Petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act seeking appointment of an arbitrator for disputes over unpaid lease rentals under a lease agreement. The court found an arbitration clause existed, declined to entertain merits objections, appointed a Sole Arbitrator under DIAC aegis, and disposed of the petition.
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ ARB.P. 621/2025
Date of Decision : 22.11.2025
IN THE MATTER OF:
MANISH GUPTA
S/O LATE SH. RAMESH CHANDRA GUPTA ADDRESS: MADHAV NAGAR, GWALIOR MADHYA PRADESH- 474002
..... PETITIONER
Through: Mr. Shubham Budhiraja, Mr. Sanjeev Chaudhary and Mr. Shubham Prateek, Advocates.
Versus
M/S ORIENTAL QUARRIES AND MINES PRIVATE LIMITED
THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE ADDRESS: OSE COMMERCIAL BLOCK, HOTEL ALOFT, ASSETS- 5B, HOSPITALITY DISTRICT, IGI AIRPORT, SOUTH WEST DELHI, DELHI-110037 .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Nitesh Jain, Mr. Nishant Bhargava and Ms. Anushka Singh, Advocates.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV JUDGEMENT
PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J. (ORAL)
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appointment of an Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes that have arisen between the parties under Lease Agreement dated 20.06.2012 (hereinafter “ the Agreement ”).
―38) All dispute or differences whatsoever arising between the parties out of, relating to the construction, meaning and operation or effect of this
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agreement or the breach thereof shall be settled in following manners:
(i) All disputes shall be referred and settled through an arbitration procedure as per arbitration and conciliation act, 1996. The parties shall notify in writing their intention to commence arbitration. Such notice shall establish the entitlement of the party giving the same to commence arbitration.
(iii) Within 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice for intention to commence arbitration by other party, the parties will agreed upon sole arbitrator, to be appointed by the managing director of Second party, failing which the appointment shall be as per the provision of arbitration and conciliation act, 1996. The courts of Delhi shall have the exclusive jurisdiction. The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of arbitration and conciliation act, 1996 and the award made in pursuance thereof shall be binding on the parties. The venue of arbitration shall be New Delhi only.‖
―19.In In Re: Interplay , the Supreme Court confined the analysis under Section 11 of the Act to the existence of an arbitration agreement and
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under Section 8 of the Act to the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. Under both the provisions, examination was to be made at the touchstone of Section 7 of the Act. Further, issues pertaining to the arbitrability of the dispute fell outside the scope of both Section 11(6A) and Section 8 of the Act. The material part of the judgement of the Supreme Court in In Re: Interplay reads as under:
164. The 2015 Amendment Act has laid down different parameters for judicial review under Section 8 and Section 11. Where Section 8 requires the referral Court to look into the prima facie existence of a valid arbitration agreement. Section 11 confines the Court’s jurisdiction to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. Although the object and purpose behind both Sections 8 and 11 is to compel parties to abide by their contractual understanding, the scope of power of the referral Courts under the said provisions is intended to be different. The same is also evident from the fact that Section 37 of the Arbitration Act allows an appeal from the order of an arbitral tribunal refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8, but not from Section 11. Thus, the 2015 Amendment Act has legislatively overruled the dictum of Patel Engineering (supra) where it was held that Section 8 and Section 11 are complementary in nature. Accordingly, the two provisions cannot be read as laying down a similar standard. 165. The legislature confined the scope of reference under Section 11(6A) to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. The use of the term ―examination‖ in itself connotes that the scope of the power is limited to a prima facie determination. Since the Arbitration Act is a self-contained code, the requirement of ―existence‖ of an arbitration agreement draws effect from Section 7 of the Arbitration Act. In Duro Felguera (supra), this Court held that the referral Courts only need to consider one aspect to determine the existence of an arbitration agreement – whether the underlying contract contains an arbitration agreement which provides for arbitration pertaining to the disputes which have arisen between the parties to the agreement. Therefore, the scope of examination under Section 11(6A) should be confined to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section 7Similarly, the validity of an arbitration agreement, in view of Section 7, should be restricted to the requirement of formal validity such as the requirement that the agreement be in writing. This interpretation also gives true effect to the doctrine of competence-competence by leaving the issue of substantive existence and validity of an arbitration agreement to be decided by arbitral tribunal under Section 16. We accordingly
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clarify the position of law laid down in Vidya Drolia (supra) in the context of Section 8 and Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. 166. The burden of proving the existence of arbitration agreement generally lies on the party seeking to rely on such agreement. In jurisdictions such as India, which accept the doctrine of competencecompetence, only prima facie proof of the existence of an arbitration agreement must be adduced before the referral Court. The referral Court is not the appropriate forum to conduct a minitrial by allowing the parties to adduce the evidence in regard to the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement. The determination of the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement on the basis of evidence ought to be left to the arbitral tribunal. This position of law can also be gauged from the plain language of the statute. 167. Section 11(6A) uses the expression ―examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.‖ The purport of using the word ―examination‖ connotes that the legislature intends that the referral Court has to inspect or scrutinize the dealings between the parties for the existence of an arbitration agreement. Moreover, the expression ―examination‖ does not connote or imply a laborious or contested inquiry. On the other hand, Section 16 provides that the arbitral tribunal can ―rule‖ on its jurisdiction, including the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. A ―ruling‖ connotes adjudication of disputes after admitting evidence from the parties. Therefore, it is evident that the referral Court is only required to examine the existence of arbitration agreements, whereas the arbitral tribunal ought to rule on its jurisdiction, including the issues pertaining to the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. A similar view was adopted by this Court in Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd.‖ [Emphasis supplied]
20. The effect of In Re: Interplay was further explained by a Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning3 wherein the Court declared Vidya Drolia and NTPC Ltd.’s findings qua scope of inquiry under Section 8 and Section 11 of the Act to no longer be compatible with modern principles of arbitration. The material portions of the judgement read as under:
―114. In view of the observations made by this Court in In Re : Interplay (supra), it is clear that the scope of enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement, and nothing else.
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For this reason, we find it difficult to hold that the observations made in Vidya Drolia (supra) and adopted in NTPC v. SPML (supra) that the jurisdiction of the referral Court when dealing with the issue of ―accord and satisfaction‖ under Section 11 extends to weeding out ex-facie non-arbitrable and frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the subsequent decision in In Re : Interplay (supra). … 118. Tests like the ―eye of the needle‖ and ―ex-facie meritless‖, although try to minimise the extent of judicial interference, yet they require the referral Court to examine contested facts and appreciate prima facie evidence (however limited the scope of enquiry may be) and thus are not in conformity with the principles of modern arbitration which place arbitral autonomy and judicial non-interference on the highest pedestal.‖ [Emphasis supplied]
21. Similarly, in BGM and M-RPL-JMCT (JV) v. Eastern Coalfields Ltd4 the Supreme Court succinctly explained the effect of In Re: Interplay on a Referral Court’s powers under Section 11 of the Act. The relevant part of the judgement is as under:
15. …
(a) Section 11 confines the Court's jurisdiction to the examination regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement.
(b) The use of the term ―examination‖ in itself connotes that the scope of the power is limited to a prima facie determination.
(c) Referral Courts only need to consider one aspect to determine the existence of an arbitration agreement — whether the underlying contract contains an arbitration agreement which provides for arbitration pertaining to the disputes which have arisen between the parties to the agreement. Therefore, the scope of examination under Section 11(6-A) should be confined to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section 7. Such a legal approach will help the Referral Court in weeding out prima facie non-existent arbitration agreements.
(d) The purport of using the word ―examination‖ connotes that the legislature intends that the Referral Court has to inspect or scrutinise the dealings between the parties for the existence of an arbitration agreement. However, the expression ―examination‖ does not connote or imply a laborious or contested inquiry.
(e) The burden of proving the existence of arbitration agreement generally lies on the party seeking to rely on such agreement.
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Only prima facie proof of the existence of an arbitration agreement must be adduced before the Referral Court. The Referral Court is not the appropriate forum to conduct a minitrial by allowing the parties to adduce the evidence in regard to the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement. The determination of the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement on the basis of evidence ought to be left to the Arbitral Tribunal.
(f) Section 16 provides that the Arbitral Tribunal can ―rule‖ on its jurisdiction, including the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. A ―ruling‖ connotes adjudication of disputes after admitting evidence from the parties. Therefore, when the Referral Court renders a prima facie opinion, neither the Arbitral Tribunal, nor the Court enforcing the arbitral award is bound by such a prima facie view. If a prima facie view as to the existence of an arbitration agreement is taken by the Referral Court, it still allows the Arbitral Tribunal to examine the issue in depth.
[Emphasis supplied]
22. Thus from the above-mentioned authorities it is clear that a Court’s scope of inquiry under Section 11 of the Act has been limited to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement while the adjudication under Section 8 is to be made for both existence and validity. Further, the examination so undertaken under both the said provisions must be within the confines of Section 7 of the Act. Objections relating to arbitrability of disputes are not to be entertained by a referral Court acting under Section 8 or 11 of the Act.‖
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15. Accordingly, the instant petition stands disposed of.
PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J
NOVEMBER 22, 2025 Nc/amg
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2 issues framed by the court
Whether an arbitrator should be appointed under Section 11(6) given the arbitration clause in the Lease Agreement dated 20.06.2012.
Whether respondent's objections of time-bar and invalidity of the Agreement bar referral to arbitration.
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As recorded by the court registry
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