Dismissed

Jeevan Prakash and Sons v. Bharat Rathi

Delhi HC10 Jul 2026RC.REV./188/2026

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Rent revision against dismissal of leave to defend in an eviction petition on bona fide need. The ARC had found the alleged alternate properties were Amazon warehouses or paid storage used by the landlord's wife. The High Court held revisional jurisdiction is supervisory only and dismissed the petition.

What the court decided

AI extract

Jeevan Prakash and Sons Vs Bharat Rathi — Landlord and Tenant | Delhi HC (2026)

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$~16

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

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Date of decision: 10.07.2026

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- RC.REV. 188/2026, CM APPL. 36453/2026 (Stay), CM APPL. 36454/2026 (Ex.) & CM APPL. 36455/2026 (Delay of 14 days in Re-filing the petition)

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JEEVAN PRAKASH AND SONS .....Petitioner Through: Mr. Neeraj Kumar, Adv.

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versus

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BHARAT RATHI .....Respondent Through:

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CORAM:

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HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR

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% JUDGEMENT (Oral)

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The present Rent Revision Petition, filed under Section 25B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958¹ read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908² , seeks to assail the Order dated 23.12.2025³ passed by the learned SCJ-cum-RC (Central), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi⁴ in RC ARC No. 617/2022 whereby the leave to defend application preferred by the Petitioner came to be dismissed and an eviction order was consequently passed against the Petitioner.

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Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submits that the principal grievance urged before this Court is that the Petitioner was not granted an effective opportunity to controvert the

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1 the DRC Act

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2 CPC

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3 Impugned Order

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4 Learned ARC

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Signature Not Verified

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Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR RC.REV. 188/2026 Page 1 of 7 BHATIA Signing Date: 14.0 7.2026 11:21:15

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submissions advanced by the Respondent with regard to premises bearing Shop no. 3, Ground Floor, Property No. XVI-2780, Gali No. 20-21, Naiwala, Karol Bagh, New Delhi⁵ , which, according to the Respondent, had been leased/licensed to Amazon by the Respondent’s wife and, therefore, were not available as alternative accommodation.

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Elaborating on the aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the Petitioner contends that the learned ARC proceeded on the basis of certain letters and documents indicating Amazon to be the licensee of the said premises despite there being no registered lease deed or any other conclusive document evidencing such arrangement.

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According to learned counsel for the Petitioner, in the absence of any cogent material establishing the true nature of the occupation of the said premises, the learned ARC could not have concluded that the said properties did not constitute reasonably suitable alternate accommodation available to the Respondent.

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It is, therefore, submitted that the bona fide requirement projected by the Respondent has not been conclusively established and the Impugned Order warrants interference by this Court through the present Revision Petition.

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This Court takes note of the relevant paragraphs of the Impugned Order wherein these aspects have been extensively dealt with by the learned ARC and are reproduced hereinunder as follow:

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“Requirement of premises bonafide by the petitioner for himself and for members of his family dependent upon him and non-availability of any other reasonably suitable accommodation:

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Respondent has raised the contention that the tenanted premises

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5 Subject premises

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Signature Not Verified

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Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR RC.REV. 188/2026 Page 2 of 7 BHATIA Signing Date: 14.0 7.2026 11:21:15

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is not suitable for running the business of the wife of the petitioner as the same is small in size, admeasuring only 16ft X 7 ft. No merit found in above contention of the respondent. Admittedly, respondent himself is running his jewellery business from the tenanted premises. When the respondent himself is using the tenanted premises for commercial purpose, it is not open for him to say that same is not suitable for running the business of the petitioner or his family member. Thus, above contention of respondent does not give rise to any triable issue.

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Respondent has claimed that petitioner is owner of many properties and as such, has suitable alternative accommodation to meet his requirement. The availability of alternate accommodation with the petitioner, as alleged by the respondent will now be discussed. As per respondent, three properties namely, A-28, Mohan Co-operative Industrial Estate, Mathura Road, Badarpur, Delhi-110044, A-29, Mohan Co-operative Industrial Estate, Mathura Road, Badarpur, Delhi-110044 and A-33, Mohan Cooperative Industrial Estate, Mathura Road, Badarpur, Delhi-110044 are available with the petitioner. Respondent has relied upon a screenshot, which shows the aforesaid three properties as additional places of business available for the business of the petitioner’s wife. Per contra, petitioner has stated in his Reply to leave to defend application that the said properties are warehouses of amazon.com and petitioner’s wife is using the same for storing of her goods by paying charges for the same. Petitioner has filed copy of letter dated 14.10.2023 of Amazon Seller Services Pvt. Ltd. wherein Amazon is mentioned as licensee of property bearing no. A-28, Mohan Co-operative Industrial Estate, Mathura Road, Badarpur, Delhi-110044. The above document go on to substantiate the claim of the petitioner that aforesaid property is actually licensed out to Amazon. The averment that the petitioner’s wife is paying charges for using aforesaid property has been not countered by the respondent. In such scenario, if the petitioner’s wife uses the tenanted premises for her business, she need not incur any such expenses. In such circumstances, even if it is assumed that petitioner’s wife is using the said property for storage of her business goods, it cannot be said to be an alternate accommodation available for running of her business.

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As far availability of property bearing no. A-29, Mohan Cooperative Industrial Estate, Mathura Road, Badarpur, Delhi110044 is concerned, petitioner has filed copy of property tax receipt issued by South Delhi Municipal Corporation qua said property wherein Jagan Jyoti Product Pvt. Ltd. is stated to be owner of the same. Petitioner has admitted that his wife is using aforesaid property for storage purpose but is paying charges for the same. Respondent has not countered the same by way of filing Rejoinder. As such, court has no reason to doubt that petitioner’s

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Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date: 14.0 7.2026 11:21:15

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RC.REV. 188/2026 Page 3 of 7

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wife is incurring expenses for using of the aforesaid property to store her goods. In such circumstances, the petitioner or his family member cannot be compelled to continue to pay charges, when they can set up their business in their own property i.e. the tenanted premises.

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Turning now to the respondent’s claim of availability of property bearing no. A-33, Mohan Co-operative Industrial Estate, Mathura Road, Badarpur, Delhi-110044, it would suffice to say that petitioner has placed on record a document showing that Amazon Seller Services Pvt. Ltd is a licensee of the said property. In view of above and considering the averment of the petitioner that his wife is paying charges for using the said property, same cannot be said to be available for the petitioner’s need as a suitable alternate accommodation.

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Respondent has claimed that property bearing no. J-4, BlockB1, Mathura Road, New Delhi-110044 is available with the petitioner. The petitioner, however, has denied the same and has stated that it is a warehouse of Amazon.com and petitioner’s wife is using the same for her storage, against payment of charges. Above averment of petitioner has not been denied or countered by the respondent by way of filing Rejoinder. Thus, court has neither any reason to disbelieve the same, nor the above plea of respondent gives rise to any triable issue.

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Lastly, respondent has also claimed that petitioner’s wife can run her business from room no. 3, second floor of property bearing no. XVI-2780, Gali no. 20-21, Naiwala, Karol Bagh, New Delhi110005. However, it is the respondent’s own case that the petitioner is running his own business titled M/s Tulip Impex in the aforesaid property. Since respondent himself admits that aforesaid property is already being used for the petitioner’s business, same cannot be said to be available for accommodating the business of the petitioner’s wife.”

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ANALYSIS:

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This Court has heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner and, with his able assistance, perused the material available on record.

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Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the proviso to Section 25B (8) of the DRC Act. 9. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The

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Signature Not Verified

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Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date: 14.0 7.2026 11:21:15

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RC.REV. 188/2026 Page 4 of 7

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Hon’ble Supreme Court, in S arla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.⁶ , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh⁷ , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua⁸ , has consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under the proviso to Section 25B (8) of the DRC Act is supervisory and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

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The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.⁹ , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover¹⁰ .

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In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25B of the DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is, therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process, including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent Controller merely because another view on the material available on record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court read as under:

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“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B (8) gives the High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural

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6 (1998) 8 SCC 119

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7 (2014) 9 SCC 78

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8 (2022) 6 SCC 30

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9 2024:DHC:9322

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10 2025:DHC:11285

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Signature Not Verified

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Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR RC.REV. 188/2026 Page 5 of 7 BHATIA Signing Date: 14.0 7.2026 11:21:15

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compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature.”

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In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court, upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the proviso to Section 25B (8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an absence of adjudication warranting interference.

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A perusal of the Impugned Order makes it clear that the contention now sought to be urged before this Court had already been considered by the learned ARC. The learned ARC has adverted to each of the objections raised by the Petitioner, examined the material placed on record and assigned cogent reasons while returning findings thereon. Insofar as the plea relating to the alleged alternate accommodation is concerned, the learned ARC has specifically considered the documents relied upon by the parties and recorded a finding that the properties in question could not be regarded as reasonably suitable alternate accommodation available to the Respondent. Merely because the learned ARC has accepted the

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Signature Not Verified

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Digitally Signed By:HARVINDER KAUR BHATIA Signing Date: 14.0 7.2026 11:21:15

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RC.REV. 188/2026 Page 6 of 7

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explanation furnished by the Respondent in that regard cannot, by itself, lead to the conclusion that the Petitioner was denied an effective opportunity of hearing, particularly when the issue stands specifically considered in the Impugned Order.

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Viewed in the light of the above, this Court finds no error apparent on the face of the record, perversity or material irregularity in the findings returned by the learned ARC, warranting interference in exercise of the limited revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court. The submissions advanced on behalf of the Petitioner essentially seek a reappreciation of the material already considered by the learned ARC, which is impermissible while exercising jurisdiction under Section 25B (8) of the Act.

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In view of the detailed consideration already accorded by the learned ARC to the issues sought to be raised before this Court and having regard to the limited scope of interference available under Section 25B (8) of the Act, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned Order.

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