Allowed

Jagjeet Singh v. State

Himachal Pradesh HC22 Nov 2016CR.R/107/2009

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In a criminal revision petition, this Court quashed convictions under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC. Finding no specific evidence on vehicle speed and noting conflicting witness accounts regarding snow conditions, the Court held that the accused was entitled to the benefit of doubt on reasonable alternative explanations of the accident.

What did the court decide?

Judgments of courts below quashed and set aside; petitioner accused acquitted of charges;

Jagjeet Singh Vs State — Murder and Culpable Homicide | Himachal Pradesh HC (2016)

¶1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

¶2

Cr. Revision No. 107 of 2009. Date of Decision: 22.11.2016.

¶3

_[ Jagjeet Singh ……...Petitioner. Versus State of H.P. ..……....Respondent. Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting¹ ? Yes For the petitioner: Mr. O.P. Negi, Advocate. For the respondent: Mr. P.M. Negi, Additional Advocate General, with Mr. Ramesh Thakur, Deputy Advocate General. ____________________________________________________________________

¶4

Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)

¶5

The present criminal revision petition filed under Section 397

¶6

read with Section 401 of the Cr.PC, is directed against the judgment dated 1.7.2009, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judg, FTC, Shimla, HP, in Criminal Appeal No. 39-S/10 of 2007, affirming the judgment of conviction dated 14.8.2007, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Court No.2, Shimla, HP, in Police Challan No. 36/2 of 2004, whereby the accused-petitioner is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months for commission of offence punishable under Section 279 IPC . The petitioner

¶7

Whether reporters of the Local papers are allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

¶8

¶9

is further sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months for the commission of offence punishable under Section 304-A of IPC.

¶10

2. Briefly stated facts as emerged from the record are that on 30.1.2004, police post Sunni received a telephonic information that a Qualis Car bearing registration No. CH-03E-7849 has met with an accident. Accordingly, rapat No.17 (Ext.PA), was entered in the police station Sunni, on the basis of which, Sub-Inspector, Lal Singh, the then in charge police post Sunni proceeded to the spot. Sh. Manmohan Raheja, one of the occupant of ill fated quails car, made statement Ext.PW1/A, under Section 154 of the Cr.PC before the police that he is a resident of Chandigarh and has retired as Principal, Govt. College, Shimla. He further stated that on 29.1.2004, he himself, his sister in law Smt. Ved Kanwal, her husband Sh. Raj Kumar Kanwal, his ‘Sala’ Sh. Jitender Nath Singha, his wife Smt. Kamla Singha and another ‘Sala’ (brother in law) Hans Raj Singha left Chandigarh at about 9:00 pm in the aforesaid car. He further stated that they reached Shimla at 1:00 am during the intervening night of 29/30^th January, 2004 and stayed in their house i.e. viz both well lodge during the night. He informed the police that on 30.1.2014 around 5:30 am, they left Shimla for Nandgaon (Kotgarh) via Rampur, Basantpur in the above numbered vehicle. The complainant reported to the police that accused namely Jagjeet Singh was on the wheels of the car and at about 6:30 am, when the

¶11

¶12

aforesaid car reached near Badmahan Mor (turn), it went off the road and fell in a trench, as a result of which the occupants suffered injuries in the mishap whereas Smt. Ved Kanwal and Raj Kumar Kanwal died on the spot. He stated that the mishap occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver. Police on the basis of aforesaid statement made by the complainant, registered the FIR No. 23/04 (Ext.PW10/A) and conducted investigation. Police after completion of all codal formalities, recorded statement of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.PC. Police also took into possession the ill fated car and got it mechanically examined; however same was later on released on spurdari. Police also prepared the spot map Ext.PW10/B and also got clicked the photographs Ext.PW1 to P8 and thereafter, presented the Challan under Section 173 Cr.PC, before the competent court of law.

¶13

3. Learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Court No.II Shimla, (HP), after satisfying itself that prima facie case exists against the accused put a notice of accusation, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Learned trial Court on the basis of evidence adduced on record by the prosecution, found the accused guilty of having committed offence under the Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC, and convicted and sentenced him as per description already given above.

¶14

¶15

4. The present petitioner-accused being aggrieved with the

¶16

judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court, filed an appeal under Section 374 of Cr.PC before the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTC, Shimla, HP, who vide judgment dated 1.7.2009, dismissed the appeal. Hence, this criminal revision petition before this Court.

¶17

5. Mr. O.P. Negi, Advocate, representing the petitioner

¶18

vehemently argued that the impugned judgments of conviction and sentence recorded by the Courts below are not sustainable as the same are not based upon the correct appreciation of evidence available on record, as such, same deserve to be quashed and setaside. While referring to the judgments passed by the courts below, Mr. Negi, strenuously argued that bare perusal of the same suggests that both the courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, as a result of which great prejudice has been caused to the petitioner, who is an innocent person. Mr. Negi, further contended that findings of the learned Sessions judge on record are totally contrary to the evidence available on record because all the prosecution witnesses (PW1 and PW3) categorically admitted in their evidence that accused was driving the vehicle smoothly and slowly and accident in question took place due to error of judgment. Mr. Negi while inviting attention of this Court to the judgments passed by

¶19

¶20

the Sessions Judge, contended that the finding of learned appellate Court is apparently wrong on the face of it because on one hand court below concluded that PW1 and PW3 have admitted in evidence that accused was driving the vehicle “ Aaram Se Pyar Se ” and accident in question took place due to error of judgment and on the other hand, wrongly came to conclusion that this cannot be the ground to conclude that accused is not a culprit. Counsel representing the petitioner further stated that none of PW stated that vehicle in question was being driven rashly and negligently by the petitioner accused, rather all the witnesses unequivocally stated that the vehicle was being driven smoothly and slowly by the petitioner accused. With a view to substantiate his aforesaid argument, Mr. Negi made this Court to travel through the statements having been made by the PWs to demonstrate

¶21

that there was no convincing evidence led on record by the prosecution to suggest that the vehicle in question was being driven on high speed that too rashly and negligently and as such, there was no occasion for the courts below to record conviction of the accused. While concluding his argument, Mr. Negi forcefully contended that learned first appellate Court wrongly applied principle of “Res Ipsa Loquitor” in criminal proceedings as such, findings are totally against the evidence available on record and against the settled principle of law. Mr. Negi, further stated that learned court below failed to

¶22

¶23

appreciate the that maxim of “Res Ipsa Locquitor” is not applicable in the present case as it has come in the evidence of the petitioner that petitioner also went off the road along with vehicle and its occupants and also sustained injuries. In the aforesaid background, Mr. Negi prayed that petitioner may be acquitted of the charges framed against him under Section 279 and 304-A after setting aside the judgment of conviction recorded by the courts below

¶24

6. Per contra, Mr. P.M. Negi, learned Additional Advocate General, duly assisted by Mr. Ramesh Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General, representing the State supported the impugned judgment passed by the courts below. He vehemently argued that bare perusal of the impugned judgments suggests that same are based upon the correct appreciation of the evidence available on record and prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. He further contended that in the given facts and circumstances of the case, no interference, whatsoever, of this Court, is warranted, especially, in view of the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below. While refuting the contention put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no evidence available on record suggestive of the fact that vehicle in question was being driven rashly and negligently, learned Additional Advocate General invited attention of this Curt to the statements made by the

¶25

¶26

prosecution witnesses to demonstrate that the PWs (PW1 and PW3) have specifically stated that car in question was being driven rashly and negligently by the petitioner accused. He also invited attention of this court to the spot map to demonstrate that at that relevant spot, road was wide enough and there is/was no scope of skidding of vehicle, as is being claimed by the petitioner accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.PC. He also reminded this Court that it has very limited powers while exercising its revisionary powers under Section 397 of the Cr.PC to re-appreciate the evidence, when it stands duly established on record that the courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter very meticulously. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in

¶27

case State of Kerala V s . Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri

¶28

(1999)2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held as under:-

¶29

“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.”

¶30

¶31

7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties as well carefully gone through the record

¶32

8. True, it is that this Court has very limited powers under Section 397 Cr.PC while exercising its revisionary jurisdiction but in the instant case, where accused has been convicted and sentenced, it would be apt and in the interest of justice to critically examine the statements of the prosecution witnesses solely with a view to ascertain that the judgments passed by learned courts below are not perverse and same are based on correct appreciation of the evidence on record. 9. As far as scope of power of this Court while exercising revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 is concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241 ; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as under:-

¶33

8. The object of Section 483 and the purpose behind conferring the revisional power under Section 397 read with Section 401, upon the High Court is to invest continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of

¶34

¶35

the procedure or to mete out justice. In addition, the inherent power of the High Court is preserved by Section 482. The power of the High Court, therefore, is very wide. However, the High Court must exercise such power sparingly and cautiously when the Sessions Judge has simultaneously exercised revisional power under Section 397(1). However, when the High Court notices that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order.”

¶36

10. During the proceedings of the case, this Court had an occasion to peruse the entire material made available on record by the prosecution as well as statement of the petitioner-accused recorded under Section 313 Cr.PC, perusal whereof, clearly suggest that on 30.1.2004, vehicle in question being driven by the petitioner accused, met with an accident causing death of two occupants as well as injuries to the other occupants. It also emerges from the record that the occupants of the ill-fated vehicle had hired the CAB in question from Chandigarh to Nandgaon (Kotgarh), District Shimla, HP. It is also not disputed that occupants of the vehicle were to visit Nandgaon to commiserate their relatives who had bereavement in the family. It has also come in the statement of PW1 i.e. complaint Ext. PW1/A that the complainant as well as other occupants of the CAB had actually started journey from Chandigarh on 29.5.2004 at 9 PM and they reached Shimla at 1 AM, during intervening night of 29/30.1.2004 and on that day, they stayed at Shimla in their house and

¶37

10 -

¶38

next morning on 30.1.2004, around 5:30 am, they left Shimla for

¶39

Nandgaon Kotgarh via Rampur, HP in the ill fated car. Finally at 6:30 am, the car went off the road and fell in trench as a result of which occupants of the Car including petitioner sustained injures and two occupants lost their lives.

¶40

11. Petitioner accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 admitted the factum of vehicle being driven by him at the time of unfortunate incident. He also admitted the accident. However, he categorically stated that he was driving the vehicle slowly and accident occurred because of skidding of the vehicle due to snow fall. He further stated that he had told the complainant that there is snow on the road and despite that the complainant and others instructed him to drive at slow pace. He categorically denied that mishap occurred due to his rash and negligent driving and claimed himself to be innocent. However, fact remains that petitioner-accused did not lead any evidence in his support.

¶41

12. After carefully examining the entire evidence led on record as well as the judgments of the courts below, this Court is of the view that both the courts below failed to consider the statement having been made by the petitioner accused under Section 313 Cr.PC in its right perspective, wherein he specifically stated that vehicle was being driven slowly and accident occurred because of skidding of

¶42

11 -

¶43

vehicle due to snow fall. If the sequence of events as put forth by the prosecution is read in its entirety, it corroborates the version put forth by the petitioner-accused. Al l the prosecution witnesses have admitted in their cross-examination that at that relevant time car, was moving at normal speed. Though, PW1 while making his statement under Section 154 of the Cr.PC stated that accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the accused but if his examination in chief as well as cross examination is read in its entirety, it can be safely inferred that it had snowed on the 29.1.2004 and as such, they were compelled to go to Kotgarh via Basantpur not from Kufri side.

¶44

13. True, it is that though petitioner accused claimed that he had

¶45

told the complainant/occupant of the car that there is snow on the road but in spite of that complainant and others instructed him to drive the car at slow pace, he did not produce any evidence in this regard. But if statement of PW1 is examined closely, it can be safely inferred that since occupants of the car had to attend the condolence meeting at Kotgarh, they had no option but to visit the said place on that day only. PW1 specifically stated that mishap took place due to error of judgment on the part of the driver accused. Similarly urgency on the part of the occupants of ill fated vehicle to reach Kotgarh could be easily gathered from the fact that they had hired the vehicle from Chandigarh to Kotgarh on 29.1.2004 at 9:00 PM and they started around 5:30 am on 30.1.2004,

¶46

12 -

¶47

from Shimla to Nandgaon, after staying in Shimla on the intervening night of 29/30.1.2014. Though PW1 denied the suggestion put to him that driver had refused to go ahead of Shimla due to snow but it stands proved on record that it had snowed on 29.1.2004 i.e. day prior to accident. Similarly, decision not to go to Kotgarh by Kufri itself corroborates the version put forth by the petitioner-accused that on the date of accident, there was snow on the road.

¶48

14. PW3 Sh. H.R. Singha and PW4 Smt. Kamla Singha also corroborated the version put forth by the aforesaid prosecution witness PW2. PW4 specifically stated that her brother in law asked the accused to drive the car on road. He further stated that accused took the vehicle to extreme left of the road as a result of which, one of its tyre went out of the road. She further stated that car suffered a jerk and went off the road and fell in the gorge since accused failed to negotiate the curve, whereas PW3 in his statement stated that he had warned the accused to keep the vehicle in middle of the road but all in vain. This aforesaid assertion/deposition made by PW3 itself suggests that occupants of the vehicle were aware of the fact that there is a slippery on the road due to snow fall and it would be safe to keep the vehicle in middle of the road. If the aforesaid deposition made by PW3 is examined in light of spot map, it clearly suggests that there was small curve and road was wide enough and possibility of failure, if any, on

¶49

13 -

¶50

the part of the driver to negotiate the curve was bleak, especially, when it has come in the statement of all the PWs that at that time vehicle was being driven in normal speed.

¶51

15. This Court after perusing the statement of PW3 and after seeing the spot map is compelled to draw the conclusion that on the ill fated day, it was either snowing or there was slippery on the road that is why PW3 specifically instructed the accused to drive the vehicle in the middle of the road. If there was no snow or slippery on the road, where was the occasion for PW3 to instruct driver to drive the vehicle in middle that too on the road which was quite wide at the spot of occurrence. PW3 in his cross examination though denied that it had snowed on that day but self stated that after the accident there was a rainfall and then there was snow fall. He also stated that driver was driving in normal speed and accident took place because the accused lost control of the vehicle. PW3 in his cross-examination admitted that the accused was driving car in normal speed, which clearly corroborates the version put forth by the petitioner accused in his statement, under Section 313 Cr.PC that accident occurred due to skidding of vehicle on the snow.

¶52

16. This Court carefully examined the version put forth by the aforesaid PWs to ascertain the correctness and genuineness of finding recorded by the courts below that at that relevant time, vehicle in question was being driven rashly and negligently, by the petitioner-

¶53

14 -

¶54

accused but there is nothing in the statement of aforesaid PWs which could persuade this Court to draw a conclusion that vehicle was driven rashly and negligently at high speed at that point of time. Rather, this court after examining the story put forth by the prosecution as well as evidence led on record to prove the same, is of the view that since occupants of the vehicle had to visit Nandgaon to pay condolence in the family of their relatives, they despite there being snow on the road, instructed the driver accused to drive the vehicle slowly. It is not understood that on what basis courts below came to conclusion that at that relevant time, vehicle in question was being driven rashly and negligently by the petitioner accused because none of the PW has stated anything specific with regard to the speed of the vehicle, rather, all the PWs in one way or the other have admitted that vehicle was being driven in normal speed. It also emerges from the statement of PW3 that since petitioner accused was not acquainted with the terrain especially during snow, he was being instructed by the occupants of the vehicle to drive the vehicle in a particular manner.

¶55

17. Similarly, as has been discussed above, this Court sees considerable force in the claim of the petitioner accused that he had told the occupants that there is snow on the road but despite that they instructed him to drive because it is undisputed that vehicle in question was hired by the occupants from Chandigarh to Kotgarh with a view to

¶56

15 -

¶57

visit their relatives, who had bereavement in the family. Since occupants of the vehicle had to compulsorily visit their relatives for paying condolence, there is every likelihood of compelling the accused to drive vehicle on snow.

¶58

18. PW10 Sub-Inspector Lal Singh in his cross-examination admitted that it had snowed at that point of time; however, later on he stated that there was no snow on the spot. Similarly, he admitted that there is small curve on the site of the accident and vehicles were moving on the road on that day. If the statement of PW10 is carefully analyzed, it gives strength to the version of the petitioner accused towards the factum of snowfall on the relevant date and this Court, on the basis of statement/admission having been made by the PWs in cross examination, has every reason to presume that vehicle skidded in snow and went off the road as a result of which, two persons lost their lives. Spot map Ext.PW10-B, further suggests that road was wide enough at the spot and there were very little chances of mistake by the petitioner as far as negotiating of curve is concerned, especially when all the occupants have stated that he was driving the vehicle carefully and in normal speed.

¶59

19. Apart from above, none of the PW has specifically stated with regard to speed of the vehicle and as such, no finding could be returned by the court below on mere statement of complainant that at

¶60

16 -

¶61

that relevant time vehicle was being driven rashly and negligently. Had

¶62

any prosecution witness stated something with regard to specific speed, it could be the best piece of evidence for the Court to ascertain the genuineness and correctness of the claim of the complainant with regard to rash and negligent driving of the petitioneraccused.

¶63

20. At this stage, reliance is placed on judgment rendered our own High Court in case titled Akshay Kumar v. State of HP , Latest HP

¶64

LJ 2009 HP 72, relevant para of which reads as under :-

¶65

“8. In fact, an injury shall be deemed to be negligently caused whomsoever it is willfully caused, but results from want of reasonable caution, in the undertaking and doing of any act either without such skill, knowledge or ability as is suitable to consequences of such act, or when it results from the not exercising reasonable manner of using them or from the doing of any act without using reasonable caution for the prevention of mischief, of from the omitting to do any act which is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so and that it may cause injury, but without an intention to cause injury or knowledge that it will be probably caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Rash and negligent act may be described as criminal rashness negligence. It must be more than mere carelessness or error of judgment.

¶66

The courts below did not appreciate the above facts that there was debris on the side of the road on the curve due to the slip, while negotiating the curve, as stated above, some witnesses have admitted that the danga gave way to the bus which caused the accident and the rash and negligent driving by the petitioner is also denied, therefore, it find that the findings of quilt arrived at against the petitioner by both the courts below were not based upon legal and proper appreciation of evidence. In the circumstances aforesaid, the petitioner cannot be said to have criminal rashness or negligence, thus he is entitled for the benefit of doubt as two views were deducible from the evidence on record.”

¶67

17 -

¶68

21. Reliance is placed upon judgment of this Court reported in

¶69

Gurcharan Singh versus State of Himachal Pradesh 1990 (2) ACJ 598,

¶70

the relevant paragraphs of which are reproduced here-in-below:-

¶71

“14. Adverting to the facts of this case, it is in evidence that the truck in question was loaded with fertilizer weighing 90 quintals. Obviously, it cannot be said that the speed of the vehicle was very fast. Secondly, it is a State Highway and not a National Highway. Therefore, the speed on this account as well cannot be considered to be high.

¶72

15. Coming to the statements of witnesses on this aspect, it has been stated that the truck was moving in high speed but it has not been said as to what that speed actually was. To say that a vehicle was moving in a high speed is neither a proper and legal evidence on high speed nor in any way indicates thereby the rashness on the part of the driver. The prosecution should have been exact on this aspect as speed of the vehicle is an essential point to be seen and proved in a case under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. Further, there are no skid marks which eliminate the evidence of high speed of the vehicle. In addition to this, it has been stated by the witnesses that the vehicle stopped at a distance of 50 feet from the place of accident. This appears to be exaggerated. However, it is not a long distance looking to the two points; viz, the first impact of the accident and the last tyres of the vehicle and the total length of the body of the truck in question. If seen from these angles, the distance stated by the witnesses cannot be considered to be very long and thus an indication of high speed. The version of the petitioner that he blew the horn near about the place of curve which frightened the child, cannot be considered to be without substance. This can otherwise be reasonably inferred that the petitioner would have blown the horn on seeing the child on the road as it is in evidence that the child had come on the pucca portion of the road while there is no evidence as to whether the witnesses, more particularly, Ghanshyam, PW7, Chander Kanta, PW8, mother, and a few other witnesses were there at that particular time. Rather the depositions of these witnesses indicate that they were coming from some village lane which was joining the main road in question. Children of this age, usually crafty by temperament, move faster than the parents and are in advance of them while walking. This appears to have happened in the present case. Minute examination of the circumstances of this case and the evidence brought on the record, discloses that the deceased had reached the pucca portion of the road much before the arrival of his parents and the witnesses. That is why in their deposition they have said that the child had been run over by the truck. On the other hand, the petitioner has stated that horn by him and started crossing the road which could not be seen by him and the result was the accident and the death of the

¶73

18 -

¶74

child. In case some pedestrians suddenly cross a road, the driver of the vehicle cannot save the pedestrian, however slow he may be driving the vehicle. In such a situation he cannot be held negligent; rather it appears that the parents of the child were negligent in not taking proper care of the child and allowed him to come alone to the road while they were somewhere behind and they could have rushed to pull back the child before the approaching vehicle came in contact with him as it is in their depositions that the truck driver was at a distance coming at a high speed and in case the child wanted to cross the road, it could do so within the time it reached at the place of the accident. How the accident has actually taken place, has not been clearly and comprehensively stated by any of the witnesses. They appear to have been prejudiced by the act of the driver. Their versions are, therefore, coloured by the ultimate act of the petitioner and the fact that the child had been finished.”

¶75

22. In the aforesaid case, Hon’ble Court while passing

¶76

aforesaid judgment has observed that “prosecution should have been exact on this aspect as speed of the vehicle is an essential point to be seen and proved under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code”. Definitely, there cannot be any quarrel with regard to the aforesaid observations made by the Court. But now question arises as to what can be the method/mode for measuring the exact speed of the offending vehicle at the time of accident, undisputedly, in the present case, engine of offending vehicle after falling in gorge must have stopped, no help at all can be taken from speedometer to ascertain the exact speed of the vehicle at the relevant time. To my mind, in the aforesaid situation, the eye witnesses of the accident could be the best persons to depose whether offending vehicle was in high speed or not.

¶77

Apart from above, aspect of high speed can be gauzed from the

¶78

19 -

¶79

side/direction of the offending vehicle being driven on the wrong side and certainly an inference of its being driven rashly and negligently on high speed can be drawn by perusing spot map, photographs and mechanical reports which may point towards the force/impact, as supporting evidence. But obviously, in the absence of some specific mode to gauze the speed, only eye witnesses to the accident can be the best persons to depose the high speed/actual speed of the vehicle. In the instant case, as has been discussed in detail, none of the prosecution witness has stated anything with regard to specific speed of the offending vehicle, rather all the prosecution witnesses in one way or the other, have admitted that vehicle in question was being driven in normal speed by the petitioner accused and as such, no finding could be returned by the court below that vehicle in question was being driven at high speed by the petitioner accused at that relevant time.

¶80

23. Evidence discussed herein above is sufficient to hold that in given facts and circumstances, two views are possible in the present case and as such present respondent-accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. In the present case, prosecution story does not appear to be plausible/ trustworthy and as such same cannot be relied upon. In this regard, I may refer to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in State of UP versus Ghambhir Singh , AIR 2005 (92) SCC 2440 , where Hon’ble Apex Court has held that if on the same evidence, two

¶81

20 -

¶82

views are reasonably possible, the one in favour of the accused must

¶83

be preferred. The relevant paragraph is reproduced as under:-

¶84

“6. So far as Hori Lal, PW-1 is concerned, he had been sent to fetch a basket from the village and it was only a matter of coincidence that while he was returning he witnessed the entire incident. The High Court did not consider it safe to rely on his testimony because he evidence clearly shows that he had an animus against the appellants. Moreover, he evidence was not corroborated by objective circumstances. Though it was his categorical case that all of them fired, no injury caused by rifle was found, and, only two wounds were found on the person of the deceased. Apart from this PW-3 did not mention the presence of either PW-1 or PW-2 at the time of occurrence. All these circumstances do create doubt about the truthfulness of the prosecution case. The presence of these three witnesses becomes doubtful if their evidence is critically scrutinized. May be it is also possible to take a view in favour o the prosecution, but since the High Court, on an appreciation of the evidence on record, has recorded a finding in favour of the accused, we do not feel persuaded to interfere with the order of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. It is well settled that if on the same evidence two views are reasonably possible, the one in favour of the accused must be preferred.”

¶85

24. The Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court vide judgment

¶86

reported in Pawan Kumar and Kamal Bhardwaj versus State of H.P .,

¶87

latest HLJ 2008 (HP) 1150 has also concluded here-in-below:-

¶88

“25. Moreover, when the occurrence is admitted but there are two different versions of the incident, one put forth by the prosecution and the other by the defence and one of the two version is proved to be false, the second can safely be believed, unless the same is unnatural or inherently untrue.

¶89

26. In the present case, as noticed hereinabove, the manner of occurrence, as pleaded by the defence, is not true. The manner of the occurrence testified by PW-11 Sandeep Rana is not unnatural nor is it intrinsically untrue, therefore, it has to be believed.

¶90

27.Sandeep Rana could not be said to have been established, even if the prosecution version were taken on its face value. It was pleaded that no serious injury had been caused to PW-11 Sandeep Rana and that all the injuries, according to the testimony of PW-21 Dr. Raj Kumar, which he noticed on the person of Sandeep Rana, at the time of his medical examination, were simple in nature .

¶91

21 -

¶92

25. Consequently in view of the detailed discussion as well as

¶93

law laid down herein above, this Court sees substantial force in the criminal petition preferred by the petitioner and as such, same is allowed. Accordingly, judgments passed by the Courts below are quashed and set-aside. Petitioner accused is acquitted of the charges so framed against him. Bail bonds discharged. Interim order, if any, vacated. All applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

¶94

22^nd November, 2016 (Sandeep Sharma), manjit Judge.

Jagjeet Singh v. State

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Jagjeet Singh v. State

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Raghubar Dayal Vs Kuldeep Kumar

Deep Chand Vs Jagdish Ram

State of Hp Vs Onkar Singh Randhawa

Uma Thakur Vs State of Hp

Lal Chand Vs State

Kalimudeen Vs State