Mohammad Ali and 6 Ors. Vs the Union of India and 6 Ors.

3: GULESSA BEGUM D/O MOHAMMAD ALI W/O FAKAR UDDIN VILL AND PO GORAIMARI PS LAHARIGHAT DIST. MORIGAON ASSAM PIN-782104 4: NAZIMA KHATUN D/O MOHAMMAD ALI W/O ABDUL HANIF VILL- GORIABAORI PO LOCHANABARI PS MOIRABARI DIST. MORIGAON ASSAM PIN-782126 5: AMINA KHATUN D/O MOHAMMAD ALI

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VILLAGE SOLMARI PS BHELOWGURI MOUZA-MOIRABARI DIST. MORIGAON ASSAM PIN-782441

¶12

6: MAMONI KHATUN D/O MOHAMMAD ALI W/O JAHIRUL ISLAM VILL GORIABORI GAON PO LOCHANABARI PS MOIRABARI DIST. MORIGAON ASSAM PIN-782126

¶13

7: ASMINA KHATUN @ ASPINA KHATUN @ ASIYA KHATUN D/O ASMAT ALI W/O MOHAMMAD ALI VILL SOLMARI PS BHELOWGURI MOUZA-MOIRABARI DIST. MORIGAON ASSAM PIN-78244 VERSUS

¶14

THE UNION OF INDIA AND 6 ORS. REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, NEW DELHI-1

¶15

Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. M U MAHMUD, MR P K DAS,MR S ISLAM,MR S HOQUE,MR. M ALI,SC, ELECTION COMMISSION.

¶16

Advocate for the Respondent : ASSTT.S.G.I., SC, F.T,SC, NRC

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¶18

BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE KALYAN RAI SURANA HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SUSMITA PHUKAN KHAUND

¶19

JUDGMENT AND ORDER

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06.01.2025

¶21

(K.R. Surana, J)

¶22

Heard Mr. M.U. Mahmud, learned Counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. K.K. Parashar learned CGC for respondent no.1, Mr. H. Kuli, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. A.I. Ali, learned standing counsel for respondent no.2, Ms. A. Verma, learned standing counsel for the F.T. matters appearing for respondent nos. 3, 6 and 7, Mr. G. Sharma, learned standing counsel for respondent no.4 and Mr. P. Sarmah, learned Addl. Senior Govt. Advocate for respondent no.5.

¶23

By filing this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has assailed the opinion dated 30.01.2018, passed by the learned Member, Foreigners’ Tribunal No. 5^th , Morigaon, in Case No. F.T.(C) 281/2016 [F.T.(C)1330/12 (old), arising out of IM(D)T case no.565/2001 dated 27.09.2001], by which the petitioners were declared to be foreigners who have entered into India (Assam) on or after 25.03.1971.

¶24

The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that along with his written statement, the petitioner had submitted the voters list of 1965, 1970, 1977, 1985, 1989, 1997, 2017, certificate of Govt. Gaonbura, Ulubari, Solmari, Sonarigaon. Moreover, alongwith the additional written statement filed by all the petitioners, the voters list of 2011 was also submitted. The learned

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¶26

counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that as annexure to this writ petition the petitioners have alleged all the documents referred above and moreover the petitioners have also annexed the HSLC admit card and provisional certificate for the year 2009 of petitioner no.2; transfer certificate of petitioner no.3, voter list of 2013 and 2018 of petitioner no.3; transfer certificate and voters list of 2018 of petitioner no.4; admit card, provisional certificate and

¶27

B.A. 4^th Semester mark sheet of petitioner no.5; transfer certificate of petitioner no.6, voters list of 1966 of grandfather of petitioner no.7, voters list of 1970 of father of petitioner no.7 and Panchayat certificate of petitioner no.7 to show her linkage. Accordingly, it is submitted that the petitioners have no reason not to give evidence.

¶28

In this regard, by referring to the statements made in paragraphs nos. 12 and 13 of the writ petition, it is submitted that the petitioners did not get proper advice from the learned counsel and thus, they did not adduce evidence before the learned Tribunal. It is further, submitted that the learned counsel without asking the petitioners to adduce evidence filed several petitions before the learned Tribunal and ultimately the learned Tribunal had rejected the adjournment petitions and an ex parte opinion was rendered against the petitioners. Accordingly, it is submitted that at least one opportunity should granted to the petitioners to adduce evidence to prove their citizenship, which is a valuable right.

¶29

By referring to page nos. 9 and 10 of the records of the Tribunal, it is submitted that the enquiry officer had examined two witnesses in course of his enquiry and the said witnesses had stated that petitioner no.1 is an Indian citizen and accordingly, as per enquiry officer’s report dated 10.11.2001, as

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¶31

entered in the case diary the petitioner was born in Solmari Gaon and his name is entered in the voters list of 1993 and his father’s name appeared in the voters list of 1966 and therefore, the petitioner was a Indian citizen. Accordingly, it is submitted that the reference made by the Superintendent of police (B), Morigaon was illegal and not sustainable as there was no material before the said authority to allege that the petitioners are foreigners who had illegally entered into India (Assam) after 25.03.1971.

¶32

In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on paragraph no.98 of the case of State of Assam & Ors. v. Moslem Mondal, 2013 (1) GLT 809.

¶33

The learned standing counsel for the FT matters has submitted that the learned Tribunal had granted more than reasonable time to the petitioners to produce their evidence, but the petitioners had failed to do so. Accordingly, it is submitted that vide order dated 27.11.2017, the learned Tribunal had granted one last chance to the petitioners to produce evidence and having failed to do so, an unsustainable allegation has been made by the petitioners against their counsel by falsely projecting that they were not asked and/or advised by their learned counsel to give evidence and that their counsel took adjournment without informing them. Accordingly, by relying on the decision of this Court in the case of Aziz Miya @ Aziz Mia v. Union of India & Ors., (2023) 0 Supreme(Gau) 637, it is submitted that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.

¶34

Two issues arise for determination in this case. They are:-

¶35

i. Whether or not was a valid reference against the petitioner nos. 2 to 7? If not, then what would be the consequences?

¶36

ii. Whether the impugned opinion is liable to be interfered with?

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¶38

Upon carefully perusing the records called from the learned Tribunal, the same was handed over to the learned standing counsel for FT matters for her perusal. However, nothing could be shown that any enquiry was ordered to be made against the petitioner nos. 2 to 7. The Sub-Inspector of Police (Border), who had conducted the enquiry, is not found to have recorded the statement of the petitioner nos. 2 to 7 and moreover, no questions are found to have been asked to the two witnesses examined by the said SubInspector of Police (Border) in respect of petitioner nos. 2 to 7. Accordingly, it is seen from the learned Tribunal’s record that vide memo no. MRG/B/33/200 dated 08.05.2003, bearing IM(D)T Case No. 565/01 dated 27.09.01, reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (Border), Morigaon before the then Illegal Migrants (Determination) Tribunal, Morigaon. In the case of Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India & Ors., (2005) 5 SCC 665, the provisions of the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 and the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Rules, 1984 were declared to be ultra vires the Constitution of India and were struck down. Consequently, it was ordered that the Tribunals and the Appellate Tribunals constituted under the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 shall cease to function. Moreover, it was directed that all cases pending before the Tribunals under the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 shall stand transferred to the Tribunals constituted under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 and shall be decided in the manner provided in the Foreigners Act, 1946 the Rules made thereunder and as per the procedure prescribed under the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964. It was also directed that it will be open to the authorities to initiate fresh proceedings under the Foreigners Act against all such persons whose cases

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¶40

were not referred to the Tribunals by the competent authority whether on account of the recommendation of the Screening Committee or any other reason whatsoever.

¶41

Thus, in terms of the directions contained in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra), as the competent authorities are not found to have referred to the Foreigners Tribunal, the proceedings against the petitioner nos. 2 to 7 is not maintainable on facts and in law.

¶42

Moreover, in the case of Sudhir Roy & Ors. V. Union of India, (2019) 5 GLR 489: (2019) 0 Supreme(Gau) 132, the Division Bench of this Court had held as follows:-

¶43

9 . As regards the declaration of the wife, sons and daughters of the petitioner to be foreigners, we have perused the records and have taken note of that the reference was made only against the petitioner and not against his wife, sons and daughters. Although the law in this respect has been settled by this Court in Aktara Khatun Vs. State of Assam & Ors., reported in 2017 (2) GLT 974 that a presumption can also be drawn against the family members of the proceedee who has been declared as foreigner, but at the same time we are also of the view that such presumption would by itself not lead to a conclusion that the family members of a proceedee who has been declared to be a foreigner are also foreigners. The same may be a good cause for initiating an enquiry and making a reference against the family members, but without following the due procedure of law of conducting an enquiry and making a reference and being adjudicated by the Tribunal, the family members cannot be declared to be foreigners.

¶44

Therefore, the Court is of the unhesitant considered opinion that as the Tribunal’s record to not disclose that the competent authority, being the Superintendent of Police (Border), Morigaon had specifically made any reference against the petitioner nos. 2 to 7, the impugned opinion, insofar as it relates to the petitioner nos. 2 to 7, namely, Ikramul Haque, Miss. Gulesa Begum, Miss. Nazima Khatun, Miss. Amina Khatun, Miss. Mamoni Khatun and Miss. Asmina

¶45

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¶46

Khatun @ Aspina Khatun @ Asiya Khatun, is set aside and quashed. However, the Court hastens to provide that in terms of the directions contained in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra), it will be open to the authorities to initiate fresh proceedings under the Foreigners Act, 1946 against the petitioner nos. 2 to 7, whose cases were not referred to the Tribunals by the competent authority after following the due process of law.

¶47

The first point of determination is answered accordingly.

¶48

In connection with the second point of determination, it is seen that in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra), the Supreme Court of India had clearly held that the burden of proof would be upon the procedure as he would be possessing the necessary documents to show that he is a citizen not only within the meaning of the provisions of the Constitution of India but also within the provisions of the Citizenship Act. It would be relevant to quote paragraph 26 thereof below:-

¶49

"26. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country. In order to establish ones citizenship, normally he may be required to give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Sometimes the place of birth of his grandparents may also be relevant like under Section 6-A(1)(d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State authorities can verify the fact and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points. This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him."

¶50

As per paragraph 3(8) of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964

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the Tribunal is required to give ten days time to a proceedee to produce evidence in support of his/her case. However, in the present case, the learned Tribunal has granted more than sufficient time to the petitioner no.1 to produce evidence.

¶53

On perusal of the records received from the learned Foreigners Tribunal, it is seen that upon service of notice of the proceedings of F.T. (C) 281/2016, which was addressed only to Mohammad Ali, son of Late Arsad Ali (petitioner no.1), he had entered appearance and submitted petition no. 879/17 dated 04.04.2017, stating that his father’s name is Asad Ali but in the notice his father’s name is stated to be Arsad Ali and accordingly, prayer was made for correction of his father’s name. Thereupon, the learned Tribunal, by order dated 04.04.2017, called for a police report. Accordingly, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Border Branch, Moirabari P.S. submitted a report dated 28.04.2017 to the effect that on local enquiry from Gaonbura and some other people the name was clarified he found that the actual name of petitioners father is Lt. Asad Ali. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed his written statement on 20.06.2017. However, it is seen that upon receipt of the Police Report, no consequential order was passed by the learned Tribunal. As per order dated 24.07.2017, the learned Tribunal took notice that there are other persons also being involved in the reference. Therefore, notice was also issued to all the family members of the petitioner no.1. Accordingly, notice was issued upon the petitioner’s nos. 2 to 7 and the case was fixed on 14.08.2017 for additional written statement. The proceeding was adjourned on 14.08.2017, 30.08.2017 and 03.10.2017 and on 16.10.2017, additional written statement was filed by all the 7 (seven) petitioners.

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Page No.# 10/16

¶55

Thereafter, the matter was fixed on 10.11.2017 and 27.11.2017 for evidence of the petitioners and by order dated 27.11.2017, the petitioners were put to notice that 25.12.2017 was fixed as a last chance for evidence, failing which matter would be decided in accordance with law. As 25.12.2017 was a holiday, the matter was taken up on 26.12.2017 and by rejecting the prayer for adjournment, it was ordered that the case will proceed for argument and accordingly, the date of argument was fixed on 08.01.2018. On 08.01.2018, a prayer for adjournment from the petitioners’ was rejected and it was ordered that the Tribunal will determine the case without hearing of argument and the matter was fixed on 25.01.2018 for opinion as opinion could not delivered on the said date, the opinion was delivered on 30.01.2018 by declaring the petitioners’ as foreigners to enter India (Assam) on or after 1971.

¶56

Thus, the petitioner no.1 had deliberately not filed his evidence despite last chance granted by order dated 27.11.2017. The Tribunal is not expected to wait endlessly for the petitioner no.1 to file his evidence at his own sweet will.

¶57

In this writ petition the petitioners have taken two pleas for not filing evidence. Firstly, it is alleged that their learned counsel did not advice them to file evidence and therefore, evidence could not be filed for improper advice of their advocate. Secondly, it is alleged that without asking them to file their evidence, their counsel had taken adjournment. In the considered opinion of the Court, both the allegations cannot be said to be good or sufficient reason for not filing evidence by the petitioners. Moreover, the allegations against the advocate for the petitioners before the Foreigners Tribunal cannot be examined in the absence of the said advocate as a respondent in this writ petition.

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¶59

Accordingly, it is held that the plea of improper advice by the petitioners’ advocate and or taking adjournment without asking the petitioners to file their evidence is hit by the principles of non-joinder of necessary parties.

¶60

Now coming to the plea that the Enquiry Officer had found the petitioner no.1 to be a citizen of India by birth, the same is countered by the learned standing counsel for the FT matters by citing the case of Aziz Miya @ Aziz Mia (supra). Paragraph nos. 10, 11 and 13 to 16 thereof are quoted below:-

¶61

“10. Clause 2 of the Foreigners (Tribunal) Orders, 1964 provides that the Central Government may by order refer the question as to whether the person is or is not a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners’ Act, 1946 to a Tribunal to be constituted for the purpose for its opinion. It is stated that the Central Government by an appropriate notification had delegated its power under Clause 2 of the Foreigners (Tribunal) Orders, 1964 to the Superintendant of Police Superintendant of Police (Border) of the respective districts to make any order referring the question on the citizenship of a person to a Tribunal constituted for the purpose for its opinion. The provisions of Clause 2 of the Foreigners (Tribunal) Orders, 1964 makes it explicit that it is the Superintendant of Police Superintendant of Police (Border) who would be the authority to take a decision based upon the report of the inquiry or any further materials that may be available as to whether a person concerned is required to be referred to a Tribunal for its opinion as to whether he is a foreigner or not.

¶62

A reading of the provisions of Clause 2 of the Foreigners (Tribunal) Orders, 1964 as indicated above also leads to a conclusion that the report of the investigating authority that may have been submitted as to whether the suspected person is a foreigner or not would be merely indicative in nature and cannot be said to have attained a finality on the status of the suspected person as to whether he is a foreigner. From such point of view, we are unable to accept the submission of Mr. R Ali learned counsel for the petitioner that as because the inquiring authority in the instant case had given a report that the petitioner is not a foreigner, therefore, the Superintendant of Police (Border) did not have any jurisdiction to make a reference to the Tribunal for an opinion as to whether he is a citizen or not and accordingly the reference itself made is a defective reference which is required to be returned back.

¶63

¶64

In the matter of Monowara Khatun v. The Union of India & Ors., [W.P.(C)

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¶66

2674/2016], the factual situation was that the Superintendant of Police (Border) after proper application of mind on the report of the inquiring authority came to a conclusion that the suspected person therein did not appear to be a foreigner. In other words, it was the Superintendant of Police Superintendant of Police (Border) who had arrived at such a conclusion and no finality was given to any report of an inquiring authority. In the instant case, it is noticed that although the report of the inquiring authority may be that the petitioner is not a foreigner but the Superintendant of Police (Border) upon going through the materials on record did not arrive at any conclusion that the petitioner is not a foreigner which again also impliedly flows from his conduct that he had made a reference to the Tribunal for rendering an opinion on the said question.

¶67

On facts of the present case, we have noticed that the inquiring authority in its report dated 28.03.2001 had stated that during the inquiry the petitioner had produced the voters’ list of 1966 which belonged to his father and therefore, the petitioner is not a foreigner.

¶68

We are constrained to observe that a mere claim by a suspected person by referring to a voters’ list claiming a person therein to be his father is not a conclusive proof and that by doing so, the person has discharged the burden that he is not a foreigner. This is because there is also a further requirement to prove that the person who is reflected in the voters’ list relied upon is actually the father of the person who makes the claim the claim will have to be substantiated with further material/ materials acceptable in law.

¶69

Accordingly, the report of the inquiring authority on its own cannot be viewed to be conclusive in nature that the petitioner is not a foreigner. From such point of view, we do not notice any infirmity in the reference made by the Superintendant of Police (Border), Kamrup to the Foreigners’ Tribunal No. 2, Kamrup (M) for rendering an opinion as to whether the petitioner is a foreigner who entered the State of Assam from the specified territory.”

¶70

Therefore, as the Superintendent of Police (Border) is the competent authority to make reference, the finding of the Enquiry Officer is inconsequential. The Tribunal’s record reveals that the Superintendent of Police (Border), Morigaon had specifically stated in the reference to the then Illegal Migrants (Determination) Tribunal that “there is no evidence that he entered into India before 25-3-1971. But there are more evidence that he entered into India after 25-3-1971.” Accordingly, by following the ratio laid down in the case

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¶72

of Aziz Miya @ Aziz Mia (supra), the Court is inclined to hold that the reference by the Superintendent of Police (Border), Morigaon against the petitioner no.1 is valid and sustainable on facts and in law.

¶73

In this case, the petitioners have neglected and failed to produce evidence in support of their defence despite more than reasonable opportunity granted to them. Therefore, in the considered opinion of the Court, the learned Foreigners Tribunal did not commit any legal infirmity in deciding the reference in absence of filing of evidence by the petitioners despite being given reasonable opportunity.

¶74

Therefore, a corollary issue also arises as to whether the Writ Court, in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction can substitute its discretion over the decision of the Tribunal, which is otherwise lawful.

¶75

In the quest to answer the said corollary issue, it would be apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences & Anr. v. Bikartan Das & Ors., 2023 INSC 733: (2023) 0 Supreme(SC) 763. Paragraphs 51 to 53 thereof [as extracted from (2023) 0 Supreme(SC) 763] are quoted below:-

¶76

“51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not

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¶78

notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not.

¶79

The essential features of a writ of certiorari, including a brief history, have been very exhaustively explained by B.K. Mukherjea, J. in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another, reported in AIR 1954 SC 440. The Court held that a writ in the nature of certiorari could be issued in ‘all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner’ so long as the broad and fundamental principles were kept in mind. Those principles were delineated as follows:

¶80

“7. … In granting a writ of ‘certiorari’, the superior court does not exercise the powers of an appellate tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous, but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal …..

¶81

The supervision of the superior court exercised through writs of certiorari goes on two points, as has been expressed by Lord Summer in King v. Nat Bell Liquors Limited [(1922) 2 AC 128, 156]. One is the area of inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of law in the course of its exercise. ….

¶82

Certiorari may lie and is generally granted when a court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.”

¶83

Relying on T.C. Basappa (supra), the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque & Ors., AIR 1955 SC 233, laid down the following propositions as well established:

¶84

“(1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior court or tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it.

¶85

(2) Certiorari will also be issued when the court or tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice.

¶86

(3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous.”

¶87

On the facts of this case, the Tribunal’s records do not reveal that

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¶89

the reference was decided without giving a reasonable opportunity to the petitioners to be heard or that the principle of natural justice has been violated in respect of the petitioners. Therefore, the Writ Court should be a loathe to interfere with the opinion of the learned Tribunal in a causal manner by substituting the opinion of the Court on the otherwise lawful opinion, which was rendered after giving a fair warning to the petitioners vide order dated 27.11.2017, thereby granting a last chance to produce evidence.

¶90

Therefore, in light of the discussions above, the second point of determination is answered in the negative and against the petitioner no.1 by holding that the petitioners have not been able to make out a case warranting interference of this Court in respect of the opinion dated 30.01.2018, passed by the learned Member, Foreigners’ Tribunal No. 5^th , Morigaon, in Case No. F.T.(C) 281/2016 [F.T.(C)1330/12 (old), arising out of IM(D)T case no.565/2001 dated 27.09.2001], by which the petitioners were declared to be foreigners who have entered into India (Assam) on or after 25.03.1971.

¶91

Before parting with the record, it would be appropriate to refer to paragraph 16 above that the name of father of the petitioner was not Late Arshad Ali but Late Asad Ali. In this regard, it is seen that in the cause title of this writ petition, the petitioners have referred the name of the father of the petitioner no.1 as Late Ashad Ali @ Arshad Ali. Similarly, in the affidavit filed by the petitioner no.1 in support of this writ petition the name of the father of the petitioner no. 1 is stated to be Late Ashad Ali @ Arshad Ali. Therefore, the Court is inclined to hold that the issuance of notice to the petitioner by the learned Foreigners Tribunal by referring the name of the father of the petitioner no. 1 as Arshad Ali has not caused any perceivable prejudice to the petitioners as the

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¶93

identity of the petitioner no.1 is otherwise well established by way of admission.

¶94

Accordingly, the Court is inclined to pass the following-

¶95

O R D E R

¶96

a. This writ petition fails in so far as it relates to the petitioner no.1, namely, Mohammad Ali, against whom thus writ petition stands dismissed.

¶97

b. However, this writ petition is allowed, in so far as petitioner nos. 2 to 7, namely, Ikramul Haque, Miss. Gulesa Begum, Miss. Nazima Khatun, Miss. Amina Khatun, Miss. Mamoni Khatun and Miss. Asmina Khatun @ Aspina Khatun @ Asiya Khatun. However, as indicated hereinbefore, it will be open to the authorities to initiate fresh proceedings under the Foreigners Act, 1946 against the petitioner nos. 2 to 7, whose cases were not referred to the Tribunals by the competent authority after following the due process of law.

¶98

1. The parties are left to bear their own cost.

¶99

JUDGE JUDGE

¶100

Comparing Assistant

Mohammad Ali and 6 Ors. v. the Union of India and 6 Ors.

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Mohammad Ali and 6 Ors. v. the Union of India and 6 Ors.

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