Tansen Sangeet Mahavidalaya Vs Vikas Sharma and Ors.

Aggrieved against order dated 23.08.2022 passed by learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Solan (prescribed authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936) in case No. 15/2 of 2017 titled Vikas Sharma and others vs. Tansen Sangeet Mahavidyalaya, the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India with a prayer to set-aside the impugned order.

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1 Whether reporters of print and electronic media may be allowed to see the order?

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2025:HHC:5821

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The respondents preferred a petition under Sections 15 & 16 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (for short, “The Act”) before the prescribed authority. The respondents claiming unpaid wages for the period 15.12.2015 to 08.04.2016, 15.12.2015 to 11.04.2016 and 15.12.2015 to 07.04.2016 respectively. The petition was instituted on 12.06.2017.

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The petitioner without filing any reply to the petition of respondents, preferred an application before the prescribed authority with a prayer to dismiss the petition on the ground that the same was not filed within the prescribed period of limitation and no application for condonation of delay was filed.

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The respondents filed reply to the application and averred that they in the first instance had filed application before learned Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer, Solan in the month of April, 2016. The proceedings before the said officer continued till 13.12.2016, on which date, the efforts for amicable settlement failed and no conciliation could be effected. With this background, the respondents sought benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

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The learned prescribed authority dismissed the application of the petitioner by holding that the respondents were able to make out a case for condonation of delay as they had spent considerable time from April 2016 to December, 2016 in pursuing their remedy before Labour Officer-cum-Conciliation Officer, Solan.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties and

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have also gone through the records of the case carefully.

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Section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act, reads

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as under:

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“15. Claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages and penalty for malicious or vexatious claims.

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(1) xx xx xx

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(a) to (e ) xx xx xx

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(2) Where contrary to the provisions of this Act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed person, or any payment of wages has been delayed, such person himself, or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector under this Act, or any other person acting with the permission of the authority appointed under section (1), may apply to such authority for a direction under sub-section (3):

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Provided that every such application shall be presented within twelve months from the date on which the deduction from the wages was made or from the date on which the payment of the wages was due to be made, as the case may be:

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Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of twelve months when the applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period .”

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The limitation provided for preferring a petition

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for unpaid wages is 12 months from the date when the payment of wages became due.

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Admittedly in this case, the petition was filed by

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the respondents before the prescribed authority beyond prescribed period.

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However, the aforesaid bar is not absolute. The prescribed authority has been vested with jurisdiction to admit such petition beyond the period of 12 months in case the applicant satisfies that he had sufficient cause for not making the petition within such period.

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The perusal of petition preferred by the respondents before prescribed authority under Section 15 and 16 of the Act reveals that they disclosed the factum of

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complaint earlier filed by them before the Labour Officercum-Conciliation Officer, Solan. An averment was also made that though the petition of the respondents was within time, still in case the authority concluded that there was delay, the same be condoned to avoid technicalities in adjudication of claim under a welfare legislation.

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The petitioner instead of filing reply to the petition or aforesaid averments, chose to file separate application seeking dismissal of the petition on the ground that it was barred by limitation.

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As noticed above, the respondents had further clarified that the proceedings before Labour Court-cumConciliation Officer, Solan had continued from April 2016 to December, 2016.

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Taking into consideration the facts averred in the main petition of the respondents and also the reply filed by them to the application of the petitioner, learned prescribed authority has shown its satisfaction as to existence of sufficient reasons explaining delay in filing of the petition by respondents. The reasons assigned by the respondents have been found to be bonafide by learned prescribed

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authority and thus giving the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to the respondents, their petition has been held to be within time.

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The petitioner has not been able to point out any perversity or error of jurisdiction in the impugned order. In my considered view, the prescribed authority was well within its jurisdiction to decide the issue of limitation without there being a separate application for condonation of delay. No illegality can be said to have been committed by learned prescribed authority in admitting the petition beyond prescribed period of limitation, on the basis of material otherwise available before it.

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The petitioner has not disputed the fact that the proceedings before the Labour Officer -cum-Conciliation Officer, Solan remained pending between April 2016 to December, 2016 on the same subject matter and issue. It being so, the respondents had valid and justified reasons for not simultaneously approaching the prescribed authority. The application was filed in June, 2017 after the closure of proceedings by Labour Officer-cum-Conciliation

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Officer in December, 2016 and hence, the delay was not unreasonable.

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Though, the pleadings made by the respondents in their petition under Section 15 of the Act were lacking in material particulars, yet keeping in view the nature of proceedings under the Act, technicalities cannot be allowed to defeat the substantial justice between the parties.

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In result, there is no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed, so also the pending application(s) if any.

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(Satyen Vaidya) 12^th March, 2025 Judge (GR)

Tansen Sangeet Mahavidalaya v. Vikas Sharma and Ors.

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Tansen Sangeet Mahavidalaya v. Vikas Sharma and Ors.

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