Charu Tamam and 2 Ors. Vs Charu Tana and 2 Ors.

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GAHC040005262023

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2025:GAU-AP:65

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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

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Case No. : CRP/18/2023

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Charu Tamam, Son of Late Jakshi Tara Village, PO Chambang, Kra Daadi District, Arunachal Pradesh. Contact No. 7085221280

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2: Charu Charu Age: Occupation : Son of Late Charu Tayo Resident of Rumbang Village PO Chambang Kra Daadi District, Arunachal Pradesh.

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3: Charu Tudo Age: & Occupation : Son of Late Charu Talam Resident of Rumbang Village PO Chambang Kra Daadi District, Arunachal Pradesh

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VERSUS

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Charu Tana and 2 Ors. Son of Late Charu Talang, Resident of Gai I Village, P.O Chambang, Kra Daadi District, Arunachal Pradesh.

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2:Charu Punung Age: 0, Occupation : Son of Late Charu Tamar Resident of Terpu Village PO Chambang Kra Daadi District, Arunachal Pradesh.

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Page No.# 2/12

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3:Charu Alo Age: 0 , Occupation : Son of Late Charu Tudu Resident of Deng Deng Village PO Chambang Kra Daadi District, Arunachal Pradesh

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Advocate for the Petitioner : Subu Koyang, Kago Taja,Tabit Tapak,H Tubin

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Advocate for the Respondent : G Riba, G Basar,T Tsering,T Don,H Richo

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BEFORE

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HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE KARDAK ETE

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JUDGMENT

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Date : 09-01-2025

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Heard Mr. K. Taja, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. G. Riba, learned counsel for the respondents.

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By filling this Revision Petition, the petitioners have assailed the order dated 28.03.2023, passed by the learned District Judge, Ziro in IA (Z) No.14/2022, in Civil Appeal (Z) No.12/2022, by which, the delay of 184 (one hundred eighty four) days in filing the Civil Appeal has been condoned.

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The case of the petitioners, shorn of unnecessary details, is that the petitioners and respondents have dispute over the plot of land, termed as ‘Tamar Land’, located at Chambang in Kra Daadi District, Arunachal Pradesh. The dispute was referred to the forum of Mel, which was conducted on 29.01.2022, whereby the land in question has been declared to be the land of Abu Tamo family i.e. the great grandfather of the petitioners. Being aggrieved, the respondents have filed a Civil Appeal which has been registered as Civil Appeal (Z) No.12/2022, before the Court of District Judge, Ziro. Since the

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appeal was not filed within the period of limitation but filed after a delay of 184 (one hundred eighty four) days, an interlocutory application being IA (Z) No.14/2022 was filed praying for condonation of said delay of 184 (one hundred eighty four) days in filing the Civil Appeal by the respondents under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

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The learned District Judge, Ziro, after consideration of the grounds elaborately, returned with a finding that the grounds shown by the applicants (respondents herein), for condoning the delay of 184 (one hundred eighty four) days in filing the Civil Appeal are not convincing. However, for the ends of justice and for providing an opportunity to the respondents to prove their case in an appeal, condoned the delay by imposing a cost of Rs.6,000/- (Rupees six thousands) only, to be paid to the petitioners. Hence this Revision Petition.

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Mr. K. Taja, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the learned District Judge, Ziro has erred in facts and law, in condoning the delay of 184 (one hundred eighty four) days in filing the Civil Appeal vide the impugned order in as much as despite finding that the explanation for condoning the delay is not convincing, the delay has been condoned by imposing a cost of Rs.6,000/(Rupees six thousand) only, which is against the settled principle of law and as such is untenable. He has placed reliance of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and another vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer , reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81 and Majji Sannemma Alias Sanyasirao vs. Reddy Sridevi and others , reported in (2021) 18 SCC 384, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held which is reproduced herein under:

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“12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so

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prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

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The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Majji Sannemma Alias Sanyasirao (Supra) has held as under:

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“7.4 In the case of Basawaraj (supra), it is observed and held by this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. It is further observed that the expression “sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is observed that each application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter disregard to legislature.

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7.5 In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil(supra), it is observed by this Court that the court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The Courts help those who are vigilant and “do not slumber over their rights”.”

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e-converso, Mr. G. Riba, learned counsel for the respondents, submits that since the delay is only of 184 (one hundred eighty four) days and considering the substantial justice and the statutory right of appeal, the learned District Judge, Ziro has rightly condoned the delay by imposing cost,, although there is a finding of unsatisfactory explanation, which the respondents have already deposited as ordered. Therefore, since the respondents have the right to avail the remedy of appeal as per the law, the delay being rightly condoned by the learned District Judge, Ziro, no interference is called for and prayed that the matter may be allowed to be proceeded before the learned District Judge, Ziro and hear the parties in accordance with law.

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Mr. G. Riba, learned counsel, has relied upon the case of N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy , reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:

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“7. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on whole untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court.

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It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Could should not forget the opposite party

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altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss”.

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I have heard the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and considered the materials available on record.

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Admittedly, there is a delay of 184 (one hundred eighty four) days in filing the Civil Appeal (Z) No.12/2022 and the respondents had filed the IA (Z) No.14/2022, praying for condonation of said delay of 184 (one hundred eighty four) days in filing the said appeal.

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The learned District Judge, Ziro, after framing two points for determination, i.e. as to whether the applicants have given sufficient reasons for condoning the delay u/s 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and whether the reasons for delay are satisfactory, returned the following findings which is reproduced herein under:

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“28. As per the Schedule, the period of Limitation as mentioned in Second Division of Appeals, at serial no. 116 (b) under the description of appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, from any decree or order, the period of limitation for appeal to any other court is 30 (thirty) days from the date of the decree or order.

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In the instant case we find delay of about 184 days in filing appeal. Even if it is accepted that the impugned order dated 29.01.2022 passed by the Gaon Buras was received by the respondents in first week of April'2022, still there is delay in filing of the appeal beyond the limitation period of 30 days.

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The learned counsel for the applicants submitted that Applicant No.1 could not file appeal on time because of suffering from gastritis ulcer disease and his advocate also took one month time to prepare the appeal draft. That Applicant No. 3 is 65 yrs of age and was busy looking after the infant (grand daughter) left behind by his late daughter in law. And the

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Applicant No.2, a 62 years old man has vertebral disc prolapsed ailment, so the appeal could not be filed on time.

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This court agrees to the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents that the Doctor's advice to the applicant No.1 to take medicine for 3 (three) months for treatment of gastritis ulcer disease cannot be a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. The other applicants could have authorized the applicant No. 1 on time to file appeal petition in a representative capacity against the decision of the Gaon Burahs.

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Further the applicants have stated that scheduled Mel was fixed to be held at Chalo village, however the respondents in connivance with other 3 Gaon Burahs shifted the venue of the Mel from Chalo village to Chambang town in a whimsically manner and without even informing the applicants and consequently, the impugned Mel declaration/order dtd. 29.1.2022 was passed by the 3 (Three) Gaon Burahs.

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On the contrary from the record, it has been revealed that it is the applicants who lodged complaint before the Circle Officer, Chambang disputing ownership of the suit land. Thereafter, the Circle Officer, Chambang passed an order dated 12.01.2022 for conducting a Mel on 27.01.2022 by Sri Charu Tangum, HGB, Sri Charu Tudu, GB, Sri Patey Takia, GB, Sri Jamru Tacho, GB and Sri Dindo Taniang, GB to settle the land dispute between the parties.

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And there is nothing on record to suggest that the venue of the MEL was changed or that the petitioners who were the applicants of the MEL were not informed of the changed date or venue.

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(33) It is found by this Court that overall the grounds shown by the applicants in the application for condoning the delay of 184 days are not convincing. However for the ends of justice, this court would like to give an opportunity to the applicants to prove their case in appeal petition, provided they pay a cost of Rs. 6000/- (rupees six thousand) only to the respondents for the delay caused.

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(34) Decision: For the above mentioned reasons, all the points for determinations are answered with consideration that on paying cost to the respondents for the delay caused, the application of the applicants would be allowed and the delay would be condoned.”

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Perusal of the impugned order dated 28.03.2023 clearly shows that the

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learned District Judge, Ziro has held that overall grounds shown by the applicants (respondents herein) in the application for condoning the delay of 184 days are not convincing. However, for the ends of justice, the delay of 184 days has been condoned, by imposing a cost of Rs.6,000/- (Rupees six thousands), to be paid to the respondents.

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It is submitted at the bar that the respondents have deposited the cost of Rs.6,000/- (Rupees six thousands) only, so directed to be paid to petitioners. However, the petitioners have declined to receive the same.

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The law of limitation, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest republicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and another (Supra) has observed and held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. It is further observed that the expression “sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bonafide is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona

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fides or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is observed that each application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter disregard to legislature.

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Equally, in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another vs. Mst. Katiji and others , reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held which is reproduced herein under:

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“3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on "merits". The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the lifepurpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:

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Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

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Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

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"Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

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When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

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There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

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It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of the case of Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu and others vs. Gobardhan Sao and others , reported in (2002) 3 SCC 195, has held which is reproduced herein under:

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“12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance the substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over- jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a

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balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.”

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On consideration of the impugned order dated 28.03.2023, it appears that the respondents have failed to properly explain the reasons for delay in filing the connected Civil Appeal, however, this Court finds the explanation not smack of mala fide or is not put as part of a dilatory strategy and the delay appears to be occasioned not on deliberate negligence or laches or acted deliberately to gain time in filing the appeal.

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As reproduced here in above, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. Every day's delay must be explained does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. . It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone

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the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.

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On perusal of the case laws relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it is seen that in the cases of Basawaraj and Majji Sannemma Alias Sanyasirao (Supra), the delay were of 5 (five) and half years and 1011 days, in approaching the Court respectively, which were inordinate and not satisfactorily explained. In the present case, delay is of 184 days which is clearly distinguisible. In my view, the principles laid down are settled principles.

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Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and considering that the explanation does not smack of mala fide or is not put as part of a dilatory strategy and the delay appears to be occasioned not on deliberate negligence or laches or acted deliberately to gain time in filing the appeal, although it appears that the delay has not been sufficiently explained, to subserves the substantial justice as no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to respondents, I am of the view that the parties should be allowed to contest their cases on merit. Thus, delay of 184 days be condoned.

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In view of the above, no interference is required with the impugned order dated 28.08.2023 passed by the learned District Judge, Ziro. Accordingly, the revision petition stands dismissed.

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JUDGE

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Comparing Assistant

Charu Tamam and 2 Ors. v. Charu Tana and 2 Ors.

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Charu Tamam and 2 Ors. v. Charu Tana and 2 Ors.

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