Chain Lal and Ors. Vs State of Hp

Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:5075 )

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MMO No. 260 of 2022 Reserved on:26.06.2024 Date of Decision: 12.7.2024.

Chain Lal & others ...Petitioners Versus State of Himachal Pradesh. ..Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹ No. For the Petitioners : Ms. Kiran Dhiman, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No. 8 of 2022, dated 21.01.2022, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 308, 486, 420 467, 468, 471 and 120B of IPC and Section 39(1) (a)of the Himachal Pradesh Excise Act 2011 registered at Police Station Shahpur, District Kangra, H.P. and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom.

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition

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are that five persons died due to consumption of country made liquor mark ‘VRV Santra Batch No.62, August 2021 made by VRS Fools Ltd’. The police started checking of all the liquor vends to find out if any other bottles of the same batch were lying with any liquor vend. HC Sushil Kumar, posted in Police Station Shahpur was directed to visit Nerti, liquor vend. He found Chain Lal, the salesperson in the liquor vend. Sher Singh, Up Pardhan Nerti, was also present. HC Sushil Kumar checked the liquor vend and found one box of VRV Santra, Batch No. 62, August 2021 made by VRS Fools Ltd. The box was opened and it contained 12 bottles of country liquor. The police seized the bottles after putting them in the carton from which they were recovered. These were put in a ‘Boru’ and the Boru was sealed with the seal “A”. A Rukka was sent to the Police Station and F.I.R. was registered based on the contents of the Rukka.

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Being aggrieved from the registration of the F.I.R., the petitioners have filed the present petition asserting that petitioners No. 2 to 4 were booked as they are License Holders of the liquor vend and are liable under Section 57 of the H.P. Excise Act. The F.I.R. was registered without carrying out a preliminary investigation to ascertain whether the bottles were being carried illegally or the same

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were purchased by the petitioners. The petitioners had valid bills of the purchase. The Investigating Agency misused the power vested in it. The investigation could not have been conducted by an Officer below the rank of Assistant Sub Inspector. The continuation of the proceedings is an abuse of the process of the Court; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising therefrom be quashed.

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The petition is opposed by filing a reply making preliminary submissions that power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly when no offence is made out. In the present case, the petitioners are involved in an economic offence. Petitioner No.1 is Salesman and petitioners No. 2 to 4 are partners and license holders. Seven persons died due to the consumption of the VRV Santra Batch No. 62 August 2021, made by VRS Fool Ltd. The police started a special drive to detect other bottles of the same make and during a search of the liquor vend at Nerti, twelve bottles were recovered. The investigation was conducted by Inspector Tarlochan Singh, who has retired. Further, investigation is being conducted by Sub-Inspector Kuldeep Chand and there is no violation of Notification. The petitioners could not produce any documents to keep and sell the illicit liquor. The petitioners have obtained the

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license for dealing in country liquor including ‘Beer’ under the name and style of M/S Neeraj Singh and Company. The documents produced by the petitioners do not mention the liquor recovered by the police. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have heard Ms Kiran Dhiman, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.

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Ms Kiran Dhiman, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. There is nothing on record to connect them with the commission of crime. The petitioners possessed the bottles under a valid license and they had produced the documents to this effect before the police, however, the police failed to look into the documents and wrongly registered the F.I.R. The Investigation was conducted by the Head Constable, whereas only a person above the rank of Assistant Sub Inspector is entitled to investigate the offence. Therefore, she prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. be ordered to be quashed.

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Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State submitted that the investigation is being

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conducted by the competent Officer. Head Constable Sushil Kumar had only recovered bottles. The petitioners could not provide any satisfactory documents regarding the possession of the liquor. The petitioners being the Licensee are liable for the contravention of the provisions of the Excise Act; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submission given at the Bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The law regarding the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

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A.M. Mohan v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 339, wherein it was observed:-

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“9. The law with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. to quash complaints and criminal proceedings has been succinctly summarized by this Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Limited (2006) 6 SCC 736: 2006 INSC 452 after considering the earlier precedents. It will be apposite to refer to the following observations of this Court in the said case, which read thus:

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“ 12. The principles relating to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few— Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692: 1988 SCC (Cri) 234], State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh

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Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194: 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059], Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591: 1996 SCC (Cri) 1045], State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla [(1996) 8 SCC 164: 1996 SCC (Cri) 628], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259: 1999 SCC (Cri) 401], Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269: 2000 SCC (Cri) 615], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786], M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645: 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122: 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:

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( i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused.

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For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint is warranted while examining prayer for quashing a complaint.

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( ii ) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides /malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.

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( iii ) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.

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( iv ) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not

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been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are necessary for making out the offence.

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( v. ) A given set of facts may make out: ( a ) purely a civil wrong; or ( b ) purely a criminal offence; or ( c ) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.”

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10. Similar is the judgment Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P.,

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2024 SCC OnLine SC 643 , wherein it was held: -

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“12. We may gainfully refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1990 INSC 363 :

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“ 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for

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wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

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103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.”

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The present petition has to be considered as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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A perusal of the F.I.R. shows that HC Sushil Kumar had

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only checked the liquor vend and recovered a carton containing 12 of VRV Santra Batch No. 62 August 2021 made VRS Fools Ltd.; therefore, it is incorrect to say that an investigation is being conducted by the Head Constable. Even otherwise, an F.I.R. cannot be quashed on the ground that the investigation is not being conducted by an authorized officer. In R.A.H. Siguran vs. Shankare Gowda 2017 (16) SCC 126 , the proceedings were quashed by the High Court on the ground that the police officer who had conducted the investigation was not competent to do so under provisions of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the investigation could not have been quashed on this ground. It was observed:

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“It is well-settled law that even if the investigation is not conducted by an authorized officer, the trial is not vitiated unless prejudice is shown.

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In H.N. Rishbud and Anr. v. The State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196, (1955) 1 SCR 1150 the question considered by this Court was whether after the court takes cognizance, a trial can be held to be initiated merely on the ground that investigation was invalid. Answering in the negative, this Court held that if the plea of invalidity of investigation is raised at a sufficiently early stage, the court, instead of taking cognizance of direct reinvestigation by the competent investigating officer. But, after cognizance is taken the trial cannot be quashed for invalidity of investigation.

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The observations in the said judgment are:-

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"9. The question then requires to be considered whether and to what extent the trial which follows such investigation is vitiated. Now, trial follows cognizance and cognizance is preceded by the investigation. This is undoubtedly the basic scheme of the Code in respect of cognizable cases. But it does not necessarily follow that an invalid investigation nullifies the cognizance or trial based thereon. Here we are not concerned with the effect of the breach of a mandatory provision regulating the competence or procedure of the Court as regards cognizance or trial. It is only with reference to such a breach that the question as to whether it constitutes an illegality vitiating the proceedings or a mere irregularity arises. A defect or illegality in an investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report that results from an investigation is provided in section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the material on which cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a valid and legal police report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is one out of a group of sections under the heading "Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings". The language of this section is in marked contrast with that of

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the other sections of the group under the same heading i.e. Sections 193 and 195 to 199. These latter sections regulate the competence of the Court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in compliance therewith. But Section 190 does not. While no doubt, in one sense, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1) are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance, it is not possible to say that cognizance on an invalid police report is prohibited and is, therefore, a nullity. Such an invalid report may still fall either under clause (a) or (b) of Section 190(1), (whether it is the one or the other we need not pause to consider) and in any case, cognizance so taken is only in the nature of the error in a proceeding antecedent to the trial. To such a situation section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is in the following terms is attracted:

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"Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during the trial or in any enquiry or other proceedings under this Code, unless such error, omission or irregularity, has, in fact, occasioned a failure of justice."

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If therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police report vitiated by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to the investigation, there can be no doubt that the result of the trial which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice. That illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the Court for trial is well settled as appears from the cases in Prabhu v. Emperor (AIR 1944 PC 73) and Lumbhardar Zutshi v. King (AIR 1950 PC 26) . These no doubt relate to the illegality of

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arrest in the course of an investigation while we are concerned in the present cases with the illegality with reference to the machinery for the collection of the evidence. This distinction may have a bearing on the question of prejudice or miscarriage of justice, but both cases clearly show that the invalidity of the investigation has no relation to the competence of the Court. We are, therefore, clearly, also, of the opinion that where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the precedent investigation does not vitiate the result, unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby.

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It does not follow, however, that the invalidity of the investigation is to be completely ignored by the Court during the trial. When the breach of such a mandatory provision is brought to the knowledge of the Court at a sufficiently early stage, the Court, while not declining cognizance, will have to take the necessary steps to get the illegality cured and the defect rectified, by ordering such reinvestigation as the circumstances of an individual case may call for. Such a course is not altogether outside the contemplation of the scheme of the Code as appears from Section 202 under which a Magistrate taking cognizance on a complaint can order an investigation by the police. Nor can it be said that the adoption of such a course is outside the scope of the inherent powers of the Special Judge, who for purposes of procedure at the trial is virtually in the position of a Magistrate trying a warrant case. When the attention of the Court is called to such an illegality at a very early stage it would not be fair to the accused not to obviate the prejudice that may have been caused thereby, by appropriate orders, at that stage but to leave him to the ultimate remedy of waiting till the conclusion of the trial and of discharging the somewhat difficult burden under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of making out that such an error has, in fact, occasioned a failure of justice. It is relevant in this context to observe that even if the trial had proceeded to a

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conclusion and the accused had to make out that there was, in fact, a failure of justice as the result of such an error, an explanation to section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that the fact of the objection having been raised at an early stage of the proceeding is a pertinent factor. To ignore the breach in such a situation when brought to the notice of the Court would be virtually to make a dead letter of the peremptory provision which has been enacted on grounds of public policy for the benefit of such an accused. It is true that the peremptory provision itself allows an officer of a lower rank to make the investigation if permitted by the Magistrate. But this is not an indication by the Legislature that an investigation by an officer of a lower rank without such permission cannot be said to cause prejudice. When a Magistrate is approached for granting such permission he is expected to satisfy himself that there are good and sufficient reasons for authorising an officer of a lower rank to conduct the investigation. The granting of such permission is not to be treated by a Magistrate as a mere matter of routine but it is an exercise of his judicial discretion having regard to the policy underlying it. In our opinion, therefore, when such a breach is brought to the notice of the Court at an early stage of the trial the Court have to consider the nature and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders for such reinvestigation as may be called for, wholly or partly, and by such officer, as it considers appropriate with reference to the requirements of Section 5-A of the Act. It is in the light of the above considerations that the validity or otherwise of the objection as to the violation of Section 5(4) of the Act has to be decided and the course to be adopted in these proceedings, determined."

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The above view has been repeatedly followed in subsequent decisions of this Court. In Union of India and Ors. represented through Superintendent of Police v. T. Nathamuni, (2014) 16 SCC 285 , the position was discussed as follows:-

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"12. It is clear that in the case of an investigation under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, an officer below the rank of Inspector cannot investigate without the order of a competent Magistrate. In the present case, the order of the Special Judge was obtained by filing an application. That order dated 24-9-2009 shows that it was passed on request and in the interest of justice, investigation pursuant to such order did not suffer from want of jurisdiction and hence, in the facts of the case, the High Court erred in law in interfering with such investigation more so when it was already completed.

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The question raised by the respondent is well answered by this Court in a number of decisions rendered from a different perspective. The matter of investigation by an officer not authorised by law has been held to be irregular. Indisputably, by the order of the Magistrate investigation was conducted by the Sub-Inspector, CBI who, after completion of an investigation, submitted the chargesheet. It was only during the trial, an objection was raised by the respondent that the order passed by the Magistrate permitting the Sub-Inspector, CBI to investigate is without jurisdiction. Consequently, the investigation conducted by the officer is vitiated in law. Curiously enough the respondent has not made out a case that by reason of the investigation conducted by the SubInspector a serious prejudice and miscarriage of justice has been caused. It is well settled that the invalidity of the investigation does not vitiate the result unless a miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby.

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In M.C. Sulkunte v. State of Mysore [(1970) 3 SCC 513] , the main question raised by the appellant in an appeal against the order of conviction was that the sanction to investigate the offence given by the Magistrate was not proper inasmuch as he had not recorded any reason as to why he had given permission to the Inspector of Police to investigate the offence of criminal misconduct of obtaining illegal gratification. Considering Section 5-A of the Act, Their Lordships observed: (SCC p. 517, para 15)

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"15. Although laying the trap was part of the investigation and it had been done by a police officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police, it cannot on that ground be held that the sanction was invalid or that the conviction ought not to be maintained on that ground. It has been emphasised in a number of decisions of this Court that to set aside a conviction it must be shown that there has been a miscarriage of justice as a result of an irregular investigation. The observations in State of M.P. v. Mubarak Ali [1959 Supp (2) SCR 201], at pp. 210-11 to the effect that when the Magistrate without applying his mind only mechanically issues the order giving permission the investigation is tainted cannot help the appellant before us."

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In Muni Lal v. Delhi Admn [(1971) 2 SCC 48] , this Court was considering the question with regard to the irregularity in an investigation for the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Following earlier decisions, this Court held: (SCC p. 52, para 14)

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"14. From the above proposition it follows that where cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the preceding investigation will not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby and the accused has been prejudiced. Assuming in favour of the appellant, that there was an irregularity in the investigation and that Section 5-A of the Act was not complied with in substance, the trial by the Special Judge cannot be held to be illegal unless it is shown that miscarriage of justice has been caused on account of the illegal investigation. The learned counsel for the appellant has been unable to show us how there has been any miscarriage of justice in this case and how the accused has been prejudiced by any irregular investigation."

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In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335] , this Court while considering Section 5-A of the Act, held as under: (SCC pp. 384-85, para 119)

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"119. It has been ruled by this Court in several decisions that Section 5-A of the Act is mandatory and not a directory and the investigation conducted in violation thereof bears the stamp of illegality but that illegality committed in the course of an investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the court for trial and where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case is proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the preceding investigation does not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. See (1) H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi [AIR 1955 SC 196], (2) Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay [AIR 1961 SC 1762], (3) Munnalal v. State of U.P [AIR 1964 SC 28], (4) Sailendranath Bose v. State of Bihar [AIR 1968 SC 1292], (5) Muni Lal v. Delhi Admn. [(1971) 2 SCC 48] and (6) Khandu Sonu Dhobi v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 3 SCC 786] . However, in Rishbud case [AIR 1955 SC 196] and Muni Lal case [(1971) 2 SCC 48] , it has been ruled that if any breach of the said mandatory proviso relating to the investigation is brought to the notice of the court at an early stage of the trial, the court will have to consider the nature and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders as may be called for to rectify the illegality and cure the defects in the investigation."

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In A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Admn [(1973) 1 SCC 726] , provisions of Section 5-A were again considered by this Court and held as under (SCC p. 735, para 15)

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"15. As the foregoing discussion shows the investigation in the present case by the Deputy Superintendent of Police cannot be considered to be in any way unauthorised or contrary to the law. In this connection, it may not be out of place also to

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point out that the function of investigation is merely to collect evidence and any irregularity or even illegality in the course of collection of evidence can scarcely be considered by itself to affect the legality of the trial by an otherwise competent court of the offence so investigated. In H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi [AIR 1955 SC 196 ], it was held that illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and jurisdiction of the court for trial and where cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination of the invalidity of the preceding investigation does not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. When any breach of the mandatory provisions relating to the investigation is brought to the notice of the court at an early stage of the trial the Court will have to consider the nature and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders for such reinvestigation as may be called for, wholly or partly, and by such officer, as it considers appropriate with reference to the requirements of Section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. This decision was followed in Munnalal v. State of U.P. [AIR 1964 SC 28] where the decision in State of M.P. v. Mubarak Ali [AIR 1959 SC 707] , was distinguished. The same view was taken in State of A.P. v. N. Venugopal [AIR 1964 SC 33] and more recently in Khandu Sonu Dhobi v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 3 SCC 786] . The decisions of the Calcutta, Punjab and Saurashtra High Courts relied upon by Mr Anthony deal with different points: in any event, to the extent, they contain any observations against the view expressed by this Court in the decisions just cited those observations cannot be considered good law."

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In view of the above, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings merely on

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the ground that the investigation was not valid. It is not necessary for this Court to go into the question raised by learned counsel for the appellants that there was no infirmity in the investigation.”

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Therefore, the F.I.R. cannot be quashed on the ground that

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the investigation was not conducted by an authorized Officer.

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Section 18(2) of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011 provides that a licensed vendor shall not have in his possession any quantity of any liquor above such quantity as the State Government has declared to be the limit of sale by retail, except under a permit granted by the Collector in this behalf.

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16. Section 20 of the H.P. Excise Act, 2011 prohibits the possession of any quantity of liquor knowing the same to have unlawfully manufactured, imported, transported, or knowing that the prescribed excise duty, countervailing duty or other fee has not been paid thereon.

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17. Section 39 of the H.P. Excise Act punishes a person who possesses liquor in violation of the provisions of the Act, Rules made there under, notification issued, any order made in any license, permit or pass granted under the Act.

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18. In the present case, the petitioners could not produce any records of the purchase of VRV Santra Batch No. 62 August 2021 made

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VRS Fool Ltd. A reliance was placed upon invoice dated 17.01.2022, wherein Himalayan Wine Enterprises L-13 had sold 200 boxes of VRV Santra 750 ml to Neeraj Singh & Co. Unit No. 128, L-2 Shahpur. However, this invoice does not mention the batch number and it is difficult to connect it with the bottles recovered in the liquor vend of the petitioners.

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19. Further the authenticity of the document is to be verified by investigation. The investigation is continuing and if it is found that bottles recovered from the liquor vend were in fact purchased by the petitioners from the licensed vendor, the police will be at liberty to file the cancellation report. It is not permissible to quash the F.I.R. at this stage merely on the basis of a document, the authenticity of which is yet to be established.

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20. It is undisputed that petitioner No.1 was the Salesman and petitioners No. 2 to 4 are the partners of the Company; therefore, all the petitioners would be liable for possession of the liquor in contravention of the H.P. Excise Act and Rules made thereunder.

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