Sameer Alias Shabbir Vs State NCT of Delhi

The instant application has been filed on behalf of the applicant under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (erstwhile Section 439 CR.P.C) r/w Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (erstwhile Section 482 CR.P.C) seeking grant of regular bail in relation to FIR No. 469/2022 dated 16.07.2022 for offence punishable under Sections 376/354/354A/506 Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and 6 of the Prevention of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).

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Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant submits that the applicant is innocent and has been falsely implicated in the instant case. According to him, there was no transaction between the father of the prosecutrix and the applicant owing to which the false implication has been

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This is a digitally signed order.

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The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 25/07/2026 at 11:25:01

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made. He tries to indicate various infirmities and inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case. The consistent change in the version of the prosecutrix is tried to be established while taking the Court to the statement of the prosecutrix. It is contended that even otherwise the incident is of the year 2018, whereas, the FIR was lodged in the year 2022. The reason for such delay is not property explained. The material witnesses have already been examined and the applicant has already suffered 4 years incarceration. Therefore, the applicant deserves for grant of regular bail.

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Submissions made on behalf of the applicant are vehemently opposed by learned APP for the State as well as by learned counsel for the prosecutrix. They contend that on account of fear and the photographs, which the applicant had captured, the incident could not be reported to the police. It is, thus, contended that when the applicant has fully supported the prosecution case in the testimony before the Court, there is no reason for grant of regular bail to the applicant.

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I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record.

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The prosecution story would indicate that the FIR was registered on 16.07.2022 on a statement given by victim. The victim at the time of the FIR seems to be 18 years of age. She stated that in the year 2019, when she was in Standard IX and she had failed in her examination, she borrowed Rs.1,500/- for tuition from the applicant. She was knowing the applicant as her ‘Chacha’. The applicant allegedly took advantage of her and first sexually harassed her. Then after a few days, he took her to a hotel and intimidated her that he would disclose the fact that she had failed in her examination to her relatives and then committed penetrative sexual assault

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This is a digitally signed order.

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The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 25/07/2026 at 11:25:01

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on her. The applicant allegedly repeatedly had sexually intercourse with her and thereafter, he also clicked some obscene photographs and made videos, which he threatened to circulate to defame the victim.

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The Court, however, has considered the testimony of the prosecutrix/ victim. In her testimony, she has admitted that in the year 2021, she disclosed the entire incident to her mother. The mother has not been cited as a witness. There is no reason as to why in the year 2021 itself, no action was taken.

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Besides the aforesaid, there are various other prima facie inconsistencies. The prosecution has not brought on record the details of the hotel, where the applicant had taken the prosecutrix. There is no evidence to that effect. The medical evidence would also not fully corroborate the prosecution case. The factum of taking Rs.1500/- from the applicant and on that pretext, the alleged sexual repeated assault does not seem to be justified in absence of there being any corroboration to the effect that the prosecutrix failed in her Standard IX and in order to take tuition, she has taken the said amount. There is no evidence to that effect.

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The Supreme Court in Dataram Singh v. State of U.P .,¹ has reiterated that the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is an exception, and that the presumption of innocence continues to operate until guilt is established in accordance with law.

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The parameters governing the grant of bail have also been succinctly laid down in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee ,² wherein the Supreme Court held that while considering an application for bail, the Court

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1 (2018) 3 SCC 22

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2 (2010) 14 SCC 496

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This is a digitally signed order.

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The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 25/07/2026 at 11:25:01

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is required to balance the nature of the accusation, the severity of punishment, the possibility of the accused fleeing from justice, likelihood of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses, antecedents of the accused and the overall interests of justice

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The Supreme Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI ,³ has further observed that the object of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused during trial and that pre-trial detention should not assume a punitive character. These observations were expounded as follows:

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“21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.”

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More recently, in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI ,⁴ the Supreme Court has emphasised that prolonged incarceration pending trial, particularly where the trial is not likely to conclude within a reasonable period, has to be viewed in the light of the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.

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The Supreme Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb ,⁵ held that an under trial cannot be subjected to indefinite incarceration pending trial and that, where it becomes evident that a timely conclusion of the trial is not possible and the accused has already undergone a substantial period of incarceration, constitutional courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge

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3 (2012) 1 SCC 40

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4 (2022) 10 SCC 51

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5 (2021) 3 SCC 713

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This is a digitally signed order.

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The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 25/07/2026 at 11:25:01

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the accused on bail, notwithstanding the statutory restrictions governing the grant of bail.

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“15. This Court has clarified in numerous judgments that the liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution would cover within its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial. In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Under trial Prisoners) v. Union of India, it was held that under trials cannot indefinitely be detained pending trial. Ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences of his acts unless the same is established before a neutral arbiter. However, owing to the practicalities of real life where to secure an effective trial and to ameliorate the risk to society in case a potential criminal is left at large pending trial, the courts are tasked with deciding whether an individual ought to be released pending trial or not. Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail .”

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[Emphasis supplied]

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Having considered the overall facts and circumstances and as the application has already suffered 4 years of incarceration, the Court deems it appropriate to allow the instant application. Accordingly, the applicant is directed to be released on regular bail subject to such conditions as may be imposed by the concerned Trial Court.

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Nothing stated, hereinabove, shall however be construed as an expression of opinion on merits of the case.

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In light of these observations, the application stands disposed of.

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Copy of the order to be forwarded to the concerned Jail Superintendent for necessary compliance.

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PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J

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JULY 24, 2026/ Nc

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This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 25/07/2026 at 11:25:01

Sameer Alias Shabbir v. State NCT of Delhi

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Sameer Alias Shabbir v. State NCT of Delhi

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