(v) any interpretation which rendered the obligation of SAIL to ship the requisite amount of cargo in the relevant period “optional” would lead to an absurdity; (vi) reading of the Contract as a whole made it evident that the SAIL was obliged to ship a minimum of 1,900,000 MT and maximum of 2,100,000 MT of coal; (vii) it was noticed that there was nothing optional and/or non-binding as regards (a) cargo/quantity, (b) shipment period, (c) type of vessels, (d) details of vessels likely to perform COA and (e) Nomination of Vessels. Even where flexibility was permitted, the limits of that flexibility were strictly mentioned in the Contract; (viii) on the basis of the above, it was concluded that SAIL’s interpretation would practically annihilate the binding nature of many clauses in the Agreement including Clauses 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, even though they expressly convey that the parties intended for them to be binding; (ix) Clause 62 could only have been invoked if a supplier in Australia failed or was unable to supply material for shipment. It cannot be said to operate if the supplier provides coal to SAIL but SAIL does not provide the same to Seaspray for shipment; the failure must be a failure by the supplier which in turn leads to a failure by SAIL. 65. It can be seen that the conclusion drawn and the findings rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal is based on an interpretative exercise. 66. The interpretation accorded to Clause 62 and the limitation read into it by the Arbitral Tribunal are based on an evaluation and interpretation of the Contract as a whole, and in the light of the purport thereof.
