Dismissed

Geetha v. Canara Bank

DRT29 May 2026SA/458/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Debt Recovery Tribunal dismissed the applicant's application for condonation of delay in filing a Securitization Application under the SARFAESI Act. The Tribunal held that Section 17 of the Act mandates a strict 45-day limitation period without any provision for condonation, citing Supreme Court and High Court precedents. Consequently, the Masquerade Application and the Securitization Applicat

What did the court decide?

The Securitization Application (SA) and the present Masquerade Application (MA) were dismissed in limine; any interim order granted is vacated.

Geetha versus Canara Bank — Contract and Commercial Disputes | DRT (2026)

¶1

MA 46/21 in SA 458/25

¶2

29.05.2026

¶3

¶4

IN THE DEBTS RECOVERY TRIBUNAL-III, CHENNAI

¶5

Dated this the 29^th day of May, 2026

¶6

Present: SMT. S.V. GOWRAMMA Presiding Officer

¶7

MA No.46 of 2021 in SA No.458 of 2025

¶8

Mrs. A. Geetha W/o Mr. Arjun Balakrishnan No.1 Siva Sakthi Nagar Korattur, Chennai – 600 080 …Petitioner

¶9

-Vs-

¶10

The Authorised Officer, Canara Bank

¶11

SME Ambattur Branch

¶12

No.3, MTH Road

¶13

Padi, Chennai – 600 050

¶14

Mr. B.R. Siva S/o Mr. Ramachandran No.98, 8^th Street, Kamaraj Nagar Korattur, Chennai – 600 080

¶15

M/s Arjun Enterprises Represented by its Proprietor Mr. Arjun Balakrishnan No.87, MTH Road, Mannurpet Chennai – 600 087 …Respondents

¶16

Counsels on record / appeared:

¶17

Counsel for Applicant : M/s. T.M. Naidu Counsel for 1^st Respondent : M/s. M.L. Ganesh Counsel for 2^nd Respondent : Sh. G. Sanjeevi

¶18

Uploaded on 29.05.2026 at 17:00 hours

¶19

MA 46/21 in SA 458/25

¶20

29.05.2026

¶21

¶22

ORDER ON MA 46/2021 in SA No.458/2025

¶23

The present Securitization Application [SA] is filed under sub section [1] of S.17 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Asset and Enforcement of Security Interest Act,2002 (for short the ‘Act’) challenging the action and the measure taken by the secured creditor under the Security Interest Enforcement Rules, 2002 [for short the Rules].

¶24

The applicant has filed present application MA 46/2021 to condone the delay of 188 days in filing the present SA challenging the Sale Certificate dated 02.12.2020 and consequent action under the provisions of SARFAESI Act as null and void.

¶25

3. Brief facts of the case:

¶26

3.1 It is the case of the petitioner that Sale Notice dated 27.08.2020 was caused with insufficient address and received much later on 21.09.2020 for the sale to take place on 29.09.2020. Subsequently, there was no notice of sale or otherwise and thus it is concluded that sale was taken place on 29.09.2020. Only after the 2^nd respondent approached the petitioner to vacate the SA schedule mentioned premises in the month of June, 2021 and thereafter on 25.06.2021, when the sale certificate was obtained, it was understood that the sale certificate was registered in favour of the respondent and SA No.64/2020 was dismissed.

¶27

3.2 It is further submitted that the sale notice and sale certificate is not in accordance with law. The petitioner submits that she does not have any other place to dwell and the sale certificate is liable to be set aside as

¶28

Uploaded on 29.05.2026 at 17:00 hours

¶29

MA 46/21 in SA 458/25

¶30

¶31

29.05.2026

¶32

arbitrary for the reasons mentioned in the SA. The petitioner submits that the present SA ought to have been filed within 30 days from the date of sale notice. However as SA No.64/2020 was pending, the petitioner was under the impression that her husband would take care of the issue with the 1^st respondent. Only after 2^nd respondent approached the petitioner for vacating in June, 2021, the instant SA was filed after obtaining certified copy dated 25.06.2021, which was received by E-mail on 05.07.2001. Hence there was delay of 188 days in filing the instant SA challenging the Sale certificate dated 02.12.2020 and prayed for condonation of the delay.

¶33

4. Counter of 1^st respondent bank:

¶34

4.1 It is submitted by the first respondent that originally the 1^st respondent had sanctioned OCC facility to the 3^rd respondent and since the loan account slipped into NPA category as per extant RBI guidelines, it is migrated to 2^nd respondent in terms of internal policy of the respondent bank for proper resolution.

¶35

4.2 The respondent bank submits that the applicant had vexatiously asserted that she has filed the above SA within the period of limitation by projecting that she had received the certified copy of sale certificate from the office of Sub-Registrar, Villivakkam through E-mail only on 05.07.2021 and the above SA has been filed on 22.07.2021. The said averment is unknown to the rule of law and the applicant has miserably failed to explain the delay and what precluded her from approaching this Tribunal

¶36

Uploaded on 29.05.2026 at 17:00 hours

¶37

MA 46/21 in SA 458/25

¶38

29.05.2026

¶39

¶40

immediately after the issuance of sale notice and registration of sale certificate in favour of auction purchaser, the 2^nd respondent herein.

¶41

4.3 The applicant has further arrayed her husband as 3^rd respondent in the above SA with sinister motive. As a matter of fact, the applicant and her husband, had jointly filed SA No.64 of 2020 before this Tribunal which was dismissed on the ground that the sale notice dated 06.02.2020 has become infructuous for want of bidders. It is apt to mention that during the pendency of the above SA, the 1^st respondent had caused Sale Notice dated 25.08.2020 to bring the secured property for E-auction on 29.09.2020, the sale was successful and the same was duly intimated by the 1^st respondent bank during the hearing of SA No.64 of 2020. Despite having such knowledge and information, the applicant cannot pretend that she came to know about the sale of secured asset only on June, 2021 when the 2^nd respondent approached her to vacate from the secured property, which is nothing but concocted statement made with oblique motive.

¶42

4.4 The 1^st respondent bank submits that as a matter of fact, the applicant had received the Sale Notice dated 25.08.2020 on 27.08.2020, but had contended that she has not received the same, which is contrary to the factual position. The reasons as assigned in the condonation application is not cogent and is contradictory to each other and the same is liable to be dismissed.

¶43

4.5 The 1^st respondent had narrated the facts of the case in paras 9 and 10 of the counter, furnishing particulars of loan availed, renewed,

¶44

Uploaded on 29.05.2026 at 17:00 hours

¶45

MA 46/21 in SA 458/25

¶46

29.05.2026

¶47

¶48

documents executed. security created and default thus committed by the 3^rd respondent, who is applicant’s husband. In view of default committed, the respondent bank had classified the loan account as NPA on 30.06.2018 and issued Demand Notice under Section 13(2) of the Act on 30.06.2018, followed by Possession Notice under Section 13(4) of the Act dated 28.11.2018. Since the Possession Notice dated 28.11.2018 was not acted upon, the respondent bank had withdrawn the same and issued another Possession Notice dated 29.11.2019, which as duly served, affixed and published in accordance to law. The 1^st respondent had obtained valuation of the secured asset on 18.01.2020. As no payment was forth coming, respondent bank issued Sale Notice on 06.02.2020, which was duly served on 08.02.2020, affixed and published. As the sale was not successful, the respondent bank issued another Sale Notice dated 25.08.2020, which was affixed on 26.08.2020, duly served on 27.08.2020 and published in Tamil

¶49

and English dailies on 29.08.2020. The sale was successful pursuant to Sale Notice dated and 25.08.2020 sale certificate was issued to successful bidder and registered on 02.12.2020.

¶50

4.6 It is contended by the 1^st respondent bank that applicant and third respondent have not challenged the Possession Notice which was issued on 29.11.2019 despite receipt of the same, which clearly shows their recalcitrant attitude in safe guarding the secured property. The Tribunal has no power to condone the delay and the above SA has to be dismissed in limine and accordingly prayed for dismissal of the MA.

¶51

Uploaded on 29.05.2026 at 17:00 hours

¶52

MA 46/21 in SA 458/25

¶53

29.05.2026

¶54

¶55

Heard both sides of the Counsels and perused the records of the case.

¶56

5.1 It is the case of applicant that though the SA ought to have been filed witin 30 days from the date of Sale Notice, as the SA was pending before this Tribunal, the applicant was under the impression that her husband would take care of the issue with 1^st respondent bank. But when the 2^nd respondent approached her for vacating in June, 2021, the present SA came to be filed after obtaining certified copy dated 25.06.2021, which was received by mail on 05.07.2021.

¶57

5.2 The 1^st respondent bank had duly countered the same that the applicant was duly served with Sale Notice dated 25.08.2020 on 27.08.2020, which was received by her husband, Mr. Arjun Balakrishnan, as evidenced from the postal acknowledgment produced by the 1^st respondent bank in their typed set, but had contended that she has not received the same. Hence, the applicant contention that she got to know about the sale only after 2^nd respondent approached her for vacating in June, 2021 is not sustainable, as the applicant was served with the Sale Notice dated 25.08.2020 by the respondent bank.

¶58

5.3 Now, considering the delay application, the Tribunal is posed with the question whether the Tribunal can condone the delay under S.17 of the SARFAESI Act?

¶59

For appreciation of the facts S.17(1) is extracted as under: -

¶60

Section 17(1):

¶61

Uploaded on 29.05.2026 at 17:00 hours

¶62

MA 46/21 in SA 458/25

¶63

29.05.2026

¶64

¶65

Application against measures to recover secured debts (1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorized officer under this Chapter, [may make an application along with such fee, as may be prescribed,] to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measures had been taken:

¶66

[Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower.]

¶67

[Explanation.- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under this sub-section(1) of section.17.]

¶68

5.4 A reading of the above provision, it is palpable that there is no provision made by the Parliament for condonation of delay in approaching the DRT against the measures, no matter whatever be the cause and howsoever justifiable it may sound. Unless power to condone delay is legislatively granted expressly or by inference, the Tribunal cannot condone delay. It is the indication of Parliament that one who wants to have redressal must knock the doors of DRT within 45 days and subsequently those doors should permanently stand closed. In other words, law does not come to the aid of those who are sleepy and late.

¶69

5.5 Thus, it is clear that any person aggrieved by any measures under Section 13[4] is required to approach the Tribunal under Section 17 within 45 days from the date of the measure. Evidently, the present SA challenging

¶70

Uploaded on 29.05.2026 at 17:00 hours

¶71

MA 46/21 in SA 458/25

¶72

¶73

29.05.2026

¶74

the Sale Certificate dated 02.12.2020 is not filed within the period of 45 days and the same is filed with a delay of 188 days.

¶75

5.6 This view of the Tribunal is confirmed by the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled Bank of Baroda – Vs.Parasaadilal Tursiram Sheetgrah Pvt. Ltd, reported in 2022 Livelaw (SC) 671 , at para 12, observed that a time limit of 45 days for filing an application under Section 17 of SARFAESI Act is provided for quick enforcement of the security is as under:

¶76

“ The reason for providing a time limit of 45 days for filing an application under Section 17 can easily be inferred from the purpose and object of the enactment. In Transcore v. Union of India and Anr. this Court held that the SARFAESI Act is enacted for quick enforcement of the security. It is unfortunate that proceedings where a property that has been brought to sale and third-party rights created under the provisions of the Act, have remained inconclusive even after a decade.”

¶77

5.7 Further the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Akshat Commercial Pvt Ltd. Vs. Kalpana Chakroborty has taken view that S.17 is mandatory and therefore the question of condoning the delay does not arise. If the Parliament intended that DRT should have power to condone delay, it would have enacted a provision like Section 5 of Limitation Act to SAFAESI Act. As it consciously chosen not to do it clearly emphasis the purpose of the SARFAESI Act.

¶78

Uploaded on 29.05.2026 at 17:00 hours

¶79

MA 46/21 in SA 458/25

¶80

¶81

29.05.2026

¶82

5.8 The Tribunal is of the view that DRT has no power to condone delay in an application under Section 17 of the Act, as it is a special law for speedy recovery of money due to bank in enforcing the security available to them is reinforced at para 65 of the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

¶83

Celir LLP Vs. Bafna Motors [Mumbai][P] Ltd., reported in [2024] 2 SCC

¶84

1 at para 65 which is reproduced here under:

¶85

“The SARFAESI Act is a special law containing an overriding clause in comparison to any other law in force. The SARFAESI Act is a special law of recovery with a paradigm shift that permits expeditions recovery for the banks and the financial institutions without intervention of Courts. If the general law is allowed to govern in the manner as sought to be argued by the borrowers, it will defeat the very object and purpose….”

¶86

5.9 Therefore, it is obvious that when a special legislation grants aright of action it is subject to certain conditions and create a forum for its implementation, that right becomes exercisable on satisfying such conditions and not otherwise and Limitation period is one such condition.

¶87

5.10 It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it must be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Tribunal has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds and has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation as per the Judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of P.K. Ramachandran

¶88

vs. State of Kerala, reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556, the Hon’ble Supreme

¶89

Uploaded on 29.05.2026 at 17:00 hours

¶90

MA 46/21 in SA 458/25

¶91

¶92

29.05.2026

¶93

Court has held thus:-

¶94

"Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds".

¶95

Hence, the legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation.

¶96

5.11 The question whether the Debt Recovery Tribunal can entertain an application under Section 17 of the Act after 45 days of measure referred to in sub section [4] of Section 13 is no more res integra.

¶97

5.12 The Hon'ble Division Bench of High Court of Kerala in Writ Appeal No.1797 of 2009 in W.P.(C) No.22192 of 2007 in the case titled K.P. Jayan vs. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd and others decided on 31.08.2015 had categorically held that the power to condone delay in entertaining an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act is not conferred on the Debts Recovery Tribunal. It further held that the Debts Recovery Tribunal cannot consider an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The relevant paras is extracted as under:

¶98

“7. Referring to these provisions the contention urged before us is that since section 24 of the RDB Act makes Limitation Act applicable and as the DRT constituted under the RDB Act is conferred with jurisdiction under section 17, Limitation Act governs applications made in a proceedings under section 17 also. We are unable to accept this contention. Both the RDB Act and the SARFAESI Act are independent enactments,

¶99

Uploaded on 29.05.2026 at 17:00 hours

¶100

MA 46/21 in SA 458/25

¶101

29.05.2026

¶102

¶103

although certain provisions of the RDB Act are made applicable in respect of the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act also. However, that does not mean that every provision of the RDB Act would apply to every proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act. In so far as this case is concerned, proceedings were initiated under SARFAESI Act and in view of the provisions contained in section 17 conferring jurisdiction on the DRT constituted under RDB Act application is made by the appellant before the DRT. That does not mean that provisions of section 24 of the RDB Act governing the proceedings taken thereunder would get automatically attracted to such proceedings before the DRT. Therefore, the contention raised relying on section 24 in so far as this case is concerned is only to be rejected and we do so. This is further clear from section 36 of the SARFAESI Act, which confines the applicability of the Limitation Act to measures under section 13(4) of the said Act.”

¶104

5.13 Further, the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala has also considered the issue

¶105

in the case titled The Authorised Officer, Indian Bank Vs. K.J. George, order dated 02.11.2020 has placed reliance on K.P. Jayan V. Hong Kong

¶106

& Shanghai Banking Corporation and has held that DRT has no power to condone the delay under Section 17 of the Act.

¶107

5.14 As per Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, an application against measures to recover secured debts, must be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken. It further observed that "The reason for providing a time limit of 45 days for filing an application under Section held that the SARFAESI Act is enacted for quick enforcement of the security, which can easily be inferred from the purpose and object of the enactment.” In Transcore v. Union of India and Anr, this Court held that the SARFAESI Act is enacted for quick enforcement of the security.

¶108

Uploaded on 29.05.2026 at 17:00 hours

¶109

MA 46/21 in SA 458/25

¶110

29.05.2026

¶111

¶112

5.15 Additionally in the instant matter the applicant had failed to make a case to condone each day’s delay by producing any records in support of her case without any justifiable reasons. However, the delay cannot be condoned on equitable grounds and in support of its view, the reliance is placed on the Judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled Lingeswaran Vs. Thirunagalingam, where it is observed that an application for condonation of delay has to be dismissed, if it is found that the delay is not properly explained and that the period of limitation cannot be extended on equitable ground. Otherwise, it would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. The court also observed "The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.

¶113

5.16 The Hon’ble Apex Court also noted the following observations made

¶114

in Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai ,

¶115

(2012) 5 SCC 157, while dismissing the SLP:

¶116

"The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient

¶117

Uploaded on 29.05.2026 at 17:00 hours

¶118

MA 46/21 in SA 458/25

¶119

¶120

29.05.2026

¶121

cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation."

¶122

5.17 The Tribunal also places reliance on the judgement of the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in the case of Kailasam P – Vs.The Karnataka Bank Limited, Rep. by its Authorised Officer in Writ Petition No.11273 of 2024 (GM-DRT) has held that:

¶123

“law of Limitation fixes upon a particular period within which a party is entitled to institute legal proceedings and if he fails to do so, ordinarily the cause of action dies subject to just all exceptions. Law of Limitation is statute of repose. True it is that any welfare State like ours is bound in good faith to furnish its citizens all needful legal remedy however it is not bound to keep its Courts and Tribunals open ad infinitum. If an aggrieved person neglects or refuses to apply for redress within the prescribed period of limitation, his claim is lost in the lapse of time.”

¶124

5.18 In other words, the statutory time of 45 days provided under Section 17(1) of the SARFEASI Act is mandatory and no discretion has been conferred upon the DRT to extend such period. It is pertinent to note that the Securitization Act is for quick enforcement of the security interest created favouring the respondent bank for the recovery of the amount due.

¶125

5.19 In fact the provisions of the Act and Rules framed thereunder cast an obligation upon the secured creditor for strict compliance of the SARFAESI Act and the Rules made thereunder. Each measure is to be followed meticulously giving a time frame to proceed further. Firstly, the measures can be initiated after the account is classified as NPA, then

¶126

Uploaded on 29.05.2026 at 17:00 hours

¶127

MA 46/21 in SA 458/25

¶128

29.05.2026

¶129

¶130

issuance of statutory notice i.e., demand notice demanding outstanding due to be repaid within 60 days.

¶131

5.20 The secured creditor must wait for completion of 60 days and then proceeds further under Section 13[4] possession notice which is challengeable within a period of 45 days. Similarly, the Order of CJM or DM is also to be challenged within 45 days. In other words, ample opportunity is granted by the Act for an aggrieved person to invoke his right of appeal under S.17 of the Act within a period of 45 days from the date of measure. The provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder puts the borrower/guarantor/mortgagor notices in advance before taking measures under Section 13(4) of the Act read with Rule 8 and 9, giving the aggrieved person ample of time and opportunities to assail measure within a period of 45 days.

¶132

5.21 Thus, the provisions of the Act and Rules ensures that the borrowers have advance notice of the proposed measure to be taken by the secured creditor. The judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bank of Baroda – Vs.- Parasaadilal Tursiram Sheetgrah Pvt. Ltd has given a quietus to the conundrum which existed until that time on the power of the DRT to condone the delay in filing an SA after the statutory period of 45 days provided under Section 17(1) of the SARFEASI Act.

¶133

5.22 The Tribunal also places reliance on Order dated 27.06.2023 passed in MA [SA]32/2021 by the Hon’ble DRAT Chennai in Antony Samy Vs. State Bank of India has held that the statutory period of 45 days in

¶134

Uploaded on 29.05.2026 at 17:00 hours

¶135

MA 46/21 in SA 458/25

¶136

29.05.2026

¶137

¶138

challenging the measures cannot be condoned. The further reliance of the judgment dated 13.06.2025 passed by Hon’ble DRAT Chennai in MA.[SA] 31/2022 in Smt. M. Subathra Vs. State Bank of India , wherein it is held that if an application under S.5 of Limitation Act is entertained in an application filed under S.17 of SARFAESI Act,2002, it would derail the very purpose of the SARFAESI Act.

¶139

It is pertinent to note that the applicant had raised specific contention that Sale Notice dated 25.08.2020 was caused with insufficient address and received much later on 21.09.2020, for the sale to take place on 29.09.2020. Subsequently, there was no notice of sale or otherwise and thus it is concluded that sale was taken place on 29.09.2020. Only after 2^nd respondent approached the petitioner to vacate the schedule property in June, 2021, she came to know about the sale held after obtaining sale certificate. The said contention is not sustainable and duly countered by the respondent bank that the applicant was served with Sale Notice on 27.08.2020 (duly received by her husband) as evidenced from the acknowledgment card produced by the respondent bank.

¶140

Furthermore, on perusal of typed set of documents filed by the respondent bank, it is evident that earlier sale notice dated 06.02.2020 and the Sale Notice impugned in this SA dated 25.08.2020, were sent to the same address of the Applicant. The same address is mentioned in the present SA also. Therefore, the claim of applicant that she had not received the Sale Notice is untenable and the present MA is filed only to frustrate the

¶141

Uploaded on 29.05.2026 at 17:00 hours

¶142

MA 46/21 in SA 458/25

¶143

29.05.2026

¶144

¶145

recovery measures of the respondent bank. The applicant has not explained each day’s delay in preferring the present application. Hence, the contention

¶146

of the applicant fails and the present MA is only to be dismissed.

¶147

Resultantly the present MA No.46 of 2021 stands dismissed, consequently SA No.458 of 2025 also stands dismissed. Interim Order granted, if any stands vacated. No order as to cost.

¶148

Sd/- (S.V. GOWRAMMA) PRESIDING OFFICER, DRT-III, CHENNAI

¶149

(Dictated to PS, transcribed by her, corrected, signed and pronounced by me on this the 29^th

¶150

day of May, 2026)

¶151

Uploaded on 29.05.2026 at 17:00 hours

Geetha v. Canara Bank

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Geetha v. Canara Bank

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Rbl Bank Limited versus Mr Dr R Manivannan

Punjab National Bank versus Shalini Sathishbabu

Canara Bank versus R G Enterprises Rep By Mr R Sathish And two Others

Indian Overseas Bank versus M/S Vaizier Tailors Textiles

Karnataka Bank Limited versus Charles Rajakumar

Karur Vysya Bank versus Almeida