Dismissed

Jai Chand v. the State & Anr.

Delhi HC17 Oct 2025LPA/643/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Appeal against dismissal of a writ petition seeking reclassification of driver posts and consequential benefits from Indian Airlines/Air India. Relying on the Supreme Court's ruling that writ jurisdiction does not lie against Air India after disinvestment to a private entity, the Division Bench found no infirmity in the Single Judge's order and dismissed the appeal.

What the court decided

AI extract

Jai Chand Vs the State & Anr. — Service and Employment | Delhi HC (2025)

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$~11

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

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- LPA 643/2025 & CM APPL. 65603/2025

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JAI CHAND .....Appellant

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Through: Appearance not given.

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versus

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THE STATE & ANR. .....Respondents Through: Ms. Nitika Bhutani, Advocate for R-1.

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CORAM:

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HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIMAL KUMAR YADAV

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O R D E R % 17.10.2025

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The challenge in the present appeal is to the Order dated 24.08.2023 passed by the Ld. Single Judge in W.P.(C) 644/2019.

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As noted by the Ld. Single Judge in the Impugned Order, the W.P.(C) 644/2019 was filed seeking the following prayers:

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"a) issue the writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction thereby directing the respondent no. 2 i.e. Indian Airlines to perform proper classification of the post of a senior driver-cum-junior operator and chief operator as technical post and to give consequential benefits as per Rules and Regulations of Indian Airlines;

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b) pass any other order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of this case in favour of the petitioner in the interest of justice."

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On the date when the writ petition was filed, the Respondent No.2/Air

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LPA 643/2025

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This is a digitally signed order. The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 25/10/2025 at 11:50:37

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India was an instrumentality of the State, however, with effect from 27.01.2022, Respondent No.2/Air India has ceased to be the instrumentality of the State.

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The Ld. Single Judge vide the Impugned Order dated 24.08.2023, after relying upon the Judgment passed by High Court of Bombay in R.S. Madireddy v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 2657 , has dismissed the writ petition.

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The aforementioned Judgment passed by the High Court of Bombay has been affirmed by the Apex Court in R.S. Madireddy v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 965 . The questions formed for adjudication by the Apex Court in the said Judgment reads as under:

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“Questions of law posed for adjudication:—

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22. The questions of law presented for adjudication of this Court are:

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(i) Whether respondent No. 3(AIL) after having been taken over by a private corporate entity could have been subjected to writ jurisdiction of the High Court?

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(ii) Whether the appellants herein could have been non-suited on account of the fact that during pendency of their writ petitions, the nature of the employer changed from a Government entity to a private entity?

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(iii) Whether the delay in disposal of the writ petition could be treated a valid ground to sustain the claim of the appellants even against the private entity?”

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The above-mentioned questions have been answered by the Apex

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LPA 643/2025

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This is a digitally signed order.

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The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 25/10/2025 at 11:50:37

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Court in the following manner:

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“30. We would like to answer the three questions of law enumerated above as follows.

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31. In order to be declared as “State” or “other authority” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, it would have to fall within the well-recognised parameters laid down in a number of judgments of this Court. In this regard, we may refer to the case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biolog y²¹ wherein this Court after taking into consideration the previous judgments on this point, observed as follows:

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“27. Ramana [(1979) 3 SCC 489 : AIR 1979 SC 1628] was noted and quoted with approval in extenso and the tests propounded for determining as to when a corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of the Government therein were culled out and summarised as follows : (SCC p. 737, para 9)

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“(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. (SCC p. 507, para 14)

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(2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character. (SCC p. 508, para 15)

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(3) It may also be a relevant factor … whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State-conferred or State-protected. (SCC p. 508, para 15)

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(4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a

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State agency or instrumentality. (SCC p. 508, para 15)

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(5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. (SCC p. 509, para 16)

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(6) ‘Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference’ of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government. (SCC p. 510, para 18)”

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40. The picture that ultimately emerges is that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia [Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 258] are not a rigid set of principles so that if a body falls within any one of them it must, ex hypothesi, be considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12. The question in each case would be — whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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32. There is no dispute that the Government of India having transferred its 100% share to the company Talace India Pvt Ltd., ceased to have any administrative control or deep pervasive control over the private entity and hence, the company after its disinvestment could not have been treated to be a State anymore after having taken over by the private

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company. Thus, unquestionably, the respondent No. 3(AIL) after its disinvestment ceased to be a State or its instrumentality within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

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33. Once the respondent No. 3(AIL) ceased to be covered by the definition of State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, it could not have been subjected to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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34. A plain reading of Article 226 of the Constitution of India would make it clear that the High Court has the power to issue the directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Certiorari, Quo Warranto and Prohibition to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government within its territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of rights conferred by Part-III of the Constitution of India and for any other purpose.

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35. This Court has interpreted the term ‘authority’ used in Article 226 in the case of Andi Mukta (supra), wherein it was held as follows:

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“17. There, however, the prerogative writ of mandamus is confined only to public authorities to compel performance of public duty. The ‘public authority’ for them means everybody which is created by statute—and whose powers and duties are defined by statute. So government departments, local authorities, police authorities, and statutory undertakings and corporations, are all ‘public authorities’. But there is no such limitation for our High Courts to issue the writ ‘in the nature of mandamus’. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English law. Under Article 226, writs can be issued to ‘any person or

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authority’. It can be issued ‘for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose’.

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***

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20. The term ‘authority’ used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning like the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as nonfundamental rights. The words ‘any person or authority’ used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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36. Further, in the case of Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas²² , this Court culled out the categories of body/persons who would be amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court which are as follows:

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“ 18 . From the decisions referred to above, the position that emerges is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be maintainable against (i) the State (Government); (ii) an authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an instrumentality or agency of the State; (v.) a company which is financed and owned by the

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State; (vi) a private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a private body discharging public duty or positive obligation of public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under liability to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function.”

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37. The respondent No. 3(AIL), the erstwhile Government run airline having been taken over by the private company Talace India Pvt. Ltd., unquestionably, is not performing any public duty inasmuch as it has taken over the Government company Air India Limited for the purpose of commercial operations, plain and simple, and thus no writ petition is maintainable against respondent No. 3(AIL). The question No. 1 is decided in the above manner.

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38. The question of issuing a writ would only arise when the writ petition is being decided. Thus, the issue about exercise of extra ordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would arise only on the date when the writ petitions were taken up for consideration and decision. The respondent No. 3(AIL)- employer was a government entity on the date of filing of the writ petitions, which came to be decided after a significant delay by which time, the company had been disinvested and taken over by a private player. Since, respondent No. 3 employer had been disinvested and had assumed the character of a private entity not performing any public function, the High Court could not have exercised the extra ordinary writ jurisdiction to issue a writ to such private entity. The learned Division Bench has taken care to protect the rights of the appellants to seek remedy and thus, it cannot be said that the appellants have been non-suited in the case. It is only that the appellants would have to approach another forum for seeking their remedy.

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Thus, the question No. 2 is decided against the appellants.

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39. By no stretch of imagination, the delay in disposal of the writ petitions could have been a ground to continue with and maintain the writ petitions because the forum that is the High Court where the writ petitions were instituted could not have issued a writ to the private respondent which had changed hands in the intervening period. Hence, the question No. 3 is also decided against the appellants.

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40. Resultantly, the view taken by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in denying equitable relief to the appellants herein and relegating them to approach the appropriate forum for ventilating their grievances is the only just and permissible view.

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41. We may also note that the appellants raised grievances by way of filing the captioned writ petitions between 2011 and 2013 regarding various servicerelated issues which cropped up between the appellants and the erstwhile employer between 2007 and 2010. Therefore, it is clear that the writ petitions came to be instituted with substantial delay from the time when the cause of action had accrued to the appellants.

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42. It may further be noted that the Division Bench of Bombay High Court, only denied equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to the appellants but at the same time, rights of the appellants to claim relief in law before the appropriate forum have been protected.

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43. We may further observe that in case the appellants choose to approach the appropriate forum for ventilating their grievances as per law in light of the observations made by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, Section 14 of the Limitation Act,

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1963 shall come to the rescue insofar as the issue of limitation is concerned.

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44. In wake of the discussion made hereinabove, we do not find any reason to take a different view from the one taken by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in sustaining the preliminary objection qua maintainability of the writ petitions preferred by the appellants and rejecting the same as being not maintainable.”

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In view of the above, no relief could be granted against Respondent No.2/Air India after it ceased to be the instrumentality of the State. We do not find any infirmity in the Order dated 24.08.2023 passed by the Ld. Single Judge.

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Resultantly, the appeal is dismissed, along with pending application(s), if any.

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SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J

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VIMAL KUMAR YADAV, J

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OCTOBER 17, 2025 S. Zakir

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Jai Chand v. the State & Anr.

Case brief

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What the court decided

Jai Chand v. the State & Anr.

Case brief

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