against him, the Complainant was required to show specific acts of personal fraudulent intention or personal gain, distinct from the corporate entity’s business operations. The deposition of CW-3 confirms that Accused No. 2 acted solely “on behalf of and in the name of” the Company, thereby attributing the transaction to the corporate entity, not the individual. 37. The “assurance” of payment mentioned in the allegations is a standard commercial representation made in the ordinary course of business. Every purchase on credit involves an implied or express promise to pay. 38. The subsequent failure of the Company to honour this promise, due to financial incapacity or BIFR status, renders the dispute civil in nature. It does not automatically translate into criminal cheating on the part of the Director. Without evidence showing that Accused No. 2 knew at the time of the promise that the money would definitely not be paid, the “assurance” cannot be labelled as a fraudulent inducement. 39. Since the complaint against the Company has been dismissed/abated, the prosecution of the Director becomes legally unsustainable. The Director cannot be held criminally liable for the Company’s financial status or its corporate debts when the Company itself is no longer being prosecuted. 40. Therefore, in the absence of specific allegations attributing a personal act of deception or misappropriation to Accused No. 2, and given that he acted merely as an agent of a principal Company - that is no longer an accused, the ingredients for an offence under Section 420 IPC are not made out against him personally. The continuation of the trial against Accused No. 2 would be an abuse of the process of law.
