Kartaroo Devi Vs Anil Sharma

This Revision Petition has been preferred under Section 24 (5) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (herein after referred to as the Act in short) against the order dated 6.5.2022, passed by learned District Judge, Shimla, exercising the powers of Appellate Authority under the Act (herein after referred to as the Appellate Authority) in Rent Appeal No. 32-S/14 of 2020, titled as Kartaroo Devi Vs. Anil Sharma, whereby order of eviction dated 13.10.2020, passed by Rent Controller, Shimla in Rent Petition No. 41-2 of 2017/13, titled as Anil Sharma Vs. Kartaro Devi, has been upheld.

¶12

2

¶13

2025:HHC:37520 Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶14

Petitioner herein is tenant and respondent is landlord and

¶15

hereinafter they have been referred as tenant and landlord respectively.

¶16

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record.

¶17

Landlord has preferred petition against tenant for her eviction from Shop No. 43/2, Ward No. 3 Lower Kaithu, Shimla-1, a non residential Halwai shop, on the ground that occupation of premises was bonafide required by the landlord for carrying out repair work and also major addition and alteration work in the building including the premises in reference and the said work was not possible to be carried out without vacating the premises in question, with further assertion that building was quite old and cracks were appearing in the walls, floors, and wooden roofs and roof sheets (tin sheets) had also totally ruined and damaged due to monkey jumps and the landlord was interested for making such extensive repair and renovation work and also alteration in the building which was necessary not only for survival of the premises in question but also the entire building of which the premises in reference was a part. It was further stated that after carrying out repair, alteration and renovation work with modern technique would increase the value and utility of the building and also income of the landlord. Another ground taken for eviction that tenant had failed to pay statutory enhancement/increase on the agreed rent w.e.f. February, 2012.

¶18

3

¶19

2025:HHC:37520 Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶20

Tenant had opposed the eviction petition by filing reply with

¶21

various preliminary objections and submissions, mainly with the plea that premises in dispute was owned by Kanshi Ram and after his death there are other legal heirs, apart from the petitioner/landlord and premises in question was in the tenancy of late Prithvi Chand, who was also survived by other legal heirs apart from respondent/tenant.

¶22

It was further claimed that petition was filed with malafide intention and ulterior motive as the petitioner/landlord was in habit of filing frivolous petitions on baseless grounds, and out of earlier two petitions filed by the landlord, one was dismissed by the High court and another was compromised and now landlord has devised a new ground to seek the eviction of the tenant. The pleas taken by the landlord for evicting the tenant regarding repair, alteration, modification and enhancement the value of the property and increase in income of the landlord were also denied.

¶23

In rejoinder, the plea taken in the eviction petition was reaffirmed by giving details, and to substantiate the claim of status of landlord as well as tenant, various rent agreements including rent agreement dated 20.7.2012 were also referred.

¶24

Landlord has examined eight witnesses, whereas tenant has examined two witnesses. On behalf of landlord his son as a Special Power of Attorney has appeared as PW-1, whereas tenant has been

¶25

4

¶26

2025:HHC:37520 Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶27

represented by her son Sandeep as RW-2 as her Special Power of Attorney.

¶28

Appearing as PW-1 Amit Sharma has re-iterated the grounds for eviction narrated in the Eviction Petition. He has also proved on record Special Power of Attorney Ex. PW-1/A and examination-inchief by way of affidavit Ex. PW-1/B, rent agreement entered between landlord Anil Sharma and Deepak Ex. PW-1/C, General Power of Attorney executed by Anita Sharma in favour of Anil Sharma landlord Ex. PW-1/D, copy of rent agreement entered between Anil Sharma and Mahavir Prasad Ex. PW-1/E and copy of jamabandi Ex. PW-1/F, depicting Anil Kumar and Anita as owners of property in reference upon which the rented accommodation is existing.

¶29

PW-2 Rakesh Kumar has proved on record Eviction Petition filed by Anil Sharma landlord against another tenant Ram Piari Ex. PW2/A, reply to petition as Ex. PW-2/B and rejoinder thereto Ex. PW-2/C. 11. PW-3 Manik Bhatija, J.E. M.C. Shimla, has placed on record documents filed by landlord for permission to repair the property in reference alongwith photographs of building proposed to be repaired, map, affidavit and General Power of Attorney etc. He has further deposed that as per record, permission to repair was not granted till the time of his examination as a witness in the Court.

¶30

PW-4 Desh Raj, who is an Engineer, has proved on record Technical Site Visit Report Ex. PW-4/B with observation that first floor of

¶31

5

¶32

2025:HHC:37520 Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶33

the building was unsafe and unfit for human habitation and there was possibility of collapse of load bearing walls at any time. Further that the wooden rafters, batten used in its construction were rotten and eaten by wood worms and first floor of the building needed immediate major repair which was not possible to be carried out without being vacated by the tenants. Photographs Ex. PW-4/C 1, Ex. PW-4/C 2, Ex. PW-4/C 3 and Ex. PW-4/C 4 were also proved by this witness on record to substantiate the plea of landlord and Technical Report.

¶34

The premises in reference is two storeyed building and upper floor is having five shops, which are rented to other tenants.

¶35

PW-5 Pushpa Thakur, Rent Ahlmed office of Rent Controller Shimla-2, had expressed her inability to produce the summoned record as it had been destroyed.

¶36

PW-6 Suman, Rent Ahlmed, office of Rent Controller-1 Shimla, has proved on record copy of Eviction Petition filed by Anil Sharma landlord against another tenant Sudesh Kumari (Ex. PW-6/A), reply thereto Ex. PW-6/B, rejoinder therein Ex. PW-6/C.

¶37

PW-7 Chet Ram, Judicial Record Keeper of Shimla has proved on record copy of Rent Petition preferred by Anil Sharma against tenant Mahavir Prasad Ex. PW-7/A.

¶38

PW-8 Jai Prakash, Record Keeper General Record Room New Judicial Complex, Chakkar, Shimla has proved on record, judgment dated 3.12.2012 (Ex. PW-8/A), passed in Rent Petition titled as Anil

¶39

6

¶40

2025:HHC:37520 Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶41

Sharma Vs. Mahavir Prasad, wherein tenant Mahavir Prasad was directed to vacate the premises in reference, memo of costs (Ex. PW-8/B), copies of statements of Anil Kumar, Jagat Ram and Desh Raj Ex. PW-8/C (five pages), copy of letter Ex. PW-8/D submitted to Commissioner M.C. Shimla and copy of site/location plan Ex. PW-8/E of the building in question of which premises in reference is part.

¶42

RW-1 Sanjeev Kumar (Architect) has been examined by tenant to prove Technical Report (Ex. RW-1/A) with conclusion that premises in reference was in good and sound condition and there was no settlement of any wall, floor and the walls were in plumb and wooden deodar sleepers used in the building were in their original position and had not rottened and decayed. The overall condition of the shops and residential set was stated to be good and sound at least for 100 years

¶43

further.

¶44

RW-2 Sandeep Kumar is son of Kartaroo Devi. He has proved on record Special Power of Attorney (Ex RW-2/A) executed by Kartaroo Devi (mother) in his favour, copy of order dated 2.4.2013 Ex. RW-2/C, passed in earlier Eviction Petition preferred by Anil Sharma against Kartaroo Devi and receipt of money order dated 6.11.2013 (Ex. RW-2/D), remitting rent to Anil Kumar. Copies of statements recorded in Rent Petition, titled as Anil Sharma Vs Sudesh Kumari have been placed on record as Ex. DZ-1 by the tenant.

¶45

7

¶46

2025:HHC:37520 Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶47

After considering the material on record, Rent Controller

¶48

had concluded that demises premises was bonafide required by the landlord for carrying out necessary repair work, making major additions or alteration, rebuilding/reconstruction which cannot be carried out without vacating the same and, therefore, tenant was directed to handover vacant possession of the demised premises to the landlord within 30 days from the date of order and in aforesaid terms Eviction Petition was allowed vide order dated 13.10.2020.

¶49

The aforesaid order was assailed by the tenant by filing Rent Appeal No. 32-S/14 of 2020, which has been dismissed by District Judge (Exercising the powers of Appellate Authority under the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act) vide impugned judgment dated 6.5.2022.

¶50

The aforesaid order and judgment has been assailed by filing present Revision Petition invoking revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Rent Act.

¶51

Learned counsel for the tenant has submitted that Eviction Petition was not filed with bonafide intention; previous litigation between the parties has not been taken into consideration; there is no map sanctioned by Municipal Corporation for allowing repair; and additional grounds taken before the Appellate Authority have not been taken into consideration by the Appellate Authority and, therefore, it has been contended that the impugned order and judgment warrants interference and deserves to be set aside.

¶52

8

¶53

2025:HHC:37520 Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶54

To substantiate the plea, reliance has been placed on behalf of tenant on the judgment passed by learned Single Judge of this High Court in Jai Karan Vs. Madan Lal, 1997 (2) SimLC 264 , wherein it has been observed that to reflect bonafide on the part of landlord necessary permission/sanction plan should be there and in absence thereof Rent Eviction Petition is liable to be dismissed. It has also been contended that even if on merits present Revision Petition is not accepted, than tenant has right to re-entry in the premises after reconstruction/repair their of.

¶55

Learned counsel for the landlord by referring reasoning assigned by the Courts below in the impugned order/judgment, has supported the directions passed for eviction of tenant with prayer for dismissal of Revision Petition.

¶56

Supreme Court in Rukmini Amma Saradamma vs. Kallyani Sulochana and others , reported in (1993) 1 SCC 499 , referring its earlier pronouncement in Rai Chand Jain vs. Chandra Kanta Khosla, (1991) 1 SCC 422 , with respect to scope of revisional power under Section 20 of Kerala Rent Control Act, which is similar to H.P. Rent Act, has observed that notwithstanding the fact that Section 20 of the Act conferring revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is widely worded, such a jurisdiction cannot be converted into an appellate jurisdiction.

¶57

With respect to scope of jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction and the extent of power which High Court can exercise in a

¶58

9

¶59

2025:HHC:37520 Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶60

Revision filed under Section 24(5) of the Rent Act, Five Judges’ Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, has observed as under:-

¶61

“28. Before we consider the matter further to find out the scope and extent of revisional jurisdiction under the above three Rent Control Acts, a quick observation about the 'appellate jurisdiction' and 'revisional jurisdiction' is necessary. Conceptually, revisional jurisdiction is a part of appellate jurisdiction but it is not vice-versa. Both, appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction are creatures of statutes. No party to the proceeding has an inherent right of appeal or revision. An appeal is continuation of suit or original proceeding, as the case may be. The power of the appellate court is co-extensive with that of the trial court. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves rehearing on facts and law but such jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that provides for appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, revisional jurisdiction, though, is a part of appellate jurisdiction but ordinarily it cannot be equated with that of a full-fledged appeal. In other words, revision is not continuation of suit or of original proceeding. When the aid of revisional court is invoked on the revisional side, it can interfere within the permissible parameters provided in the statute. It goes without saying that if a revision is provided against an order passed by the tribunal/appellate authority, the decision of the revisional court is the operative decision in law. In our view, as regards the extent of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, much would, however, depend on the language employed by the statute conferring appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction.

¶62

With the above general observations, we shall now endeavour to determine the extent, scope, ambit and meaning of the terms "legality or propriety", "regularity, correctness, legality or propriety" and "legality, regularity or propriety" which are used in three Rent Control Acts under consideration.

¶63

10

¶64

2025:HHC:37520 Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶65

29.1. The ordinary meaning of the word 'legality' is lawfulness. It refers to strict adherence to law, prescription, or doctrine; the quality of being legal.

¶66

29.2. The term 'propriety' means fitness; appropriateness, aptitude; suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or condition conformity with requirement; rules or principle, rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy.

¶67

29.3. The terms 'correctness' and 'propriety' ordinarily convey the same meaning, that is, something which is legal and proper. In its ordinary meaning and substance, 'correctness' is compounded of 'legality' and 'propriety' and that which is legal and proper is 'correct'.

¶68

29.4. The expression "regularity" with reference to an order ordinarily relates to the procedure being followed in accord with the principles of natural justice and fair play.

¶69

We have already noted in the earlier part of the judgment that although there is some difference in the language employed by the three Rent Control Acts under consideration which provide for revisional jurisdiction but, in our view, the revisional power of the High Court under these Acts is substantially similar and broadly such power has the same scope save and except the power to invoke revisional jurisdiction suo motu unless so provided expressly. None of these statutes confers on revisional authority the power as wide as that of appellate court or appellate authority despite such power being wider than that provided in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision under consideration does not permit the High Court to invoke the revisional jurisdiction as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. Revision does not lie under these provisions to bring the orders of the Trial Court/Rent Controller and Appellate Court/Appellate Authority for re-hearing of the issues raised in the original proceedings.

¶70

We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court/First Appellate Authority because on re- appreciation of the evidence, its view is different from

¶71

11

¶72

Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶73

2025:HHC:37520

¶74

the Court/Authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the Court/Authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by Court/Authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or re-assess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.”

¶75

Present Revision Petition is to be decided keeping in view

¶76

the aforesaid exposition of law with respect to scope of revisional jurisdiction of this Court.

¶77

It is also settled that landlord has a right to put his property for better use and to obtain higher income and in case of having more than one property or other property than the premises subject matter of rent petition, he is the best person to decide that which of the property is

¶78

12

¶79

2025:HHC:37520 Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶80

better located having possible potential for his bonafide requirement including the augmentation of income.

¶81

It is also settled that landlord is also entitled to enjoy his property by putting it to its fullest use and beneficial to him.

¶82

Plea raised on behalf of tenant that previous litigation was not taken into consideration and for the said litigation, present petition was not maintainable, is not sustainable as nothing has been placed on record with respect to previous litigation initiated by the landlord for eviction, alleged to be dismissed by the High Court. With respect to second Eviction Petition, tenant herself has placed on record copy of order dated 2.4.2013 (Ex. PW-2/C) passed in Case No. 12-2 of 2013, titled as Anil Sharma Vs. Kartaroo Devi, wherein it has been recorded that respondent (Kartaroo Devi) had paid the entire arrears of rent uptill 31.12.2012 and, therefore, landlord was not interested in prosecuting the said proceedings and in view of that Rent Eviction Petition was dismissed by the Rent Controller

¶83

It is evident from the aforesaid copy of order that previous Rent Eviction Petition was filed on the ground of arrears of rent and, therefore, the order passed in the said petition has no bearing on present case, as present Eviction Petition has been filed for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement to carryout repair, alteration and improvements in the premises in reference.

¶84

13

¶85

2025:HHC:37520 Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶86

The aforesaid order dated 2.4.2013 relied upon by the tenant and postal receipt Ex. RW-2/D placed on record to claim that rent was paid by Kartaroo Devi to Anil Sharma in the year 2013, also belies the plea of tenant that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, rather by paying the rent to the landlord, respondent/tenant has accepted the status of Anil Sharma as a landlord. In these facts, now Kartaro Devi cannot take U-turn to deny the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.

¶87

Landlord has proved on record various copies of Rent Eviction Petitions preferred by him against other tenants on the same ground as well as photographs and technical report reflecting the condition of the premises in reference. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that there is sufficient material on record to depict the condition of the premises in reference, requiring vacation of tenant for carrying out repair/alteration or modifications in the premises in reference. Therefore, it is wrong to say that there is no bonafide intention for filing the Eviction Petition.

¶88

The Apex Court in Hari Dass Sharma Vs. Vikas Sood and Others reported in (2013) 5 SCC 243 has held that availability of building plan, duly sanctioned by local authorities, is not an ingredient of Section 14(3)(c) of the Act and therefore, it cannot be a condition precedent to the entitlement of the landlord for eviction of tenant, but depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the Court may look into the

¶89

14

¶90

2025:HHC:37520 Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶91

availability of sanction plan duly sanctioned by the local Authorities for the purpose of determining the bona fides of the landlord.

¶92

Right of re-entry, if any shall accrue to the tenant after completion of re-construction, repair work of the building, however such right is not an absolute right, but subject to certain conditions, contained in the provisions as well as subsequent developments, if any, affecting the right of re-entry of the tenant.

¶93

To substantiate the aforesaid contention, learned counsel for the landlord has relied upon judgment dated 21.7.2023 passed in Civil Revision Nos. 69 and 70 of 2009 , titled as Raj Singh Vs. Ram Shakti (deceased) through LRs. and connected matter , passed by Single Bench of the Hon’ble Chief Justice, wherein it has been held as under:-

¶94

“26) As regards the contention of the Counsel for the tenants that they are entitled to be re-inducted into the premises in view of the first proviso to Section 14(3)(c) of the Act is concerned, the said proviso, having been introduced by the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act No.8 of 2012), it came into operation only from 16.03.2012. Since this provision introduces an amendment to the substantive law governing the rights of enants, it can only have prospective operation and cannot be made applicable to the instant case where eviction proceedings have started way-back in 2003.

¶95

Similar view has been expressed by this Court in Shri Jasvinder Singh & Another versus Shri Kedar Nath (2012) SCC Online HP 7470.

¶96

The decision in Chaman Lal Bali versus State of Himachal Pradesh & Another, AIR 2016 HP 168 cited by the counsel for the tenants, does not deal with this aspect at all, i.e. whether the amendment is

¶97

15

¶98

2025:HHC:37520

¶99

Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶100

prospective or retrospective. Therefore, the said decision is not applicable and the tenants cannot claim any right of re-entry on the basis of the said amendment.”

¶101

Learned counsel for the landlord has also placed reliance

¶102

on the judgment passed in Prem Lal Vs. Soma Devi, reported in 2020

¶103

(1) RCR (Rent) 371 , wherein it has been observed as under:-

¶104

“31. Appellate Authority in terms of proviso to Section 14(3)(c) of the Act has granted right to re-entry to tenant, however, appellate Authority has failed to take notice that substantial additions and alterations proposed to be carried out in the premises will change the user of the premises, sought to be vacated by the landlord and it will be no more available for using by the family of tenant for residence or his business, as after alterations it shall be a parking space of the landlord. Therefore, I find that right to re-entry granted to the tenant is not possible after substantial additions proposed to be made in the building. It is also relevant to notice that under clause (c) of Section 14(3) of the Act, a landlord has been provided a right for eviction for ‘building’ or ‘rebuilding’ or making thereto ‘any substantial additions’ or ‘alterations’. These are four different situations. An act of ‘building’ generally will be on vacant land, rebuilding will be after demolishing the building already in existence and substantive additions and alterations can certainly never be said to be ‘rebuilding’ but it will be change(s) in existing building or addition thereto according to necessity and suitability. In proviso right to re-entry has been conferred upon tenant to the premises in rebuilt building. This right will be available in case of re-building only but not in case of ‘building’ ‘additions’ or ‘alterations’ which changes the entire scenario on the spot. ‘Building’ activity will be upon vacant land vacated by tenant and after raising building thereon there is no question of providing area to tenant in it equivalent to area of land in his possession prior to building as there will be no such land available for re-entry and in fact it would not be re-entry but entry in newly constructed building. Similarly ‘substantial additions and/or alterations’ will also change the premises according to bonafide

¶105

16

¶106

2025:HHC:37520

¶107

Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶108

requirement for which eviction is ordered and in such eventuality it may not be possible to allow re-entry as this clause provide eviction for substantive addition or alteration but not for addition and alteration simplicitor and that is why legislature has provided re-entry only in case of rebuilt building. The proviso granting right to re-entry will not be applicable in present case, rather it is applicable in those cases where re-building is carried out in such a manner that user of the premises after re-building remains the same and it can be used for the same purpose. However, in present case, the premises is required bonafide altogether for a different purposes and after substantiate additions/alterations in the same for the said purpose, it would not be available for the purpose for which it was being used earlier. Therefore, right to re-entry granted by Appellate Authority is patently wrong, illegal and contrary to statutory provisions and thus is not sustainable and accordingly, it is quashed and set aside.”

¶109

Reliance has also placed on behalf of landlord on judgment

¶110

dated 29.9.2023, Civil Revision No. 27 of 2023, titled as Prakash Kaur

¶111

Vs. Rajwant Singh Manta , wherein this Court has observed as under:-

¶112

“14. So far right of re-induction or re-entry is concerned that shall be subject to and adherence to all provisions of law applicable and prevailing at relevant point of time for such reentry including determination of fair rent or rent mutually agreed between the parties as well as proposed user and utilization of the property by the landlord. 15. Right to re-entry of the tenant has been granted in the Act itself. However, such right shall definitely is not to be an absolute right, as the Courts have to determine the same keeping in view the given facts and circumstances of the case including the purpose for which reconstruction/rebuilding of the premises has been proposed and permitted, and also keeping in view the bonafide requirement of the landlord. In case premises after rebuilding/reconstruction is to be rented, then definitely tenants shall have right to re-entry/re-induction in the premises, in accordance with law, as recorded hereinabove. For example, if premises is ordered to be vacated for banafide requirement

¶113

17

¶114

2025:HHC:37520

¶115

Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶116

of the owner to utilize the premises in better way by converting the residential building into a commercial complex, in such eventuality tenant living in residential premises may not claim re-entry or reinduction in the newly constructed commercial complex for residential accommodation. Similarly, there may be a case where landlord intends to expand his business and shall have requirement of more space for commercial activity by rebuilding/ reconstructing the premises. In such eventuality also, it may not be justified to impose a tenant upon him causing curtailment of his plan of extension of his business. In a given case, a building may be proposed to be reconstructed or rebuilt for own residential purpose with no proposal to let it out. In such eventuality, a tenant cannot be thrusted upon the owner of the premises by way of re-induction or re-entry in a house particularly designed and constructed in a manner that there is no scope for letting out portion thereof as existence of any other family in such premises may cause interference in privacy. Such re-entry/re-induction shall amount to depriving a person from his right of full enjoyment of his property for no fault on his part, but for the only reason that he or his predecessor had provided rented accommodation to someone in the past, as per circumstances prevailing at that time.”

¶117

Similar observation have been made by this Court in Civil Revision No. 155 of 2019 , titled as Rattan Chand Vs. Madhu Bharat Chadha & Another, decided on 21.3.2023.

¶118

Though right to re-entry has been recognized in aforesaid cases referred on behalf of tenant, but at the same time in these judgments, it has nowhere been declared or held that right of re-entry of tenant is an absolute right, and in all eventuality he has to be allowed to re-enter by the landlord. As already observed by this Court in Rattan Chand and Parkash Kaur’s cases, the right of reentry shall be subject to

¶119

18

¶120

2025:HHC:37520 Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶121

certain restrictions and shall be subject to mutual agreement, if any, arrived at between the parties in terms of Rent Act.

¶122

Additional grounds for assailing eviction order placed on record before the Appellate Authority are nothing, but expansion, explanation and multiplication of grounds already raised before the Appellate Authority. For the discussion herein-above, there is no force in the additional grounds placed before the Appellate Authority.

¶123

Appellate Authority has appreciated the material on record in its right perspective by referring pronouncements of the Apex Court in

¶124

R.V.E. Venkatachala Goundor Vs. Venkatesha Gupta and others

¶125

(2004) 4 SCC, 437 , wherein it has been held that eviction is sought on the ground of augmenting income, then the same is permissible; pronouncement of the Apex Court in Harrington House School Vs. S.N. Ispahani and others, (2002) 5 SCC, 229, wherein it has been held that desire of landlord to earn economic advantage is one of the relevant factors pointing to the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord, as well as pronouncements of the Apex Court in Hari Dass Sharma Vs. Vikas Sood and ohters (2013) 5, SCC, 243 and D. Sasi Kumar Vs. Soundararajan, (2019) 9 SCC 282.

¶126

At this state it is apt to record that landlord has also filed an application CMP No. 16873 of 2022 for grant/fixation of compensation for use and occupation charges of premises/mesne profits on the ground that at the time of passing stay order use and occupation charges/mesne

¶127

19

¶128

2025:HHC:37520 Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶129

profits were not fixed or directed to be deposited by the tenant. It has been further stated that after passing of eviction order tenant is continuing in possession of the premises without payment of any amount. In aforesaid circumstances, it has been prayed that tenant be directed to pay 15,000/- per month from the date of passing of eviction order till₹ vacation of premises as use and occupation charges.

¶130

In response to the aforesaid CMP No. 16873 of 2022, it has been stated that landlord has waived his right to claim use and occupation charges when matter was pending adjudication before Appellate Authority, which has affirmed the order passed by the Rent Controller, by not praying for any use and occupation charges for the period of pendency of appeal before the Appellate Authority and now this application has been filed with malafide intention. It has been further claimed that adjoining premises are not fetching more than 5,000/- per₹ month and in absence of any cogent material on record use and occupation charges cannot be fixed at the rate of 15,000/- per month.₹

¶131

Neither landlord nor tenant has placed on record any material to substantiate their respective plea with respect to quantum of use and occupation charges.

¶132

I am of the opinion that in the interest of justice, it would be appropriate to take mean of the amount narrated by both sides for determining use and occupation charges. Accordingly, landlord is held entitled for 10,000/- per month as use and occupation charges from the₹

¶133

20

¶134

2025:HHC:37520 Civil Revision No. 179 of 2022

¶135

date of order of eviction passed by Rent Controller, i.e. 13.10.2020. However, in case tenant vacates the premises on or before 31^st December, 2025, the mesne profit shall be payable from the date of passing of judgment by Appellate Authority, i.e. 6.5.2022. The application is allowed in aforesaid terms.

¶136

In view of aforesaid discussion, I do not find any illegality, irregularity or perversity in impugned judgment and as such there is no merit in the Revision Petition and accordingly, the same is dismissed alongwith pending application, if any, in aforesaid terms.

¶137

7^th November, 2025 (Keshav)

¶138

(Vivek Singh Thakur), Judge.

Kartaroo Devi v. Anil Sharma

Case brief

What is this about?

Kartaroo Devi v. Anil Sharma

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Kamal Singh Alias Tiger Vs State of Hp

Commandant 70 Rcc ( Greef) Vs Kiran Bala Ors.

Icici Lombard General Insurance Company Ltd. Vs Raj Kumari and Ors.

Secretary(Pw) Vs Indira Devi

Shankar Dass Vs Jitender Gupta

Vineet Vs Vishal Sohal