death of one person and injuries to another. Therefore, he was rightly convicted. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was not excessive. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.

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Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused have filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. The informant Jagjit Singh (PW5) did not support the prosecution’s case. His statement showed that the tractor was being driven uphill. It was loaded, and it could not have been driven at a high speed. Kamlesh Kumar (PW4) claimed that he had seen the incident. He was related to the deceased, and the police would have registered the FIR at his instance had he been an eyewitness. The fact that the police had not recorded the FIR at his instance falsifies the prosecution’s case regarding his presence. The witnesses did not state anything about

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the approximate speed of the tractor, and the mere use of the term ‘high speed’ is not sufficient to infer the rashness or negligence. The learned Trial Court passed the maximum sentence, which is harsh. The accused is the sole earner of the family, and putting him behind the bars would cause difficulties to his family members; therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

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I have heard Mr. Rajesh Mandhotra, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

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Mr. Rajesh Mandhotra, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the learned Courts below did not appreciate the material on record in a proper manner. It was proved on record that the tractor was going uphill and it was loaded with the material; therefore, the speed of the tractor could not have been high. The witnesses have also not given the approximate speed of the tractor, and the mere use of the term ‘high speed’ is insufficient to convict the person. There was no evidence of rashness or negligence of the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present

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revision be allowed and judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. He submitted in the alternative that the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court, as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court, is excessive. Hence, prayed that a lenient view be taken and the sentence be reduced.

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Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, supported the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below. He submitted that the accused was driving the tractor towards the wrong side of the road, which was the proximate cause of the accident. He had not explained why the tractor was taken towards the wrong side of the road. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly convicted the accused. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was not excessive because a young life was lost. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not

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an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207:-

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“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.

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14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC

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1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

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“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

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15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] , where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

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“ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

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13 . Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”

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It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda , (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:

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“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275 , while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

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5 . … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its

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jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

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13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19 . This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)

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“ 14 . … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”

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This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar , (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ)

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309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:

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“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.

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17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.”

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A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.

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Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:

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“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh (supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.

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28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.”

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The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The accused admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.PC that he was driving the tractor on the date of the accident. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was driving the tractor at the time of the accident.

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It was submitted that Kamlesh Kumar (PW4) was related to the accused and the FIR was not lodged at his instance, which made the prosecution’s case doubtful. This submission is not acceptable. Merely because the FIR was not lodged at the instance of a witness is not sufficient to doubt his testimony.

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Kamlesh Kumar (PW4) stated that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused, who drove it towards the wrong side of the road. Rakesh Kumar (PW6) also stated that the tractor was taken towards the wrong side of the road. Jagat Ram (PW11) stated that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the tractor, who had taken the tractor towards the wrong side and hit the motorcycle. Jai Kumar (PW13), pillion rider,

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stated that the motorcycle was being driven towards its correct side.

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The statements of these witnesses are duly corroborated by the site plan (Ext.PW16/D) in which the width of the road is shown to be 20 feet. The tractor is shown towards the extreme right side of the road and on the Kachha portion. It had dragged the motorcycle for a distance of about 40 feet. The photographs (Ext.PW14/A, Ext.PW14/D, Ext.PW14/E to Ext.PW14/G) also show the tractor towards the extreme right side of the road. Thus, it was duly established that the tractor was being driven towards the right side of the road.

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The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the wrong side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed:

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“The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the

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right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.”

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Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar

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2008 H.L.J. 399 , where the vehicle was taken towards the right side

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of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed:

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“The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road.”

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This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj

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2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held:

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“16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued

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before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.”

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In the present case, the site plan shows the dragging marks to a distance of about 40 feet, which shows that the accused

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was unable to bring the tractor to a halt immediately after the accident. It was laid down by this Court in State of H.P. versus Dinesh Kumar, 2008 Cr. L.J 2024 that the spot map showed the skid marks

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to the extent of 74 feet. It proved the negligence of the accused. It was observed:

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“10. Once again reverting to the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A, the skid marks on the road were 74 feet in length. For the vehicle going from Hamirpur to the Nadaun side point 'A' shown in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is on the extreme right side. It is not the case that the accident took place on the left side of the road for a vehicle going from Hamirpur to Nadaun, or even in the middle of the road. The skid marks of 74 feet on the road are clear to show that the jeep was being driven at high speed. The respondent could not control the jeep due to his rash or negligent driving and high speed, and the jeep went from the left side to the right side and crushed the girl at point 'A'…”

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Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was negligently driving the tractor.

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Kashmir Singh (PW10) mechanically examined the vehicle and issued the report (Ext.PW10/A) mentioning that the right-side steering shaft was damaged. He admitted in his crossexamination that the tractor becomes imbalanced by damage to the right side of the shaft. He volunteered to say that the steering gets free. He denied that the brakes of the tractor were not functioning. It was submitted based on the statement of this witness that there was some mechanical defect in the vehicle, which could have led to the accident. This submission cannot be accepted. He noticed the damage to the right side of the steering shaft. He was not asked whether this damage was caused before the accident or after the accident. Further, he stated that the steering of the tractor would become free due to the damage to the steering shaft. The site plan (Ext.PW16/D) shows that the place of the incident is straight and does not have any curves. Similarly, the photographs also do not show any curve at the place of the incident. If the steering of the vehicle had become free, it is not explained how the tractor moving on a straight road would change its position and go towards the right side of the road. Therefore, the proximate cause of the accident was not damage to the steering shaft or the steering

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becoming free, but taking the tractor towards the right side of the road.

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The accused did not state in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that the tractor had developed a mechanical defect which led to the accident. He did not provide any evidence to show the defect in the tractor. Further, he has not explained why the brakes were not applied when the right shaft of the steering was damaged. The application of the brakes would have brought the tractor to a halt. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the report of the mechanical expert.

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It was submitted that the informant Jagjit Singh (PW5) and the eye witness Sunil Kumar (PW7) had not supported the prosecution’s case, and the learned Courts below erred in relying upon it. This submission cannot be accepted. Jagjit Singh was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. Dugalu Ram (PW16) specifically stated that he had recorded the statement of Jagjit Singh as per his version. There is nothing in his cross-examination to show that he was making a false statement. Therefore, his testimony that he has recorded the statement of informant Jagjit Singh (PW5) as per his

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version has to be accepted to be correct. Thus, Jagjit Singh (PW5) is shown to have made two inconsistent versions: one before the police and another before the Court. His credit has been impeached under Section 155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act, and no reliance can be placed upon his testimony.

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It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that where a witness has been thoroughly discredited by confronting him with the previous statement, his statement cannot be relied upon. However, when he is confronted with some portions of the previous statement, his credibility is shaken to that extent, and the rest of the statement can be relied upon. It was observed:

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“52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is

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impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.”

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This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman versus.

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State 2002(2) ShimLC 16 wherein it was observed: -

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“12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has been called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness loses credibility and cannot be relied upon by the defence. We find support for the view we have taken from the various authorities of the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400 , the Apex Court observed:

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"It is now well settled that when a witness, who has been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the result of that course being adopted is to discredit this witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony".’

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Therefore, the testimony of Jagjit Singh could not have been used for discarding the prosecution’s case.

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It was submitted that the witnesses had not given the approximate speed of the vehicle, and the negligence of the accused cannot be inferred from the use of the term high speed. There is no dispute with the proposition of law that high speed by itself does not constitute negligence. However, in the present case, the proximate cause of the accident was not high speed but driving the tractor towards the right side of the road. Thus, the fact that

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witnesses have not mentioned the proximate state of the tractor will not help the defence or make the prosecution’s case doubtful.

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Dr Kamlesh Sharma (PW12) medically examined Jai Kumar (PW13) and found that he had suffered grievous injuries. He also conducted the postmortem examination of Sikander and found that he had died due to multiple injuries caused in a motor vehicle accident. He admitted in the cross-examination that the injuries are possible in case of a fall on the road by skidding. However, that is an alternative hypothesis and will not make the prosecution’s case suspect.

¶136

Jai Kumar (PW13) stated that he was riding the motorcycle bearing registration No. HP23B-1052 and when they reached near Padyalag, a tractor came from the opposite side at high speed and hit the motorcycle. The tractor was taken towards its right side. He sustained injuries in the accident and was taken to Bilaspur, from where he was sent to IGMC Shimla. He denied that the motorcycle was being driven at a high speed towards the wrong side of the road or that he had consumed alcohol on the date of the accident.

¶137

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¶138

2025:HHC:38304

¶139

There is nothing in his cross-examination to show that he was making a false statement. He categorically stated that he had sustained multiple injuries in an accident. Thus, it was duly proved that Jai Kumar (PW13) had sustained injuries in the accident.

¶140

Duglu Ram (PW16) stated that the accused could not produce any insurance certificate, and he added Section 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The accused admitted that he was driving the tractor at the time of the accident. He failed to produce any insurance certificate before the Court. Section 192 punishes a person who drives a motor vehicle without a valid insurance certificate. Therefore, the accused had violated the provisions of Section 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act, and he was rightly convicted and sentenced for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

¶141

Thus, there is no infirmity in the judgment of the learned Trial Court for convicting the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304 A of IPC.

¶142

Learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for two years for the commission of

¶143

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¶145

an offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC. This is the maximum sentence which can be imposed. The learned Trial Court has not given any justification for imposing the maximum sentence. The offence involving the motor vehicle indeed is to be seriously viewed because of the increase in the number of road accidents, but this consideration cannot outweigh the provision of the statute. When the legislation has provided for maximum imprisonment for two years, it is not permissible to sentence a person to the maximum imprisonment unless there are aggravating circumstances on record. Learned Trial Court had not noticed any such aggravating circumstances; therefore, the imprisonment for two years is liable to be interfered with.

¶146

The accused had taken the tractor towards the right side of the road, which led to the accident. This shows that he was not careful while driving the vehicle. This led to the death of one person. The accused was also a young person at the time of the accident. He had also suffered the agony of trial, appeal and the revision. Considering all these circumstances, the sentence of two years imposed by the learned Trial Court is ordered to be reduced to 18 months.

¶147

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¶149

38. No other point was urged.

¶150

In view of the above, the present revision is partly allowed, and the sentence of two years imposed by the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section

¶151

304A of IPC is ordered to be reduced to 18 months. Subject to this modification, the rest of the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below are upheld.

¶152

The present revision petition stands disposed of along with pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.

¶153

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 14^th November 2025 (Nikita)

Vijay Kumar v. State of Hp

Case brief

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Vijay Kumar v. State of Hp

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