Dismissed

I Manoharan v. Indian Bank

DRT5 Mar 2026SA/457/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Debts Recovery Tribunal dismissed an application seeking condonation of a 90-day delay in filing a challenge to the sale of a mortgaged property under the SARFAESI Act. The Tribunal held that the 45-day limitation period under Section 17(1) is mandatory and statutory for quick recovery, leaving no power to the Tribunal to condone delay on equitable grounds or under the Limitation Act.

What did the court decide?

Application for condonation of delay dismissed; Sale order upheld; Respondent bank directed to hand over possession to auction purchaser.

I Manoharan versus Indian Bank — Banking and Recovery | DRT (2026)

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IA No.1619 of 2025 In SA No.457/2025

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05.03.2026

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IN THE DEBTS RECOVERY TRIBUNAL-III, CHENNAI

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Dated this the 05^th day of March, 2026

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Present: SMT. S.V. GOWRAMMA Presiding Officer

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IA No. 1619 of 2025 In SA No. 457 of 2025

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Mr. I Manoharan S/o Mr. T. Iyavoo Nadar No.4/46, Rayala Nagar 3^rd Main Road, Ramapuram, Chennai – 600 089.

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…Applicant

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-Vs-

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Indian Bank, The Authorized Officer – Home Loan Division, No.7, Prakasam Road, T. Nagar, Chennai – 600 017.

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…Respondent

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Counsels on record / appeared:

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Counsel for Applicant : Mr. J.J.R. Edwin Counsel for Respondent : Ms. Hemalatha Suresh Counsel for 2^nd Respondent : M/s. D.R. Law Chambers

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ORDER ON IA No.1619/2025 In SA 457 /2025

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The present Securitization Application [SA] is filed under sub section [1] of S.17 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Asset and Enforcement of Security Interest Act,2002 (for short the ‘Act’) challenging the action and the measure taken by the secured creditor under the Security Interest Enforcement Rules, 2002 [for short the Rules].

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IA No.1619 of 2025 In SA No.457/2025

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05.03.2026

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The applicant has filed the present Challenging the Section 14 order dated 25.06.2024 and admittedly the present SA is filed on 07.11.2024 with a delay of 90 days. Hence, the applicant has filed an IA No.1619 of 2025 to condone the delay.

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Further the applicant has filed an affidavit and contended that the applicant had approached the respondent bank requesting time to make the payments on EMI in a regular manner. The respondent bank is with a malafide intention to sell the property at low price without any justification.

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It is contended that the applicant had approached the respondent bank for availing Home Loan of Rs.83,57,688/- vide A/c No.6738856200 and Home Loan plus of Rs.25,00,000/- vide A/c. No.6745319142 and IND Kavach Loan of Rs.5,00,000/- vide A/c. No.7136450569, totaling to a sum of Rs.1,13,57,688/-. Further the respondent bank has undervalued the property as Rs.1,25,42,103.51/- but value of the property is about Rs.1,50,00,000/-.

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The applicant sought for an OTS proposal on the loan accounts for an amount of Rs.60,00,000/- but the respondent bank has sold the property and the payments made by the applicant was not properly adjusted towards the loan accounts and have charged exorbitant, penal interest. Due to Covid-19 pandemic situation, the applicant has lost his wealth, health and unable to pay a sum of Rs.1,25,42,103.51/-. However, the respondent bank has sent Rowdy elements in the name of collection agents to recover the total outstanding amount due.

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IA No.1619 of 2025 In SA No.457/2025

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05.03.2026

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The Hon’ble CJM, Tiruvallur in Crl.M.P.No.1564 of 2024 dated 25.06.2024 allowed the application and the advocate commissioner issued notice on 22.07.2024 without even looking into the agricultural status.

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The respondent bank has filed an objection memo stating that upon request of the applicant, the respondent bank has sanctioned various credit facilities. The applicant is irregular in the repayment as agreed upon which resulted in classification of the loan account as NPA on 27.07.2022 as per the RBI guidelines.

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The respondent bank has issued Section 13(2) Demand Notice dated 05.08.2022 and Section 13(4) Possession Notice dated 17.10.2022, and the Sale notice dated 03.08.2023 scheduling the sale to be held on 23.08.2023 and the schedule property is sold in favor of the Mrs. L. Ramyasai and Sale certificate is also issued on 26.09.2023 which is registered as Doc.No.2776/2023 before the SRO, South Chennai.

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Further, the total outstanding due amount of the applicant is Rs.1,37,67,179/- as on 31.07.2023. The auction purchaser Mrs. L. Ramyasai has created mortgage on the property in favor of the Indian Bank by way of Memorandum of Deposit of Title Deeds dated 06.10.2023 vide Doc.No.2777/2023. Therefore, the respondent bank prays not to grant any stay in the present SA.

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Heard both sides of the Counsels and perused the records of the case.

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IA No.1619 of 2025 In SA No.457/2025

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05.03.2026

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It is discernible from the records that the applicant admits the availing of the credit facilities and the mortgage of the property and also the default in the repayments made. Due to default in the repayment, the loan account has been classified as NPA on 27.07.2022.

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The respondent bank has issued Section 13(2) Demand Notice dated 05.08.2022 followed by Section 13(4) Possession Notice dated 17.10.2022. In spite of receipt of the statutory notices, the applicant did not liquidate the entire liability and the respondent bank has proceeded further and filed a Section 14 application. It is a matter of fact, pursuant to the Section 14 order dated 25.06.2024, the Advocate Commissioner has issued the notice dated 22.07.2024 to take the physical possession of the property. The applicant being aware of the measures has not filed any application under Section 17(1) within a period of 45 days, challenging the measures under the SARFAESI Act.

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It is also pertinent to note that the property is sold on 23.08.2023 pursuant to the Sale notice dated 03.08.2023, further the auction purchaser is also impleaded in the present SA vide proceedings dated 14.07.2025. However, the applicant has not amended the SA in spite of impleading the Auction purchaser in the present SA. The auction purchaser i.e., 2^nd respondent has filed a detailed objections to the present SA contending that the present SA is filed with a delay and prays for dismissal of the present SA.

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IA No.1619 of 2025 In SA No.457/2025

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05.03.2026

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The respondent bank could not hand over the Physical Possession to the Auction Purchaser Ms. Ramiya Sai, hence she approached the Hon’ble High Court in WP No.46675 of 2025 seeking for a writ of Mandamus directing the DRT-III to dispose the SA No.475/2025 as expeditiously as possible, vide order dated 08.12.2025 directed this Tribunal to dispose of the matter within a time limit of 3 months from the date of the order.

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Now considering whether challenge to Section 14 order 25.06.2024 is within the period of 45 day as mandated under the Acts and whether the Tribunal can condone the delay under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act?

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For appreciation of the facts S.17(1) is extracted as under: -

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S.17(1):

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Application against measures to recover secured debts (1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorized officer under this Chapter, [may make an application along with such fee, as may be prescribed,] to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measures had been taken:

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[Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower.]

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[Explanation. - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under this sub-section (1) of section.17.]

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IA No.1619 of 2025 In SA No.457/2025

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05.03.2026

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A reading of the above provision it is palpable that there is no provision made by the Parliament for condonation of delay in approaching the DRT against the measures, no matter whatever be the cause and howsoever justifiable it may sound. Unless power to condone delay is legislatively granted expressly or by inference, the Tribunal cannot condone delay. It is the indication of Parliament that one who wants to have redressal must knock the doors of DRT within 45 days and subsequently those doors should permanently stand closed. In other words, law does not come to the aid of those who are sleepy & late.

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Thus, it is clear that any person aggrieved by any measures under Section 13[4] is required to approach the Tribunal under Section 17 within 45 days from the date of the measure. Evidently, the present SA challenging the Section 14 order dated 25.06.2024 passed by Hon’ble CJM, Tiruvallur in Crl.M.P.No.1564 of 2024 is not filed within the period of 45 days under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act and there is a delay of 90 days which the Tribunal cannot condone.

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It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it must be applied with all its rigor when the statute so prescribes. The Tribunal has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds and has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation as per the Judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of P.K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala, reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556,

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IA No.1619 of 2025 In SA No.457/2025

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05.03.2026

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the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus:-

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"Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds".

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Hence, the legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation.

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The question whether the Debt Recovery Tribunal can entertain an application under Section 17 of the Act after 45 days of measure referred to in sub section [4] of Section 13 is no more res integra.

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The Hon'ble Division Bench of High Court of Kerala in Writ Appeal No.1797 of 2009 in W.P.(C) No.22192 of 2007 in the case titled

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K.PJayan vs. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd and

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others decided on 31.08.2015 had categorically held that the power to condone delay in entertaining an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act is not conferred on the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Further it held that the Debts Recovery Tribunal cannot consider an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The relevant paras are extracted as under:

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“7. Referring to these provisions the contention urged before us is that since section 24 of the RDB Act makes Limitation Act applicable and as the DRT constituted under the RDB Act is conferred with jurisdiction under section 17, Limitation Act governs applications made in a proceeding under section 17 also. We are unable to accept this contention. Both the RDB Act and the SARFAESI Act are independent enactments, although certain

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IA No.1619 of 2025 In SA No.457/2025

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05.03.2026

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provisions of the RDB Act are made applicable in respect of the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act also. However, that does not mean that every provision of the RDB Act would apply to every proceeding initiated under the SARFAESI Act. In so far as this case is concerned, proceedings were initiated under SARFAESI Act and in view of the provisions contained in section 17 conferring jurisdiction on the DRT constituted under RDB Act application is made by the appellant before the DRT. That does not mean that provisions of section 24 of the RDB Act governing the proceedings taken thereunder would get automatically attracted to such proceedings before the DRT. Therefore, the contention raised relying on section 24 in so far as this case is concerned is only to be rejected and we do so. This is further clear from section 36 of the SARFAESI Act, which confines the applicability of the Limitation Act to measures under section 13(4) of the said Act.”

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Further, the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala has also considered the issue in the case titled The Authorised Officer, Indian Bank Vs. K.J.

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George, order dated 02.11.2020 has placed reliance on K.P. Jayan V.

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Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation and has held that DRT

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has no power to condone the delay u/s.17 of the Act.

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As per Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, an application against measures to recover secured debts, must be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken. It further observed that "The reason for providing a time limit of 45 days for filing an application under Section held that the SARFAESI Act is enacted for quick enforcement of the security, which can easily be inferred from the purpose and object of the enactment. In Transcore v. Union of India and Anr, this Court held that the SARFAESI Act is enacted for quick enforcement of the security.

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IA No.1619 of 2025 In SA No.457/2025

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9 05.03.2026

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Additionally in the instant matter the applicants have failed to make a case to condone each day’s delay by producing the any evidence to support of the case without any justifiable reasons. However, the delay cannot be condoned on equitable grounds and in support of its view, reliance is placed on the Judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled Lingeswaran Vs. Thirunagalingam where it is observed that an application for condonation of delay has to be dismissed, if it is found that the delay is not properly explained and that the period of limitation cannot be extended on equitable ground. Otherwise, it would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. The court also observed "The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.

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The Tribunal places reliance on the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled Bank of Baroda – Vs.- Parasaadilal Tursiram Sheetgrah Pvt. Ltd, reported in 2022 Livelaw (SC) 671 , at para 12 where it is, observed that a time limit of 45 days for filing an application under Section 17 of SARFAESI Act is provided for quick enforcement of the security, and the observation is as under:

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“ The reason for providing a time limit of 45 days for filing an application under Section 17 can easily be inferred from the purpose and object of the enactment.

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IA No.1619 of 2025 In SA No.457/2025

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10 05.03.2026

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In Transcore v. Union of India and Anr. this Court held that the SARFAESI Act is enacted for quick enforcement of the security. It is unfortunate that proceedings where a property that has been brought to sale and third-party rights created under the provisions of the Act, have remained inconclusive even after a decade.”

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Further the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Akshat Commercial Pvt Ltd. Vs. Kalpana Chakroborty has taken view that Section 17 is mandatory and therefore the question of condoning the delay does not arise. If the Parliament intended that DRT should have power to condone delay, it would have enacted a provision like Section 5 of Limitation Act to SARFAESI Act. As it consciously chosen not to do it clearly emphasis the purpose of the SARFAESI Act.

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The Tribunal is of the view that DRT has no power to condone delay in an application under Section 17 of the Act, as it is a special law for speedy recovery of money due to bank in enforcing the security available to them is reinforced at para 65 of the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Celir LLP Vs. Bafna Motors

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[Mumbai][P] Ltd., reported in [2024] 2 SCC 1 at para 65 which is reproduced here under:

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“The SARFAESI Act is a special law containing an overriding clause in comparison to any other law in force. The SARFAESI Act is a special law of recovery with a paradigm shift that

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IA No.1619 of 2025 In SA No.457/2025

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05.03.2026

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permits expeditions recovery for the banks and the financial institutions without intervention of Courts. If the general law is allowed to govern in the manner as sought to be argued by the borrowers, it will defeat the very object and purpose….”

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Therefore, it is obvious that when a special legislation grants aright of action it is subject to certain conditions and create a forum for its implementation, that right becomes exercisable on satisfying such conditions and not otherwise and Limitation period is one such condition.

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The Hon’ble Apex Court also noted the following observations made in Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan

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Mumbai , (2012) 5 SCC 157, while dismissing the SLP:

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"The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation."

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The Tribunal also places reliance on the judgement of the Hon’ble

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High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in the case of Kailasam P –

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Vs.- The Karnataka Bank Limited, Rep. by its Authorised Officer

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in Writ Petition No.11273 of 2024 (GM-DRT) has held that:

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IA No.1619 of 2025 In SA No.457/2025

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“law of Limitation fixes upon a particular period within which a party is entitled to institute legal proceedings and if he fails to do so, ordinarily the cause of action dies subject to just all exceptions. Law of Limitation is statute of repose. True it is that any welfare State like ours is bound in good faith to furnish its citizens all needful legal remedy however it is not bound to keep its Courts and Tribunals open ad infinitum. If an aggrieved person neglects or refuses to apply for redress within the prescribed period of limitation, his claim is lost in the lapse of time.”

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In other words, the statutory time of 45 days provided under Section 17(1) of the SARFEASI Act is mandatory and no discretion has been conferred upon the DRT to extend such period. It is pertinent to note that the Securitization Act is for quick enforcement of the security interest created favoring the respondent bank for the recovery of the amount due.

¶103

In fact the provisions of the Act and Rules framed thereunder cast an obligation upon the secured creditor for strict compliance of the SARFAESI Act and the Rules made thereunder. Each measure is to be followed meticulously giving a time frame to proceed further. Firstly, the measures can be initiated after the account is classified as NPA, then issuance of statutory notice ie., demand notice demanding outstanding due to be repaid within 60 days.

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The secured creditor must wait for completion of 60 days and then proceeds further under S.13[4] possession notice is challengeable within a period of 45 days. Similarly, the Order of CJM or DM is also to be

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IA No.1619 of 2025 In SA No.457/2025

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05.03.2026

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challenged within 45 days. In other words, ample opportunity is granted by the Act for an aggrieved person to invoke his right of appeal under Section 17 of the Act within a period of 45 days from the date of measure.

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The provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder puts the borrower/guarantor/mortgagor notices in advance before taking measures under Section 13(4) of the Act read with Rule 8 and 9, giving the aggrieved person ample of time and opportunities to assail measure within a period of 45 days.

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Thus, the provisions of the Act and Rules ensures that the borrowers have advance notice of the proposed measure to be taken by the secured creditor. The judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

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Bank of Baroda – Vs.- Parasaadilal Tursiram Sheetgrah Pvt. Ltd has given a quietus to the conundrum which existed until that time on the power of the DRT to condone the delay in filing an SA after the statutory period of 45 days provided under Section 17(1) of the SARFEASI Act.

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The Tribunal also places reliance on Order dated 27.06.2023 passed in MA [SA]32/2021 by the Hon’ble DRAT Chennai where it is held that the statutory period of 45 days in challenging the measures cannot be condoned. The further reliance of the judgment dated 13.06.2025 passed by Hon’ble DRAT Chennai in MA. [SA] 31/2022, as held that if an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is entertained in an application filed under

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IA No.1619 of 2025 In SA No.457/2025

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Section 17 of SARFAESI Act,2002, it would derail the very purpose of the SARFAESI Act.

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Resultantly the present IA stands dismissed. Respondent bank is hereby directed to proceed further under the SARFAESI Act in handing over the physical possession of the property to the Auction Purchaser. Consequently, the SA No.457/2025 stands dismissed. Interim Order granted, if any stands vacated, pending IAs are disposed of in terms of this final order. No order as to cost.

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Sd/(S.V. GOWRAMMA) PRESIDING OFFICER, DRT-III, CHENNAI

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(Dictated to Steno (Mogesh), transcribed by him, corrected, signed and pronounced by me on this the 05^th day of March, 2026)

I Manoharan v. Indian Bank

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

I Manoharan v. Indian Bank

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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