Dismissed

Anuj Sharma and Another v. State of Hp and Another

Himachal Pradesh HC12 Sept 2024CRMMO/518/2023

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

This is a special criminal miscellaneous matter regarding a petition to quash an FIR under Section 482 Cr.P.C. involving allegations of domestic violence. The court held that specific FIR allegations make out a prima facie case and dismissed the petition, refusing a quashing plea despite filed charge sheets. Reliance was placed on Supreme Court precedents.

What did the court decide?

The petition for quashing of the FIR is dismissed; the matter is reserved for the trial court.

Anuj Sharma and Another Vs State of Hp and Another — Quashing and FIR | Himachal Pradesh HC (2024)

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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8418 )

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. MMO No. 518 of 2023 Reserved on: 7.8.2024 Date of Decision: 12.9.2024.

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Anuj Sharma and another ...Petitioners

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Versus

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State of H.P. and another

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...Respondents

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Coram

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Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹ No.

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For the Petitioners : Mr. Sarthak Mehta, Advocate. : For the Respondents Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State. Mr. Sunny Modgil, Advocate, for respondent No.2

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 1 of 2023, dated 15.1.2023, registered at Women Police Station Una, District Una, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 406 and 506 of IPC and consequential proceedings pending before

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Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.3, Una H.P., titled State of H.P. Vs. Anuj Sharma and another. It has been asserted that the informant lodged a false FIR against the petitioners. The contents of the FIR do not contain the details of the incident of demand. Petitioner No.1 actively helped the informant in getting her Ph.D. Degree and it was wrongly mentioned in the FIR that she was not allowed to pursue her higher education. The informant worked as an Assistant Professor at RIMT University, Punjab and thereafter shifted to Chandigarh University. It was wrongly mentioned that the petitioners were unhappy with the birth of a baby girl. On the other hand, the petitioners and their family members were happy with the birth of the girl and also named her Krishanpriya. The FIR is the result of misunderstanding. The informant left her home with her daughter without any reason. Petitioner No.1 used to reside in Panipat due to his job and the informant was taking education at Patiala. They used to meet during the weekend. The informant had initiated various proceedings against the petitioners. The informant had taken all the articles belonging to her with the help of the police. The continuation of the proceedings would be highly unjust. Hence,

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it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and FIR be quashed.

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The petition is opposed by respondent No.1 by filing a reply making preliminary submission regarding lack of maintainability. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was asserted that the FIR was registered at the instance of the informant. The police conducted the investigation and found sufÏcient reasons to file a charge sheet against the petitioners hence, the charge sheet was submitted in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Una, who assigned it to learned Judicial Magistrate First Class-II, Una. Specific allegations were levelled by the informant against the petitioners. She stated that three gold sets, two gold karas, one gold nose ring (nath), two gold tops and a scooty are lying in the house of the petitioners. The competent Court is seized of the matter. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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No reply was filed on behalf of the informant.

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I have heard Mr Sarthak Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General

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for respondent No.1/State and Mr. Sunny Modgil, learned counsel for respondent No.2/informant.

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Mr. Sarthak Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. The contents of the FIR are highly vague and no specific allegations were made against the petitioners. There is an unfortunate tendency of arraying all the family members in case of matrimonial discord and Courts should look carefully into the allegations made by the wife. Applying this yardstick to the present case, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence. Hence, he prayed that the FIR be quashed. He relied upon the judgments of Abhishek Vs. Madhya Pradesh (2023) INSC 775, Mahalaxmi and others Vs. State of Karnataka (2023) INSC 1050, Achin Gupta Vs. State of Haryana (2024) SCC Online SC 751, Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam and others Vs. State of Bihar (2022) 6 SCC 599, Geeta Mehrota Vs. State of H.P. Cr. Appeal No. 1674 of 2012, decided on 17.10.2012, Gulam Mustafa Vs. State of Karnataka (2023) SCC Online, SC 603. Kapil Aggarwal Vs. Sanjay Sharma, Cr. Appeal No. 142 of 2021, decided 1.3.2021, and Saleem Vs. State of H.P. (2023) INSC 687 in support of his submission.

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Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General,

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for respondent No.1/State submitted that the allegations against the petitioners are quite specific. The police conducted the investigation and found sufÏcient grounds to file the charge sheet. Learned Trial Court is seized of the matter and this Court should not exercise the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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Mr. Sunny Modgil, learned counsel for respondent No.2/informant adopted the submissions of Mr. Ajit Sharma learned Deputy Advocate General and further submitted that this Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while deciding a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter and the petitioners should be directed to approach the learned Trial Court for the redressal of their grievances. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Shyam Lal Vs. State of H.P., Cr. MMO No. 1041 of 2023, decided on 11.1.2024 in support of his submission.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The parameters for exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.M. Mohan v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 339, wherein it was observed: -

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9. The law with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. to quash complaints and criminal proceedings has been succinctly summarized by this Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Limited (2006) 6 SCC 736: 2006 INSC 452 after considering the earlier precedents. It will be apposite to refer to the following observations of this Court in the said case, which read thus:

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“ 12. The principles relating to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few— Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692: 1988 SCC (Cri) 234], State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194: 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059], Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591: 1996 SCC (Cri) 1045], State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla [(1996) 8 SCC 164: 1996 SCC (Cri) 628], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259: 1999 SCC (Cri) 401], Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269: 2000 SCC (Cri) 615], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786], M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645: 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122: 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:

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( i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused.

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For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint is warranted while examining prayer for quashing a complaint.

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( ii ) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides /malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.

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( iii ) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.

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( iv ) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are necessary for making out the offence.

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( v. ) A given set of facts may make out: ( a ) purely a civil wrong; ( b ) purely a criminal offence; or ( c ) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for

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seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.

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Similar is the judgment in Maneesha Yadav v. State of

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U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643 , wherein it was held: -

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12. We may gainfully refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1990 INSC 363 :

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“ 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufÏciently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police ofÏcers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police ofÏcer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufÏcient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efÏcacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the

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accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

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We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.”

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The FIR mentions that a complaint was made by the informant stating that she was married on 25.6.2019 to petitioner Anuj Sharma. The informant’s parents provided dowry at the time of her marriage as per their capacity. Her mother-in-law started harassing her for bringing insufÏcient dowry soon after the marriage. She started saying that no vehicle was provided by the informant’s father and this had defamed the petitioners in the community. The informant told her that her parents had provided the ornaments as per their capacity to the petitioners’ relatives but her pleas fell on deaf ears. The informant also stated that her father remained ill and he had spent a good amount on the education of his children. The informant could not pressurize him for providing the vehicle. She shared the demand for a vehicle with her husband in

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July 2019. Her husband also stated that only a vehicle was demanded and started harassing the informant on petty matters. The informant was late in August 2019 and when she reached home, her husband abused her and told her that he would not allow her to complete her Ph.D. The informant was pregnant. She was not helped by any person and was forced to work. Whenever any gifts were provided by the informant’s parents, the petitioners used to taunt her by saying that the gifts were not provided as per their status. The informant told these facts to her father-in-law but he expressed his inability to do anything. The informant went to get herself checked up in the sixth month of the pregnancy. She met some person known to her. Her husband started abusing her in the presence of that person and told her that in case she came out of the house, it would not be good for her. He used to say that the informant had not done anything in life, she was not worth anything and she was getting the fellowship for nothing. One daughter was born to the informant on 18.5.2020. The petitioners were not happy with her birth as they wanted a son. The informant explained that she had no control over the child’s sex but the petitioners did not accept her plea. The gifts of ornaments and clothes were

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provided during the function to celebrate the birth of the daughter. The petitioners taunted the informant by saying that their reputation was lowered. The vehicle could have been provided. The petitioners harassed the informant for bringing gold ornaments. The informant was threatened not to reveal the incident to any person. The informant’s husband used to abuse her. He also snatched her mobile phone and did not allow her to talk to her parents. One day an attempt was made to throw her out of the home and when she resisted, she was slapped. The informant left the home and went to her paternal home. Her husband threatened to kill her. Three gold sets, two gold karas, one gold nath, two sets of tops, one scooty and certificates are lying in her matrimonial home.

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It is apparent from the perusal of the FIR that the allegations are quite specific. The months when the incident occurred have been given. The role of the petitioners has been outlined in detail. Hence, the submissions that the allegations in the FIR are vague cannot be accepted and the judgments of the Hon’ble Court in Abhishek (supra), Mahalaxmi (supra), Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam (supra), Achin Gupta (supra) and Geeta Mehrotra (supra) holding that when the allegations are

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general and vague, the continuation of the proceedings amounts to abuse of the process of the Court do not apply to the present case.

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It was submitted that the Courts should read between the lines to determine whether any case was made out or not. Even if the allegations are read carefully and between the lines, it cannot be deciphered that they have been made with ulterior purposes. The reading of the FIR prima facie shows that the informant had filed the FIR before the police when she was fed up with the harassment in her matrimonial home at the hands of the petitioners. Significantly, the informant mentioned that she made a complaint to her father-in-law but he did not take any action. She had not made any complaint of the harassment against her father-in-law. She could have made a general allegation implicating all the relatives of the petitioners but she chose not to do so. Therefore, the plea of the petitioners that the FIR was lodged to wreak vengeance upon the petitioners and his family members' prima face does not appear to be correct. Therefore, no assistance can be derived from the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gulam Mustafa (supra) and Salim (supra).

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The informant has given the details of the events which happened after the marriage. The details are graphic and cannot be concocted. The police conducted the investigation and found that to be correct. Hence, prima facie a case of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A, 406 and 506 read with Section 34 of IPC is made out against the petitioners.

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It was rightly submitted that the Court exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot conduct a minitrial. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Jaiswal vs. State of Jharkhand, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 685 that the Court exercises extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and cannot conduct a mini-trial or enter into an appreciation of an evidence of a particular case. It was observed:-

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“13. We say so for reasons more than one. This Court in catena of Judgments has consistently held that at the time of examining the prayer for quashing of the criminal proceedings, the court exercising extra-ordinary jurisdiction can neither undertake to conduct a mini-trial nor enter into appreciation of evidence of a particular case. The correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint cannot be examined on the touchstone of the probable defence that the accused may raise to stave off the prosecution and any such misadventure by the

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Courts resulting in proceedings being quashed would be set aside. This Court in the case of Akhil Sharda 2022 SCC OnLine SC 820 held to the following effect:

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“28. Having gone through the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court by which the High Court has set aside the criminal proceedings in the exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., it appears that the High Court has virtually conducted a mini-trial, which as such is not permissible at this stage and while deciding the application under Section 482 Cr. P.C. As observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions no mini-trial can be conducted by the High Court in the exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. jurisdiction and at the stage of deciding the application under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the High Court cannot get into appreciation of evidence of the particular case being considered.”

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16. A similar view was taken in Maneesha Yadav v. State of

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U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643 wherein it was held that: -

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“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at its face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint even if taken at its face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) .

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14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home(2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060 :

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“ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed : (SCC p. 63, para 16)

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“ 16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.”

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Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into

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the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint.

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A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed:

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“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and charge-sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating ofÏcer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.”

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