Krishan Kumar Gupta Vs State of Hp

By way of this petition, the petitioner has assailed order dated 03.01.2012, passed by Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil), Collector, in Case No. 1-PP-2005 as well as order dated 09.03.2017, passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Shimla, in Appeal No. 16/2012, in terms whereof, the petitioner has been ordered to be evicted from the premise in issue.

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Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of these proceedings are that in terms of the order passed by Sub-

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1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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2

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Divisional Officer (Civil), exercising the powers of Collector under H.P. Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1971 Act’), Eviction Petition filed by the State of Himachal Pradesh through Controller, Printing and Stationary Department, was allowed, vide order dated 03.01.2012 (Annexure P-3) and the Appeal filed by the petitioner against the same, was rejected by the Appellate Authority, vide order dated 09.03.2017 (Annexure P- 4). Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Court. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the impugned orders are per se perverse and not sustainable in the eyes of law, as the procedure prescribed under the 1971 Act, was not followed at all. He submitted that no notice, as is envisaged under Section 4 of the 1971 Act was even issued to the petitioner and, therefore, as the proceedings from the very initial stage were vitiated, the orders which have resulted from said proceedings are void ab initio. He further submitted that otherwise also the proceedings could not have been initiated against the petitioner under the provisions of the 1971 Act, for the reason that as the petitioner was in valid possession of the

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premises even before the property was acquired for the benefit of the Controller, Printing and Stationary Department, from a private individual, therefore, simply because the same stood acquired subsequently, this would not have otherwise rendered the possession of the petitioner as bad in law.

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On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that there is no merit in the petition for the reason that the procedure prescribed in the 1971 Act was duly followed while passing the impugned orders and as the petitioner was duly heard by the Authorities, both at the stage of passing of the order by the first Authority as well as at the Appellate Authority and as petitioner was given full opportunity to put forth his claim, therefore, this petition be dismsised. He also referred to the record of the case and submitted that Ved Prakash, the original owner of the property had stated before the Revenue Authority that the petitioner was never inducted as a tenant in the estate.

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I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Additional Advocate General and have also carefully gone through the record of the case as well as the impugned

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orders.

Section 4 of the 1971 Act, inter alia, provides that

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whenever a Collector is of the opinion that any persons that are in authorized occupation of any public premises situated within his jurisdiction and that they should be evicted, the Collector shall issue in the manner provided under Section 4 of the Act, a notice in writing calling upon all persons concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made.

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Now herein, the contention of the petitioner is that no notice under Section 4 of the 1971 act was ever issued to the petitioner before the commencement of the proceedings by the Collector.

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A perusal of the record demonstrates that this was the specific defence taken by the petitioner to the reply filed to the eviction petition in terms of preliminary objection No.2. Now when one refers to the order passed by Collector dated 03.01.2012, one finds that this contention of the party has been taken note of by the Collector. However, he answers it by stating that orders dated 06.01.2010 and 19.03.2010 show that the respondent was served notice under Section 4 of the Act by

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affixation in the shop. In the backdrop of this order, this Court perused the record of the learned Collector which demonstrates

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that when the case was listed before the said Authority on 25.02.2010, the following order was passed:-

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“25.02.2010

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Case called. Sh. Ramesh Rana, Supdt. representative of Petitioner present, Respondent not present. Case was fixed for service of respondent. Ld. PO is on Training at Delhi. So case is fixed for effective hearing on 19/03*2010 for service.”

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Thereafter, when the case was listed on 19.03.2010, the following order was passed:-

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“19.03.2010

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Case called. Sh. Gian Chand representative of petitioner present. Notice u/s 4 of P.P. Act be issued and served by affixing in the shop and case come up on 23.04.2010.”

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A perusal of the said zimni orders passed by the Authority demonstrate that what has been construed by the Authority to be issuance of a notice under Section 4 of the Act

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was the notice issued to the present petitioner during the pendency of the proceedings, when on a date the Court did not

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assemble. Such notice by no stretch of imagination can be termed to be a notice as is prescribed under Section 4 of the 1971 Act. The notice referred to by the Collector is just a notice intimating the next date of appearance to the party and this does not suffice the requirements of Section 4 of the 1971 Act.

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Otherwise also, a notice under Section 4 of the 1971 Act, is a preliminary requirement before proceedings are initiated and it is not as if the Collector has the power to issue this notice during the pendency of proceedings for eviction of a party.

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This extremely important aspect of the matter has been ignored by the learned Collector while passing the impugned order and evidently this renders the orders passed by the Authorities to be void ab initio. This aspect of the matter has not been dealt with in the right perspective even by the Appellate Authority, as there is no independent adjudication on this issue, in light of the contentions raised in the grounds of

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Appeal. The Appellate order also is thus per se perverse and bad in law.

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Accordingly, in light of the above observations, this

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petition is allowed. Order dated 03.01.2012, passed by SubDivisional Officer (Civil), Collector, in Case No. 1-PP-2005 and order dated 09.03.2017, passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Shimla, in Appeal No. 16/2012, are quashed and set aside. However, allowing of this petition shall not come in the way of the respondents to initiate fresh proceedings under the provisions of 1971 Act, if so advised. All other questions left open. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.

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(Ajay Mohan Goel) Judge

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September 05, 2025 (Shivank Thakur)

Krishan Kumar Gupta v. State of Hp

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Krishan Kumar Gupta v. State of Hp

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