Debashish Roy Vs Punjab National Bank and Anr.

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GAHC010180522024

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2025:GAU-AS:15807

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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

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Case No. : WP(C)/4958/2024

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DEBASHISH ROY SON OF LATE NALINI MOHAN ROY, RESIDENT OF HOUSE NO. 3, SUB LANE NO. 4, BY LANE NO. 7, LACHITNAGAR, GUWAHATI- 781007.

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VERSUS

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PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND ANR REPRESENTED BY THE MANAGING DIRECTOR AND CEO, PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK, HEAD OFFICE, PLOT NO. 4, SECTOR 10, DWARKA, NEW DELHI- 110075.

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2:THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK HEAD OFFICE PLOT NO. 4

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SECTOR 10 DWARKA NEW DELHI- 110075

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Advocate for the Petitioner : PETITIONER IN PERSON,

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Advocate for the Respondent : SC, PNB, MS S MOCHAHARI,MR S DUTTA,MR. S DUTTA,MS K BORAH,MR SISHIR DUTTA

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– B E F O R E –

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HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI

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For the Petitioner : Shri. Debashish Roy, Petitioner in person.

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For the Respondent(s) : Mr. Sishir Dutta, Ms. S Mochahari, Mr. S Dutta, Ms. K Borah, Standing counsel,

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Punjab National Bank.

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Date on which judgment is reserved : N/A

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Date of pronouncement of judgment : 19.11.2025

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Whether the pronouncement is of the

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operative part of the judgment ? : No.

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Whether the full judgment has been

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Pronounced : Yes.

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J UDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)

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Heard Mr. Debashish Roy, petitioner in person. Also heard Mr. Sishir Dutta, learned Senior counsel assisted by Ms. K Borah, learned Standing counsel, Punjab National Bank for the respondents.

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2 . The petitioner, a former officer of the United Bank of India (now amalgamated with Punjab National Bank), has approached this Court praying for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the impugned Speaking Order dated 14.06.2024, whereby the petitioner’s representation regarding alleged arbitrary marking in his APAR for the year 2010-2011 has been rejected. The petitioner also seeks a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to treat the said APAR as non-existent and to reconsider his eligibility for promotion on the basis of the residual APARs within the zone of consideration, i.e., APAR for 2011-2012, along with consequential service benefits, particularly because he has already superannuated on 31.01.2022.

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3. It is the specific grievance of the petitioner that 42 officers junior to him were included in the promotion lists dated 31.05.2012 and 08.06.2012, and many of those juniors were subsequently promoted, thereby causing serious prejudice to the petitioner.

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4. The petitioner was disqualified from promotion during the year 2012 on account of an alleged below-benchmark APAR for the year 2010-2011. The APAR in question awarded the petitioner a total of 59 marks, one mark short of

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the minimum benchmark of 60 required for consideration for promotion.

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5. In the ‘Quality of Performance’ parameter (maximum 20 marks), the Reporting Authority recorded that the petitioner’s performance was “very good, capable of discharging duties independently, requiring minimal supervision, though needing deeper penetration in tackling defaulted borrowers” yet, he was awarded 13 marks out of 20 marks. The Reviewing Authority concurred and also awarded 13 marks out of 20 marks.

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6. In self-appraisal, the petitioner had acknowledged certain constraints, such as the vulnerability of the area, poor asset-disposal scope in rural sectors, and some limited success in semi-urban pockets.

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7. The Reporting Authority, while computing overall weightage, awarded 59 marks, which falls within the category of ‘Good’ i.e., falling in the weight range between 55 to below 70. The Reviewing Authority concurred with the overall weightage awarded by the Reporting Authority.

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8. It appears that because of this single-mark shortfall, the petitioner was found ineligible for promotion during 2012 despite being within the zone of consideration, leading to 42 officers who were junior to the petitioner being promoted to the next higher grade.

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9. Since the marking for the year 2010-11 was not communicated to the petitioner at the relevant point of time, for which he did not get an opportunity to convince the respondent authorities as to why he should not have been given one more mark so as to make him eligible for promotion during 2012, he had approached this Court by way of a writ petition, being WP(C) No. 3362/2012, wherein this Court, after hearing the parties by order judgment and order dated 11.08.2014 was pleased to direct that the entries in the APAR of the petitioner for both the years 2010-11 and 2011-12 be communicated to him and further

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was pleased to give an opportunity to the petitioner to submit representation against such entries and upon such representation being filed, the respondent authorities were directed to consider the same fairly and objectively with an open mind. Thereafter, the APAR for the years in question were communicated to the petitioner.

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10. Upon perusing the APAR grading given by the Reporting Authority as well as the Reviewing Authority for the year 2010-11 and comparing the same with 2011-12 wherein he has been given 95 marks falling under the grade of ‘outstanding’, the petitioner submitted his representation on 10.10.2014.

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11. After receipt of the said representation dated 10.10.2014, the respondent authorities by Speaking Order dated 11.10.2014 was pleased to reject the same, by observing that though the petitioner may have done good in training college, however, as Branch Head his performance was not so good and accordingly observed that the marks allotted by the Reporting/Reviewing Authority are fair and without any prejudice or bias.

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12. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Speaking Order dated 11.10.2014, the petitioner approached this Court by way of another writ petition, being WP(C) No. 2102/2015, wherein this Court by judgment and order dated 18.03.2024 held that the impugned rejection was mechanical, non-speaking, and vitiated by lack of objective consideration. Accordingly, the respondent authorities were directed to reconsider the representation with an open mind, following the essential principles governing objective review.

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13. Despite the aforesaid directions issued by this Court by the aforesaid judgment and order dated 18.03.2024, the respondent thereafter passed the impugned Speaking Order dated 14.06.2024 whereby the petitioner’s representation was once again rejected in a manner the petitioner describes as

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an ‘eyewash’, alleging that no objective analysis was carried out and no material reasoning was offered explaining how ’very good’ performance could receive a lower marking than ‘satisfactory’. Situated thus, the present writ petition has been filed.

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14. Mr. D Roy, the petitioner in person, submits that the respondent authorities in a most mechanical and arbitrary manner have graded the APAR of the petitioner for the year 2010-11, leading to his disqualification for promotion to the next higher grade, despite 42 junior officers being promoted. He further submits that despite the Reporting Officer having not remarked any adverse comments as such regarding the petitioner’s quality of performance and other criteria for the year in question, however, because of the marking made by the Reporting Authority, which was concurred mechanically without any application of mind by the Reviewing Authority, the petitioner having fallen short of only one mark of the benchmark of promotion to the next higher grade, the service prospect of the petitioner was totally jeopardized.

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15. He further submits that the Apex Court in the case of Manoj Kumar -VsUnion of India & Ors in Civil Appeal No. 2679/2024 categorically has held that where a candidate is otherwise is meeting the benchmark and no valid reasons exists for below benchmark grading, the Courts may intervene to ensure fairness. He further submits that despite earlier directions of this Court being passed in WP(C) No. 3362/2012 and WP(C) No. 2102/2015 for an objective reconsideration of the marks awarded to the petitioner in the APAR in question, the same was not complied with by the respondent authorities. He further submits that being short by only one mark should not defeat substantive justice, especially when subsequent APAR shows consistent good performance. He thus seeks the quashing of the impugned APAR and prays for consequential

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benefits.

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16. In support of his aforesaid submissions, he further relied on the following decisions–

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(i) Narender Prakash Kohli -Vs- Union of India & Ors, of High Court of Delhi in WP(C) No. 2968/2014.

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(ii) Ajit Kumar -Vs- Union of India & Anr, of High Court of Delhi in WP(C) No. 6498/2023.

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(iii) Manudev Dahiya -Vs- Union of India through DG ITBP, of High Court of Delhi in WP(C) No. 2673/2016.

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(iv) R. K. Jibanlata Devi -Vs- High Court of Manipur through its Registrar General and Ors. , in WP(Civil) No. 1209/2021.

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(v) Abhijit Ghosh Dastidar -Vs- Union of India & Ors ., in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s). 26556/2004 .

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(vi) Dev Dutt -Vs- Union of India & Ors. in Civil Appeal No. 7631/2002.

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(vii) H.P. Housing & Urban Development Authority -Vs- Roop Lal Verma & Anr ., in CWP No. 167/2018.

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17. Per contra, Mr. S Dutta, learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondents, submits that a writ court should not interfere in matters of assessment and grading in APAR and that APAR evaluation is primarily an administrative function. He further submits that the petitioner, though, has alleged malafide against the concerned Reporting Officer and also the Reviewing Authority, however, has not made the concerned officers party respondents in the present writ proceeding. He accordingly submits that the issue of malafide cannot be taken up in the absence of the officers concerned.

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18. In support of his aforesaid submissions, he relies upon the following

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decisions –

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(i) Bihar State Electricity Board & Ors -Vs- Dharamdeo Das reported in (2024) SCC OnLine SC 1768.

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(ii) Government of West Bangal & Ors. -Vs- Dr. Amal Satpathi & Ors, reported in (2024) SCC OnLine SC 3512.

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(iii) Swapan Kumar Pal -Vs- Achintya Kumar Nayak & Ors, reported in (2008) 1 SCC 379.

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(iv) Ajit Kumar -Vs- Union of India & Anr., reported in (2025) SCC OnLine Del 16.

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(v) State of U.P. -Vs- Yamuna Shanker Misra & Anr., reported in (1997) 4 SCC 7.

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(vi) Rajendra Singh Verma (Dead) through LRS and Ors. -VsLieutenant Governor (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., reported in (2011) 10 SCC 1.

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(vii) M.V. Thimmaiah -Vs- Union Public Service Commission, reported in (2007) Supreme (SC) 1621.

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(viii) State of Bihar and Anr. -Vs- P.P. Sharma, IAS and Anr., reported in (1992) Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 192.

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19. I have heard the arguments advanced before this Court by the petitioner in person as well as learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondents and have perused the materials available on record. I have also duly considered the case laws cited at the bar.

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20. It appears that twice this Court had directed objective reconsideration by judgment and order dated 11.08.2014 passed in WP(C) No. 3362/2012 and subsequent judgment and order dated 18.03.2024 passed in WP(C) No. 2102/2015. This Court while elaborately explaining the contours of objective

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review by setting aside the earlier rejection of the respondent authorities in refusing to interfere in enhancing the marks/weightage awarded by the Reporting/Reviewing Authority, by judgment and order dated 18.03.2024 was pleased to direct a fresh reconsideration of the impugned awarding of marks/weightage in the APAR in question of the petitioner with reasons founded on materials. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid subsequent judgment read as under –

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22. In the facts of this present case, this Court had specifically directed the respondent authorities to consider the representation filed by the petitioner fairly and objectively with an open mind by the higher authority who is placed higher in the office above the accepting authority, within the time period specified.

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23. When the Court has directed the respondent authorities to consider the case fairly and objectively with an open mind, it means that Court was inclined to interfere with the order passed by the authorities which was assailed in the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.3362/2012. However, instead of interfering with the order, the Court left it to the authority in order that the authority will reconsider the matter and decide it afresh by taking into consideration of relevant materials and without being influenced or guided by their individual perception or bias while deciding the case of the petitioner. Viewed from this perspective, the impugned communication dated 11.12.2014 which is extracted in the paragraph herein before, merely conveyed the order of the higher authority while intimating the petitioner that his representation was considered fairly and objectively as under: “I have seen past performance and performance in the Branch, May be in training college, he has done good but as Branch Head, his performance was not so good and marks allotted are fair and without any prejudice or bias.”

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24. It was implicit in the order dated 11.08.2014 passed in W.P.(C) No.3362/2012 by the Co-ordinate Bench that any such order that may have been passed by the higher authority as directed, a copy thereof was required to be served on the petitioner. Instead the petitioner was served with the communication dated 11.12.2014 which merely conveyed the order passed by the higher authority. It appears that the Bank authorities undermined the directions passed by the Co-ordinate Bench earlier that on the representation permitted to be filed by the petitioner, an authority higher than the accepting authority was directed to consider the representation filed

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by the petitioner “objectively” and pass appropriate orders in the representation.”

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21. It appears that pursuant to the directions passed by this Court, the respondent authorities once again rejected the prayer of the petitioner for enhancing the marks/weightage awarded by the Reporting/Reviewing Authority in the APAR in question. The conclusions made in the impugned Speaking Order dated 14.06.2024, read as under –

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“ In view of the aforesaid observations and records perused. I observe as under

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Sh Debashish Roy was working as Chief Manager at Regional Office Nagaon during the period of 2010-11 and he was awarded 59 marks out of 100 marks in APAR by his Reporting Authority- Shri Mukti Ranjan Ray and confirmed by the Reviewing Authority- Sh. Ranjan Kumar Mohanty. Sh. Roy has raised contention that the marks awarded in APAR during the said period is not correct.

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The petitioner himself as well as his reporting authority, since, superannuated from the service of Bank. So, the assessment can be done only on the basis of facts and records available with Bank.

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The role of Shri Roy during the year 2010-11 was to assist Regional Head (i.e.. his Reporting Authority for his APAR) in the overall supervision and control of Business Development of the Region.

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It is noted that assessment of his performance during the said period was not linked to any business parameter and had to be done based on the qualitative parameters by his reporting authority based on his understanding and evaluation.

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The appraisal of Sh. Roy was done by his reporting authority and confirmed by reviewing authority, which mitigates any individual biasness.

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The marks awarded during the previous period as well as subsequent period is also placed on record and no conclusion can be drawn based on the marks achieved in previous period and subsequent period as the role of Sh. Roy was different in these period from the period under contention.

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It is also placed on record that his reporting authority Sh. Mukti Ranjan Roy has been asked to provide clarification and he has opined that overall assessment of a score of 59 out of 100 as awarded to Sh Roy is deemed to

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be correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

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After going through the facts as mentioned above and looking to the appraisal evaluation process, where performance of an employee is evaluated by the reporting authority and subsequently reviewed by different authority whose rank is higher than reporting authority, I am of the view that concerned officer Sh Debashish Roy's performance evaluation seems to be appropriate.

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Shri Debashish Roy be informed accordingly” .

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22. Upon a careful scrutiny of the said impugned order, it reveals an absence of meaningful reasoning, a mechanical affirmation of earlier remarks, no explanation of how ‘very good’ performance translated into sub-benchmark marks and no consideration of the petitioner’s admitted field constraints which were acknowledged in the narrative portion. Such cryptic reasoning does not satisfy the test of objectivity, fair and reasoned review. In fact, the impugned order merely restates old conclusion.

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23 . It is apparent that the petitioner was awarded 59 marks, one mark short of the benchmark of 60. However, the narratives portion as recorded by the Reporting Authority though reveals ‘very good performance’, ‘can work independently’, ‘needs minimal supervision’, yet he was awarded only 13 out 20 in ‘quality of performance’, which is barely above average. The Reviewing Authority blindly concurred with the aforesaid marks awarded, without recording any reason explaining the rational of such marking.

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24. Undoubtedly, the officer entrusted with the duty to write a confidential report has a public responsibility and trust to write the confidential report objectively, fairly, and dispassionately, while giving as accurately as possible the statement of facts on an overall assessment of the performance of the subordinate officer. It should be founded upon facts or circumstances. Though sometimes, it may not be part of the record, but the conduct, reputation, and

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character acquire public knowledge or notoriety and may be within his knowledge. Before forming an opinion to be adverse, the Reporting Officer writing confidential should share the information that is not part of the record with the officer concerned, have the information confronted by the officer and make it part of the record. This amounts to an opportunity given to the erring corrupt officer to correct the errors of the judgment, conduct, behavior, integrity or conduct/corrupt proclivity. If, despite being given such an opportunity, the officer fails to perform the duty, correct his conduct or improve himself, the same may necessarily be recorded in the confidential report and a copy thereof supplied to the affected officer so that he will have an opportunity to know the remarks made against him. If he feels aggrieved, it would be open to him to have it corrected by appropriate representation to the higher authorities or any appropriate judicial forum for redressal. Thereby honesty, integrity, good conduct, and efficiency get improved in the performance of public duties and standard of excellence in services constantly rises to a higher level and it becomes a successful tool to manage the services with officers of integrity, honesty, efficiency, and devotion (Refer:- State of U.P. -Vs- Yamuna Shanker Misra & Anr., reported in (1997) 4 SCC 7 ).

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25. Hence, when an officer makes a remark, he must eschew making vague remarks causing jeopardy to the services of the subordinate officer. He must bestow careful attention to collect all correct and truthful information and give necessary particulars when he seeks to make adverse remarks against the subordinate officer whose career prospect and service were in jeopardy. In other words, due diligence has to be exercised by the Reporting Authority inasmuch as any adverse remarks or marking, may adversely affect the future service prospects of the employee concerned.

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26. In the instant case, the Reporting Authority though has not as such, given any adverse remark against the petitioner in the APAR for the year 2010-11, however, because of his weightage awarded, the petitioner has fallen short of one mark of the benchmark for promotion to the next higher grade, and thereby his future promotional avenues have been seriously jeopardized.

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27. The role of a Reviewing Authority in relation to reviewing of APAR is not that of a mere postman so as to mechanically endorse the markings of the Reporting Authority and communicating the same to the selection/promotion committee, as the case may be. The Reviewing Authority has a significant, independent, and judicial role in evaluating the performance of an officer, far beyond merely forwarding the report prepared by the Reporting Authority. The Reviewing Authority is expected to apply its own judgment and assessment to ensure fairness and objectivity. Its assessment should not be a rubberstamp of the Reporting Authority’s remark. The Reviewing Authority must indicate whether it agrees with the assessment made by the Reporting Authority. In case of disagreement with the Reporting Authority, regarding numerical grading or remarks, it must record its own specific assessment and provide clear justification. The said power of the Reviewing Authority is not an empty formality. The Reviewing Authority acts as a check and balance to the Reporting Authority, whose judgment might sometime be too narrow or subjective. Its role helps to ensure a more objective and impartial evaluation of the officer’s performance. In essence, the Reviewing Authority is a crucial, active participant in the performance appraisal process, to ensure that the APAR is a true indicator of the employee’s achievement and potential for career advancement. Its active involvement helps in preparing proper guidance and feedback for improvement, which is a core objective of the APAR system. Hence, APAR scores are critical for

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promotion, selection and other career advancement opportunities. Any adverse remark/marks/weightage seriously can jeopardize their future service prospects. Thus, the Reviewing Authority has to exercise utmost care and due diligence in overall assessing the weightages awarded by the Reporting Authority.

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28. Since in the case in hand, the Reporting Authority has awarded the overall weightage of 59 which falls under the heading ‘good’, i.e., 55 to below 70, the Reviewing Authority could have added 1 mark, as there was no adverse remark recorded in the performance of the petitioner. On the contrary, in the quality of performance column, though he was reported by the Reporting Officer as ‘very good’, however, out of 20 marks, only 13 marks were given by the Reporting Authority.

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29. Apt at this stage to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Manoj Kumar (Supra). Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment read as under –

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“ 18 . Within the realm of judicial review in common law jurisdictions, it is established that constitutional courts are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring the lawfulness of executive decisions, rather than substituting their own judgment to decide the rights of the parties, which they would exercise in civil jurisdiction.⁵ It has been held that the primary purpose of quashing any action is to preserve order in the legal system by preventing excess and abuse of power or to set aside arbitrary actions. Wade on Administrative Law states that the purpose of quashing is not the final determination of private rights, for a private party must separately contest his own rights before the administrative authority.⁶ Such private party is also not entitled to compensation merely because the administrative action is illegal.⁷ A further case of tort, misfeasance, negligence, or breach of statutory duty must be established for such person to receive compensation.

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19 . We are of the opinion that while the primary duty of constitutional courts remains the control of power, including setting aside of administrative actions that may be illegal or arbitrary, it must be acknowledged that such measures may not singularly address repercussions of abuse of power. It is

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equally incumbent upon the courts, as a secondary measure, to address the injurious consequences arising from arbitrary and illegal actions. This concomitant duty to take reasonable measures to restitute the injured is our overarching constitutional purpose. This is how we have read our constitutional text, and this is how we have built our precedents on the basis of our preambular objective to secure justice.

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25 . Returning to the facts of the present case, in exercise of our primary duty, we have set aside the action of the respondents as being illegal and arbitrary. In furtherance of our duty to provide a reasonable measure for restitution, we have explored the possibility of directing the Institute to appoint the appellant as a primary teacher in any other school run by them. However, it seems that the only primary school run by the Institute is the one for which they sought to fill vacancies and it is closed since 2023. In this situation, we must consider an alternative restitutory measure in the form of monetary compensation.”

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30. Perhaps the inconsistencies between narrative assessment and the numerical grading in the context of the present case are precisely the type of arbitrary grading the Apex Court considered in the above referred case. Following the ratio of the above referred case, it is clear that where the grading is inconsistent with the narrative or unsupported by reasons, it invites judicial interference.

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31 . There is no quarrel with the proposition urged by the learned Senior counsel for the respondents to the effect that this Court should not interfere in matters of assessment and grading of APAR, however, the same is subject, of course, to the existence of any malafides, arbitrariness, procedural violations and/or perversity, as the case may be.

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32 . Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rajendra Singh Verma (Supra), relevant paragraphs of the said judgment read as under –

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“ 147. Writing the confidential report is primarily and essentially an

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administrative function. Normally tribunals/courts are loath to interfere in cases of complaints against adverse remarks and to substitute their own h judgment for that of the reporting or reviewing officers. It is because these officers alone are best suited to judge the qualities of officials working under them and about their competence in the performance of official duties entrusted to them. Despite fear of abuse of power by prejudiced superior officers in certain cases, the service record contained in the confidential reports, by and large, reflects the real personality of the officer.

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150. This Court has consistently taken the view that an order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment and does not have adverse consequence and, therefore, the principles of natural justice are not attracted. What is relevant to notice is that this Court has held that an uncommunicated adverse ACR on record can be taken into consideration and an order of compulsory retirement cannot be set aside only for the reason that such uncommunicated adverse entry was taken into consideration. If that be so, the fact that the adverse ACR was communicated but none of the appellants had an opportunity to represent against the same, before the same was taken into consideration for passing the order of compulsory retirement, cannot at all vitiate the order of compulsory retirement. ”

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33 . Reading of the aforesaid judgment, it is absolutely clear that normally this Court shall not interfere in case of complaints against adverse remarks and substitute their own judgments for that of the reporting or reviewing authority. It is because these officers alone are best suited to judge the qualities of an officer working under them and their competence in the performance of official duties entrusted to them. However, if a bonafide decision is not taken in the public interest to augment efficiency in the public service and/or the decision is not fair, this Court certainly can interfere with such grading.

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34. This Court is mindful of the constitutional responsibility of a writ court under Article 226 to the effect that the same is not merely supervisory. Where injustice is apparent and administrative authorities have failed to correct themselves despite repeated opportunities, the Court must exercise its constitutional mandate to ensure fairness, reasonableness, and non-

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arbitrariness under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

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35. In Dwarka Nath -Vs- Income Tax Officer, Special Circle, D-Ward reported in AIR 1966 SC 81 , the apex Court held as under –

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“ We shall first take the preliminary objection, for if we maintain it, no other question will arise for consideration. Article 226 of the Constitution reads :

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"... every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders, or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose."

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This article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the high court to reach injustice wherever it is found. The constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purposes for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression "nature", for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with the those in England, but only draws in analogy from them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution with that of the English courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary from of Government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the article itself. To say this is not to say that the High Courts can function arbitrarily under this Article. Some limitations are implicit in the article and others may be evolved to direct the article through defined channels. This interpretation has been accepted by this Court in T. C. Basappa v. Nagappa, and Irani v. State of Madras.”

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It is thus well settled that the arms of the writ court are wide enough to reach the injustice, wherever it is found.

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36. That apart, taking a clue from the decision of the Apex Court in Manoj Kumar (Supra), it can be safely held that the constitutional Courts must intervene when the assessment process becomes arbitrary or inconsistent with its own narrative.

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37. In the present case, the petitioner lost promotion by a single mark, a mark unsupported by any reason or logic. Such marginal deprivation caused by arbitrary assessment offends the guarantee of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Reviewing Authority is not a mere countersigning authority. Its function is to apply an independent mind; examine inconsistencies; ensure that the numerical grade matches the narrative and protect against arbitrariness by the Reporting Authority.

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38. Reference is made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dev Dutt -Vs- Union of India & Ors. in Civil Appeal No. 7631/2002 . Relevant paragraph of the said judgment reads as under –

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“ 10. In the present case the bench mark (i.e. the essential requirement) laid down by the authorities for promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer was that the candidate should have 'very good' entry for the last five years. Thus in this situation the 'good' entry in fact is an adverse entry because it eliminates the candidate from being considered for promotion. Thus, nomenclature is not relevant, it is the effect which the entry is having which determines whether it is an adverse entry or not. It is thus the rigours of the entry which is important, not the phraseology. The grant of a `good' entry is of no satisfaction to the incumbent if it in fact makes him ineligible for promotion or has an adverse effect on his chances.”

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39. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court has held that an entry that affects promotion, even if the same is termed ‘good’ is in substance an adverse entry, the same must be communicated and subjected to objective scrutiny. Likewise, in Abhijit Ghosh Dastidar (Supra), the Apex Court held that where the Reviewing Authority merely echoes the Reporting Authority without independent

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evaluation, the entire APAR becomes arbitrary and cannot be relied upon, and the Court may grant notional promotion. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment read as under –

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“ 4. It is not dispute that the CAT, Patna Bench passed an order recommending the authority not to rely on the order of caution dated 22.09.1997 and the order of adverse remarks dated 09.06.1998. In view of the said order, one obstacle relating to his promotion goes. Coming to the second aspect, that though the benchmark ‘very good’ is required for being considered for promotion admittedly the entry of ‘god’ was not communicated to the appellant. The entry of ‘good’ should have been communicated to him as he was having ‘very good’ in the previous year. In those circumstances, in our opinion, non-communication of entries in the ACR of a public servant’ whether he is in civil, judicial, police or any other service (other than the armed forces), it has civil consequences because it may affect his chances for promotion or get other benefits. Hence, such noncommunication would be arbitrary and as such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The same view has been reiterated in the above referred decision relied on by the appellant. Therefore, the entries ‘good’ if at all granted to the appellant, the same should not have been taken into consideration for being considered for promotion to the higher grade. The respondent has no case that the appellant had ever been informed of the nature of the grading given to him.

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5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has pointed out that the officer who was immediately junior in service to the appellant was given promotion on 28.08.2000. Therefore, the appellant also be deemed to have been given promotion from 28.08.2000. Since the appellant had retired from service, we make it clear that he is not entitled to any pay or allowances for the period from which he had not worked in the Higher Administrative Grade Group-A, but his retrospective promotion from 28.08.2000 shall be

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considered for the benefit of re-fixation of his pension and other retrial benefits as per rules. ”

¶138

40. The present case reveals that the Reviewing Authority mechanically affirmed the marks without stating why a person described as ‘very good’ and ‘independent in functioning’ merited only 13 marks out of 20 marks in the key category, causing him to fall short by only one mark. Such mechanical concurrence defeats the very purpose of review and vitiates the APAR. The narrative portion praises the petitioner’s performance as ‘very good’ and that he required minimal supervision. The petitioner also faced field constraints acknowledged in the self-appraisal. Despite this, both the Reporting and Reviewing Authority awarded 13 marks out of 20 marks, without explaining the downward departure from the narrative, ultimately leading to a total assessment award of 59, thereby falling short by only 1 mark to be eligible for promotion to the next higher grade.

¶139

41. This mismatch was noted by the Apex Court in Dev Dutt (Supra), wherein it held that the effect of the entry on the employee’s career is determinative of its character.

¶140

42. The petitioner’s future was jeopardized solely because the authorities failed to justify the numerical grading.

¶141

43. This Court’s previous judgments mandated a fresh, objective review with an open mind, however, the impugned Speaking Order dated 14.06.2024 shows no independent analysis, no fresh evaluation, no reasoning, and no consideration of inconsistencies whatsoever.

¶142

44. The respondents have demonstrated complete disregard for judicial directions passed by a constitutional court. A 3^rd remand in such a situation would result only in further delay and perpetuate injustice, especially after

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retirement.

¶145

45. In Abhijit Ghosh Dastidar (Supra) and Dev Dutt (Supra), the Apex Court held that where the APAR entries are arbitrary or un-communicated and they have the effect of depriving promotion, the Court must grant notional promotion with consequential notional benefits, but without arrears of salary. 46. The present case is on even stronger footing because the petitioner was denied promotion by only one mark, the award of which is tainted by arbitrariness and non-application of mind.

¶146

47. The petitioner has already superannuated. Hence, monetary arrears may not be granted, but he is entitled to notional promotion, notional pay fixation, and revised pension and retiral benefits.

¶147

48. This Court is satisfied that the APAR for 2010-11 is arbitrary, inconsistent with its narrative, unsupported by reasoning, and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It cannot form the basis of denial of promotion.

¶148

49. The respondent authorities having failed to comply with judicial directions twice, a further remand would be futile. Judicial review must now extend to correct the injustice.

¶149

50. In view of the foregoing, I am of the unhesitant view that the impugned Speaking Order dated 14.06.2024 cannot stand the scrutiny of the eye of law. Accordingly, the impugned Speaking Order dated 14.06.2024 passed by the Executive Director, Punjab National Bank is hereby set aside and quashed.

¶150

51. The APAR for the year 2010-11 is declared arbitrary, non-speaking, and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It shall be ignored for all service purposes.

¶151

52. The petitioner shall be treated as eligible for promotion for the year 2012 on the basis of the residual APARs by ignoring the APAR of 2010-11. The

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petitioner shall be deemed to have been notionally promoted from the date on which his immediate junior was promoted in the lists dated 31.05.2012 and 08.06.2012. The petitioner shall be granted all notional consequential benefits, including notional pay fixation and re-fixation of pension, gratuity, commutation, and other retiral dues, but without payment of the arrear salary, in accordance with the principles laid down in Abhijit Ghosh Dastidar (Supra).

¶154

53. The entire exercise, as noted above, shall be completed within three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this judgment.

¶155

54. The instant writ petition is allowed in the above terms. No order as to costs.

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JUDGE

¶157

Comparing Assistant

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Digitally Pranab signed by Pranab Kumar Deka Kumar Date: 2025.11.21 Deka 01:02:42 +05'30'

Debashish Roy v. Punjab National Bank and Anr.

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Debashish Roy v. Punjab National Bank and Anr.

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