Dismissed

Ajeet Kumar v. State of Hp and Others

Himachal Pradesh HC6 Sept 2024CRMMO/1246/2023

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Petitioner filed petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash FIR accusing him of offences under IPC and POCSO Act, citing civil dispute and lack of forensic evidence. Court dismissed petition, holding that allegations prima facie disclosed offence and etiquette precludes mini-trial or quashing once charge sheet filed.

What did the court decide?

Petition for quashing of FIR and consequent proceedings dismissed; matter remanded to Trial Court for further proceedings.

Ajeet Kumar Vs State of Hp and Others — Criminal Trial and Appeal | Himachal Pradesh HC (2024)

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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:7999 )

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. MMO No. 1246 of 2023 Reserved on: 6.8.2024 Date of Decision: 6.9.2024.

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Ajeet Kumar ...Petitioner

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Versus

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State of H.P. and others

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...Respondents

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Coram

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Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹ No.

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For the Petitioner : M/s R.L. Chaudhary and H.S. Sidhu, Advocates. : For the Respondents Ms. Ayushi Negi, Deputy Advocate General, for respondents No.1 to 3/State. None for respondents No.4 and 5.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioner has filed the present petition for

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quashing of FIR No. 134 of 2022, dated 22.12.2022 for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 452, 354-B, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 8 of the

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Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2 Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:7999 )

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Act) at Police Station Dharampur, District Mandi, H.P. and the consequent proceedings arising out of the same.

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It has been asserted that the informant made a complaint to the police stating that he had left home to attend his job, his wife was doing the work under MGNREGA and his daughter (the victim) was alone at the home. The petitioner entered the informant’s house in a drunken condition. He assaulted the victim, tore her clothes and used vulgar language in her presence. The police registered the FIR and filed the charge sheet after completion of the investigation. The petitioner was medically examined and he was found to be intoxicated. Samples were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for analysis. No semen or blood stains were found on the samples. No injuries were found on the victim’s body. This shows that the petitioner was falsely implicated. The mobile phone of the petitioner was lost. It was found in the hands of the victim. The petitioner snatched his mobile phone from the victim and no other incident had taken place. Civil disputes are pending between the parties. A false FIR was lodged against the petitioner to settle the score. The allegations in the FIR are not corroborated by the report of the FSL. Therefore, it was prayed

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that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be ordered to be quashed.

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The petition is opposed by respondents No.1 to 3/State by filing a reply denying the contents of the petition. It was asserted that the informant had gone to his duty at Baroti and his wife went to work under MGNREGA. The victim was alone in her home. She called the informant at 3.30 PM and informed him that the petitioner had entered her house, acted indecently with her, tore her clothes, abused her and threatened to kill her. The informant returned to his home. The persons working under MGNREGA also saw the petitioner roaming near the informant’s house. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. The petitioner had committed the heinous offence against the minor in a state of intoxication. The victim supported the prosecution case in her statement recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. As per the date of birth certificate, the victim was born on 9.9.2005. She was aged 17 years, three months and 12 days on the date of the incident. As per the report of analysis, 92.19 mg per cent alcohol was found in the petitioner’s blood. There is sufÏcient material on record to connect the petitioner with the commission of a crime. The

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4 Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:7999 )

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police filed a charge sheet which is pending before the Court. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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No separate reply was filed on behalf of the informant and the victim.

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I have heard M/s R.L. Chaudhary and H.S. Sidhu, learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Ayushi Negi, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondents No.1 to 3/State.

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Mr. R.L. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a false FIR was lodged against the petitioner. The petitioner is innocent and he has not committed any crime. A civil litigation is pending against the petitioner and a false case was filed to wreak vengeance upon the petitioner. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be ordered to be quashed. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Deepak Gaba and others Vs. State of Utter Pradesh and another, Cr. A. No. 2328 of 2022, decided on 2.1.2023 in support of his submission.

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Ms. Ayushi Negi, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondents No.1 to 3/State submitted that the allegations in the FIR constitute the commission of cognizable offence. The

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5 Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:7999 )

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presence of the petitioner on the spot is corroborated by the statements of the workers working under MGNREGA. The mere pendency of the civil litigation is not sufÏcient to infer that a false FIR was lodged by the informant. Therefore, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The parameters for exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.M. Mohan v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 339, wherein it

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was observed: -

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“9. The law with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. to quash complaints and criminal proceedings has been succinctly summarized by this Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Limited (2006) 6 SCC 736: 2006 INSC 452 after considering the earlier precedents. It will be apposite to refer to the following observations of this Court in the said case, which read thus:

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“ 12. The principles relating to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few— Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692: 1988 SCC (Cri) 234], State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal

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6 Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:7999 )

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Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194: 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059], Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591: 1996 SCC (Cri) 1045], State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla [(1996) 8 SCC 164: 1996 SCC (Cri) 628], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259: 1999 SCC (Cri) 401], Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269: 2000 SCC (Cri) 615], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786], M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645: 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122: 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:

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( i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused.

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For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint is warranted while examining prayer for quashing a complaint.

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( ii ) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides /malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.

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( iii ) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.

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( iv ) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are necessary for making out the offence.

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( v. ) A given set of facts may make out: ( a ) purely a civil wrong; ( b ) purely a criminal offence; or ( c ) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.”

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Similar is the judgment in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643 , wherein it was held: -

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“12. We may gainfully refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1990 INSC 363 :

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“ 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the

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following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufÏciently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police ofÏcers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police ofÏcer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent

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9 Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:7999 )

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person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufÏcient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efÏcacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

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We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.”

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The FIR reads that the victim was alone in her house.

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She informed the informant telephonically that the petitioner visited her home. He acted indecently with her, tore her clothes, abused and threatened her. These allegations show the commission of cognizable offences. These allegations are also

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10 Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:7999 )

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supported by the statements of the workers working under MGNREGA.

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Heavy reliance was placed upon the fact that a civil suit is pending between the informant’s father and the petitioner’s father. This will not assist the petitioner because the enmity is a double-edged weapon: while it furnishes the motive for false implication, it also furnishes a motive for the commission of a crime. Thus, the FIR cannot be said to be false simply because civil litigation is pending between the fathers of the parties.

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Even otherwise, it is not permissible to look into the documents annexed with the petition. The Court has to consider the FIR and the material collected by the prosecution during the investigation to determine whether the continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 , that the proceedings can be quashed if on the face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed:

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“10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.”

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Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram,

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1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018 , that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed:

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“Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostate copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent by filing this document is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr.P.C .”

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Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view

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in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G.

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K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP , and held:

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“9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it and the sworn statements of the witnesses if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which are not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh

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12 Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:7999 )

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documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192 . The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:

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"The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court, which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings".

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A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of

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Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401 wherein it was

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observed on page 142:

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“ 16 . … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations nor for that matter can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, on the basis of the evidence collected during the course of the trial.”

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13 Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:7999 )

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This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was held:

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13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents.

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A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus

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Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2 SCC 86:2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258 wherein it was observed:

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“63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing a process issued under Section 204 read with

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Section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand.” (Emphasis supplied).

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Thus, the Court cannot look into the document

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annexed to the petition and hold that the FIR is the result of enmity.

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It was submitted that the report of the FSL does not show the presence of any semen. This submission will not assist the petitioner. First, no allegations of penetrative sexual assault were made against the petitioner and the absence of the semen will not falsify such allegations. Secondly, the sufÏciency of the evidence is not to be seen at this stage. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1503 that the High Court exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness, sufÏciency and admissibility of the evidence. It was observed:

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“21. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed under Section

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15 Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:7999 )

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173(2)CrPC on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufÏciency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482CrPC and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the trial court at the time of trial. This position is evident from the decisions referred to supra.

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22. In the decision in M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita [ M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita , ( 2023) 12 SCC 821: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1300: JT (2002) 3 SC 89] , this Court held that while considering the question of quashing of FIR the High Court would not be entitled to appreciate by way of sifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC.

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23. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51] , a two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161CrPC being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings, in that case, was based on its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC, it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. It was also held that the High Court committed an error in

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16 Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:7999 )

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quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C.”

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It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are

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false. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Jaiswal vs. State of Jharkhand, 2024 INSC 357: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 685 that the Court exercising extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot conduct a mini-trial or enter into an appreciation of an evidence of a particular case. It was observed: -

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“13. We say so for reasons more than one. This Court in catena of Judgments has consistently held that at the time of examining the prayer for quashing of the criminal proceedings, the court exercising extraordinary jurisdiction can neither undertake to conduct a mini-trial nor enter into appreciation of evidence of a particular case. The correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint cannot be examined on the touchstone of the probable defence that the accused may raise to stave off the prosecution and any such misadventure by the Courts resulting in proceedings being quashed would be set aside. This Court in the case of Akhil Sharda 2022 SCC OnLine SC 820 held to the following effect:

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“28. Having gone through the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court by which the High Court has set aside the criminal proceedings in the exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., it appears that the High Court has virtually conducted a mini-trial, which as such is not permissible at this stage and while deciding the application under Section 482 Cr. P.C. As observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions no mini-trial can be conducted

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17 Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:7999 )

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by the High Court in the exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. jurisdiction and at the stage of deciding the application under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the High Court cannot get into appreciation of evidence of the particular case being considered.”

¶105

A similar view was taken in Maneesha Yadav’s case

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(supra), wherein it was held that: -

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“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at its face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint even if taken at its face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).

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14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060 :

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“ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this

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18 Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:7999 )

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Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed : (SCC p. 63, para 16)

¶112

“ 16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, chargesheet, documents, etc. or not.”

¶113

Thus, it is not permissible for this Court to conduct a

¶114

Trial to determine the truthfulness and falsity of the allegations in the F.I.R.

¶115

The challan has been filed before the learned Trial Court and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed:

¶116

“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence particularly in the

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19 Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:7999 )

¶118

absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating ofÏcer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.”

¶119

Therefore, there is no reason to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. in the present case and the FIR cannot be quashed at this stage.

¶120

Consequently, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed.

¶121

The observation made here-in-above shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

¶122

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 6^th September, 2024 (Chander)

Ajeet Kumar v. State of Hp and Others

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Ajeet Kumar v. State of Hp and Others

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