Allowed

Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and Superintendent of Stamps

Gujarat HC3 Oct 2019SCA/6873/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Stamp duty on land sold by an urban development authority was assessed using Jantri rates at delayed conveyance. The court accepted the earlier sale consideration as market value, allowed the petition, quashed the assessment and appellate orders, and directed refund of the appeal deposit with interest.

What did the court decide?

Assessment and appellate orders quashed; appeal deposit to be refunded within three months of receipt of writ, with 6% simple interest from deposit until realization.

Indian Oil Corporation Limited Vs Chief Controlling… — GST and Indirect Tax | Gujarat HC (2019)

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C/SCA/6873/2018 JUDGMENT

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6873 of 2018

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FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

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HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA

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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?

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2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?

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3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?

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4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any order made thereunder ?

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================================================================ INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED

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Versus

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CHIEF CONTROLLING REVENUE AUTHORITY AND SUPERINTENDENT OF STAMPS

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================================================================ Appearance:

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M R BHATT AND CO.(5953) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1

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MS SHRUTI PATHAK, AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2

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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA

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Date : 03/10/2019

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ORAL JUDGMENT

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Rule returnable forthwith. Ms. Shruti Pathak, learned AGP waives service of notice of rule on behalf of the respondents.

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This petition is filed challenging the order dated 22^nd May 2017 passed by the Deputy Collector, Stamp Duty Valuation Department – respondent no.2 and the order dated 10^th December 2017 passed by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority – respondent no.1 in the appeal preferred by the petitioner under Section 53 of the Gujarat Stamp Act, 1958 (for short “the Stamp Act”) and also challenged the order dated 20^th February 2018 passed by the respondent no.1 under Section 54(1) of the Stamp Act.

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The petitioner Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 is a public undertaking. The petitioner on a request being made by it, Rajkot Urban Development Authority (for short ‘RUDA’) sold certain land to the petitioner for a consideration of Rs.19,66,424/- on 22^nd February 1984 and allotted land admeasuring 35 Acres and 22 Gunthas situated Revenue Survey no.207 of Anandpur, Navagam, District: Rajkot and further allotted land admeasuring 9 Acres and 31 Gunthas on 28^th June 1987. RUDA also handed over the possession of the land to the petitioner in the year 1984 and 1987 respectively upon payment of the consideration made by the petitioner at the relevant point of time by issuing allotment

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letter recording that the petitioner had made payment of the full consideration.

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3.1 It is the case of the petitioner that a draft conveyance deed was sent for approval to the RUDA, which in turn sought approval of the Collector, Rajkot and after various follow-ups ultimately the Collector, Rajkot granted approval to the draft conveyance deed in the year 2004. The petitioner was consistently requesting for follow-up issue with RUDA from 1988 to 2004 for executing the conveyance deed.

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3.2 It appears that the conveyance deed was executed and registered on 20^th February 2004 and the stamp duty was affixed on the said document considering on the transaction value of Rs.19,66,624/-.

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3.3 Thereafter, the respondent no.2

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initiated proceedings by issuance of notice dated 7^th August 2004 indicating that the market value in question was to be determined as per Jantri value prevailing in the year 2004 when the sale deed was executed and thereafter, order was passed dated 22^nd May 2017 determining the market value of the property at Rs.2,38,45,640/- and called upon the petitioner to pay the deficit stamp duty of Rs.24,50,518/- with penalty of

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Rs.250/- aggregating to Rs.24,50,768/-.

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3.4 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, the petitioner challenged the order passed by the respondent no.2 by way of an appeal before the respondent no.1, which was registered as an Appeal no.11 of 2017. The petitioner also filed written arguments with supporting documents before the appellate authority. The petitioner relied upon the decision of this Court in SCA no.1071 of 2014 rendered on 31^st August 2016 in case of Arraycom (India) Pvt. Ltd. through Company Secretary and Authorised Signatory & 1 Vs. Deputy Collector and contended that the situation in the facts of the petitioner is similar to the facts before this Court in the said case wherein it was held that proviso to Section-39(2)(A)(1) of the Stamp Act provides that for the purpose of determination of the market value of the instrument, the consideration stated in the instrument executed by the local authority shall be deemed to be the true market value of the property which is the subject matter of such instrument.

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The respondent no.1 by order dated 12^th December 2017 dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner and confirmed the order dated 22^nd May 2017 passed by the respondent no.2.

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The petitioner therefore, made an application dated 8^th February 2018 to make a reference before this court under Section 54(1) of the Stamp Act, however, the said application was also rejected by the respondent no.1 by order dated 20^th February 2018.

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Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Manish R. Bhatt assisted by learned advocates Mr. Munjal Bhatt and Mr.Vinit Sheth on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the transaction was completed in the year 1984/1987 itself but the conveyance deed could not be executed in view of the inordinate delay on the part of the Collector, Rajkot in granting the approval to the draft conveyance deed to be executed by the RUDA. In such circumstances, it was submitted that the respondent no.2 could not have arrived at a market value of Rs.2,38,45,650/- on the basis of the Jantri of the year 2004.

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Learned senior advocate for the petitioner submitted that as per Section 2(n)(a) of the Stamp Act, market value means price that such property would have fetched in an open market on the date of execution of such instrument but in the facts of the case, execution of the instrument would be in the

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nature of completion of the transaction in the year 1987 and it is not in dispute that the property was correctly valued in the year 1987 and consideration was also paid in the year 1987.

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Learned senior advocate for the

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petitioner submitted that as the transaction was completed in all respect in the year 1987 itself, i.e. offer made, possession given, payment made but only in view of the inordinate delay on the part of the Collector in granting approval to the draft of the conveyance deed to be executed by RUDA in favour of the petitioner, it cannot be said that the transaction was not completed.

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It was submitted that in view of the decision of this Court in case of Arrcom (India) Ltd., (supra) proviso to sub-section 32(A)(1) would be applicable in the facts of the case as the RUDA is local authority and statutory body constituted under the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 which has sold the subject property to the petitioner. Therefore, the sale consideration stated in the conveyance deed should be deemed to be true market value of the property in question.

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With regard to the rejection of the reference under Section 54(1)(A) of the Stamp Act

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by the respondent no.1, it was submitted that once an application is made requesting the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority to refer the statement of claim for the opinion of this Court, the authority is bound to refer a statement of case and there is nothing in Section 54(1)(A) of the Stamp Act, which would require the authority to refuse such request.

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Learned advocate for the petitioner also relied upon the following decisions in support of his submission.

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(1) The Full Bench decision of this Court in case of Gorwa Vibhag Co-operative Housing Societies Ltd. and another Vs. State of Gujarat, reported in 1993 (1) GLH 571 wherein the full bench of this court has held that as per the provisions of Section 32A of the Stamp Act for determination of the market value of the property, the Collector is required to take into consideration the factors such as agreement to sale executed on a particular date, the order passed by the statutory authority determining the price of the land of the property and such other relevant factors including the factors that the property is let-out and the tenant occupying the lands or building is protected either under the Bombay Tenancy and Agriculture Lands Act or under the

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Bombay Rent Act and other factors which the Collector would consider to have a bearing on the valuation of the land or building. The full bench therefore, held that in Section 2(n)(a), it is rightly provided that the market value in relation to any property which is a subject matter of instrument means the price which such property would have fetched in open market on the basis of execution of such instrument. It was submitted by Mr. Bhatt in view of proviso to Section 32A of the Stamp Act, the respondent no.2 could not have determined the market value of the property in question on the date of the sale deed executed by any local authority.

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(2) Reliance was placed on the decision of Supreme Court rendered on 16^th November 2011 in case of State of Rajasthan & others Vs. M/s. Khandaka Jain Jewellers , in Civil Appeal No.5273 of 2007, wherein the Supreme Court has held that registering authority has to ascertain the correct valuation given in the instrument regarding market value of the property at the time of sale. It was therefore, submitted that in the facts of the case the sale took place in the year 1987 and therefore, the respondent could not have determined the market value on the date of the conveyance deed.

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(3) Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in case of Ismailbhai Gafurbhai Bin Bhulabhai Vohara Vs. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority in SCA no.9745 of 2009 rendered on 15^th October 2013, wherein this Court (Coram: Hon’ble Mr.Justice Rajesh H. Shukla) has held that the stamp duty could be levied on the basis of rate as prevailed in the year in which transaction was completed and not on the market value on the date of execution of the deed of conveyance.

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(4) Reliance was placed on the full bench decision of this Court in case of Chitvan Co-operative Housing Society Limited Vs. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority , reported in AIR 2012 GUJ. 62 , wherein the full bench opined that the Jantri rates on the date of execution of the conveyance deed did not reflect the correct value of the property on the date of the sale. It was therefore, submitted that after referring to the full bench decision in case of Gorwa Vibhag Cooperative Society (supra), this Court confirmed the order passed by the Stamp Duty Authorities on the facts of that case.

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(5) Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in case of Hitesh D. Desai Vs. Superintendent of Stamps and Inspector General of Registration rendered in SCA No.17485 of 2013 on

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24^th February 2015, wherein it is held that the petitioner is entitled to refund of the excess amount of the stamp duty paid under Section 44 of the Stamp Act. Learned senior advocate for the petitioner submitted that though the petitioner was not liable to pay the stamp duty, but was required to deposit 25% of the alleged deficit stamp duty so as to prefer an appeal under Section 53(A) of the Stamp Act and the same is required to be refunded to the petitioner.

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(6) Learned senior advocate for the

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petitioner also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad Vs. Gold Coin Health Food (P) Ltd. reported in 304 ITR 308 to submit that the proviso to Section 32A has been inserted subsequently w.e.f. 1991 , it would be applicable retrospectively and for that it was submitted that the petitioner also relies upon the Government Resolutions dated 19^th May 1990 and 30^th September 1991 for application of the proviso to Section 32A and subsequent GR issued in the year 2003 cannot be stated to be have retrospective operations whereby the earlier resolutions were withdrawn. The Apex Court in the aforesaid decision has held that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law, retrospective operation is generally intended.

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It was therefore, submitted that the impugned transactions, which have been completed in the year 1987 would be governed by the proviso to Section 32A(1) of the Stamp Act.

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(7) Reliance was placed on the decision of Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) reported in 396 ITR 323 Guj., in support of the contention that the RUDA would be a statutory body having function to undertake the preparation of the development plans for the urban development area and to undertake preparation and execution of TP scheme under the provisions of the Town Planning Act if so directed by the State Government to execute the work in connection with the supply of water, disposal of sewerage and provision of other services and amenities to acquire, hold, manage and disposed of property etc., and to carry out development work as may be assigned by the State Government from time to time. It was therefore, submitted that the RUDA is covered by the proviso to Section 32A of the Act. It was therefore, submitted that the respondent ought to have considered the sale consideration stated in the conveyance deed for levy of the stamp duty and not the market value of the property in question on the date of execution of sale deed.

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On the other hand, learned AGP Ms. Shruti Pathak vehemently opposed the petition and submitted that the document in question was ‘executed’ on 20^th February 2004 by RUDA and what is relevant for the purpose of stamp duty is the date of execution as per the provisions contemplated under the Stamp Act. Therefore, the market value of the property for the purpose of valuation of the stamp duty is always on the price which the property would have fetched if sold in the open market ‘on the date of execution’of conveyance deed. It was therefore, submitted that as per the definition contemplated under section 2(i) of the Act which provides that the document which is signed and executed coupled with the definition of market value if it is taken into consideration as the document was admittedly executed on 20^th February 2004 ,the market value which was required to be seen for the purpose of levy of the Stamp Duty Valuation was on the date of 20^th February 2004 and not the date of allotment as it is contended by the petitioner.

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It was submitted that the Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and Ors. Vs. Khandaka Jain Jewelers reported in (2007) 14 SCC 339 has held after taking into consideration the

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provisions under the Stamp Act as well as the provisions under the Registration Act that the Stamp Duty Valuation of the instrument is required to be determined on the basis of the market value of the property on the date when the document is executed.

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It was submitted that even in the the decision of this Court in Special Civil Application no.17485 of 2013, the Court held that the petitioner was liable to get refund of the excess amount of the stamp duty paid by the petitioner taking into consideration the market value of the property as on 31^st March 2011 i.e. ‘date of execution’ of the instrument.

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It was further submitted that the proviso to section 32A was brought into by way of an amendment with effect from 11^th June 2004 and the same was given a prospective effect with effect from 11^th June 2004. Since the document in question in the present case is executed on 20^th February 2004, and since, the document was executed before the amendment was brought into in the statute and hence, the petitioner cannot be granted any benefit of the proviso to section 32A. It was submitted that recently the Division Bench of this Court has rendered a decision in group of Letters Patent Appeal is being LPA no.919 of 2016 and other allied matters on the

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similar issue. Therefore, only because the petitioner has purchased the land in question from the RUDA, it cannot be granted the benefit of the proviso which was subsequently brought into the enactment and as per the decision of the Division bench, the ‘State Government’ and the instrumentality of the State cannot be read so wide enough. The Division Bench has also held that there is nothing in section 32A of the Stamp Act which gives the term ‘State Government’ an extended meaning so as to include its agencies, instrumentalities and local authorities under its control.

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It was submitted that reliance is also placed on the decision of Gorwa Vibhag Cooperative Housing Society Limited Vs. State of Gujarat reported in 1992 1 GLR 654 : 1993 1 GLH 571 to contend that the entire procedure with respect to the date of execution and procedure to be followed by the respondent authority was upheld by the Full Bench in the said decision wherein vires under the several provisions under the Gujarat Stamp Act were under challenge and after considering the provisions of section 32A and 32B Stamp Act, the procedure to be followed for determining the market value on the date of execution of the document was upheld. It was submitted that the reliance placed on paragraph

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34 of the said judgment on behalf of the petitioner to contend that the Government Resolutions dated 19^th May 1990 and 30^th September 1991 clarifies that the proviso to section 32A is applicable to the sale executed by any statutory board or Government authority or property sold by the public auction by local bodies like Panchayats, Municipalities, Municipal Corporations or sale executed after obtaining sanction from the Charity Commissioner or on the basis of scheme framed under section 21 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act is thoroughly misconceived and the same would not be applicable in the case of the petitioner as the respondent authority while rejecting the claim of the petitioner of being a local authority has relied upon section 3 of the definition under the General Clause Act, 1897, therefore, these Government Resolutions had specifically made provisions exclusively for granting exemption under section 32A for the property to be executed by a statutory board or government administration or property sold by way of ‘auction proceedings’ by local bodies which were specifically described as panchayats, municipalities, municipal corporations whereas in the present case, the sale was first of all not by way of public auction as the land was allotted to the petitioner by RUDA and thereafter, the documents

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were executed in 2004 by the authority. It was further submitted that as far as these Government Resolutions are concerned, the Government Resolution dated 30^th September 1991 for giving exemption for implementation of section 32A was cancelled by way of subsequent Government Resolution issued by the Revenue Department in July 2003. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be granted any benefits of these Government Resolutions.

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Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record, it is not in dispute that the transaction between the petitioner and RUDA was completed in all respect i.e. the sale consideration was paid and the possession was handed over in the year 1987 in respect of the land in question. The conveyance deed could not be executed because of the inordinate delay on the part of the Collector for approval of the same till 2004. In such circumstances, the question, which arises for consideration is whether the sale consideration paid by the petitioner to the RUDA in the year 1987 and reflected in conveyance deed executed in the year 2004 should be deemed to be as market value for the purpose of determination of stamp duty under the provisions of the Stamp Act or not.

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It would be therefore, germen to refer to the relevant provisions of the Stamp Act as under :-

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2(i) of the Stamp Act, which provides definition of “executed and execution” as under :-

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2(i) "executed" and "execution" used with reference to instruments means "signed" and "signature";

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Explanation. - The terms "signed" and "signa ture" also include attribution of electronic - record as provided in section 11 of the In formation Technology Act, 2000." (21 of 2000)

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Section 2(na), which provides for definition of market value as under :-

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2(na) "market value", in relation to any property which is the subject matter of an instrument means the price which such property would have fetched if sold in open market on the date of execution of such instrument;

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32A(1), which provides for determination of the market value by the competent authority as under :-

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“32A (1) Every instrument of conveyance, exchange, gift, certificate of sale, partition, partnership, settlement, power of attorney to sell immovable property when given for consideration or transfer of lease by way of assignment, presented for registration under

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provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 (XVI of 1908) shall be accompanied by a true copy thereof; [and the Statement in such form as may be prescribed by rules] and if an officer - registering such instrument under the afore said Act or any person referred to in section 33 before whom such instrument is produced or comes in the performance of his functions, has reason to believe that the consideration set forth therein does not approximate to the market value of the property which is the subject matter of such instrument or as the case may be the market value of the property - which is the subject matter of such instru ment, has not been truly set forth therein, he [shall before] registering the instrument - or, as the case may be, performing his func tions in respect of such instrument, refer the instrument or true copy thereof to the Collector of such district in which either the whole or any part of the property is situated for determining the true market value of such property and the proper duty payable on the instrument under this section.

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Provided that for the purpose of this Subsection, the consideration set forth in an instrument executed by the State Government, the Central Government, a local authority, Gujarat Housing Board, Gujarat Slum Clearance Board or Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, shall be deemed to be the true market value of the property which is the subject matter of such instrument.”

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Section 44, which provides for refund :-

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“44. Power to Revenue authority to refund penalty or excess duty in certain cases. - (1) Where any penalty is paid under section - 34 or section 39, the Chief Controlling Rev enue Authority may, upon application in

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writing made within one year from the date of the payment, refund such penalty wholly or in part.

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- (2) Where, in the opinion of the Chief Con - trolling Revenue Authority stamp duty in ex cess of that which is legally chargeable has been charged and paid [under section 32, section 34] or section 39, such authority may, upon application in writing made by the party concerned within three months from the date of receipt of the order charging the same, refund the excess.”

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Section 53(1) and 54(1) as under :-

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“53. Control of and statement of case to Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. - (1) - The powers exercisable by a Collector un der [Chapter III [*** ], Chapter IV and Chapter V] and under clause (a) of the first proviso to section 27 shall in all cases be - subject to the control of the Chief Con trolling Revenue Authority:

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[Provided that the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority shall not entertain an application made by a person under sub-section (1),unless,-

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(a)such application is presented within a period of [ninety days] from the date of order of the Collector

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(b) such person deposits twenty-five per cent, of the amount of duty or as the case may be amount of difference of duty payable by him in respect of subject matter of the instrument for which application has been made:]

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[Provided further that where in any particular case the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority is of the opinion that the deposit of the amount by the applicant may cause undue hardship to him, the authority may in its description, either

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unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may think fit to impose, dispense with a part of the amount deposited so however that the part of the amount so dispensed with shall not exceed fifty per cent, of the amount deposited or required to be deposited.]”

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“54. Statement of case by Chief Controlling Revenue Authority to High Court. - (1) The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority may state any case referred to it under subsection (2) of section 53, or otherwise coming to its notice and refer such case, with its own opinion thereon, to the High Court.”

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On perusal of the above provisions of the Stamp Act, the respondent no.2 is required to determine the stamp duty payable by the petitioner as determine under Section 32A of the Stamp Act. The Full Bench of this Court in case of Gorwa Vibhag Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (supra) has held that there is a scientific procedure prescribed under Section 32A of the Act along with the rules and has described the procedure as under :-

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“31. In our view, the contention that the method of valuation of property is unreasonable, arbitrary and invalid, is raised without referring to the detailed statutory provisions prescribed under the Act and the Rules. On the face of it, in our view, the said procedure is scientific, reasonable and cannot be

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termed as irrational by any standard. Sections 32A and 32 Belong with the Rules provide for exhaustive detailed procedures for determining the market value of the property. They also provide for giving adequate reasonable opportunity of hearing to the concerned person at every stage. The said procedures can be divided into the following parts;

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1(a). When the instrument is presented for registration, if the concerned officer has reason to believe that the consideration set forth therein does not approximate to the market value of the property which is the subject-matter of such instrument, he may after registering the instrument refer the instrument to the Collector for determining true market value of the property and the proper duty payable on the instrument [Section 32(I)];

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The expression 'reason to believe' contemplates belief and existence of reasons for that belief, Belief must be held in good faith. It cannot be merely a pretence. The expression does not mean a purely subjective satisfaction of the registering officer or of the Collector.

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(b) Before referring such instrument to the Collector for determination of proper market value and stamp duty, under the Bombay Stamp (Determination of Market Value of Property) Rules, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules')

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the registering officer is required to give intimation of his belief to the concerned person that market value stated in the instrument does not approximate to the market value of the property. For this purpose, he must have reason to believe that the consideration set forth in the instrument does not approximate to the market value of the property. This would be based upon the information furnished in the instrument by the person producing document for registration and any other information available within [Rule 3(2)]; Information which would be available with the registering officer would be on the basis of information supplied by the Valuation Department. The Valuation Department is required to work out 'minimum values' in respect of different kinds and different localities in all cities and towns. These 'minimum values' would in fact be constructively estimated market values and would become the norms that would be given to the registering officers (as per the affidavit-in-reply). Normally, the concerned person would pay stamp duty without any hesitation on the minimum market value unless there are genuine circumstances to point out that the consideration mentioned in the instrument is truly set forth;

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(c) After receipt of intimation, the person presenting document for registration offers to the registering officer the amount required to make up

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the proper duty chargeable on the instrument, the registering officer is required to accept the same and to proceed to register the document as provided in Section 40 of the Stamp Act [Rule 3(3)];

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(d) If the person concerned does not offer the amount required to make up the proper duty on the instrument, the registering officer is required to make reference to the Collector under Subsection (1) of Section 32A [Rule 3(3)];

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Secondly for determining the true market value, the Collector is also required to follow the following exhausive procedure prescribed under the Rules.

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(a) He is required to issue notice in form D to the concerned person who is liable to pay stamp duty in respect of such instrument and ask him to submit within 30 days from the date of service of notice his representation in writing along with evidence in support of such representation [Rule 4(1)];

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(b) If no representation is received, the Collector is required to serve notice upon the concerned person to make a statement before the Collector which he is required to record [Rule 4(2)];

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(c) After considering the representation or statement, if any, and after examining the information on record or information, if any, called by him, he

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is required to make a provisional order in writing determining the true market value of the property in accordance with the principles laid down in Rule 8 and proper duty payable thereon [Rule 4(4)];

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(d) That provisional order is required to be communicated to the concerned person along with a notice informing him that against that provisional order he can make a represention [Rule 5];

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(e) After considering the represention, if any, against the provisional order, the Collector is required to pass the final order determining the true market value and the proper stamp duty payable on the instrument [Rule 6];

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(f) After determination of the market value, the Collector is required to direct the party liable to pay duty to make payment of difference of stamp duty and penalty which shall not be less than such duty and not more than twice the amount of such duty. Further, no party would be required to pay any amount to make up difference or to pay any penalty if difference between the amount of consideration or the market value set forth in the instrument and the market value determined by the Collector does not exceed 10% of the market value determined by the Collector.

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(g) Against the order passed by the Collector, the aggrieved person is entitled to file an application to the

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Collector for referring it to the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority for determination of proper duty [Section 32B(1)];

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32. Considering the aforesaid elaborate procedures prescribed and the opportunities which are required to be given to the concerned person, the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioners that the procedure prescribed for determining the market value is irrational and illegal requires to be rejected without any further discussion.

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33. Apart from the aforesaid elaborate procedures of giving opportunity of hearing to the concerned person even for determining the market value, detailed criteria are laid down in Rule 8 of the Rules. Rule 8 is as under:

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“8. Principles to be taken into consideration for determination of market value The Collector of the District shall while determining the market value of a property which is the subject-matter of an instrument take into consideration primarily the capitalized value of the property, i.e, the amount of money whose annual interest at the highest prevailing interest at any given time is its net annual income, and also the following factors, namely: (a) in the case of agricultural land,-

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(i) classification of land under the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879;

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(ii) the rate of the land revenue; (iii) the nature of crops raised on the land;

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(iv) average yield from the land, its nearness to road and market, its distance from the village site road to land, facilities available for irrigation and also for transport of produce of such land;

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(v) value of adjacent land or land in vicinity;

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(vi) any factors mentioned in the instrument which is relevant for the purpose of determination of the true market value;

¶163

(vii) any other factor which the Collector of the District thinks to have a bearing on the value of the land;

¶164

(b) in the case of non-agricultural land,

¶165

(i) the general value of nonagricultural land in the vicinity;

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(ii) facilities such as road, railway station, bus route, shops, market and the like available in the vicinity of the land;

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(iii) amenities like public offices, hospitals and educational institutions available in the vicinity of the land;

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(iv) development activities including development of industries in the vicinity of the land;

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(v) any factor mentioned in the instrument which is relevant for the purpose of determination of true market value',

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(vi) any other factor which the Collector of the District thinks to have a bearing on the valuation of the non-agricultural land',

¶173

(c) in the case of buildings,

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(i) the area of construction;

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(ii) the floor space index; (iii) type and structure;

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(iv) year of construction;

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(v) kind of material used;

¶178

(vi) locality in which constructed; (vii) rate of depreciation; (viii) any factor mentioned in the instrument which is relevant for the purpose of determination of true market value;

¶179

(ix) any other factor which the Collector of the District thinks to have a bearing on the valuation of the building

¶180

(d) in the case of any other property,

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(i) the nature and condition of the property;

¶182

(ii) purpose for which the property is being put to use;

¶183

(iii) any factor mentioned in the instrument which is relevant for the purpose of determination of the property.”

¶184

The aforesaid principles of determining

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the market value can be said to be most reasonable and scientific by any standard. Further it is specially provided that any factor mentioned in the instrument which is relevant for the purpose of determination of true market value is required to be taken into consideration by the Collector. Therefore, the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioners that as Section 2(na) of the Act provides for determination of market value of the property on the date of execution of instrument, it is arbitrary and irrational, requires to be rejected because for determining the market value the Collector is required to take into consideration the factors such as agreement to sell executed on a particular date (if it is a genuine one), the orders passed by the statutory authorities determining the price of the land or property, or such other relevant factors including the factor that the property is let out and the tenant occupying the lands or building is protected either under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act or under the Bombay Rent Act. Not only this, it is also provided that the Collector is required to take into consideration any other factor which he considers to have a bearing on the valuation of the land or building. Therefore, in Section 2(na) it is rightly provided that market value in relation to any property which is subject-matter of an instrument means

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the price which such property would have fetched if sold in open market on the date of execution of such instrument. If a property transferred is mortgaged with possession, then in the said set of circumstances the market value of the said property is to be determined after taking into consideration the fact that it is mortgaged with possession and for getting possession of the property the purchaser is required to redeem the property and also in some cases there may be litigation. Therefore, this factor would have to be taken into consideration before determining its market value. Similarly, if there are sitting tenants over a land or a building, then such property would not fetch the same market value as the one over which there are no sitting tenants. Similarly, if agreement to sell is executed, which is a genuine one, then the Collector is bound to take into consideration the facts mentioned in the agreement to sell. But in the agreement to sell itself if consideration is understated or that the agreement to sell is not a genuine one, then he can discard it. All these and such other factors which have bearing on the market value are required to be considered by the Collector in each and every case while determining the market price of the property conveyed. Therefore, the Legislature has wisely used the phrase 'price which such property would have fetched if sold in open market on the date of execution of such instrument'.

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If the property is encumbered or charged or there are tenants over it, then it would not fetch the same market price as the property which is free from any such encumbrances. Hence, it cannot be said that Section 2(na) is in any manner illegal, arbitrary or irrational.

¶194

34. Apart from the aforesaid Rule 8, at the time of hearing the learned Advocate General has produced on record Government Resolutions dated 19th May, 1990 and 30th September, 1991. Resolution dated 30th September, 1991 inter alia provided that:

¶195

(i) With regard to sheds/plots directly allotted by the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, the price shown by the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation is to be taken into consideration;

¶196

(ii) The provision of Section 32A is not to be made applicable to the sale deed executed by any statutory Board or Government Administration or property sold by public auction by local bodies like Panchayat, Municipality, Municipal Corporation or the sale deed executed after obtaining sanction from the Charity Commissioner or on the basis of scheme framed under Section 21 of the Urban Land 'Ceiling & Regulation) Act.

¶197

Not only this, but thereafter also rules are amended by Notification dated 13th March, 1992. The relevant part is as

¶198

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under:

¶201

2. In the Bombay Stamp (Determination of Market Value Of Property) Rules, 1984, in Rule 3, after Sub-rule (2;, the following proviso shall be inserted, namely-

¶202

“Provided that nothing in this Sub-rule shall apply to.

¶203

(a) conveyance deed executed by small and marginal farmer of his own agricultural land;

¶204

Explanation: The expression 'small farmer' and 'marginal farmer' shall have the meaning assigned to them in Section 2 of the Gujarat Rural Debtors Relief Act, 1976.

¶205

(b) document executed by any statutory Board or Government Company;

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(c) conveyance deed to be executed by local bodies such as Panchayat, Municipality. Municipal Corporation where sale by auction of any property is carried out as per prescribed rules and resolution;

¶207

(d) conveyance deed of the trust property wherein sanction of the Charity Commissioner has been obtained.

¶208

35. It should be noted that guidelines or amended rules would not be applicable in the cases where the Statutory Board or the Government Authority purchase the property. To that extent, in our view,

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there is lacuna in the guidelines or the rules framed by the State (Government. Still, however, in view of the aforesaid provisions and discussion, it would be difficult to accept the contention that concept of market value is vague and it gives unguided power to the concerned officer which could be used as means of oppression by the officers entrusted with duty of collecting stamp duty. It is apparent that the State Legislature has taken the necessary care to see that the powers are not misused and are circumscribed by laying down exhaustive guidelines. Therefore, in some cases, if powers are misused, that would hardly be a ground to hold that the statutory provisions are illegal or arbitrary. Assuming that in some cases powers are misused, it can be challenged before the Chief Controlling Revenue Officer as per Section 32B and/or by filing a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India before this Court.”

¶212

In view of above dictum of law and as held by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan (supra) , that the registering authority has to ascertain the correct valuation given in the instrument regarding the market value of the property at the time of sale cannot be considered in the facts of the case as in that case, the

¶213

time was taken to execute the sale deed after the agreement for sale was executed due to

¶214

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litigation. Whereas, in the facts of the case, the sale was completed in the year 1987 and only the conveyance deed was executed in the year 2004. Therefore, the market value cannot be the sale consideration as on the date of the instrument in peculiar facts of the case.

¶217

Reliance placed on behalf of the respondent on the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Mit Housing Association Vs. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority in LPA no.919 of 2016 is concerned, the same was in respect of the question as to whether the Gujarat State Textile Corporation Ltd. would be covered by the proviso to Section 32A of the Act or not. The Division Bench of this Court in such context defined the word “State Government” appearing in the proviso and has held as under :-

¶218

“27.In the main part of the provision of Sec tion 32A of the Act, 1958 the word “market value” is important. In the same manner, in the proviso to Section 32A of the Act, 1958 which came into effect from 11.06.2004, the important term therein is “S tate Government”. The term“State Government” has not been defined under the Act, 1958.How ever,the term “State Government” as defined under the General Clauses Act, 1897, reads thus:

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“State Government”,-

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(a) as respects anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, shall mean, in a Part A State, the Provincial Government of the corresponding Province, in a Part B State, the authority or person authorised at the relevant date to exercise executive government in the corresponding Acceding State, and in a Part C State, the Central Government;

¶223

(b) as respects anything done after the commencement of the Constitution and before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, shall mean, in a Part A State, the Governor, in a Part B State, the Rajpramukh, and in a Part C State, the Central Government;

¶224

(c) as respects anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, shall mean, in a State, the Governor, and in a Union territory, the Central Government; and shall, in relation to functions entrusted under article 258A of the Constitution to the Government of India, include the Central Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under the article;”

¶225

28.In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon a decisionof the Supreme Court in the case of Srikant V/s.Vasantrao,reporte d in 2006(2) SCC 682 wherein the Supreme Court in context with Section 9A of the Representation of People Act, 1951 has observed as under:

¶226

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“15. The term 'State Government' is not defined either in the Constitution of India or in the Act (that is Representation of the People Act, 1951). Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Act provides that unless the context otherwise requires, each of the expressions defined in section 2 or subsection (1) of section 27 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, but not defined in the Act, shall have the same meaning as in that Act. Section 2(j) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 defines "State Government" as follows :-

¶229

"2(j). 'State Government'.- State Government in relation to Union Territory means the administration thereof."

¶230

Section 2(60) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, provides that the term "State Government", as respects anything done or to be done, shall mean in a State, the Governor.

¶231

16. The High Court after an exhaustive consideration of the provision of MGMIDC

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Act and MJA Act, and the principles laid down by this Court with reference to Article 12, has held that GMIDC and MJP answer the definition of "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution. This is not seriously disputed by the Appellant. Having reached the conclusion that both GMIDC and MJP answer the definition of State under Article 12, the High Court wrongly and if we may say so, without any logical basis, assumed that they are 'appropriate government' and

¶235

consequently, the appellant who had subsisting contracts with GMIDC and MJP incurred disqualification under section 9-A of the Act. Neither Article 12 nor the decisions rendered with reference to

¶236

Article 12 is of any assistance for interpreting Section 9A of the Act. The term 'State Government' (as also the term 'Central Government') is used in the various provisions relating to disqualification, in contradistinction

¶237

from its instrumentalities or local or other authorities. While it is true that the meaning of the terms 'State' and 'State Government' may depend on the context in which they are used, the manner in which the said terms are used

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in the various provisions relating to disqualification leaves no doubt that 'State' refers to an entity described in the First Schedule to the Constitution of India and 'State Government' refers to the three wings of governance of the 'State' that is Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. The term 'State Government' in section 9A (read with section 7 of the Act) should, therefore, be understood in its ordinary and normal sense, and not with reference to the extended meaning under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

¶241

17. Article 12 provides that in Part III of the Constitution dealing with fundamental rights, the word 'State' would refer to and include not only the Government of India, Parliament of India, the Government and Legislature of each of the States, but also all local and other authorities within the territory of India and all local and other authorities under the control of Government of India. The significance of Article 12 lies in the fact that it occurs in Part III of the Constitution which deals with Fundamental Rights. The

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various Articles in Part III have placed responsibilities and obligations on the "State" vis-a-vis the individual, to ensure constitutional protection of the individual's rights against the "State", including the right to equality under Article 14, and equality of opportunity in matters of public employment under Article 16 and most importantly the right to enforce all or any of those fundamental rights against the "State" as defined in Article 12, either under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution [vide Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra)]. The decisions rendered under Article 12 lay down that a body would answer the definition of State under Article 12 if it is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under all pervasive control of the "Government". On the other hand, where the control by the "Government" is merely regulatory, whether under any statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body 'State'. Thus the very decisions relied on by the High Court make it clear that 'instrumentalities of State' are different from 'State Government',

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though both may answer the definition of 'State' under Article 12 for the limited purpose of Part-III of the Constitution. Further, the very inclusive definition of 'State' under Article 12 by referring to Government of India, the Government of each of the States and the local and other authorities, makes it clear that a 'State Government' and a local or other authorities, are different and that they fall under a common definition only for the purpose of Part-III of the Constitution. This Court has consistently refused to apply the enlarged definition of 'State' given in Part-III (and Part-IV) of the Constitution, for interpreting the words 'State' or 'State Government' occurring in other parts of the Constitution. While the term "State" may include a State Government as also statutory or other authorities for the purposes of part-III (or Part-IV) of the Constitution, the term "State Government" in its ordinary sense does not encompass in its fold either a local or statutory authority. It follows, therefore, that though GMIDC and MJP may fall within the scope of 'State' for

¶248

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purposes of Part-III of the Constitution, they are not "State Government" for the purposes of section 9-A (read with section 7) of the Act.”

¶251

29.However, the term “market value” has been defined under Section2(na) of the Act, 1958. The definition reads thus:

¶252

“Section 2(na) “market value”, in relation to any property which is the subject matter of an instrument means the price which such property would have fetched if sold in open market on the date of execution of such instrument;”

¶253

30.Two principles of construction one relati ng to casus omissus andthe other in regard t o reading the statute as a whole appear to b e wellsettled. Under the first principle a c asusomissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time acasus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to

¶254

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manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature. "An intention t o produce an unreasonable result", said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopiou (at All ER p. 544I), "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result", we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC where at AC p. 577 he also observed: (All ER p. 664I) "This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges."] .

¶257

31. The intention of a Legislature normally comprises of two components. The first relates to the concept of meaning i.e. what is commonly understood meaning of the expressions chosen to be used by the Legislature and the second aspect conveys the purpose and object or the reason or spirit behind the legislation itself. In all normal circumstances, primarily, the language employed in the statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intention. The first and primary rule of construction therefore, is that the intention of the Legislature must be gathered

¶258

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from the words employed by the Legislature i tself.Long years ago, Lord Atkin in Pakala N arayana Swami v. Emperor has observed: " But in truth when the meaning of words is plain, it is not the duty of the Courts to busy themselves with supposed intentions." If the words of a statute are very precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expand those words in their natural and ordinary sense. In Emperor v. Benoarilal Sarma, it is set out that:

¶261

" In construing enacted words we are not concerned with the policy involved or with the results, injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used."

¶262

In Kanailal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhu K han, it is held that "The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act, whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the Courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction."

¶263

32. We are not impressed by the vociferous submission canvassed on behalf of the appellants that the word

¶264

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“State Government” in the proviso to Section 32A of the Act, 1958 must be understood to mean “State” in the wider sense of the term as in the Article 12 of the Constitution of India. According to Mr. Shah, a property belonging to a local authority or an agency or the instrumentalities of the State would also come within the ambit of “Government Property” for the purpose of the Act.

¶267

33. In our view, this submission must be rejected. The extended meaning of “State” is relevant only for Part III of the Constitution of India which is the chapter on fundamental rights. It, therefore, follows that the State not only includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the legislature of each of the State, but also all local and other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, for the purpose of Part III of the Constitution of India and even the agencies or instrumentalities of th e State will come within the definition of State. In the instant case , we are not concerned with a petition filed by the petitioner for the e nforcement of his fundamental rights, and therefore, the definition of State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India can be of no help to the petitioner. There is nothing in the Section 32A of the Act which gives to the term

¶268

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“State Government” an extended meaning so as to include its agencies, instrumentalities and local authorities under its control.

¶271

34.In our opinion, the view taken by the lea rned Single Judge lays down the correct proposition of law. In the context of the Indian Constitution “State Government” would mean the Governor acting through the council of Ministers.”

¶272

However, in the facts of the case, the RUDA is an authority established under the Act which is authorized to carry-out the task assigned by the State Government. The functions of the Urban Development Authority are described by this Court in case of Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority (supra) as under :-

¶273

3.1. That the assessee AUDA is constituted as Urban Development Authority, constituted by the State Government in exercise of powers under Section 22 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the "Town Planning Act"). The powers and function of the AUDA as Urban Development Authority are as per Section 23 of the Town Planning Act. As per Section 23 of the Town Planning Act, the AUDA as a Urban Development Authority is required to undertake the development of the Urban Area having jurisdiction as per the Notification issued by the State Government. The function of the AUDA as Urban

¶274

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Development Authority are as under:

¶277

(i) To undertake the preparation of development plans under the provisions of this Act, for the urban development area;

¶278

(ii) To undertake the preparation 2 [and execution] of town planning schemes under the provisions of this Act, if so directed by the State Government;

¶279

(iii) To carry out surveys in the urban development area for the preparation of development plans or town planning schemes;

¶280

(iv) To guide, direct and assist the local authority or authorities and other statutory authorities functioning in the urban development area in matters pertaining to the planning, development and use of urban land;

¶281

(v) To control the development activities in accordance with the development plan in the urban development area; 3 [(v-a) to levy and collect such security fees for secrutiny of documents submitted to the appropriate authority for permission for development as may be prescribed by regulations;

¶282

(vi) To execute works in connection with supply of water, disposal of sewerage and provision of other services and amenities; 4 [(via) to levy and collect such fees for the execution of works referred to in clause (vi) and for provision of other services and amenities as may be prescribed by regulations;]

¶283

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(vii) To acquire, hold, manage and dispose of property, movable or immovable, as it may deem necessary;

¶286

(viii) To enter into contracts, agreements or arrangements, with any local authority, person or organisation as the urban development authority may consider necessary for performing its functions;

¶287

(ix) To carry any development works in the urban development area as may be assigned to it by the State Government from time to time;

¶288

(x) To exercise such other powers and perform such other functions as are supplemental, incidental or consequential to any of the foregoing powers and functions or as may be directed by the State Government.”

¶289

Relying upon the aforesaid functions of the AUDA, it was held by the Court that it cannot be said that the activities of the AUDA was in nature of trade commerce or business so as to apply the proviso to Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which was introduced by the Finance Act, 2008 w.e.f. 1^st April 2009. In such circumstances, the RUDA can also be equated to the State Government. Therefore, the intention of the legislature is very clear to include the urban development authority as constituted under the provisions of the Act which is a creator of

¶290

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legislation would be a State within the purview of the proviso to Section 32A of the Stamp Act. Therefore, the sale consideration value stated in the conveyance deed is to be deemed to be true market value of the property in question.

¶293

Moreover, as held by the Full Bench in the case of Gorwa Vibhag (supra) , which was applied by the Full Bench in case of Chitvan Cooperative Housing (supra) the jantri rates as on the date of registration of the conveyance deed cannot be said to reflect the correct value of the property on the date of the sale. In the facts of the present case as sale took place in the year 1987, the respondent authorities could not have determined the market value of the property on the date of execution of conveyance deed as the sale of the land in question was effected pursuant to the order dated 21^st November 1984 passed by the Collector. Moreover, the definition of local authority is not given in the Stamp Act, but under Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1997 local authority is defined as under :-

¶294

“Local authority shall mean a municipal committee, District Court, body of Court Commissioners of other authority, legally entitled to or entrusted to the Government with a control or management of municipal provision.”

¶295

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In view of the aforesaid definition of “local authority” RUDA is constituted under the Act by the State Government for discharging the functions as stated hereinabove. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the RUDA cannot be considered as State Government.

¶298

This Court in case of Arraycom (India) Ltd. (supra) while applying the proviso to Section 32A has held as under :-

¶299

“8. I have heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties. It is an undisputed fact that the petitioner company has paid an amount of Rs.19,85,765/- when the petitioner company entered into leasehold rights in the year 1994. The State of Gujarat thought it fit that if the plot altered in GIDC that completed 15 years time commencing the commercial production on the issuance of the said notification in the year 2006,the petitioner company would be entitled for freehold rights, if he deposits 30% of the premium/consideration fixed by the GIDC. It appears that even in the year 2011, the Jantri price with regard to the land in question is Rs.3500/- per

¶300

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sq. mtr. and therefore, 30% of the said premium for the land in question would come Rs.1,26,36,750/, which has been decided by the GIDC and accordingly the said amount has been paid by the petitioner company and accordingly stamp duty was affixed on the conveyance. Now the provision of Section 32(A)of the Act is perused, the proviso makes clear that the consideration fixed by the GIDC etc. shall be deemed to be true market value of the property. Section – 32(A)reads as under:

¶303

32A (1) Every instrument of conveyance, exchange, gift, certificate of sale, partition, partnership, settlement, power of attorney to sell immovable property when given for consideration or transfer of lease by way of assignment, presented for registration under provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 (XVI of 1908) shall be accompanied by a true copy thereof;[and the Statement in such form as may be prescribed by rules]and if an officer registering such instrument under the aforesaid

¶304

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Act or any person referred to in section 33 before whom such instrument is produced or comes in the performance of his functions, has reason to believe that the consideration set forth therein does not approximate to the market value of the property which is the subject matter of such instrument or as the case may be the market value of the property which is the subject matter of such instrument, has not been truly set forth therein, he[shall before]registering the instrument or, as the case may be, performing his functions in respect of such instrument, refer the instrument or true copy thereof to the Collector of such district in which either the whole or any part of the property is situated for determining the true market value of such property and the proper duty payable on the instrument under this section.

¶307

Provided that for the purpose of this Sub-section, the consideration set forth in an instrument executed by the State Government, the Central Government, a local authority,

¶308

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Gujarat Housing Board, Gujarat Slum Clearance Board or Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, shall be deemed to be the true market value of the property which is the subject matter of such instrument.

¶311

(2) xxx xxx xxx

¶312

(3) xxx xxx xxx”

¶313

10. Now the aforesaid aspect was brought to the notice by the registrar to the Deputy Collector, which reflects from the impugned order, however, as the same has been discarded by the authority, which is contrary to the proviso. The object to treat certain sale transaction by the State of Gujarat, the Central Board, a local authority, Gujarat Housing Board, Gujarat Slum Clearance Board or Gujarat Industrial Development

¶314

Corporation from questioning their transactions with regard totrue market value is accepted. The Supreme power of such authority which working for public good. There is no State of Gujarat,Central Government, Local Authority do transfer/sale the land

¶315

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lesser than Jantri price, with some positive object and therefore, the State cannot be questioned under the provisions of the Stamp Act. It is an admitted fact that the Gujarat Housing Board, Gujarat Slum Clearance Board allotted the land to middle class to slum dweller unit to alter at a cheaper price than market price, however, the purchaser cannot be asked to pay market value of the property, which would be reflected in Jantri. The GIDC which is also included along with the above referred authorities and since the GIDC has been established for industrial development in remote area so that it can provide employment to various persons.

¶318

11.In the present case,when the GIDC has considered the price at Rs.1,26,36,750/and has accepted the same, in my opinion the authority has committed an error in determining the price as per the Jantri rate.

¶319

12.Considering the above aspect, I am of the opinion that the petition requires consideration and accordingly is

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allowed. The dated 21.10.2013/1.11.2013 passed by the Deputy Collector,Stamp Duty Valuation, Gandhinagar is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute. Direct service is permitted.”

¶323

The respondent no.1 – Chief Controlling

¶324

Revenue Authority was required to refer the

¶325

matter to this Court under Section 54(1) for the substantial question of law raised by the petitioner in the application filed by it. The respondent no.1 while passing the order dated 20^th

¶326

February 2018 has held that it has no power to refer the matter to this Court under Section 54(1)(A) of the Act but in fact, it has decided that there is no substantial question of law, which arises for consideration of this Court.

¶327

However, the respondent no.1 has no discretion

¶328

but to refer the matter to this Court in view of

¶329

the provisions of Section 54(1)(A) of the Act which starts with non obstante clause requiring

¶330

the respondent no.1 – Chief Controlling Revenue

¶331

Authority to refer a statement of case to the

¶332

Page 53 of 55

¶333

C/SCA/6873/2018 JUDGMENT

¶334

High Court within 90 days upon the receipt of the application. As the provision of Section 54(1)

¶335

(A) is clear, it was incumbent upon the

¶336

respondent no.1 to refer the statement of claim for the opinion of this Court as the word “shall” clearly leaves no discretion on the part of the respondent no.1 to refuse such a request if the other conditions stated in the Section 54(1)(A) are fulfilled.

¶337

In view of the foregoing reasons, the impugned orders passed by the respondent nos.1 and 2 are not tenable in law and are required to

¶338

be quashed and set aside. The petition

¶339

therefore, succeeds and accordingly allowed. The impugned orders dated 22^nd May 2017 and 10^th

¶340

December 2017 passed by the Deputy Collector, Stamp Duty Valuation Department, Gandhinagar as well as Chief Controlling Authority respectively

¶341

are hereby quashed and set aside. The

¶342

respondents are directed to refund the amount of the stamp duty deposited by the petitioner so as

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Page 54 of 55

¶344

C/SCA/6873/2018 JUDGMENT

¶345

to prefer appeal before the respondent no.1 within the period of 3 months from the date of receipt of writ of this order together with the simple interest @ 6% from the date of deposit by the petitioner till its realization. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent . No order as to costs.

¶346

(BHARGAV D. KARIA, J.)

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AMAR RATHOD...

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Page 55 of 55

Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and Superintendent of Stamps

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and Superintendent of Stamps

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

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