Ashok Das Vs the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and 6 Ors.

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GAHC010150722020

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2025:GAU-AS:15260

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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

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Case No. : WP(C)/4499/2020

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ASHOK DAS S/O. LT. MATHURA DAS, R/O. HAIBARGAON, P.O. HAIBARGAON, PIN782002, DIST. NAGAON, ASSAM.

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VERSUS

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THE INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD AND 6 ORS A GOVT. OF INDIA ENTERPRISE REGD. UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 1956, REP. BY ITS CHAIRMAN AND HAVING ITS REGD. OFFICE AT INDIAN OIL BHAWAN, ALI YAVAR JUNG MARG, BANDRA (EAST), MUMBAI-400051.

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2:THE MARKETING OFFICER

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INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. ASSAM OIL DIVISION.

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3:THE CHIEF DIVISIONAL RETAIL SALES MANAGER

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INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. EAST POINT TOWER BAMUNIMAIAM GUWAHATI-781021 DIST. KAMRUP (M) ASSAM.

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4:THE DY. COMMISSIONER MORIGAON ASSAM. 5:MAUSHUMI KHAUND DAS W/O. SRI PARASHMONI DAS R/O. A T ROAD VODAFONE BUILDING OPPOSITE HAIBARGAON HIGH SCHOOL

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PIN-782002 DIST. NAGAON ASSAM.

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6:PARASHMONI DAS S/O. LT. MATHURA DAS. R/O. A T ROAD VODAFONE BUILDING OPPOSITE HAIBARGAON HIGH SCHOOL PIN-782002 DIST. NAGAON ASSAM.

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7:MOINA DAS W/O LT. GIRIN DAS R/O HAIBARGAON P.O. HAIBARGAON PIN-782002 DIST- NAGAON ASSAM

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BEFORE

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HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH MAZUMDAR

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Advocate for the petitioner(s): Mr A C Borbora, Sr. Adv., Mr M Smith

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Advocate for the respondent(s): Mr D K Sarmah, R-1 to 3.

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Date of Hearing : 06.11.2025

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Date of Judgment : 11.11.2025

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JUDGMENT AND ORDER (CAV)

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(Rajesh Mazumdar, J.)

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Heard Mr A C Borbora, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr M Smith, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr D K Sarmah, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3.

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This matter had been heard on 04.11.2025, extensively, and was directed to be listed again today for submission of written arguments on behalf of the contesting parties. The written submissions having been submitted, the Judgment and Order was reserved.

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FACTS DEPICTED IN THE WRIT PETITION:

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This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner, being aggrieved by the action of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3, in using the land of the petitioner to run a rental outlet for petroleum products, even in absence of any valid lease/license documents being executed in favour of the said respondents or the person to whom, the license for such retail shop has been awarded by the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. The prayers made in the writ petition are listed hereinbelow for a ready reference:-

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“(A) A writ in the nature of Mandamus shall not be issued directing respondent authorities in the Indian Oil Corporation Limited to immediately suspend/stop/shift the operation of the petrol pump operating under the name and style of M/s Purnima Filling Station which is being operated from the land belonging to the petitioner, and/or;

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(B) A writ in the nature of Mandamus shall not be issued directing the respondents in the Indian Oil Corporation Limited to remove all fuel vending and pumping paraphernalia which is present on the land belonging to the petitioner and/or;

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(C) A writ in the nature of Mandamus shall not be issued directing the respondents in the Indian Oil Corporation Limited to forthwith consider the representations filed by the petitioner and take necessary action as per law

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and/or;

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(D) A writ in the nature of Mandamus shall not be issued directing the respondent No. 4 to consider the representation dated 06.01.2020, filed by the petitioner and pass appropriate order as per law and;

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Upon cause/causes that may be shown, after hearing the parties and upon perusal of the records be pleased to make the Rule absolute and/or to pass any other appropriate order or direction as to Your Lordships may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances so as to give full and complete relief to the petitioner.

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-AND-

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Pending disposal of the writ petition, Your Lordships may be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to suspend/stop operations of the M/S Purnima Filling Station and/or to pass such further or other Order(s) as Your Lordships may deem fit and proper in order to give adequate interim protection to the petitioner.”

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As per the statements made in the writ petition, the petitioner claimed to be the owner and possessor of a plot of land measuring around 2 Bighas under Patta No. 42 Dag No. 274, in the revenue village of Dharmatol, Mouza-Uttar Khula, which is adjacent to the Highway No. 37, in the district of Morigaon, Assam. On being approached by one Mukul Bordoloi (since deceased), the petitioner had entered into a lease with Mukul Bordoloi for the purpose of setting up a retail outlet for sale of permitted petrol and diesel. The lease agreement was for a period 20 years from 21.08.1997. After setting up of the retail outlet, which the petitioner asserts in the writ petition to have been done with his help and under Power of Attorney executed by Mukul Bordoloi, Sri Mukul Bordoloi successfully operated the outlet for several years. The lease for the land in favour of Sri Mukul Bordoloi expired in the year 2017. However, the

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business continued to run on the said plot of land, even thereafter. The writ petitioner asserts that in the year 2017, he came to know that Sri Mukul Bordoloi had executed a Power of Attorney in favour of the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 in this writ petition, and that the said General Power of Attorney had been revoked on 29.05.2017. The writ petition, thereafter, makes a reference to civil litigation between the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 on the one hand and Mukul Bordoloi, on the other hand. Sri Mukul Bordoloi met his demise on 24.08.2020, and upon such demise, the petitioner claims to have preferred applications to the Deputy Commissioner (now, District Commissioner, Morigaon), praying for an enquiry to be caused and to show cause to the persons running the retail outlet pump as to why the license should not be cancelled for carrying out business on a plot of land without a valid and registered lease deed. The respondents in the State, however, denied receipt of such application.

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Be that as it may, the petitioner further asserts that he had sent legal notices to the Chief Divisional Retail Sales Manager of the Indian Oil Corporation Limited, bringing on record, the facts of the case and had made the respondent/IOCL aware that a few persons with vested interests were trying to grab the property of the petitioner herein, by operating the retail petroleum diesel outlet on a piece of land of the petitioner without there being any valid or legal authorization for use of the land. A similar notice had also been sent to the Marketing Officer, IOCL, Assam Oil Division.

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It is the case of the petitioner that the land upon which the retail outlet has not allowed to operate by the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3, is his own private land and, therefore, the petrol and diesel outlet of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 is being illegally operated from his land without any valid or legal authority for

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them to do so.

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It is also the case of the petitioner that the District Commissioner, Morigaon was under a legal obligation to have caused an enquiry into the matter to find out as to whether the respondent authorities in connivance with the respondent Nos. 5 and 6, were allowing the retail petrol pump to function to the detriment of the petitioner, depriving him of his legitimate right to use his property.

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It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent/IOCL are liable to be directed to immediately vacate the premises of the writ petitioner. During the pendency of the writ petition, the brother of the petitioner, who was the coowner of the plot of land had been impleaded as the respondent No. 7 and on his demise, the sister-in-law of the petitioner was impleaded in place of the respondent No. 7. The respondent No. 7 has supported the case of the petitioner.

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SUBMISSIONS MADE BY LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER:

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Mr A C Borbora, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr M Smith, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has supported the contentions made in the writ petition. It has been submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that there is no relevant law or regulation governing running of petrol filling station after the expiry of the lease of the land owned by the writ petitioner, more so, in absence of any valid authorization by the land owner. He has submitted that the action of the IOCL and other official respondents in allowing the Petrol filling station to run till date is without authority of law. He

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has further submitted that the IOCL has never made a claim as to on what basis, authorization and rules/regulation, it has allowed the petrol pump to run even today on the writ petitioner’s land. He has submitted that even presently, the petitioner is unaware as to who is running the said petrol pump, thus depriving the petitioner of his property by State Respondents without any authority of law and causing hindrance to the petitioner’s Constitutional and legal rights more particularly under Article 300A of the Constitution of India.

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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NOS. 1,2, AND 3, i.e IOCL:

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Mr DK Sharma learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Indian Oil Corporation Limited has resisted the claim raised in the writ petition and has submitted that the petition is misconceived, devoid of merits and not maintainable in its present form. The learned Counsel has submitted that there is a mismatch of the dag number and patta number as reflected in the lease dated 21.3.1997, which is annexed as Annexure-A to the petition and the dag number as reflected in the statements made in the petition, which reflect the Dag No. to be 274 and the PattaNo. 42. He has submitted that due to the mismatch in the documents and the statements made in the petition, the petition deserves to be dismissed. He has further submitted that Late Mukul Bordoloi was allowed the dealership of the retail outlet as the sole proprietor and Mukul Bordoloi expired on 24.08.2020. However, since none of the office legal heirs have been included as party respondents, the petition suffers from the vice of non-joinder of necessary parties and, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent/Indian Oil Corporation Limited has further submitted that in the absence of any document

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available with the Indian Oil Corporation regarding revocation of power of attorney executed by Sri Mukul Bordoloi, none of the statements are admitted and are to be deemed to be disputed. Learned Counsel has further submitted that there appears to be an apparent dispute between the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 and the petitioner regarding the land in issue on which the retail outlet dealership is functioning and even in that view of the matter, since disputed question of facts have arisen, the petition in the present form need not be entertained by this Court. He has further submitted that since the petitioner had continued to receive rent against the lease of the land in question, the lease cannot be said to have been terminated in law and, therefore, the present petition deserves a dismissal. He has further submitted that it remains a fact that “No Objection Certificate” issued by the District Administration has not been cancelled in accordance with the provisions of Rule 150 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 and, therefore, during its subsistence, the Indian Oil Corporation Limited would be entitled to supply fuel to the retail outlet. During the course of his arguments, Sri D K Sarmah, learned counsel has produced a copy of the NoObjection-Certificate dated 09.06.2015, issued by the Office of the District Commissioner, Morigaon, Assam. Copy of the same is kept on record and marked as –‘X’. In view of the above, the learned Counsel submits that the petition deserves to be dismissed by the Court.

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OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

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The facts which are not disputed by any of the parties are that the petitionerand his brother owned and possessed a piece of land covered by Patta No. 12, under Dag No. 273, under Mouza- Uttar Khula in the revenue village of Dharamtol, in the district of Morigaon. It is also not in dispute that the said land

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was given on lease to Late Mukul Bordoloi, for a period of 20 years by agreement dated 21.03.1997, and the Indian Oil Corporation Limited had appointed Sri Mukul Bordoloi as a Retail Outlet Dealer for the Corporation for its petroleum and diesel products. It is not in dispute that there was no further continuation of the lease in favour of Sri Mukul Bordoloi and that Sri Mukul Bordoloi expired on 24/8/2020. Although the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 have filed their affidavits-in-opposition, none has appeared for them, and their affidavits do not reveal that they had any lease agreement for the plot of land in issue with the owners of the land. It thus, appears to this Court that although initially the retail outlet of the Indian Oil Corporation Limited had been established on the piece of land owned by the petitioner herein, on and after 2017, there existed no lease agreement in the eye of law, either with the dealer who was allotted the retail outlet or with the corporation itself. In other words, the retail outlet was being operated upon a piece of land owned by the petitioner without any valid legal or lawful document authorizing any of the respondents to use the said piece of land.

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The Apex Court in the matter of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and Another vs. Dolly Das ; reported in (1999) 4 SCC 450 , has held that if the facts pleaded before the Court are of such a nature which do not involve any complicated questions of fact needing elaborate investigation of the same, the High Court could exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in such matters. In the present case at hand, there are no complicated questions of fact needing elaborate investigation. It is an admitted fact that the retail outlet of the IOCL is functioning at a location over which there is no lease or other agreement allowing such retail outlet to function. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that the writ petition is

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not maintainable on the ground of disputed questions, is noticed, only to be rejected. It is further seen that no relief has been claimed by the petitioner against Mukul Bordoloi, who was using the plot of land on the basis of a lease agreement upto the year 2017 and similarly, no relief has been claimed against the legal heirs of said Mukul Bordoloi. Therefore, the contention regarding nonjoinder of necessary party is also rejected.

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The respondent/IOCL has admitted that the lease in question has expired and in his arguments, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that the lease cannot be treated to have been terminated since the petitioner continued to accept rent against the lease. The Apex Court in the case of C Albert Morris –Vs- K Chandrasekaran & Others ; reported in (2006) 1 SCC 228, has held as follows:

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“ The consensus of judicial opinion in this country is that a mere continuance in occupation of the demised premises after the expiry of the lease, notwithstanding the receipt of an amount by the quondam landlord would not create a tenancy so as to confer on the erstwhile tenant the status of tenant or a right to be in possession. In this context, we may refer to judgment of this Court in Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. Vs. Ganesh Property, (1998) 7 SCC 184. In paragraph 13 of the said judgment, this Court held as under: “In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, it must be held that on the expiry of the period of lease, the erstwhile lessee continues in possession because of the law of the land, namely that the original landlord cannot physically throw out such an erstwhile tenant by force. He must get his claim for possession adjudicated by a competent Court as per the relevant provisions of law. The status of an erstwhile tenant has to be treated as a tenant at sufferance akin to a trespasser having no independent right to continue in possession.”

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Thus, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents, regarding receipt of rent creating a right in favour of the IOCL, does not appeal

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to this Court and is rejected.

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The contention raised on behalf of the respondents that the NO-Objection Certificate issued by the District Administration has not been cancelled and therefore, the respondent/IOCL would continue to have a lease or license to run its retail outlet, has also been considered by this Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of C Albert Morris (supra) has held that occupation of land without consent is wrongful occupation. It was further held that No Objection Certificate which is granted under Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules, is the one given by the concerned authority stating that it has no objection for the storage of petroleum on the site after examining the site plan and other relevant factors. The words “right to the site” have, therefore, to be understood as referring to right to the site on which the petroleum is stored. A person can be said to have a right to something when it is possible to find a lawful origin for that right. A wrong cannot be a right of a person who trespasses on to another’s land. He cannot be said to have a right to the land vis-a-vis the owner because he happens to be in possession of that land. Mere presence on the land by itself does not result in a right to the land. It was further held that while granting NOC, the Collector is not concerned about the ownership of the land. He is concerned about the location of the land and its suitability as a place for storage of petroleum. Rule 144 deals with the grant of NOC and does not contemplate an enquiry into the ownership of the land nor does it require the Collector to enquire into the nature of the right claimed by the person who has applied for the NOC.

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In the case of Dolly Das (supra), the Apex Court had granted some time to the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited to hand over vacant possession

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of the premises in question to the respondent therein and also to pay rent and arrear rent as may be applicable.

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In a case of similar nature before the High Court of Judicature at Madras being WP No. 1382 of 2024, decided on 20.06.2024 (M/s. Sri Gowri and Company –Vs- The Territory Manager), the High Court had directed the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited to hand over vacant peaceful possession of the premises apart from passing other directions for payment of market rate rent.

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The Apex Court in the case of National Company –Vs- Territory Manager, BPCL, reported in (2021) 13 SCC 121 , has held that the conduct of the BPCL in continuing with occupation of a premises after the expiry of the lease and that too, without payment of rent was unbecoming of a statutory corporation, which is a state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, while directing the respondents to vacate the said premises and hand over peaceful and vacant possession to the appellant, it was also deemed necessary in the interest of justice to direct the BPCL to pay arrears of market rate rent till delivery of possession. Costs were also imposed upon the BPCL, quantified at Rs. 1 lac.

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In the case before this Court, it is seen that the respondent/IOCL has taken all possible plea to assert that they have a right to continue to occupy the land of the petitioner even though there is no lease or license agreement allowing either the IOCL or their retail dealer to occupy the land in issue. The Corporation has tried to take advantage of litigation between the petitioner and the retail outlet dealer regarding a power of attorney allegedly issued by Late

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Mukul Bordoloi with regard to the functioning of the retail outlet to assert that they could continue to occupy the land belonging to the petitioner. This Court holds that the occupation of the land by the IOCL cannot be termed to be legal or lawful in any manner and the prayers made in the writ petition deserve to be allowed.

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In light of the aforesaid, the respondents, more specifically, the IOCL is directed to vacate the premises in issue forthwith and in any event, not later than 3 (three) months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. The respondent No. 1/IOCL shall hand over peaceful and vacant possession of the said land to the petitioner within the aforesaid period by removing all fuel vending and pumping paraphernalia, which is present on the aforesaid land. The right of the petitioner to claim arrears of rent, if any is unpaid, and also up to the date on which the vacant possession is handed over, is left open to be agitated before an appropriate forum.

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Writ Petition, accordingly, stands allowed.

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No order as to cost(s).

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JUDGE

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Comparing Assistant

Ashok Das v. the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and 6 Ors.

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Ashok Das v. the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and 6 Ors.

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