Petition for quashing of FIR under Section 482 CrPC allowed upon acceptance of genuine settlement. Court held offences were petty with remote chance of conviction, thus inherent power exercised to quash proceedings and acquit petitioner.
FIR No.172 and consequential proceedings against the petitioner quashed; petitioner acquitted of charges.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
ON THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2022
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP SHARMA
CRIMINAL MISC. PETITION (MAIN) U/S 482 CRPC NO. 560 OF 2022
Between:-
1. AJAY KUMAR S/O SH. JAGDISH CHANDER R/O VILLAGE DALLA P.O AND TEHSIL DHARKANA, DISTRICT PHATANKOT, H.P AT PRESENT RESIDENT OF WARD NO. 7 SHISHAMATI P O DHALPUR, TEHSIL AND DISTRICT KULLU, HP AGE 32, OCCUPATION PRIVATE BUSINESS
PETITIONERS
(BY MR. KARAN KAPOOR, ADVOCATE)
AND
1. STATE OF H.P. THROUGH SECRETARY (HOME) TO THE GOVT. OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
2. NISHA DEVI W/O NIHAL SINGH R/O VILLAGE KUTLU, THANNA, P.O CHHEUNR, TEHSIL BHUNTER, HP AGE 35 YEARS,
3. BELI DEVI
W/O LATE SH. GUDDU RAM, VILLAGE BHATGRAM, P.O RAISON KULLU, HP AGE ABOUT 80 YEARS
.. PETITIONERS
Whether approved for reporting:
This petition coming on for orders this day, the court passed the following:
O R D E R
By way of instant petition filed under S. 482 CrPC, prayer has been
made on behalf of the petitioner for quashing of FIR No.172, dated
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15.11.2015 under Ss. 279 and 337 IPC registered at Police Station Bhuntar, District Kullu, Himachal Pradesh alongwith consequential proceedings pending before learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lahul & Spiti, Himachal Pradesh, on the basis of compromise, Annexure P-2.
2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record, are that the FIR sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings came to be lodged at the behest of respondent No.2/complainant, Nisha Devi, who alleged that on 15.11.2015, at 11.30 am, while she alongwith respondent No.3, her grand mother was crossing road at Bhunter, a scooty bearing registration No. HP-34D-2343 being driven by petitioner came in high speed and hit them, due to which they suffered injuries. Though police after completion of investigation presented Challan in the competent court of law but before the same could be taken to its logical end, parties have compromised the matter inter se them amicably, as such, petitioner has approached this court for in the instant proceedings, for quashing of FIR, as detailed herein above alongwith consequential proceedings pending in the competent court of law
3. Vide order dated 4.7.2022, this Court, while directing learned Additional Advocate General to verify the factum with regard to compromise, if any arrived inter se parties also directed respondents Nos. 2 to 3 to come present in the court.
4. On 15.7.2022, though learned Additional Advocate General placed on record communication dated 14.7.2022 issued under the signatures of Station House Officer, Police Station Bhunter, Himachal Pradesh, perusal whereof reveals that parties have resolved to settle the dispute inter se
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them amicably and compromise placed on record is genuine, but since on that date, respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were not able to come present, matter was adjourned.
5. Since learned counsel for the respondent 2 and 3 apprised this Court that respondent No.3 is an old lady and is unable to come present in this Court, this Court directed learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Kullu to record statements of respondents Nos. 2 and 3.
6. Pursuant to directions issued by this court, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kullu, has recorded the statements of respondent No.2 and 3 on 25.7.2022 and has forwarded the same to this court which are taken on record. Perusal of statements made by respondents Nos. 2 and 3 which are made part of record, clearly reveals that respondent 2 and 3, of their own volition and without there being any external pressure have entered into compromise with the petitioner, whereby they have resolved to settle the dispute inter se them amicably. Both the persons have stated that they have compromised the matter with the petitioner and have received amount of compensation in lieu of injuries suffered by them, as such, they have no objection in case prayer of petitioner for quashing of FIR and consequential proceedings is accepted. They have admitted their signatures on compromise.
7. Since the parties have resolved to settle the dispute inter se them amicably and as per compromise, a sum of Rs.50,000/- stands received by respondents Nos. 2 and 3, this court finds no impediment in accepting the prayer made in the instant petition for compounding of offence, while exercising power under S.482 of the Act.
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8. After having heard statement of respondent No.2, learned Assistant Advocate General states that the chances of conviction of petitioners are remote and bleak and as such, respondent-State shall have no objection in case prayer of the petitioners for quashing of FIR alongwith consequential proceedings is allowed.
9. The question which now needs consideration is whether FIR in question can be ordered to be quashed when Hon'ble Apex Court in Narinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another (2014)6 SCC 466 has specifically held that power under S. 482 CrPC is not to be exercised in the cases which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.
10. At this stage, it would be relevant to take note of the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Narinder Singh (supra), whereby the Hon’ble Apex Court has formulated guidelines for accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings. Perusal of judgment referred to above clearly depicts that in para 29.1, Hon’ble Apex Court has returned the findings that power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable and where the parties have settled the matter between themselves,
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however, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with great caution.
Para Nos. 29 to 29.7 of the judgment are reproduced as under:-
“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:
29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.
While exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed
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by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime”.
11. Careful perusal of para 29.3 of the judgment suggests that such a
power is not to be exercised in the cases which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Apart from this, offences committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes may be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303 has held that power of the High Court in
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quashing of the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power is distinct and different from the power of a Criminal Court for compounding offences under Section 320 Cr.PC. Even in the judgment passed in Narinder Singh’s case, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that while exercising inherent power of quashment under Section 482 Cr.PC the Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime and its social impact and it cautioned the Courts not to exercise the power for quashing proceedings in heinous and serious offences of mental depravity, murder, rape, dacoity etc. However subsequently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dimpey Gujral and Ors . vs. Union Territory through Administrator, UT, Chandigarh and Ors . (2013( 11 SCC 497 has also
held as under:-
“7. In certain decisions of this Court in view of the settlement arrived at by the parties, this Court quashed the FIRs though some of the offences were noncompoundable. A two Judges’ Bench of this court doubted the correctness of those decisions. Learned Judges felt that in those decisions, this court had permitted compounding of non-compoundable offences. The said issue was, therefore, referred to a larger bench.
The larger Bench in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 considered the relevant provisions of the Code and the judgments of this court and concluded as under: (SCC pp. 342-43, para 61)
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transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” (emphasis supplied)
13. Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 4th October, 2017, titled
as Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others
versus State of Gujarat and Another , passed in Criminal Appeal No.1723 of 2017 arising out of SLP(Crl) No.9549 of 2016, reiterated the principles/ parameters laid down in Narinder Singh’s case supra for accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings. It would be profitable to reproduce para No. 13 to 15 of the judgment herein:
“13. The same principle was followed in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Maninder Singh (2016)1 SCC 389 by a bench of two learned Judges of this Court. In that case, the High Court had, in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 quashed proceedings under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. While allowing the appeal filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation Mr Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that the case involved allegations of forgery of documents to embezzle the funds of the bank. In such a situation, the fact that the dispute had been settled with the bank would not justify a recourse to thepower under Section 482:
“…In economic offences Court must not only keep in view that money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded but also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with which we are concerned is well planned and was committed with a deliberate design with an eye of personal profit regardless of consequence to the society at large. To quash the proceeding merely on the ground that the accused has settled the amount with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against
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the economic offenders are not allowed to continue, the entire community is aggrieved."
“... Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be considered nor accepted in economic offences. The submission assiduously presented on gender leaves us unimpressed. An offence under the criminal law is an offence and it does not depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are certain provisions in Code of Criminal Procedure relating to exercise of jurisdiction Under Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether pertains to a different sphere. A person committing a murder or getting involved in a financial scam or forgery of documents, cannot claim discharge or acquittal on the ground of her gender as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argument. The offence is gender neutral in this case. We say no more on this score…”
“…A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create a dent in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on the ground that there is delay in trial or the principle that when the matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the load on the system…”
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on
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a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”
14. In the case at hand, the offences alleged to have been committed by the accused are petty offences and further in view of the fact that the complainant has compromised the matter with the accused and complainant is no more interested in pursuing the case further, there are bleak and remote chances of conviction of accused and as such, this court sees no impediment in accepting the prayer made by petitioners for quashing of FIR. Otherwise also, no fruitful purpose would be served in case proceedings against the accused are allowed to continue, as such, prayer made in the petition at hand can be accepted.
15. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court (supra), FIR No.172, dated 15.11.2015 under Ss. 279 and 337 IPC registered at Police Station Bhuntar, District Kullu, Himachal Pradesh alongwith consequential proceedings i.e. Case titled State v. Ajay pending before learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kullu, Himachal Pradesh, are quashed and set aside. Petitioner is acquitted of the charges framed against him in the said FIR/proceedings.
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16. The petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms, alongwith all
pending applications.
Copy Dasti.
(Sandeep Sharma) Judge
August 5, 2022 (Vikrant)
3 issues framed by the court
Whether the FIR can be quashed under Section 482 CrPC despite the offences not being compoundable under Section 320 CrPC, given a valid settlement between parties.
Whether the grant of settlement and compromise between parties warrants quashing of criminal proceedings in offences involving threat to safety.
Whether continuation of criminal proceedings in this case would amount to an abuse of the process of the court amount to an abuse of the court.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Narinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and anotherExplained¶33
Narinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another (2014)6 SCC 466 · Who else cites this
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and anr.Explained¶51
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303 · Who else cites this
Dimpey Gujral and Ors. vs. Union Territory through Administrator, UT, Chandigarh and Ors.Explained¶53
Dimpey Gujral and Ors. vs. Union Territory through Administrator, UT, Chandigarh and Ors. (2013( 11 SCC 497 · Who else cites this
Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others versus State of Gujarat and AnotherExplained¶61
Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others versus State of Gujarat and Another
1 provisions across 1 enactments
Ajay Kumar
State of H.P.
Nisha Devi
Beli Devi
Sandeep Sharma
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
