Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants submits that as per the first information Exhibit-1, the victim had died following burn injuries. It was mentioned therein that appellants had conspired to kill the victim who was the niece of informant PW-5 and as a result of such conspiracy, the victim who was the wife of Jahidul Islam, was set on fire by pouring kerosene on her person. He submits that the conviction was based solely on the dying declaration of the deceased, Exhibit-7. Referring to the evidence of PW-1, PW-3, PW-8 and PW-10, he submits that a great deal of suspicion surrounds the dying declaration. Such a dying declaration should not have been taken into account by the learned Court below and on that basis ought not to have convicted the appellants without any corroboration. Evidence of the above witnesses clearly discredit the dying declaration which suffers from several infirmities rendering the same to be suspicious and untrustworthy. The deceased was not in a position to speak having suffered 90% burn injuries. Referring to the decision in Mukesh –vsState reported in (2017) 6 SCC 1, he submits that such a dying declaration cannot form the basis of conviction and ought not to have been acted upon without corroboration. He has also referred to the inquest report as well as the post-mortem report. Further submission is that it has come on record that it was the appellants who had rushed the victim to the hospital and therefore the statement of the deceased as contained in the dying declaration that after setting her on fire, the appellants had fled the place of occurrence cannot be accepted. He finally submits that there is every possibility of the appellants succeeding in the appeal and getting acquitted. In such circumstances, it would be in the interest of justice to enlarge the appellants on bail, more particularly, appellant Sarifa Bibi, being a woman.
