Altaf Ahmed Vs the Union of India and 6 Ors.

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GAHC010194622025

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2025:GAU-AS:12327

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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

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Case No. : WP(C)/5052/2025

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ALTAF AHMED

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SON OF LATE KUTUB UDDIN AHMED, RESIDENT OF VILLAGE DIGHALIATI, P.O.- DIGHALIATI, P.S.- RAHA, DISTNAGAON, PIN- 782446, ASSAM

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VERSUS

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THE UNION OF INDIA AND 6 ORS.

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REPRESENTED BY THE MINISTRY OF ROAD TRANSPORT AND HIGHWAYS, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, TRANSPORT BHAWAN, 1, PARLIAMENT STREET NEW DELHI-110001

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2:THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA REPRESENTED BY THE CHAIRMAN G 5 AND 6 DABRI - GURGAON ROAD SECTOR 10 DWARKA DWARKA NEW DELHI 110075.

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3:THE REGIONAL OFFICER NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA NEDFI HOUSE 4TH FLOOR G.S ROAD DISPUR GUWAHATI-781006 ASSAM

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4:THE PROJECT DIRECTOR NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA H. NO. 1

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1ST FLOOR DILIP HUJURI PATH NEAR BAGESWARI MANDIR SORUMUTORIA DISPUR GUWAHATI PIN- 781006 DIST- KAMRUP (M) ASSAM

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5:THE INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR (CMD) INDIAN OIL BHAWAN G-9 ALI YAVAR JUNG MARG D-BLOCK B.K.C NAUPADA BANDRA-EAST MUMBAI MAHARASHTRA-400051 6:THE HEAD OF THE DIVISIONAL OFFICE INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. (IOCL) GUWAHATI MANAGING DIRECTOR (M.D) 4TH FLOOR EAST POINT TOWER BAMUNIMAIDAN GUWAHATI PIN781021 DIST- KAMRUP (M) ASSAM

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7:PARTHA PRATIM HAZARIKA SON OF DIMBADHAR HAZARIKA

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RESIDENT OF RAHA BAZAR P.S RAHA DIST- NAGAON PIN 782103 ASSA

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B E F O R E

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HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEVASHIS BARUAH

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Advocates for the petitioner(s) :Mr. PP Borthakur

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Advocates for the respondent(s) :Mr. C Baruah,

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Standing Counsel, NHAI

Mr. MK Choudhury,

Senior Advocate

Mr. M Sarma

For respondent Nos.5 and 6

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Date of hearing & judgment : 10.09.2025

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JUDGMENT & ORDER(ORAL)

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Heard Mr. PP Borthakur, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. None appears on behalf of the respondent No.1, Mr. C Baruah, the learned counsel who appears on behalf of the respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4 and Mr. MK Choudhury, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. M Sarma, the learned counsel who appears on behalf of the respondent Nos.5 and 6.

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The petitioner herein who has a retail outlet (petrol pump) allotted by the Bharat Petroleum Chemical Ltd. (BPCL) in the year 2005 is aggrieved by the actions on the part of the respondent Nos.5 and 6 in allotting a retail outlet (petrol pump) in favour of the respondent No.7 which is at a distance of 500 metres of the existing

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retail outlet of the petitioner.

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The case of the petitioner is that on the basis of the guidelines dated 26.06.2020 issued by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, whereby in Appendix-I of the said guidelines, it is stipulated at Clause 2.2 and, more particularly, at Sl.No.6 as to what should be the distance between two fuel stations. It is the case of the petitioner that if there is an undivided carriage way, the distance between the two fuel stations as per the said guidelines should be 300 metres and if there is a divided carriage way, the distance should be 1000 metres. The entire case of the petitioner hinges on these guidelines and assails the actions of the respondent No.5 and 6 to allot the retail outlet to the respondent No.7 within 500 metres.

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Mr. MK Choudhury, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos.5 and 6 submitted that he has obtained instruction(s) in respect to the issues involved. An email dated 28.08.2025 issued by the Manager (Law) of the respondent No.5 was placed before this Court. The said instruction is kept on record and marked with the letter ‘X’. The contents of the said email being relevant is reproduced hereinunder:

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“May please refer trailing mail from our functional department forwarding the LEC report and the provisional demand letter from NHAI confirming that the land is in order as per their guidelines. It is pertinent to mention here that the restriction is 500 metres from two retail outlets is not a ground of rejection if a separate service road is created

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for ingress and egress of the vehicles abutting the Retail outlet. In the present case, the applicant has agreed for construction of the service road at his own cost and for that reason the land has been found in order by the LEC and also NHAI has approved the proposal. You are requested to communicate the same before the Court during the course of hearing.”

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From the perusal of the above-quoted contents, it is mentioned that the restriction of 500 metres from two retail outlets cannot be a ground of rejection if a separate service road is created for ingress and egress of the vehicles abutting the Retail outlet. It is also mentioned that the respondent No.7 had agreed for construction of a service road at his own cost and for that reason, the land has been found in order by the Land Evaluation Committee and also the National Highway Authority of India had approved the proposal.

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Mr. MK Choudhury, the learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the petitioner in the instant proceedings cannot be a person aggrieved to seek a writ in the nature of certiorari. In that regard, he referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others reported in (1976) 1 SCC 671 and specifically referred to paragraphs 47 and 48.

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Mr. C Baruah, the learned counsel who appears on behalf of the NHAI submits that the NHAI had looked into the proposal so submitted by the respondent IOCL and respondent No.7 and found that there was no violation of the guidelines.

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This Court having heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties finds it relevant to reproduce the guidelines at Clause 2.2, more particularly at Sl.No.6 on the basis of which the petitioner lays emphasis:

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Sl.No.	Items	Norms applicable
6.	Distance between two fuel stations	Undivided Carriage way – 300m Divided Carriage way – 1000m Including decelaration and acceleration lanes However, this restriction shall not apply in case access/egress for all such fuel stations are provided through common service road of 7.0m width and not directly to NH. Further, access for fuel stations at
		close proximity than above
		distance may be allowed provided entry/exit for both the
		Fuel Stations are provided through service road of 7.0m width having sufficient length; further, additional length of such service road shall be constructed at the cost of the latter fuel station owner/company seeking grant of permission for access for the facility.

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From the perusal of the above-quoted guidelines, it would be seen that though there is a stipulation of having a minimum distance between two fuel stations, but this distance shall not apply in case access/egress for all such fuel stations are provided through common service road of 7.0m width and not directly to National Highway. Further to that, access for fuel stations at close proximity than the distance stipulated may be allowed provided entry/exit for both the Fuel Stations are provided through service road of 7.0m width having sufficient length. Further, additional length of such service road shall be constructed at the cost of the latter fuel station owner/company seeking grant of permission for access for the facility. From a perusal of the above-quoted guidelines, it appears that the guidelines have been laid down in order to ease the traffic in the National Highway and the exceptions mentioned therein further clarifies the said aspect. In the opinion of this Court, the said guidelines, however, do not create a right in favour of the existing retail outlet to object to the settling up of another retail outlet.

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It is seen from the instruction(s) so produced by Mr. MK Choudhury, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Nos.5 and 6 that a separate service road is proposed to be created for ingress and egress of the vehicles abutting the Retail outlet so allotted to the respondent No.7. It is also apparent from the said instruction that the respondent No.7 had agreed for construction of the service road at his own cost. Under such circumstances, the question of violation of the guidelines does not arise.

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Be that as it may, this Court further finds it relevant to take note of another relevant aspect of the matter which has a bearing on the maintainability of the writ petition. The issue seems to have been settled by the Supreme Court in a

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plethora of cases. The judgment referred to by the learned Senior Counsel in the case of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai (supra) seems to be appropriate. Paragraphs 47 to 50 being relevant are reproduced hereinunder:

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“47. Thus, in substance, the appellant's standis that the setting up of a rival cinema house in the town will adversely affect his monopolistic commercial interest, causing pecuniary harm and loss of business from competition. Such harm or loss is not wrongful in the eye of law, because it does not result in injury to a legal right or a legally protected interest, the business competition causing it being a lawful activity. Juridically, harm of this description is called damnum sine injuria, the term injuria being here used in its true sense of an act contrary to law. The reason why the law suffers a person knowingly to inflict harm of this description on another, without holding him accountable for it, is that such harm done to an individual is a gain to society at large.

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In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore he is not a 'person aggrieved' and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the No-objection Certificate.”

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lt is true that, in the ultimate analysis, the jurisdiction under Article 226 in general, and certiorari in particular, is discretionary. But in a country like India where writ petitions are instituted in the High Courts by the thousand, many of them frivolous, a strict ascertainment, at the outset, of the standing of the petitioner to invoke this extraordinary jurisdiction, must be insisted upon. The broad guide lines indicated by us, coupled with other well established self-devised rules of practice, such as the availability of an alternative remedy, the conduct of the petitioner etc., can go a long way to help the courts in weeding out a large number of writ petitions at the initial stage with consequent saving of public time and money.

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While a Procrustean approach should be avoided, as a rule the Court should not interfere at the instance of a 'stranger' unless there are exceptional circumstances involving a grave miscarriage of justice having an adverse impact on public interests. Assuming that the appellant is a 'stranger', and not a busybody, then also, there are no exceptional circumstances in the present case which would justify the issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance. On the contrary, the result of the exercise of these discretionary powers, in his favour, will, on balance, be against public policy. It will eliminate healthy competition in this business which is so essential to raise commercial morality; it will tend to perpetuate the appellant's monopoly of cinema business in the town; and above all, it will, in effect, seriously injure the fundamental rights of respondents 1 and 2, which they have under article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution, to carry on trade or business subject to 'reasonable restrictions' imposed by law.

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From a perusal of the above-quoted paragraphs, it would be seen that the Supreme Court observed as a Rule, when an approach made by a petitioner should be avoided. It was observed that when an approach is made to eliminate healthy competition in the business which is so essential to raise commercial morality but tends to perpetuate monopoly, such approach is required to be thrawted, more so, as it would impair the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, to carry on trade or business subject to 'reasonable restrictions' imposed by law.

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This Court also finds it very pertinent to take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Nagar Rice & Flour Mills & Ors. Vs. N. Teekappa Gowda & Bros. & Ors. reported in (1970) 1 SCC 575, where the Supreme Court held that a rice mill owner had no locus standi to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution, the setting up of a new rice mill by another.

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In the instant case, the petitioner herein has approached this Court invoking the public law remedy for the sole purpose to derail the allotment of the retail outlet to the respondent No.7 as his business prospects would be affected. Such a move on the part of the petitioner cannot be allowed by this Court in view of the settled position of law.

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Considering the above, this Court does not find any merit in the instant writ petition, for which, the writ petition stands dismissed. No costs.

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JUDGE

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Comparing Assistant

Altaf Ahmed v. the Union of India and 6 Ors.

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