Quashed

Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Bhikhabhai G Patel

Gujarat HC3 Feb 2014SCA/5347/2008

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court quashed the Industrial Tribunal's award that set aside the petitioner Corporation's penalty of withholding one increment from a workman, holding that under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to interfere with punishments other than dismissal or discharge absent specific exceptions.

What did the court decide?

The judgment and award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 29th June 2007 quantifying and setting aside the penalty were quashed and set aside.

Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation Vs… — Labour and Industrial Disputes | Gujarat HC (2014)

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C/SCA/5347/2008 JUDGMENT

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

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SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5347 of 2008

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FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

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HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.V.ANJARIA

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== 1	============================================================== Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? Yes
2	To be referred to the Reporter or not ? Yes
3	Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ? No
4	Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ? No
5	Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ? No
==	============================================================== GUJARAT STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION....Petitioner(s)

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Versus

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BHIKHABHAI G PATEL....Respondent(s)

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================================================================ Appearance:

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MR HS MUNSHAW, ADVOCATE for the Petitioner(s) No. 1

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MR.KRUTARTH K PANDYA, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 1

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================================================================

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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.V.ANJARIA

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Date : 03/02/2014

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ORAL JUDGMENT

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Pursuant to the charge of misconduct and a

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Page 1 of 18

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regular departmental inquiry conducted, the competent
disciplinary authority of petitioner Gujarat State
Road Transport Corporation imposed punishment of
stoppage of one increment with future effect on the
respondent workman.

¶20

2.The Industrial Tribunal on 29th June, 2007
delivering its judgment and award in Reference (IT)
No.289 of 2001, set aside the said penalty and
directed the petitioner-Corporation to make good the
entire monetary loss to the respondent-workman by
paying the difference. It is this judgment and award
which is challenged by the petitioner by filing the
present petition.

¶21

3.The basic facts may be noted. The
respondent-workman was employed as Conductor in the
Mehsana Depot of Visnagar Division of the petitioner-
Corporation. He was served with chargesheet dated 11th
February, 1998. The charges levelled against him were
inter alia that on 06th January, 1998 he forced a bus,
plying between Chanasma to Ladol to drive through the
road between Malosana to Ladol, even though the said
road was not fit for vehicular traffic and it was not
possible for the bus to pass through the said road. It
was alleged that at around 1755 hours, the respondent-
workman instigated residents of village Malosana,
unauthorisedly stopped the bus and misbehaved with the
Driver and Conductor of Chanasma Depot and obstructed
them in discharge of their duties.

¶22

3.1For the said misconduct of negligence in

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duty and causing loss to the Corporation, the workman
was departmentally prosecuted. At the end of the
inquiry, misconduct against the workman was found to
be proved. The competent authority imposed penalty of
withholding of an increment for one year with future
effect. The first departmental appeal preferred by the
workman was dismissed. The workman raised industrial
dispute questioning the said penalty before the
Industrial Tribunal which Reference culminated into
impugned judgment and award.

¶26

4.Heard learned advocate Mr.H.S. Munshaw for
the petitioner-Corporation and learned advocate
Mr.Krutarth K. Pandya for respondent-workman.

¶27

5.The incident about commission of misconduct
of the workman came to the fore when Surpanch of
village complained to the Corporation by addressing
letters. The Industrial Tribunal while dealing with
the Reference examined the inquiry report, material
before the Inquiry Officer and the findings recorded
by the Inquiry Officer. The Tribunal found that the
Reporter who submitted report about misconduct of the
workman, was examined in the inquiry. It was observed
that necessary questions were asked to the Reporter.
He in course of his evidence produced statements of
Driver and Conductor who were on duty of the bus and
also two letters of the Surpanch of the Village
Malosan in support. Considering evidence of the
Reporter along with other supporting material, the
charge was held to be established that the Conductor
had misbehaved and that there was altercation between

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C/SCA/5347/2008 JUDGMENT

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the villagers and workman concerned.

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5.1The report of the Reporter and his evidence
duly supported by the above-mentioned statements and
the letters constituted adequate evidence, on the
basis of which the Inquiry Officer had held that
charge against the workman was proved. The Industrial
Tribunal erred in its reasoning that as the Reporter
was not a witness to the incident, his evidence could
not have been accepted. The materials before the
Investigating Officer were sufficient to bring home
the guilt of the workman.

¶32

6.Notably, the workman had given up contention
regarding procedural legality and fairness of the
inquiry by filing Purshis (Exh.17) before the
Industrial Tribunal. As held by the Apex Court in
Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation Vs Vinod
Kumar [(2008) 1 SCC 115], and also by this Court in
Muljibhai Patel Urological Hospital Vs Arunaben [2008
(3) GLR 2656], where the workman challenges only the
conclusion raised by the Inquiry Officer and the
quantum of punishment, but not the legality of inquiry
proceedings, Industrial Tribunal would not be
justified in examining the findings of the Inquiry
Officer and hold that charge was not proved, except in
limited consideration of unfair labour practice,
victimisation or on the proportionality of punishment.
The first two factors being absent in the present
case, punishment which the Tribunal imposed was one of
withholding of an increment with future effect. Given
the law laid down in Vinod Kumar (supra) by the Apex

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Court and Muljibhai Patel Urological Hospital (supra)
by this Court, the contention regarding legality of
inquiry having been forgone by the workman, going into
the findings of the Inquiry Officer by the Industrial
Tribunal was manifestly errorsome, unjustified and
impermissible in law, in the facts of the case.

¶36

7.The penalty with which the Industrial
Tribunal tinkered with was other than dismissal or
discharge. As noted above, the management of the
Corporation imposed punishment of withholding of one
yearly increment with future effect. A Division Bench
of this Court in Gujarat State Road Transport
Corporation Vs Prabhashanker K. Acharya [1992 (2) GLH
354] considered the nature and scope of powers of
Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal under Section 11A of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was observed
that Labour Court and/or Industrial Tribunal are
conferred with powers under Section 11A of the Act to
interfere in the cases specifically of discharge or
dismissal only. It was held that Labour Court and/or
Industrial Tribunal is not expected to act as an
Appellate Authority nor can it casually interfere with
the nature and quantum of punishment. The Division
Bench observed,

¶37

“The effect and change in the law by S.
11A is, however, relating to the
punishment of discharge and dismissal and
not for other kinds of punishment.
Managerial rights are not restricted to
that extent under S. 11A and the
jurisdiction of the Labour Court and the
Tribunal is widened to that extent so far
as the finding of misconduct and the

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punishment of discharge and dismissal are
concerned. The law on the point for other
kinds of punishment except the
punishment of discharge or dismissal
remains unaffected by the provisions of
S. 11A, Industrial Disputes Act.”

¶41

 (Para 17)

¶42

(Per: Chauhan, J)

¶43

7.1It was further stated,

¶44

“S. 11A only empowers the Labour Court
or the Tribunal to interfere with the
punishment regarding the discharge or
dismissal of the workman and it does not
specifically refer to any other kind of
punishment. It also empowers the Labour
Court or the Tribunal to interfere with
the order of discharge or dismissal if
it is not satisfied that such punishment
was justified and in that case, it may
set aside the order of discharge or
dismissal and direct the reinstatement
on such terms and conditions as it may
think fit. The Labour Court or Tribunal
may, in such cases, grant other relief
including the lesser punishment in lieu
of discharge or dismissal. As the
section does not refer to either kinds
of punishment, which the management is
entitled to award for certain acts of
misconduct, it cannot be accepted that
this section e powers and vests
jurisdiction in the Labour Court or
Tribunal to to interfere with the order
of punishment than the one imposed by
the management. the Legislature must be
aware of the restricted jurisdiction and
the powers of the discussed above, and
even then did not vest the jurisdiction
or empower the Labour Court or the
Industrial Tribunal to interfere with or
substitute other kind of punishment than
that of the discharge or dismissal. If
at all the intention of the Legislature
would have been to substitute other
punishment, it would have specifically
included them in S. 11A and would have

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¶47

confined it to the punishment of
discharge or dismissal. It also cannot
be accepted that it reflects the
intention of the policy of the
Legislature and, therefore, the said
principles should also be made
applicable to other kinds of punishment.
If at all that would have have been the
policy and the Legislature wanted to
restrict the managerial power for other
kinds of punishment, there was no reason
for not making such provisions in S. 11A
or in any other provisions of the Act.”

¶48

7.1.1The Court observed that powers of Labour
Court and/or Industrial Tribunal to interfere with
finding of misconduct and that of the order imposing
punishment other than punishment of discharge or
dismissal are restricted eventhough Labour Court
and/or Industrial Tribunal has wider powers than
revisional powers. Interference could be justified,
the Court held, in the circumstances mentioned, it was
clarified. It was only in the circumstances, without
being exhaustive, of one of good faith, victimization
or unfair labour practice, basic error of violation of
principles of natural justice, finding recorded is
completely perverse, exercise of powers found
colourable and punishment to be shockingly
disproportionate having regard to the nature of
misconduct committed.

¶49

7.1.2In a concurring judgment (per Ahmadi, J)
the Court observed with regard to object, the
legislature intended to subserve, while inserting
Section 11A of the statute book. The reasons which

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¶52

inspired insertion of the provisions were two-folds.
Firstly, the decision of the Apex Court in Indian Iron
and Steel Company Limited Vs Their workman[AIR
1958 SC 130] wherein the Apex Court observed that
Industrial Tribunal does not act as a Court of Appeal
and substitute its own judgment in place of that of
the management, unless one of good faith,
victimization, unfair labour practice, etc., on the
part of the management is proved. The second reason
was the recommendation No.119 of the Indian Labour
Organisation (ILO) concerning the workers right to
challenge his termination before a neutral body.

¶53

7.1.3With regard to powers available under
Section 11A, concurring judgment said,

¶54

“This power is specifically confined to
cases of discharge or dismissal and not
to other case where the punishment
imposed is short of that. That would
ordinarily mean that the Legislature
intended to permit interference in
managerial discretion by the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal in cases where
the punishment results in termination of
employment and not in all cases. In other
words, case of punishments other than
discharge or dismissal would continue to
be governed by the law laid down by
judicial pronouncements prior to the
insertion of S. 11A in the Act.”

¶55

 (para 3)
(Per Ahmadi, J)

¶56

7.1.4The anxious Court proceeded to state,

¶57

“ThetendencyoftheLabour
Court/Industrial Tribunal to lightly
interfere with the order of punishment,
is clear where the punishment inflicted

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¶60

is short of dismissal or discharge, as
if it were exercising appellate
jurisdiction must be deprecated. It must
be remembered that the quantum of
punishment cannot be measured in golden
scales and will differ from individual
to individual depending on his notions
ofdisciplinebuttheLabour
Court/Industrial Tribunal will not be
justified in interfering with the
employer's order of punishment merely
because it would have visited workman
with a lighter punishment if it were
wearing the employer's shoes. It is only
incaseswheretheLabour
Court/Industrial Tribunal comes to the
conclusion, for reasons to be stated in
writing, that the punishment imposed is
grossly disproportionate to the proved
misconduct that it may interfere with
the order of punishment. Such cases
would be far and few. Unfortunately, we
havenoticedthattheLabour
Court/IndustrialTribunalfreely
interferewiththequantumof
punishment, some of the cases on hand
areexamplesofunwarranted
interference, which has been responsible
for generating a lot of avoidable
litigation. That is why it was thought
that the time was ripe for clearly
stating the jurisdictional parameters of
the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal in
such cases. However, a word of caution
for the managements seems necessary,
namely, that it must act in a reasonable
manner in the choice of punishments from
the wide range of censure to dismissal
if it does not want the Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal to interfere
on the ground that the severity of the
punishment betrays victimisation.”

¶61

(para 7)

¶62

(per Ahmadi, J)

¶63

8.

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Another Division Bench inMunicipal

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Commissioner, Baroda Vs Santakumar D. Brahmbhatt

¶68

[1992 (1) GLR 432] held that though Section 11A would
clearly come into play when there is an order of
discharge or dismissal, however, once dispute is
referred to the Tribunal, the Tribunal would have
jurisdiction to decide whether the penalty is unduly
severe. It was held that the Labour Court or Tribunal
can set right the matter. Following were the
observations in paragraph 4 of the said decision:

¶69

“The learned Advocate for the petitioner was
right when he contended that on the express
language of Sec. 11A of the Act, such
controversy could not be covered by the said
provision as such provision relates to only
discharge or dismissal of a workman. However,
on the facts of the present case, the very
dispute which is referred to the Industrial
Tribunal for adjudication centres round the
legality and propriety of the imposition of
punishment of stoppage of three yearly
increments with future effect. Once that
dispute is referred for adjudication, the
Industrial Tribunal in exercise of its power
under Sec. 11A was bound to adjudicate upon
that dispute and pronounce upon it. The term
“industrial dispute” is defined by Sec. 2(k)
to mean any dispute or difference between
employers and employers or between employers
and workmen. It cannot be gainsaid that there
is difference or dispute between the employer
and employee in connection with the
punishment imposed on the workman. Therefore,
de horsSec. 11A, the legality and
impropriety of the punishment had to be
examined by the Industrial Tribunal while
adjudicating this very dispute which was
referred for adjudication. Consequently, when
the Industrial Tribunal considered the
gravity of the punishment in the light of the
charges having been held proved, it cannot be
said that it was exercising jurisdiction not

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vested in it. In fact, it was its obligation
to adjudicate this very dispute which was
referred for adjudication.”
(para 4)

¶73

8.1In Special Civil Application No.1026 of

¶74

1999, the order of the Industrial Tribunal which
reduced penalty imposed on the workman from reduction
of salary by 16 stages imposed by the competent
authority of the employer, to the punishment of
reduction of five stages was under challange. The
workman in that case was a conductor who was charged
with misappropriation by reissuing the used tickets.
The aforesaid order by the Tribunal reducing penalty
was passed in exercise of powers under Section 11A of
the Act. After learned Single Judge of this Court
dismissed the said Special Civil Application No.1026
of 1999, Letters Patent Appeal No.513 of 1999 came to
be preferred in which the Division Bench noticed the
conflict of view betweenPrabhashanker Acharya
(supra)andSantakumar Brahmbhatt (supra)and
recorded order, relevant part of which reads as under:

¶75

“2. Mr.Hardik C.Rawal, learned counsel for
the appellant placing his reliance upon a
Division Bench judgement dated 29.03.2005 of
this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.1199
of 2002 submits that powers vested in the
Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal under
sec.11A of the Act can be exercised only in
cases which relate to discharge or dismissal
of a workman and not otherwise. On the other
hand Mr.Prabhakar Upadhyay, learned counsel
for the workman placing his reliance upon yet
another Division bench judgement of this
Court in the matter of Municipal
Commissioner,BarodaVs.Sanatkumar
D.Brahmbhatt, reported in 1992(1) G.L.R. 432

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submits that when a reference is made to the
Labour Court/Industrial Court, then the whole
issue is writ large before the said
Court/Tribunal and de hors section 11A of the
Act, legality and propriety of the punishment
will have to be examined by the Industrial
Tribunal while adjudicating this dispute
which was referred for adjudication.

¶79

3. After going through both the judgements we
are of the considered opinion that there is a
sharp conflict in the said two judgements. We
are of the opinion that the matter deserves
to be considered by a Larger Bench of this
Court to bring at rest the controversy once
for all. Let the matter be placed before the
Honourable Chief Justice for referring the
matter to a Larger Bench on the simple
question that which of the judgements decides
the law correctly.”

¶80

8.2Thereafter Full Bench of this Court in
G.S.R.T.C. Vs D.V. Chauhan [2006 92) GLH 64], upon a
Reference to it by the Division Bench as aforesaid,
considered scope of powers of the Labour Court or
Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, in the
context of Section 11A in light of discordant views
expressed by two Division Benches. Honourable the Full
Bench enunciated the law as under:

¶81

“Adverting to the question, which of the
two judgments referred to by the Division
Bench (Coram: R.S.Garg & Ravi R.Tripathi,
JJ.) decides the law correctly, our answer
is, Section 11A may exclusively deal with
cases of discharge or dismissal, but
criteria, after common reference under
Section 10, to decide an industrial dispute
is same, namely, the Second Schedule and the
Third Schedule. In other words, in all cases
of punishments, Labour Court/Tribunal can
examine the legality and propriety of
punishment, irrespective of nature thereof.

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¶84

Scope of examination of an industrial dispute
and extent of interference is same
irrespective of the fact that Section 11A
deals specifically with cases of discharge or
dismissal, because, as said, in all cases, it
is the legality and propriety of the order
passed by the employer which is to be
examined.

¶85

In cases of discharge or dismissal, the
Labour Court/ Tribunal exercises power under
Section 10 read with Section 11A read with
the Second Schedule and the Third Schedule,
while in other cases, it exercises
jurisdiction under Section 10, read with the
Second Schedule and the Third Schedule. Mere
mention of Section 11A while exercising power
in cases of punishments other than discharge
or dismissal would not make the order illegal
since jurisdiction to interfere is traceable
to Section 10, read with the Second Schedule
and the Third Schedule.”

¶86

 (para 11)

¶87

8.2.1It was stated,

¶88

“The Division Bench decision (Coram:
G.S.Singhvi & Anant S.Dave, JJ.) [Vankar R.R.
v. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation
(supra)] is relevant to the extent, parties
have no disagreement, that Section 11A is
confined to cases of discharge or dismissal.
Still, the Court examined the case on merits,
finding no fault with procedure and laws, did
not interfere with the discretion exercised
by the employer in the matter of imposition
of punishment. The Division Bench (Coram:
S.B.Majmudar & S.M.Soni, JJ.) [Municipal
Commissioner,Barodav.Sanatkumar
D.Brahmbhatt (supra)] is correct when it
holds that punishments other than discharge
or dismissal are not covered under Section
11A of the Act. It is also correct when it
holds that dehors Sec.11A the legality and
propriety of punishment had to be examined by
the Industrial Tribunal/ Labour Court while
adjudicating the industrial dispute referred

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¶91

to it for adjudication, but holding that once
an industrial dispute is referred for
adjudication, the Industrial Tribunal/ Labour
Court, in exercise of its power under Section
11A, is bound to adjudicate upon the dispute
and pronounce upon it, is not correct,
because dispute is not referred under Section
11A, it is referred under Section 10, and
once referred, be it punishment of dismissal
or discharge or any other kind of punishment,
Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal is bound to
adjudicate upon the legality and propriety of
punishment order referred in dispute and
pronounce upon it.” (para 12)

¶92

8.3It was observed and held by the Full Bench
relying upon the Apex decision in Indian Iron and
Steel Company Limited (supra) that the management is
the master of disciplinary realm to be exercised over
the employees. When there is want of good faith, when
there is victimisation or unfair labour practice, when
the management is guilty of basic error of violation
of principles of natural justice and where on the
basis of the materials on record, findings could be
said to be completely baseless or perverse, powers of
the Labour Court could be extended to set right the
managerial deciison of imposition of penalty. The Full
Bench, carved out the categories of circumstances
under which the Labour Court or the Industrial
Tribunal would be justified in exercising the 11A
powers. It held that while exercising legality and
proprietary of the order, subject matter of industrial
dispute, irrespective of nature of punishment, the
powers could be exercised where, without being
exhaustive, there is (i) want of good faith; (ii)
victimization or unfair labour practice; (iii) basic

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¶95

error or violation of principles of natural justice;
(iv) finding completely baseless or perverse; (v)
colourable exercise of power or want of bona fide;
(vi) punishment shockingly disproportionate in the
facts of the case; and (vii) conduct of
workman/workmen, present or past.

¶96

9.A decision of the Apex Court in General
Secretary, South Indian Cashew Factories Workers
Union Vs. Managing Director, Kerala State Cashew
Development Corporation Limited [AIR 1006 SC 2208]
may now be noticed. The position of law was
highlighted by the Apex Court in paragraph 16, which
is reproduced hereunder:

¶97

“The Labour Court had earlier held that
the enquiry was properly held and there
was no violation of the principles of
natural justice and that the findings
were not perverse. The vitiating facts
found by the Labour Court against the
enquiry are erroneous and are liable to
be set aside. If enquiry is fair and
proper, in the absence of any
allegations of victimization or unfair
labour practice, the Labour Court has no
power to interfere with the punishment
imposed. Section 11A of the Act gives
ample power to the Labour Court to re-
appraise the evidence adduced in the
enquiry and also sit in appeal over the
decision of the employer in imposing
punishment. Section 11A of the
Industrial Disputes Act is only
applicable in the case of dismissal or
discharge of a workman as clearly
mentioned in the Section itself. Before
the introduction of Section 11A in
Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their
Workmen [(1958) SCR 667] this Court held

¶98

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¶100

that the Tribunal does not act as a
Court of appeal and substitute its own
judgment for that of the Management and
that the Tribunal will interfere only
when there is want of good faith,
victimisation, unfair labour practice,
etc. on the part of the management.
There is no allegation of unfair labour
practice, victimisation etc. in this
case. The powers of the Labour Court in
the absence of Section 11A is
illustrated by this Court in Workmen of
Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India
(Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Management [(1973) 1
SCC 813]. When enquiry was conducted
fairly and properly, in the absence of
any of the allegations of victimisation
or malafides or unfair labour practice,
Labour Court has no power to interfere
with the punishment imposed by the
management. Since Section 11A is not
applicable, Labour Court has no power to
re-appraise the evidence to find out
whether the findings of the enquiry
officer are correct or not or whether
the punishment imposed is adequate or
not. Of course, Labour Court can
interfere with the findings if the
findings are perverse. But, here there
is a clear finding that the findings are
not perverse and principles of natural
justice were complied with while
conducting enquiry. (para 16)

¶101

9.1The law set down as above in General
Secretary, South Indian Cashew Factories Workers
Union (supra) could be said to be churning out a gist
of legal position on the issue.

¶102

10.The above are the main decisions, which
marked the circuitous journey of position of law with
regard to the powers exercisable by Labour Court or
the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, under

¶103

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¶105

Section 11A of the Act where punishment is minor in
nature being other than discharge or dismissal. The
imposition penalty which is not one discharge or
dismissal, but could be treated as minor penalty, is
primarily and generally, the realm of the management
or the disciplinary authority in which, Labour Court
or Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, would not
interfere unless the case falls within the cagegories
mentioned, though not exhaustive. At the cost of
repetition, they are those where the findings are
totally perverse or case is one of “no evidence” or it
is a case of victimization or unfair labour practice.
It is permissible in the cases where on facts,
punishment is found to be shockingly disproportionate
and uncommensurate to the gravity of misconduct.

¶106

10.1 As discussed and highlighted hereinabove, in
the present case, the propriety of findings of Inquiry
Officer could not be excepted; the recording of proof
of guilt of charges levelled against workman was based
on legally tenable evidence. The findings were in no
way perverse, but were reasonable and emanating from
evidence. There was no allegation of unfair labour
practice or victimisation. The penalty of dismissal
imposed stood commensurate with seriousness of
misconduct of misappropriation. Thus, there was no
room for the Industrial Tribunal to interpose itself
and interfere with the penalty which was other than
dismissal or discharge.

¶107

11.For the foregoing reasons and discussion,
the impugned judgment and award dated 29th June, 2007

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¶110

passed by the Industrial Tribunal in Reference (IT)
No.289 of 2001 whereby the Industrial Tribunal has
interfered with and set aside the penalty of one
yearly increment with future effect, could not be
sustained. Accordingly the same is hereby quashed and
set aside. Rule is made absolute.

¶111

Anup

¶112

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Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Bhikhabhai G Patel

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Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Bhikhabhai G Patel

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Divisional Controller Vs Alibhai Mansurali Laxmidhar

Gujarat Electricity Board Vs Unus Mohmed Bachumiya Kadri

Patan Resha Udyog Vs Thakore Chanduji Kurshiji