sheer helpless condition asking him to wait till the legislature curds the defect by providing for the omission ? Can the Court escape the responsibility of considering these unforseen contingencies? However, I cannot ignore the modern tendency in Courts to take the view that if a case is entirely unprovided for by a Statute, either directly or indirectly, then it must remain nobody's child - a luckless orphan of the law (In re Leicester Permanent Building Society, 1942 Ch. 340). Same was the view of Devlin L. J. in Gladstone V/s. Bower, reported in 1960 (2) QB 384 when he observed "we cannot legislate for casus omiss". This tendency has given rise to inconvenient results. One option left for me is to express regrets for a statutory lacuna and to hope that it will be remedied by legislation and occasionally the hope is fulfilled, even if tardily. However, in my opinion, in this case there is "impalpable line" of distinction which should enable the Court to come out of helplessness. In this case" the caption of Sec. 15 gives general indication to give power to correct the entry in the Birth Register. However, specific case of correction of name of the child already entered is omitted to be provided for. When the entry is erroneous, there is power to correct. When it is factually improperly made, there is power of correction. Question is when entry is rightfully made can it be corrected by resort to this power ? In my opinion, once power to correct an entry already made in the Birth Register is conceded, it should legitimately take within its sweep the correction of entries rightfully made. It is the correction of the name of the child at the instance of the parents or wards. What possible objections can there be in reading such power in the authority if power to correct erroneous entry is conceded ? The omission in the present case appears to be non-deliberate. In my opinion, omission being not deliberate and not supported by cogent reasons it would not be hazardous to read "implied will of the Legislators" in this provision so as to authorise the Registrar to correct the name of the child at the instance of the parents. I, therefore, hold that there is power in the Registrar to correct the entry already made by entertaining the application of the parents. In undertaking this exercise, I am reminded of what C. K. Alien said in his book "Law in the Making":
