Dismissed

Jj Fuels v. Shriram City Union Finance Ltd.

DRT13 Mar 2026MA/86/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The DRT dismissed an application to condone a 13-day delay in filing a Section 17 appeal under the SARFAESI Act. The court held that Section 17 mandates a strict 45-day limit and the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to condone delay or apply the Limitation Act, citing Supreme Court and High Court precedents.

What did the court decide?

The MA to condone delay stands dismissed; consequently, the Section 17 appeal (S.A. No.126/2025) is also dismissed.

Jj Fuels versus Shriram City Union Finance Ltd. — Banking and Recovery | DRT (2026)

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MA 86/25 in SA No.126/2025

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13.03.2026

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IN THE DEBTS RECOVERY TRIBUNAL-III, CHENNAI

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Dated this the 13^th day of March, 2026

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Present: SMT. S.V. GOWRAMMA Presiding Officer

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M.A. No.86 of 2025 in S.A. No.126 of 2025

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M/S JJ Fuels, Prop Jayanthi Manonmani, W/o.M.Jayabalan, No-9/4A, Chickanampatti Near Dhirajlal College, Kadayampatti, Salem, Tamil Nadu – 636 309.

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Mrs.T.Jayanthi Manonmani, W/o.Mr. M.Jayabalan, No.4/135-290/1, Kurinji Nagar 2^nd Street, Mahendrapuri, Salem, Tamil Nadu – 636 008.

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Ms.MJ.Priyadarshini D/o. M. Jayabalan, No.4/135-290/1, Kurinji Nagar, 2^nd Street, Mahendrapuri, Salem Tamil Nadu – 636 008.

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Ms.MJ.Divya, No.4/135-290/1, Kurinji Nagar, 2^nd Street, Mahendrapuri, Salem Tamil Nadu – 636 008.

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Ms. MJ.Lavanya, D/o. M.Jayabalan, No.4/135-290/1, Kurinji Nagar, 2^nd Street, Mahendrapuri, Salem Tamil Nadu - 636 008. ….Applicants

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-Vs-

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MA 86/25 in SA No.126/2025

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13.03.2026

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M/S Shriram City Union Finance Limited, Having its Registered office at No.123, Angappa Naicken Street, Chennai, Rep by its Authorized Officer Cum Assistant Vice-President-Legal …..Respondent

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Counsels on record / appeared:

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Counsel for Applicants : M/s N. Aakash

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Counsel for Respondent : M/s R. Uma Shankar

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: - ORDER ON MA NO.86 OF 2025 in SA No.126 of 2025- :

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The present MA is filed by applicant praying to condone delay of 13

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days in filing the above SA No.126/2025, challenging the Section 14 order dated 06.12.2024 passed by Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Salem in Crl.M.P. No.247 of 2023, pursuant to SARFAESI measures initiated by respondent bank for recovery of a sum of Rs.1,56,90,828/-.

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Admittedly, there is a delay of 13 days in filing the SA and hence the applicant had filed MA No.86/25 to condone the delay in filing the SA.

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In the affidavit filed by 2^nd applicant along with MA, it is submitted that the 2^nd applicant had approached the respondent Finance company for a Business loan, which was accordingly sanctioned by the respondent Finance company to the tune of Rs.80,00,000/- under loan Account numbers TFH01F1905310002 dated 31.05.2019. The said loan was secured

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by mortgaging the applicant's immovable property morefully detailed in schedule to the SA, now used for the petrol bunk at chikkanampatty Village

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MA 86/25 in SA No.126/2025

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13.03.2026

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and Omalur Panchayath Union and Taluk, Salem District, standing in the name of Mrs. T.Jayanthi Manonmani, the 2^nd Applicant herein.

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It is contended by the 2^nd applicant that on obtaining the loan amount, she was carrying on Fuel business and she was paying the loan installment promptly, however due to Covid-19 National Lockdown there was great downfall in the business, which resulted in default in repayment of interest due to huge financial loss in the business and health issues. It is further submitted that the 2^nd applicant was struggling to run livelihood as she had to spend such a huge amount for the medical expenses itself. The property which has been mortgaged is the only property and that the applicant had no other source of income also. In such circumstances, if the property is sold, they be left to struggle even for our daily bread. Hence applicants prayed for condonation of delay of 13 days in filing the present SA.

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Respondent bank filed their counter affidavit along with documents in main SA and also counter in MA inter alia contending therein that the present application filed by the applicants to condone the delay of 13 days in filing the present SARFAESI Application is not maintainable either in Law or on facts and the same is liable to be dismissed on the following grounds:

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(i) As per Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, any person aggrieved by the act of the secured creditor while enforcing the mortgage is entitled to approach this Hon'ble Tribunal within the period of 45 days

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MA 86/25 in SA No.126/2025

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13.03.2026

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and there is no Provision in the said Act, enabling the applicability of the Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for filing an application under Section 17 of the Act. In view of the above, the present application is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable.

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(ii) Without prejudice to above, even assuming that the delay could be condoned by this Hon'ble Tribunal by invoking its inherent Power, the applicants have not assigned any sufficient cause or justifiable reasons for the delay in approaching this Hon'ble Tribunal within the time stipulated under the Act.

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In the counter to main SA, it is contended by the respondent institution that upon request of the applicant, the respondent had sanctioned credit facility to the tune of Rs.1,32,57,600/-. Applicants 2 to 5 stood as guarantor to the said loan and loan is secured by mortgage of the immovable property belonging to 2^nd applicant. After paying few installments, applicants were irregular in the repayment, which resulted in classification of the loan account as NPA on 31.03.2021 as per the RBI guidelines.

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The respondent bank has issued Section 13(2) Demand Notice dated 26.10.2021 and Section 13(4) Possession Notice dated 29.04.2022 in accordance with law. Further, in order to take physical possession of the property, the respondent had filed Section 14 application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Salem and the same has been numbered as Crl.M.P.

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MA 86/25 in SA No.126/2025

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13.03.2026

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No.247 of 2023 and after verification of all documents, the application was allowed on 06.12.2024 and Advocate Commissioner was appointed.

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The Advocate Commissioner visited the property on 22.01.2025 and had intimated the petitioners to vacate the property. At that time, the 1^st applicant, represented by 2^nd applicant in and by her letter dated 22.01.2025 (Page No.74 of typed set of documents) had requested time till 05.02.2025 and had undertaken to hand over the possession on 06.02.2025. Acceding to the request, the Advocate Commissioner had given time till 05.02.2025 for handing over possession of the property. However, the 2^nd applicant instead of handing over the possession, had approached the respondent and vide letter dated 05.02.2025 (page No.75 of typed set of documents) had promised to pay substantial amount on or before 25.02.2025 and also promised to settle the entire amount on or before 25.03.2025. The applicants had neither paid any amount nor surrendered the secured asset as promised. Without honoring their commitment, contrary to their undertakings, the applicants had filed the present SA challenging the Section 14 order, in order to frustrate the recovery measures of the respondent. Thus submitting, the respondent prayed for dismissing the MA with exemplary cost.

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Heard counsel for applicant, respondent and perused records

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of the case.

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MA 86/25 in SA No.126/2025

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13.03.2026

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Admittedly, there is no dispute with regard to the availing of the credit facility and mortgage created for the loan. The only contention raised by the applicant in the MA to condone the delay is that due to business loss owing to Covid pandemic, the applicants could not repay the loan and hence committed default in repayment. However, there is no justifiable reason that has been stated in the MA for condonation of delay of 13 days to file the present SA challenging the impugned order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu in Crl.M.P. No.1197 of 2024 dated 24.06.2024.

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Now, considering the delay application MA No.132/25, the Tribunal is posed with the question whether the Tribunal can condone the delay under S.17 of the SARFAESI Act?

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For appreciation of the facts S.17(1) is extracted as under: -

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Section 17(1):

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Application against measures to recover secured debts (1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorized officer under this Chapter, [may make an application along with such fee, as may be prescribed,] to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measures had been taken:

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[Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower.]

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[Explanation.- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely

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MA 86/25 in SA No.126/2025

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13.03.2026

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action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under this sub-section(1) of section.17.]

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A reading of the above provision is clear that any person aggrieved by any measures under Section 13[4] is required to approach the Tribunal under S.17 within 45 days from the date of the measure. Evidently, the present MA is filed for condonation of delay of 13 days in preferring the SA.

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It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it must be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Tribunal has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds and has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation as per the Judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of P.K. Ramachandran

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vs. State of Kerala, reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus:-

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"Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds".

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Hence, the legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation.

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MA 86/25 in SA No.126/2025

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13.03.2026

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The question whether the Debt Recovery Tribunal can entertain an application under S.17 of the Act after 45 days of measure referred to in sub section [4] of S.13 is no more res integra.

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The Hon'ble Division Bench of Hon’ble High Court of Kerala in Writ Appeal No.1797 of 2009 in W.P.(C) No.22192 of 2007 in the case titled

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K.PJayan vs. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd and

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others decided on 31.08.2015 had categorically held that the power to condone delay in entertaining an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act is not conferred on the Debts Recovery Tribunal. It further held that the Debts Recovery Tribunal cannot consider an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The relevant paras are extracted as under:

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“7. Referring to these provisions the contention urged before us is that since section 24 of the RDB Act makes Limitation Act applicable and as the DRT constituted under the RDB Act is conferred with jurisdiction under section 17, Limitation Act governs applications made in a proceedings under section 17 also. We are unable to accept this contention. Both the RDB Act and the SARFAESI Act are independent enactments, although certain provisions of the RDB Act are made applicable in respect of the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act also. However, that does not mean that every provision of the RDB Act would apply to every proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act. In so far as this case is concerned, proceedings were initiated under SARFAESI Act and in view of the provisions contained in section 17 conferring jurisdiction on the DRT constituted under RDB Act application is made by the appellant before the DRT. That does not mean that provisions of section 24 of the RDB Act governing the proceedings taken thereunder would get automatically attracted to such proceedings before the DRT.

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MA 86/25 in SA No.126/2025

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13.03.2026

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Therefore, the contention raised relying on section 24 in so far as this case is concerned is only to be rejected and we do so. This is further clear from section 36 of the SARFAESI Act, which confines the applicability of the Limitation Act to measures under section 13(4) of the said Act.”

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Further, the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala has also considered the issue in the case titled The Authorised Officer, Indian Bank Vs. K.J. George, order dated 02.11.2020 has placed reliance on K.P. Jayan V. Hong Kong

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& Shanghai Banking Corporation and has held that DRT has no power to condone the delay u/s.17 of the Act.

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The Tribunal places reliance on the recent judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled Bank Of Baroda vs Parasaadilal Tursiram Sheetgrah Pvt. Ltd., where it observed that a time limit of 45 days for filing an application under Section 17 of SARFAESI Act is provided for quick enforcement of the security.

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As per Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, an application against measures to recover secured debts, has to be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken. It further observed that "The reason for providing a time limit of 45 days for filing an application under Section held that the SARFAESI Act is enacted for quick enforcement of the security, which can easily be inferred from the purpose and object of the enactment. In

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MA 86/25 in SA No.126/2025

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13.03.2026

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Transcore v. Union of India and Anr, the Court held that the SARFAESI Act is enacted for quick enforcement of the security.

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Further the delay cannot be condoned on equitable grounds and the Tribunal places reliance on the Judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled Lingeswaran Vs. Thirunagalingam where it is observed that an application for condonation of delay has to be dismissed if it is found that the delay is not properly explained and that the period of limitation cannot be extended on equitable ground. Otherwise, it would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. The court also observed "The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same”.

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The Hon’ble Apex Court also noted the following observations made in Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai , (2012) 5 SCC 157, while dismissing the SLP:

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"The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to

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MA 86/25 in SA No.126/2025

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13.03.2026

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condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation."

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It is significant to refer that the securitization Act is for quick enforcement of the security interest created favouring the respondent bank for the recovery of the amount due.

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21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bank of Baroda –vs- Parasaadilal

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Tursiram Sheetgrah Pvt. Ltd., was of the view that the DRT does not have jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing an SA. In other words, the Statutory time period of 45 days provided under Section 17(1) of the SARFEASI Act is mandatory and no discretion has been conferred upon the DRT to extend such period. The provisions of the Act and Rules (9) framed thereunder cast upon the secured creditor an obligation to strictly comply with the said provisions and the rules and serve upon the borrowers’ notices in advance before taking measures under Section 13(4) of the Act read with Rule 8 and 9, thus giving the borrowers ample of time and opportunities to assail measure within a period of 45 days. In other words, the provisions of the Act and Rules framed thereunder ensure that the borrowers have advance notice of the proposed measure to be taken by the secured creditor, and for this reason, also the DRT does not have jurisdiction to condone the

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delay in filing an SA. The judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parasaadilal Tursiram (supra) has given a quietus to the conundrum which

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MA 86/25 in SA No.126/2025

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13.03.2026

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existed hitherto on the power of the DRT to condone the delay in filing an SA after the statutory period of 45 days provided under Section 17(1) of the SARFEASI Act.

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The Tribunal placing reliance of the above judgments comes to inevitable conclusion that in absence of any enabling provision to condone the delay, this Tribunal has no power to condone the delay in filing the SA. 23. On the other hand, the respondent institution had established their actions through their typed set of documents, wherein it is evident that applicants are served with all the statutory notices as required under law. Despite the Advocate Commissioner visiting the subject property on 22.01.2025 and intimating the applicants to vacate the property, applicants did not take any steps to repay the dues to the respondent bank or approach this Tribunal, if they were aggrieved by the actions of the respondent bank. On the other hand, the 1^st applicant represented by 2^nd applicant had sought time till 05.02.2025 and assured to vacate and hand over possession on 06.02.2025. Acceding to the request, the Advocate Commissioner had given time till 05.02.2025 for handing over possession of the property. However, the 2^nd applicant instead of handing over the possession, had approached the respondent vide letter dated 05.02.2025 had promised to pay substantial amount on or before 25.02.2025 and also promised to settle

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the entire amount on or before 25.03.2025. The applicants had neither paid any amount nor surrendered the secured asset as promised. Having

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MA 86/25 in SA No.126/2025

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13.03.2026

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failed to do so, the applicants have filed this present MA only to frustrate the actions of the respondent from recovery of its legitimate dues. The applicants have not approached this Tribunal with clean hands and the present MA lacks merits.

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For the foregoing reasons, the MA.No.86/2025, petition to condone the delay of 13 days stands dismissed. Consequently, SA No.126/2025 also stands dismissed. Interim Order granted if any stands vacated. All pending IA/s if any, are closed. No order as to cost.

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Sd/(S.V. GOWRAMMA) PRESIDING OFFICER, DRT-III, CHENNAI

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(Dictated to PS, transcribed by her, corrected, signed and pronounced by me on this the 13^th day of March, 2026)

Jj Fuels v. Shriram City Union Finance Ltd.

Case brief

What is this about?

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Jj Fuels v. Shriram City Union Finance Ltd.

Case brief

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