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Sudarshana Chakraborty v. Central Bank of India and 3 Ors.

Gauhati HC10 Jun 2026WP(C)/5666/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

A bank officer was dismissed by order dated 19.05.2017 despite having retired on 31.08.2016 pending disciplinary proceedings. Holding that the regulations permit continuation but not imposition of substantive penalties post-superannuation, and relying on Apex Court decisions interpreting identical regulations, this Court set aside the dismissal.

What the court decided

AI extract

Sudarshana Chakraborty Vs Central Bank of… — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Gauhati HC (2026)

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GAHC010176972018

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2026:GAU-AS:8346

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IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT

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(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

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WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 5666 OF 2018

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1(A) Smti Sudarshana Chakraborty, Wife of Late Sridhar Chakraborty

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1(B) Smti Suranya Chakraborty, Daughter of Late Sridhar Chakraborty

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Both are residents of Lachit Nagar, Bye Lane 4/5, House No. 4(2), P.O. Ulubari, Dist- Kamrup, Ghy- 781007

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…….Petitioners

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-Versus-

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1. Central Bank of India

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Represented by its Managing Director, Chandermukhi Nariman Point, Mumbai-21.

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2. Zonal Manager,

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Central Bank of India, C.B. Building, Bhangagarh, Guwahati -781005.

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3. Regional Manager, Central Bank of India, Nehru Park Road, Jorhat, Guwahati -785001.

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4. Union of India, Represented by the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance Deptt. Dispur, PIN - 781006

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…….Respondents

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– B E F O R E –

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HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI

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For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. A. Dasgupta, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. B. Das. For the Respondent(s) : Mr. M. Sharma, Advocate. Date of Hearing : 11.06.2026. Date of Judgment : 11.06.2026 .

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JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)

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Heard Mr. A. Dasgupta, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. B. Das, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. M. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

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2 . By way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is assailing the impugned dismissal order dated 19.05.2017, issued by the Regional Manager, Central Bank of India, Guwahati, whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service.

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3 . The brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that the petitioner was an employee of Central Bank of India and came to be dismissed from service by order dated 19.05.2017. During his service tenure, a charge sheet dated 15.06.2016 was issued to him containing twelve articles of charge. Pursuant thereto, a department enquiry was conducted. The Enquiry Officer, upon finding the charges proved, submitted his report on 24.03.2017. Acting on the said report, the disciplinary authority passed the order dated 19.05.2017 imposing various penalties upon the petitioner. Insofar as the charge Nos. 1 to 5 were concerned, the penalty of dismissal from service was imposed. In respect of charge Nos. 6, 7, 9 and 10, the petitioner was visited with the penalty of reduction in the scale of pay by four increments for a period of 2 years. For charge No. 8, the penalty of reduction by one increment for a period of 2 years was imposed, while for charge Nos. 11 and 12, the penalty of reduction by 2 increments was awarded. It is however not in dispute that the petitioner had already attained the age of superannuation and retired from service on 31.08.2016.

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4 . The principal contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that having superannuated on 31.08.2016, the disciplinary authority lacked the jurisdiction to impose the impugned penalty of dismissal by order dated 19.05.2017.

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According to the petitioner, by the time the disciplinary proceeding culminated and the impugned came to be passed, the relationship of employer and employee had already ceased on account of his retirement from service. It is further contended that although representations were submitted seeking reconsideration of the impugned order, no favourable decision was taken thereon. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present writ petition.

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5 . Mr. A. Dasgupta, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, submits that since the petitioner having in the meantime superannuated pending disciplinary proceedings, the disciplinary authority could not have inflicted major substantive punishment of dismissal upon him. He further submits that the issue is no longer res-integra in view of the judgments passed by the Apex Court in the case of UCO Bank and Ors. Vs. Prabhakar Sadashiv Karvade, reported in (2018) 14 SCC 98 and UCO Bank and Ors. Vs. Rajendra Shankar Shukla, reported in (2018) 14 SCC 92 .

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6 . Per contra, Mr. M. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that since the proceedings have been initiated while the petitioner was in service, there is no bar upon the respondent bank for inflicting the punishment of dismissal upon the petitioner notwithstanding that he superannuated in the meantime. In support of the aforesaid, he relies upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Chairman-cumManaging Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Limited Vs. Rabindranath Choubey , reported in (2020) 18 SCC 71 .

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7. I have given my prudent consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. I have also considered the case laws cited at the bar.

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8. Before proceeding to examine the merits of the controversy, it may be noted that the original petitioner expired during the pendency of the writ petition. Pursuant to the order dated 19.09.2024 passed by this Court, his wife has been brought on record by way of substitution and is continuing the proceedings as the legal representative of the deceased petitioner.

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9 . The admitted position is that while the petitioner was in service, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him. However, before the proceedings could culminate, the petitioner attained the age of superannuation and retired from service on 31.08.2016. Subsequently, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 11.05.2017 and, acting upon the same, the disciplinary authority, by the impugned order dated 19.05.2017, imposed major penalties, including dismissal from service. The principal question which arises for consideration is whether, under the applicable Regulations, a major penalty such as dismissal from service could be imposed upon an employee who had already ceased to be in service on account of superannuation.

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10 . The Central Bank of India Officer Employees’ (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1976 Regulations”) enumerate the penalties that may be imposed upon an officer employee for acts of misconduct or for any other good and sufficient reason. Regulation 4 classifies such Page 5 of 11

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penalties into minor and major penalties. Significantly, all the penalties contemplated therein are directed against an “officer employee”, thereby indicating that the disciplinary jurisdiction under the Regulation is exercisable against a person who continues to hold that status.

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11 . Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Central Bank of India Officer Employees’ (Service) Regulations, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1979 Regulations”) provides that where disciplinary proceedings have been initiated prior to superannuation, such proceedings may continue notwithstanding the retirement of the officer and shall be concluded as if he were still in service until a final order is passed. The Regulation further stipulates that the concerned officer shall not be entitled to retiral benefits, save and except his own contribution to the Contributory Provident Fund, until the proceedings attain finality.

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12 . A conjoint reading of Regulation 4 of the 1976 Regulations and Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the 1979 Regulations makes the legislative intent abundantly clear. While the latter provision permits the continuation and conclusion of disciplinary proceedings even after retirement, it does not create a substantive power to impose penalties which, by their very nature, are applicable only to a serving employee. The fiction created by Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the 1979 Regulations is limited to the continuation of the proceedings and cannot be extended to confer jurisdiction upon the disciplinary authority to impose penalties such as dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement upon a person who has already superannuated.

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13 . The issue is no longer res integra. In Prabhakar Sadashiv Karvade (supra), the Apex Court, while interpreting regulations in pari materia, categorically held that although disciplinary proceedings initiated before retirement may continue after superannuation, none of the substantive penalties specified under the disciplinary regulations, including dismissal from service, can be imposed upon an officer employee after his retirement. The Court observed that the relationship of master and servant comes to an end upon superannuation and that the continuation of the proceedings thereafter is only for the limited purpose of determining the employee’s entitlement to pensionary and retiral benefits. The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:

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“9. A reading of the plain language of Regulation 4 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations and Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the 1979 Regulations makes it clear that any of the penalties, whether major or minor can be imposed only on a serving officer employee of the Bank. This necessarily implies that none of the penalties specified in Regulation 4 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations can be imposed on an officer employee after his retirement from service, though in terms of Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the 1979 Regulations, the disciplinary proceedings initiated against an officer employee before his retirement can be continued and final order is passed and further that such officer employee is not entitled to retiral benefits till the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings and passing of final order. The only exception to this is that the officer is entitled to receive his own contribution to CPF. However, there is nothing in the language of these regulations from which it can be inferred that the disciplinary authority has the power to impose a substantive punishment on retired officer employee. This becomes more explicit from a conjoint reading of Regulation 48 of the Pension Regulations which empowers the competent authority to withhold or withdraw a pension or a part thereof and order recovery from pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the bank if in a departmental or judicial proceedings, the pensioner

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is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence or criminal breach of trust or forgery or acts done fraudulently during the period of his service. Second proviso to Regulation 48 contains a fiction and lays down that if the departmental proceedings are instituted while the employee was in service, the same shall be deemed to be proceedings under the regulations and continued and concluded as if the employee had continued in service. The third proviso imposes a bar on the initiation of departmental or judicial proceedings against an employee after his retirement in respect of an event which took place more than 4 years before such institution. The sum and substance of these regulations is that even though a departmental inquiry instituted against an officer employee before his retirement can continue even after his retirement, none of the substantive penalties specified in Regulation 4 of 1979 Regulations, which include dismissal from service, can be imposed on an officer employee after his retirement on attaining the age of superannuation. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that order dated 12-10-2004 passed by the disciplinary authority dismissing the respondent from service, who had superannuated on 31-12-1993 was ex facie illegal and without jurisdiction and the High Court did not commit any error by setting aside the same. 10. We may also observe that master and servant relationship between the respondent and the employer i.e. Appellant 1 Bank had come to an end for all practical purposes on 31-12-1993 i.e. the date of superannuation. The departmental inquiry initiated against the respondent before his retirement could be continued for a limited purpose for determining whether or not he is entitled for full pensionary benefits and gratuity.”

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14 . The aforesaid principle was reiterated by the Apex Court in Rajendra Shankar Shukla (supra), wherein it was once again emphasized that after an employee has superannuated, no substantive penalty under the disciplinary regulations can be imposed upon him. The continuation of the inquiry post-retirement is thus confined to the consequences expressly contemplated under the pensionary framework and

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does not authorise the imposition of service penalties. The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:

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“16. Finally, we may also draw attention to an unreported decision of this Court in UCO Bank v. Prabhakar Sadashiv Karvade³. In this decision, the Court considered the provisions of the Regulations that we are concerned with and held:

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‘The sum and substance of these Regulations is that even though a departmental inquiry instituted against an officer employee before his retirement can continue even after his retirement, none of the substantive penalties specified in Regulation 4 of 1979 Regulations, which include dismissal from service, can be imposed on an officer employee after his retirement on attaining the age of superannuation. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that order dated 12-10-2004 passed by the disciplinary authority dismissing the respondent from service, who had superannuated on 31-121993 was ex facie illegal and without jurisdiction and the High Court did not commit any error by setting aside the same.’

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We may also make reference to another decision of this Court in UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor. This decision also related to the very same Regulations that we are concerned with.”

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15 . Learned counsel appearing for the respondents sought to place reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. (supra) to contend that disciplinary proceedings validly initiated during service may culminate in the imposition of punishment even after an employee has retired from service. The submission, however, does not merit acceptance. The said decision arose in a distinct statutory framework and was rendered in the context of service rules materially different from the regulations governing the present case. More importantly, the Apex Court therein recognized that the permissibility of imposing punishment after retirement

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depends upon the existence of an enabling provision in the applicable statutory rules or regulations. The issue, therefore, necessarily turns on the language of the governing provisions. In the present case, the controversy is directly covered by the decisions in Prabhakar Sadashiv Karvade (supra) and Rajendra Shankar Shukla (supra), wherein the very regulations applicable to the respondent Bank fell for consideration. The ratio laid down therein, being directly on point, binds this Court and leaves little scope for any contrary interpretation.

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16 . It is trite that a judgment is an authority for what it actually decides and not for every proposition that may logically be deduced therefrom. The applicability of a precedent must always be tested in the backdrop of the statutory provisions under consideration. The decisions rendered in Prabhakar Sadashiv Karvade (supra) and Rajendra Shankar Shukla (supra) interpret the very regulatory framework governing the parties before this Court and, therefore, constitute binding precedents on the issue. Consequently, reliance upon decisions rendered in a different statutory setting is misplaced. On the contrary, the applicable regulations, as interpreted by the Apex Court, do not confer any authority upon the disciplinary authority to impose substantive penalties, including dismissal from service, after an employee has superannuated.

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17 . In view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court and the plain language of the governing Regulations, this Court has no hesitation in holding that once the petitioner stood superannuated on 31.08.2016, the disciplinary authority

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lacked jurisdiction to impose upon him the major penalty of dismissal from service. Consequently, the impugned order dated 19.05.2017, insofar as it imposes the penalty of dismissal after the petitioner had ceased to be a serving officer employee, is without jurisdiction, legally unsustainable and liable to be set aside.

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18 . Accordingly, the impugned dismissal order to that extend stands interfered with.

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19 . Resultantly, the writ petition stands allowed to that extend.

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JUDGE

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Comparing Assistant

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Sudarshana Chakraborty v. Central Bank of India and 3 Ors.

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Sudarshana Chakraborty v. Central Bank of India and 3 Ors.

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