Jai Prakash Sarma Vs the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and 4 Ors.

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GAHC010041252017

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2026:GAU-AS:8211

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IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

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W.P.(C) NO.5834 OF 2017

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Sri Jai Prakash Sarma S/o- Late Nand Kishore Shastri, R/o- Flat No. 3, Royal Apartment, 4^th Floor, Harbala Road, Ulubari, P.S.- Paltanbazar, District- Kamrup (Metro), Assam.

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…….Petitioner

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-Versus-

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1. The New India Assurance Company Ltd., (Represented by its Chairmancum-Managing Director), Head OfficeNew India Assurance Building, 87 Mahatma Gandhi Road, Fort, Mumbai.

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2. The General Manager, New India Assurance Company Ltd., Head Office- New India Assurance Building, 87 Mahatma Gandhi Road, Fort, Mumbai.

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3. The Deputy General Manager, New India Assurance Company Ltd., Head Office- New India Assurance Building, 87 Mahatma Gandhi Road, Fort, Mumbai.

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4. The Chief Regional Manager, New India Assurance Company Ltd., North Eastern Regional Office,

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G.S. Road, Bhangagarh, Guwahati5.

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5. The Regional Manager, North East Regional Office, New India Assurance Company Ltd., G. S. Road, Bhangagarh, Guwahati781005

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…….Respondents

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– B E F O R E –

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HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI

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For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. H. K. Das, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. M. P. Sarma, Advocate.

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For the Respondent(s) : Mr. S. Dutta, Advocate.

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Date on which judgment

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is reserved : N/A Date of pronouncement of judgment : 09.06.2026

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Whether the pronouncement

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is of the operative part of the judgment ? : No.

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Whether the full judgment has been pronounced : Yes.

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JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)

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Heard Mr. H. K. Das, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. M. P. Sarma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. S. Dutta, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

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2. The present writ petition, instituted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, calls in question the order of penalty dated 15.02.2012 passed by the disciplinary authority imposing upon the petitioner the penalty of reduction of basic pay by two stages permanently, with consequential reduction in dearness allowance and other allowances, under Rule 23(f) of the New India Assurance Company Ltd. (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 2003. The disciplinary authority further directed recovery of Rs.30,000/- under Rule 23(c) towards the alleged financial loss suffered by the respondent Company in connection with MACT Case No. 218/2003. Also under challenge is the appellate order dated 28.03.2013 whereby the statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner on 15.06.2012 was dismissed and the order of penalty was affirmed.

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3. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was working as an Assistant Administrative Officer (Development) in the respondent company and had been posted at the Tinsukia Branch. In the month of July, 1999, the petitioner was discharging his duties in the aforesaid branch. During that time the petitioner was also promoted as Asstt. Administrative Officer (A.A.O.) for the second time in the same rank on 01.06.2001 and was posted at Doomdooma Branch with marketing assignments of the respondent company, wherein he served in that capacity till January 2011. Thereafter, he was transferred to the Regional Office at Guwahati from the Doomdooma Branch.

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Despite his posting at the Regional Office, he was not assigned any job, and later on he was again transferred to the Noonmati Branch, Guwahati, w.e.f. 27.07.2011.

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4. The petitioner, while working as an A.A.O. at Doomdooma on 16.09.2009, was served with a memo of charge in departmental proceedings containing two charges framed by the competent authority along with articles of charges, statement of imputation, list of documents and list of witnesses which were sought to be proved and examined during a regular enquiry. The petitioner was accordingly given 15 days’ time to submit his written statement of defence against those charges. The petitioner was, however, informed that the enquiry would be held only in those articles of charge and allegations which were not admitted by the petitioner. He was further given the opportunity to take the assistance of any other co-employee if he desired assistance during presenting his case before the enquiry authority.

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5. The articles of charges framed against the petitioner read as under: -

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“1. It is alleged that Mr. J.P. Sharma issued Motor Covernote No. GHY/98-CN-73578 on 20.7.01 at 5 PM by granting insurance to the vehicle in contravention of underwriting guidelines of without any pre-insurance physical inspection of the said vehicle no ASQ-8151 and obtaining the incomplete proposal form, Mr JP Sharma violated RO guidelines RO circular dated 28.2.2000 for acceptance of motor proposal when there is in break in insurance. This he facilitated the insured

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Sri Shyam Pd. Agarwal, in obtaining insurance of the vehicle after it had met with an accident.

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2. It is alleged that as a result of issuing the aforesaid cover note, the accident which had occurred to the above mentioned vehicle at about 2:30 PM of 21.7.01 resulting in death of one Mr. Manglu Ganju, has been brought within the purview of the period of insurance leading to a MACT Claim and financial loss to the Company for Rs. 3,22,000/- + interest on claims under MACT No. 218/2003 at Golaghat.”

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6. It is thus alleged under Charge No. 1 that the petitioner, almost 8 years back, had issued a cover note on 20.07.2001 granting insurance to the subject vehicle in contravention of the underwriting guidelines as contained in the circular dated 28.02.2000 without any physical inspection of the vehicle and obtaining an incomplete proposal form thereof when there was a break in insurance, thereby facilitating the insured of the subject vehicle in obtaining insurance of the subject vehicle after it had met with an accident. It is further alleged under Charge No. 2 that as a result of the issuance of the cover note, the accident that had occurred on 21.07.2001, resulting in the death of one person, has been brought within the purview of insurance, leading to a MACT claim and financial loss to the company for Rs. 3,22,000/- plus interest on the claim under MACT Case No. 218/2003 at Golaghat.

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7. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted his reply on 26.10.2009 denying the charges. The disciplinary authority, having not been satisfied with the reply of the petitioner, appointed an Enquiry Officer to hold enquiry proceedings.

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The Enquiry Officer examined four witnesses, who were cross-examined by the petitioner. The petitioner also examined himself; however, he did not adduce any defence evidence in support of his defence. The Enquiry Officer upon completion of the enquiry, submitted its report on 09.09.2011 to the respondent authorities, though had held Charge No. 1 to have been not proved; however, concluded Charge No. 2 was proved.

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8. The relevant portion of the Enquiry Report read as under: -

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“I have gone through the entire record produced before me, the evidences and the written briefs submitted by both the P.O. and the C.O.

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I have noted that in cross examinatior or Mr.Latu Baruah, the then B.M. of Doomdooma Branch by the CO on 23-022011 in query no.(3), as regard R.O. circular dated 28-022000, P.W. Mr. LatuBaruah has categorically stated that no such circular dated 28-02-2000 was received by them. Therefore, the allegation under charge no.1 regarding violation of R.Q. guidelines vide circular dated 28-022000 is not proved.

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However, from the answers to the questionnaires posed to P.W.s Mr. LatuBaruah, the then B.M. of Doomdooma Branch, Mr. SC. Deb Barman, the then Collective Cashier (since retd.) of Doomdooma Branch and Mr. S.K. Datta, the then underwriter of Doomdooma Branch as also their cross examination by the CO., it is amply proved that the said premium was not deposited in the Doomdooma Branch on 20-07-2001) Fri day)2 nor was it the 1" entry on 23-07-2001. In fact, in cross examination by the CO., in reply to query no. (5), P.W. Mr. LatuBaruah has confirmed that the C.O. had collected the premium on 2007-2001 at 5.00 P.M. in Tinsukia, but deposited the same in DoomdoomaBranch Office on 23-07-2001 Thus, the CO has violated guidelines regarding deposit of premium collected through. issuance of Note, and hence charge no.2 is proved.

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In view of the above, it is concluded that charge no.1 is not fully proved whilst charge no. 2 is proved.

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With the above observations, this Inquiry Report is concluded.”

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9. Upon consideration of the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority expressed its disagreement with the finding of the Enquiry Officer insofar as Charge No. 1 had been held to be not proved. Accordingly, the petitioner was informed of the proposed disagreement and was issued a second show-cause notice dated 05.12.2011, affording him an opportunity to submit his representation. The petitioner thereafter submitted a detailed reply on 21.12.2011. Upon consideration of the enquiry report, the findings recorded therein, the reasons for disagreement, and the explanation furnished by the petitioner, the disciplinary authority passed the final order dated 15.02.2012. The disciplinary authority concluded that the petitioner being responsible for physically inspecting the vehicle in cases involving a break in insurance coverage, had failed to do so despite being aware of the underwriting Circular dated 28.02.2000. It was further held that although the cover note had been issued by the petitioner at Tinsukia at about 5:00 p.m. on 20.07.2001, the premium was allegedly deposited in the Branch office only on 23.07.2001, making it improbable that the proposal could have been processed through the office within working hours on the date of issuance itself. Proceeding on the aforesaid reasoning, the disciplinary authority held Charge No. 1 to be proved and imposed upon the petitioner the penalty of reduction of his basic pay by two stages permanently, with consequential reduction in dearness allowance and other admissible

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allowances, under Rule 23(f) of the applicable rules. In addition, thereto, recovery of a sum of Rs.30,000/- was directed towards the financial loss allegedly suffered by the respondent company. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred a departmental appeal on 15.06.2012. The appellate authority, by order dated 28.03.2013, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority. It is in the aforesaid circumstances that the present writ petition has been instituted.

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10. Mr. H. K. Das, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, at the outset vehemently submits that the respondent authorities have held both the charges to have been proved against the petitioner merely on conjecture and surmises without there being any proof whatsoever. He submits that it is established from the management case itself that the subject insurance policy was issued on 20.07.2001, immediately upon insurance of the subject vehicle falling due, and hence, there was no break in insurance coverage. He further submits that despite there being no break in insurance coverage, the charge presumed such break in insurance coverage without there being any material to support such presumption. He further submits that no evidence whatsoever has been brought on record to show that there was a break in the insurance service except for assuming that the premium was paid on 23.07.2001 and hence the cover note and the proposal in question were back dated. However the policy

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which itself was issued on 20.07.2001 as evident from the copy of the policy in question enclosed as Annexure-I to the additional affidavit filed by the petitioner on 15.02.2021, clearly would show that the accident occurred post issuance of the policy and hence, is covered under the policy in question. Therefore, there was no evidence to link the petitioner to the charge brought against him. Reliance has been placed upon the following decisions: -

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(i) S.R. Tewari v. R.K. Singh and Anr ., reported in (2013) 6 SCC 602 , (Apex Court)

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(ii) Moni Shankar v. Union of India and Anr ., reported in (2008) 3 SCCC 484 , (Apex Court)

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(iii) Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors ., reported in 2009 (1) Supreme 438 , (Apex Court)

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(iv) Dwijendra Nath Deka v. Union of India and Ors ., reported in 2012 (4) GLT 259 , (Coordinate Bench)

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(v) Nani Gopal Palit v. State Bank of India and Ors ., reported in 2014 (2) GLT 560 . (Coordinate Bench)

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11. He further submits that since there is no evidence either direct or indirect against the petitioner, the impugned penalty order as well as the appellate authority order are totally erroneous and warrants to be interfered with by this Court while exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction.

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12. Per Contra, S. Dutta, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, while vehemently opposing the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submits that since there are ample materials to indicate that the premium was deposited by the petitioner on 23.07.2001 post accident, it is established that the petitioner has back dated the cover note in question so as to facilitate the insurance coverage for the accident the vehicle met with on 21.07.2001. He further submits that since this Court while exercising its judicial review under the writ jurisdiction cannot act as an appellate authority, should not weigh the evidence that has come during enquiry. He further submits that the disciplinary authority having disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer as regards the Charge No. 1 having not been proved, upon recording its reasons for disagreement and upon serving notice to the petitioner having recorded its finding therein, the procedure cannot be faulted with. In support of his submission, he relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank and Ors , reported in (2003) 3 SCC 583 . He further submits that since one of the charges having been proved in the enquiry, the same even otherwise is sufficient for the disciplinary authority to inflict the penalty in question. In support of the aforesaid, he relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. and Ors., v. Nand Kishore Shukla and Anr ., reported in (1996) 3 SCC 750 .

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13. I have given my prudent consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for both the parties and have also perused the material available on record. I have also carefully considered the case laws cited at the Bar.

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14. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court does not sit in appeal over the findings recorded in departmental proceedings. The scope of judicial review is confined to examining the legality of the decision-making process and correcting errors of law, procedural irregularities, violations of the principles of natural justice, or findings which are perverse or unsupported by evidence. Judicial review is not synonymous with a re-appreciation of evidence on merits. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India , reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 , the Apex Court held that where the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on some evidence, the Court cannot reassess the sufficiency thereof or substitute its own conclusions.

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15. Similarly, in Lalit Popli (supra), the Apex Court reiterated that a writ court ought not to examine the merits of the disciplinary proceedings as an appellate forum or undertake a fresh evaluation of the evidence on record.

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16. Bearing the aforesaid limitations on the exercise of judicial review in mind, this Court proceeds to examine the materials available on record.

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17. It appears that two charges were levelled against the petitioner. Upon completion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer held Charge No. 1 to be not proved and Charge No. 2 alone to be proved. The disciplinary authority, however, disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer insofar as Charge No. 1 was concerned. The principal basis for such disagreement appears to be the underwriting Circular dated 28.02.2000 relating to physical verification of vehicles in cases involving a break in insurance coverage. According to the disciplinary authority, although the Branch Manager had stated that the said circular had not been received in the Branch, the petitioner, while answering Question No. 5 during his statement recorded on 19.08.2009, acknowledged the existence of the said circular. Proceeding on such basis, the disciplinary authority concluded that Charge No. 1 stood proved.

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18. It is trite that this Court cannot appreciate, reappreciate or weigh the evidence as an appellate authority. Nevertheless, the Court is entitled to examine whether there existed any evidence, direct or circumstantial, capable of sustaining the findings recorded against the delinquent employee. The distinction between insufficiency of evidence and absence of evidence must always be borne in mind.

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19. In Moni Shankar (supra) , the Apex Court observed that although the provisions of the Evidence Act do not strictly apply to departmental proceedings, the principles of natural justice must be scrupulously observed. The Court

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exercising judicial review is entitled to examine whether relevant evidence has been taken into consideration, whether irrelevant materials have influenced the decision, and whether the inference of misconduct is founded upon evidence satisfying the test of preponderance of probability. The Apex Court further recognised that in appropriate cases even judicial review of findings of fact is permissible where the conclusions drawn are unsupported by the evidentiary record. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment read as under: -

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“17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The Court exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the department, even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely preponderance of probability. If on such evidences, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality. (See - State of U.P. v. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava and Employees Association)

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18. We must also place on record that on certain, aspects even judicial review of fact is permissible.

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E v Secretary of State for the Home Department : [2004] 2 W.L.R. 1351.”

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20. Likewise, in Roop Singh Negi (supra) , the Apex Court emphasised that a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding and that the charges levelled against a delinquent employee must be proved on the basis of legally admissible material brought on record. The Apex Court further held that while sufficiency of evidence may not be open to judicial review, the Court is dutybound to ascertain whether there is any evidence at all to support the impugned conclusion. A finding resting on conjectures, assumptions or surmises would be liable to interference. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment read as under: -

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“10. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi judicial function. The charges leveled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the Enquiry Officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said

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confession, as he was tortured in the police station. Appellant being an employee of the bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the Enquiry Officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left.

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11. In Union of India vs. H.S. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718, it was held:

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"....The two infirmities are separate and distinct though, conceivably, in some cases, both may be present. There may be cases of no evidence even where the Government is acting bona fide;

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the said infirmity may also exist where the Government is acting mala fide and in that case, the conclusion of the Government not supported by any evidence may be the result of mala fides, but that does not mean that if it is proved that there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the Government, a writ of certiorari will not issued without further proof of mala fides. That is why we are not prepared to accept the learned Attorney-General's argument that sine no mala fides are alleged against the appellant in the present case, no writ of certiorari can be issued in favour of the respondent.

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That takes us to the merits of the respondent's contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charged framed against the respondent has been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney-General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the

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view taken by he appellant is a reasonably possible view, this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondents case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that charge No. 3 was proved against him ? In exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which dealt with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charges in question is proved against the respondent ? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent's grievance is well-founded because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit in the appellant's order dismissing the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence.

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12. In Moni Shankar v. Union of India and Anr. [(2008) 3 SCC 484], this Court held:

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17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The Court exercising power of judicial review are

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entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the department, even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely - preponderance of probability. If on such evidences, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality."

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21. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the testimony of the Branch Manager, who, inter alia, stated that although the cover note was issued by the petitioner at Tinsukia on 20.07.2001 at about 5:00 p.m., the premium was deposited in the Doom Dooma Branch only on 23.07.2001. Significantly, the Branch Manager further stated that the petitioner had never informed him telephonically about the matter and that the particulars relating to the policy had been furnished by him only after the occurrence of the accident. More importantly, he categorically stated that the circular relied upon by the disciplinary authority had not been received in the Branch.

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22. Upon a careful consideration of the evidence on record, this Court finds that the very foundation of Charge No. 1 is unsustainable. The disciplinary authority

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proceeded on the assumption that there existed a break in insurance coverage requiring physical inspection of the vehicle. However, no material whatsoever has been brought on record to establish the existence of any such break in coverage. The fact of break in insurance has merely been presumed and not proved. Even otherwise, the evidence of the Branch Manager clearly indicates that the Circular dated 28.02.2000 had not been circulated or implemented in the concerned Branch. Once such evidence remained uncontroverted, there was no basis to conclude that the petitioner was bound by or had acted in violation of the said circular. The sole circumstance relied upon by the disciplinary authority, namely, the petitioner’s acknowledgment during his statement recorded in the year 2009 of the existence of the said circular, does not lead to the inference that he was aware of, or bound to comply with, the said circular on 20.07.2001. Mere acknowledgement of the existence of a circular several years later cannot, in the absence of any supporting material, establish that the petitioner had knowledge thereof at that relevant point of time. Significantly, the petitioner never admitted that he was aware of the circular on 20.07.2001. On the other hand, there is direct evidence establishing that the said circular was not circulated and/or available at the relevant point of time. In fact, the Enquiry Officer, upon appreciation of the very same evidence, had rightly concluded that Charge No. 1 was not proved. The contrary finding recorded by the disciplinary authority is

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thus unsupported by any substantive evidence and cannot be sustained.

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23. The decision of the coordinate Bench of this Court in Nani Gopal Palit (supra) also assumes significance. It was held therein that disagreement with the findings of an Enquiry Officer must be founded upon cogent reasons and independent application of mind. It was further held that where disciplinary authorities proceed on untenable premises and impose severe penalties unsupported by the record, the resultant proceedings stand vitiated. The ratio of the said decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment read as under: -

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“18. As regards the adverse finding on the additional charge on the allegation-I, since this new charge was absent in the charge memo furnished to the delinquent, the adverse finding on this charge can't be made the basis of any disciplinary action against the delinquent.

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19. Moreover the opinion given by the appointing authority on 10.11.2003 shows that the disciplinary authority's dissent was accepted without any application of mind and although reasons were not disclosed for the dissent, surprisingly the appointing authority found the same to be in order.

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20. The gravity of the punishment also deserves to be commented upon in this case. The delinquent herein was exonerated of the substantial charges pertaining to loan disbursal to undeserved beneficiaries. However on the lesser charge of procedural lapses in loan recovery, some adverse conclusion was drawn by the Inquiry Officer. But such procedural lapse does not in my view justify

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imposition of a major penalty. As earlier noted that the petitioner's pay was substantially reduced and after suffering this penalty for 3 years, he was made to serve at a meager salary of Rs.11,140/-, since the pay reduction was made effective for the entire duration of the petitioner's service career. Moreover it appears to be a case of double penalty which not only impacted the petitioner's pay during his service tenure but also substantially reduced his pension to a measly Rs.3,990/- P.M. The gravity of the penalty impact is amply demonstrated since his pay was reduced to Rs.11,140/- from Rs.21,140/- for the duration of his service career and he received proportionately lesser pension, after he superannuated on 31.12.2010.

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21. Considering the above, I am of the view that both the disciplinary authority and the appointing authority ignored the law while disagreeing with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. Conspicuously neither of them disclosed the basis for their disagreement. Therefore the impugned proceeding is declared to be vitiated and suffering of any penalty on such vitiated proceeding can't be permitted in law. Following this conclusion, the impugned order dated 6.6.2003 (Annexure-B) of the disciplinary authority, the penalty order 10.11.2003 (Annexure-E) of the appointing authority and the negative order(s) of the Appellate Authority and the Review Committee are quashed. As a result, the respondents are directed to give all service benefits to the petitioner by considering the delinquent to be exonerated on all counts. It is ordered accordingly.”

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24. In the instant matter, the disciplinary authority has reversed the findings of the Enquiry Officer without any legally sustainable basis and has imposed a major penalty notwithstanding the absence of evidence to substantiate the charges. The inference drawn by the disciplinary authority is thus based on assumptions rather than

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evidence. Hence, Charge No. 1 is unsupported by evidence. The impugned findings, therefore, cannot withstand judicial scrutiny.

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25. This brings the Court to Charge No. 2, namely, the allegation that the petitioner had manipulated or issued the cover note with a view to extending insurance coverage to an accident which had occurred on 21.07.2001 at about 2:30 p.m., resulting in the death of one person and consequent liability of the respondent company in a claim proceeding before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.

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26. Here again, this Court finds a complete absence of evidence. There is no material, either direct or circumstantial, to establish that the cover note was fabricated, ante-dated or otherwise manipulated by the petitioner after the occurrence of the accident. On the contrary, the respondent Company has consistently acknowledged the existence of the insurance policy issued on 20.07.2001, i.e. prior to the accident. During the course of hearing, learned counsel appearing for the respondent fairly did not dispute the existence of the policy from that date. Significantly, the policy was never produced by the respondent Company during the enquiry proceedings. Rather, it is the petitioner who has placed the same on record by way of an additional affidavit. The policy clearly reflects that it was issued on 20.07.2001, bears the certificate number and also contains the signature of the Branch Manager. These facts remain undisputed. In such circumstances, the allegation that the petitioner

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subsequently fabricated or manipulated the cover note so as to extend insurance coverage to an accident which occurred thereafter is wholly untenable and devoid of any evidentiary foundation.

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27. It is also not in dispute that the consistent stand of the petitioner, from the very inception of the proceedings, has been that the cover note was issued and the premium collected on 20.07.2001, prior to the occurrence of the accident on 21.07.2001. Significantly, the insurance policy itself was admittedly issued by the Branch Manager on 20.07.2001 and was made effective from that very date, namely, the date on which the previous policy had expired. The issuance of the policy on 20.07.2001 has never been disputed by the respondent Company. It is trite that an insurance policy cannot be issued unless the premium has first been received and accepted by the insurer. Therefore, the issuance of the policy on 20.07.2001 necessarily presupposes receipt and acceptance of the premium prior thereto. Once the policy admittedly came into force on 20.07.2001 and the accident occurred only thereafter on 21.07.2001, the risk stood covered under the policy.

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28. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the premium amount was deposited in the Branch office only on 23.07.2001, as alleged by the respondent, the same would not, by itself, establish any misconduct on the part of the petitioner. No rule, regulation, circular or service instruction has been brought on record requiring the premium collected by a Development Officer to be

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deposited on the very same day or prescribing any penal consequence for failure to do so. More pertinently, no charge to the effect that the petitioner has committed misconduct by depositing the premium subsequent to the issuance of the insurance policy is alleged. In the absence of any such material, no charge of misconduct could have been sustained merely on the basis of the alleged date of deposit. What is more, the disciplinary authority has failed to explain how a valid insurance policy could have come into existence on 20.07.2001 in the absence of prior receipt and acceptance of premium. The issuance of the policy on 20.07.2001 thus constitutes the strongest contemporaneous documentary evidence corroborating the petitioner’s stand that the proposal and premium had been received and acted upon prior to the accident. The allegation that the petitioner subsequently manipulated the cover note or sought to extend insurance coverage retrospectively after the occurrence of the accident is therefore rendered wholly implausible and unsupported by any evidence on record.

¶116

29. An employee cannot be visited with civil consequences merely on the basis of suspicion, conjectures or surmises. There must exist some evidence connecting the delinquent with the misconduct alleged. While this Court cannot examine the adequacy of the evidence, it is undoubtedly empowered to interfere where the findings are unsupported by any evidence whatsoever. The present case falls squarely within the latter category.

¶117

Page 23 of 26

¶118

30. Put differently, the instant case presents a classic instance of perversity. The findings recorded by the disciplinary authority are not merely against the weight of evidence; they are founded upon assumptions unsupported by the record. A conclusion arrived at in the absence of evidence is, in law, perverse and liable to be set aside.

¶119

31. The principles governing such interference stand reinforced by the decision of the Apex Court in S.R. Tewari (supra) , wherein it was observed that disciplinary findings must rest upon evidence and that conclusions unsupported by the record cannot be sustained merely because they arise in a departmental proceeding. Relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment read as under: -

¶120

“30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is „against the weight of evidence‟, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide: Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors., Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, and Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189).”

¶121

32. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that there is no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to establish that the petitioner had fabricated, manipulated or

¶122

Page 24 of 26

¶123

ante-dated the cover note after the occurrence of the accident. On the contrary, the undisputed issuance of the insurance policy on 20.07.2001, prior to the accident, lends complete support to the petitioner’s consistent stand that the cover note had been issued and the premium collected before the accident occurred. Once the policy had admittedly come into force on 20.07.2001 and the accident occurred only thereafter on 21.07.2001, the risk stood covered under the policy. The allegation that the petitioner sought to extend insurance coverage retrospectively after the accident is thus rendered wholly untenable. The finding recorded against the petitioner on Charge No. 2 is therefore based on conjectures and surmises rather than evidence. Consequently, Charge No. 2 also cannot be said to have been proved. Consequently, the impugned disciplinary proceedings stand vitiated.

¶124

33. Accordingly, the writ petition stands allowed.

¶125

34. The order of penalty dated 15.02.2012 passed by the disciplinary authority, and the order dated 28.03.2013 passed by the appellate authority, are hereby set aside and quashed.

¶126

35. The respondents are directed to treat the petitioner as exonerated of all the charges framed in the disciplinary proceeding and to restore all consequential service benefits to which the petitioner is entitled in law.

¶127

36. The respondents are further directed to restore and release all consequential service and monetary benefits to

¶128

Page 25 of 26

¶129

which the petitioner would have been entitled but for the impugned penalty, including restoration of pay, allowances, increments, promotional benefits and retiral benefits, wherever affected. Any recovery effected pursuant to the impugned orders shall also stand refunded. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment and order.

¶130

JUDGE

¶131

Comparing Assistant

¶132

Prana Digitally signed by b Pranab Chandra Das Chand Date: 2026.06.10 ra Das 17:19:20 +05'30'

¶133

Page 26 of 26

Jai Prakash Sarma v. the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and 4 Ors.

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Jai Prakash Sarma v. the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and 4 Ors.

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