Pradip Kumar Biswas Vs the State Bank of India and 4 Ors.

SBI BARPETA BRANCH AT BARPETA ASSAM 4:THE ASSTT. GENERAL MANAGER REGIONAL ZONE OFFICE-IV SBI ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE GUWAHATI 6TH FLOOR SWAGOTA SQUARE ABC POINT 6.5 ROAD

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BHANGAGARH GUWAHATI-05 ASSAM

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5:THE DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER 581 REGIONAL ZONE OFFICE-IV ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE G.S ROAD ABC POINT GUWAHATI-78100

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Advocate for the Petitioner : MS.F INTAZ, MR. M A SHEIKH,MR.K U AHMED,MR.M HUSSAIN

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Advocate for the Respondent : MR.K K DEY, MR.S S SHARMA(R- 1 TO 5),MR.B J MUKHERJEE(R-1 TO 5),MRV K BAROOAH

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BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR

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ORDER

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Date : 17.03.2026

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Heard Mr. M Hussain and Mr. K U Ahmed, Learned Counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. V K Barooah, Learned Counsel appearing for the State Bank of India/respondents.

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The challenge in the present writ petition is to an order dated 29.06.2005, issued by the Disciplinary Authority, imposing a penalty of dismissal from service, upon the petitioner. The petitioner has also assailed the order dated 31.12.2005, passed by the Appellate Authority, and an order dated 11.04.2017, passed by the Reviewing Authority, dismissing his appeal and the review petition, respectively.

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A departmental proceeding came to be instituted against the petitioner, herein, vide issuance of charge-sheet dated 31.03.2004.

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The petitioner, at the relevant point of time, was working as an Assistant in the Barpeta branch of the respondent no. 1/Bank. Against the petitioner, 7 (Seven) distinct charges were so projected in the said charge-sheet dated 31.03.2004. The reply, submitted by the petitioner, not being found to be satisfactory, a departmental enquiry came to be ordered, in the matter. The petitioner participated in the enquiry and on conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report in the matter. The copy of the Enquiry Report, on being furnished to the petitioner, he submitted a representation, thereon, on 23.06.2005. Thereafter, the matter was considered by the Disciplinary Authority and on such consideration, the Disciplinary Authority, vide order dated 29.06.2005, proceeded to impose a penalty of dismissal from service upon the petitioner. The period of suspension, undergone by the petitioner, was also directed to be treated as not on duty and the remunerations receivable for the said period, was limited to the subsistence allowance already paid.

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The petitioner, thereafter, submitted an appeal in the matter but the Appellate Authority, vide order dated 31.12.2005, proceeded to dismiss the said appeal. The Appellate Authority’s order having been passed on 31.12.2005, upholding the penalty of dismissal from service, imposed upon the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority, it is found that the petitioner had not assailed the said orders, till institution of the present proceedings before this Court on 02.08.2017. The present proceeding is found to have been instituted after around 12 years from the passing of the orders in the departmental proceedings, instituted against the petitioner. Accordingly, this Court finds that there is an abnormal delay in institution of the proceedings assailing the order of the Disciplinary

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Authority as well as the Appellate Authority.

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The petitioner, in the present writ petition, has not adduced any reason justifying the delay occasioning in institution of the present writ petition assailing the orders passed against him in the departmental proceedings, instituted in the matter. The only reason, assigned by the petitioner, is that a criminal proceeding was pending against him and, therein, vide a judgment and order dated 05.11.2016, the petitioner was acquitted from the charges framed against him, therein.

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A perusal of the said judgment and order passed by the Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barpeta, would reveal that the petitioner was acquitted from the charges by granting him a benefit of doubt.

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It is a settled position of law that on acquittal in a criminal case, an order of penalty of dismissal from service, already passed, would not automatically be required to be interfered with, inasmuch as, the purpose of the disciplinary proceeding as well as a criminal proceeding is separate and distinct. The petitioner, admittedly, not having assailed the orders passed in the disciplinary proceeding against him, including the penalty imposed upon him, for long 12 years, this Court is of the considered view that in absence of cogent reasons being adduced towards justifying the delay occasioning, in instituting the present writ petition, the same is found to be hit by the principles of delay and laches and would not mandate a consideration on merits.

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In support of the said conclusions reached by this Court, this Court relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and

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Sewerage Board and others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 . The relevant conclusions drawn by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in this connection is extracted hereinbelow :

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“13. First, we shall deal with the facet of delay. In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati and others the Court referred to the principle that has been stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewall, and John Kemp', which is as follows:

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"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy."

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In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, while dealing with exercise of power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court observed that power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person's entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to

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such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct.

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In State of M.P. and others etc. etc. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and others etc. etc. the Court observed that it is well settled that power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. It has been further stated therein that if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction at a belated stage is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in injustice.

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Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the

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present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons who compete with 'Kumbhakarna' or for that matter 'Rip Van Winkle'. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.

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Having dealt with the doctrine of delay and laches, we shall presently proceed to deal with the doctrine of proportionality which has been taken recourse to by the High Court regard being had to the obtaining factual matrix. We think it appropriate to refer to some of the authorities which have been placed reliance upon by the High Court.”

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It is to be noted that in the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had noted that the appellant, therein, had invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Hon’ble High Court after lapse of 4 years from the date of imposition of the penalty upon him and had found the writ petition, on account of the delay occasioning to be not maintainable. Applying the said decision to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the abnormal delay occasioning in institution of the present proceedings and there being no satisfactory explanation for the same, the present case is not a fit case for this Court to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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In view of the above discussions, the present writ petition is found to be devoid of any merit and accordingly, stands dismissed. However,

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there would be no order as to costs.

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JUDGE

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Comparing Assistant

Pradip Kumar Biswas v. the State Bank of India and 4 Ors.

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Pradip Kumar Biswas v. the State Bank of India and 4 Ors.

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