The petitioner tenant filed a revision against an eviction order under the Delhi Rent Control Act. The High Court noted that the landlord had already lawfully recovered possession of the premises through execution proceedings. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the Court held the revision petition had become infructuous and dismissed it.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
$~3 (R)
1 (2003) 1 SCC 453
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dealt with a similar situation while dismissing a challenge by a tenant to a judgment passed by this Court upholding an order declining leave to defend passed by the learned Trial Court. The facts in the case were that, possession of the tenanted premises had been taken pursuant to an order passed by the Executing Court. The Supreme Court dealt with the similar arguments raised on behalf of the Respondent/landlord that the Petition has become infructuous pursuant to the possession having been taken.
“6. In view of the admitted position that pursuant to the order passed by the Rent Controller, possession has been taken on execution of the order permitting eviction, and absence of specific stand regarding implied consent it is, however, not necessary to go into the finer details and to examine the rival stand in the background of legal position as it would amount to rendering decision on a purely academic question. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed, without any order as to costs.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
“Leave granted.
2 Civil Appeal Nos. 5220-5221 of 2008 order dated 19.08.2008
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At the time of hearing of these appeals, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the landlord-respondent submits, on instructions, that the possession of the premises in question has already been taken over by the landlord-respondent. That being the position, these appeals have now become infructuous, which have been filed against the final judgment and order dt.25.02.2008 and 28.03.2008 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in RCR No.49 of 2007 and C.M.No.119 of 2008 (Review) in RCR No.49 of 2007, by which the Revision Petition filed by the tenant/appellant was dismissed and order of eviction was affirmed. Since the possession has already been taken over by the landlord-respondent, in our view nothing survives in these appeals and accordingly, the appeals are disposed of as infructuous . Interim order, if any, stands vacated. There will be no order as to costs.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
6.1 In Om Prakash Ashok Kumar & Sons v. Ajay Khurana5 while relying on the NC Daga case and several other cases, a Coordinate Bench held as follows:
“10. This Court in various decisions has followed the decision given by the Supreme Court in N.C. Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh Rana. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in Poonam Bangia v. Harbhagwan Dass Chandiramani in RC. REV. no. 16/2021 vide order dated 22.07.2021 after following the law laid down in N.C. Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh Rana, dismissed the revision petition after observing that the landlord has received the possession of the tenanted premises through execution proceedings. Another Coordinate Bench of this Court in Mange Ram v. Rajesh Narain Goel, in RC. REV. no. 147/2021, decided on 19.03.2024 after following N.C. Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh Rana and Vinod Kumar Verma v. Manmohan Verma , in Civil Appeal nos.
3 2019 SCC Online Del 6487
4 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4284
5 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5228
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5220 -5221/2008 passed by the Supreme Court and in Poonam Bangia v. Harbhagwan Dass Chandiramani in RC. REV no. 16/2021 passed by this Court as mentioned hereinabove also dismissed the revision petition as became infructuous due to the reason that the possession of the subject premises has been restored to the respondent/landlord. The same view was also taken by another Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Ram Avtar v. Anuradha Shukla in RC. Rev. Bearing no. 104/2021 vide order dated 03.11.2023, the revision petition was ordered to be dismissed as the possession of the tenanted premises has already been taken by the respondent/landlord in accordance with law.
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12. In the present case as reflected from the order dated 10.05.2024, the possession of the tenanted premises has already been restored back to the respondent/landlord in execution of warrant of possession in accordance with law. This Court is also of the view that the present petition is not maintainable. Accordingly, the present petition, along with pending applications stands dismissed being infructuous.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
7. This Court has in Ashok Gupta & Anr. v. Deepak Rao6 has taken the following view:
“18. The Eviction Petition was filed by the Respondent/landlord under Section 141(c) [sic. 14(1)(e)] of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 setting out the requirement to open his law offices. The proceeding was contested by the Petitioner/tenant and an Eviction Order was passed by the learned Trial Court. Pursuant thereto, the Respondent/landlord recovered possession of the demised premises in accordance with law. As such the Revision Petition has been filed challenging the order of the learned Trial Court which has now gained fruition and was executed and has already been implemented through execution proceedings. In these circumstances, the Revision Petition has become infructuous.
19. As stated above, the jurisdiction of this Court exercising revisionary powers is limited and circumspect. The Petitioner/tenant did not initiate civil proceedings for recovery of possession, instead the present Revision Petition was filed. The Petitioner/tenant has not contended that Section 19 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 has been violated. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the NC Daga case and Vinod Kumar Verma case, this Court finds that this
6 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7148
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Petition has become infructuous and is accordingly dismissed.”
7.1 In addition, in RC. REV. No. 104/2021 captioned as Ram Avtar v. Anuradha Shukla vide order dated 03.11.2023 this Court has held that once possession was taken over by the Respondent/landlord in accordance with law, the Petition becomes infructuous. The relevant extract of the Ram Avtar case reads as follows:
“4.1 This Court has considered this contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner/tenant. The Revision Petition has been filed challenging the order of the Trial Court which has now gained fruition, and has already been implemented through execution proceedings. In these circumstances, the Revision Petition has become infructuous .
5. Furthermore, this Court in various judgments held that once possession has been taken over by the Respondent/landlord in accordance with law, this petition becomes infructuous and in view thereof, nothing survives in the petition.”
[Emphasis supplied]
7 (2022) 6 SCC 30
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apparent on the face of the record or absence of any adjudication by the learned Trial Court, and it is only then should the High Court interfere. The Supreme Court has also cautioned from converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first Appeal under revisionary jurisdiction. This has been elucidated at length by Supreme Court in AbidUl-Islam case in the following manner :
"Scope of revision
22. We are, in fact, more concerned with the scope and ambit of the proviso to Section 25-B(8). The proviso creates a distinct and unequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal against the order passed by the learned Rent Controller over an application filed under sub-section (5). The intendment of the legislature is very clear, which is to remove the appellate remedy and thereafter, a further second appeal. It is a clear omission that is done by the legislature consciously through a covenant removing the right of two stages of appeals.
23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record , which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature.
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25. The aforesaid decision has been recently considered and approved by this Court in Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal [Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal, (2020) 7 SCC 327 : (2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 107] : (SCC pp. 340-41, paras 22-23)
“22. This Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119] had an occasion to consider the scope of proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. This Court
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found, that though the word “revision” was not employed in the said proviso, from the language used therein, the legislative intent was clear that the power conferred was revisional power. This Court observed thus : (SCC p. 124, para 11)
‘11. The learned Single Judge of the High Court in the present case has reassessed and reappraised the evidence afresh to reach a different finding as though it was exercising appellate jurisdiction. No doubt even while exercising revisional jurisdiction, a reappraisal of evidence can be made, but that should be for the limited purpose to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the factfinding court is wholly unreasonable.’
It could thus be seen, that this Court has held, that the High Court while exercising the revisional powers under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 though could not reassess and reappraise the evidence, as if it was exercising appellate jurisdiction, however, it was empowered to reappraise the evidence for the limited purpose so as to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable.
23. Again in Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani [Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani, (1999) 1 SCC 141] , this Court had an occasion to consider the aforesaid powers under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. This Court observed thus : (SCC p. 148, para 12)
‘12. It is no doubt true that the scope of a revision petition under Section 25-B(8) proviso of the Delhi Rent Control Act is a very limited one, but even so in examining the legality or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the High Court could examine the facts available in order to find out whether he had correctly or on a firm legal basis approached the matters on record to decide the case. Pure findings of fact may not be open to be interfered with, but (sic if) in a given case, the finding of fact is given on a wrong premise of law, certainly it would be open to the Revisional Court to interfere with such a matter.’
It was thus held, that though the scope of revisional powers of the High Court was very limited one, but even so in examining the legality or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the High Court could examine the facts available in order to find out whether he had correctly or on a firm legal basis approached the matters on record to decide the case. It has also been held, that pure findings of fact may not be open to be interfered with, but in a given case, if the finding of fact is given on a wrong premise of law, it would be open to the Revisional Court to interfere with the same.”
[Emphasis supplied]
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“19. Recovery of possession for occupation and re-entry.—(1) Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises from the tenant in pursuance of an order made under clause (e) of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 14 [or under sections 14A, 14B, I4C, 14D and 21, the landlord shall not, except with the permission of the Controller obtained in the prescribed manner, re-let the whole or any part of the premises within three years from the date of obtaining such possession, and in granting such permission, the Controller may direct the landlord to put such evicted tenant in possession of the premises.
(2) Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises as aforesaid and the premises are not occupied by the landlord or by the person for whose benefit the premises are held, within two months of obtaining such possession, or the premises having been so occupied are, at any time within three years from the date of obtaining possession, re-let to any person other than the evicted tenant without obtaining the permission of the Controller under sub-section (1) or the possession of such premises is transferred to another person for reasons which do not appear to the Controller to be bona fide, the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by such evicted tenant within such time as may be prescribed, direct the landlord to put the tenant in possession of the premises or to pay him such compensation as the Controller thinks fit.”
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9.1 The Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam case has held that Section 19 of the Act gives a right of re-possession to the dispossessed tenant if landlord recovers possession under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act and thereafter, the landlord does not use the subject premises for the purpose that it was intended and set out in such Eviction Petition on which basis, an order for eviction was obtained by the landlord. The relevant extract is set out below:
“19. Before a presumption is drawn, the landlord is duty-bound to place prima facie material supported by the adequate averments. It is only thereafter, the presumption gets attracted and the onus shifts on the tenant. The object of Section 14(1)(e) vis-à-vis Section 25-B has to be seen in the light of yet another provision contained under Section 19. Section 19 gives a right to the dispossessed tenant for repossession if there is a non-compliance on the part of the landlord albeit after eviction, to put the premises to use for the intended purpose. Such a right is available only to a tenant who stood dispossessed on the application filed by the landlord invoking Section 14(1)(e) being allowed. Thus, Section 19 inter alia throws more light on the legislative objective facilitating a speedy possession. The object is also reflected in the proviso to Section 25-B(8), denying a right of appeal..”
[Emphasis Supplied]
10.1 The Petitioner/tenant contested that the son of the
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Respondent/landlady is already running a business. The learned Trial Court found that the bonafide need of the Respondent/landlady and her husband was not disputed. Further, on the ground for the shop allegedly being used by the son of the Respondent/landlady, it was clarified by the Respondent/landlady that a signboard bearing "Tarun Computers" had been fixed without the consent of the Respondent/landlady and was misused to dispute the bona fide requirement. The Respondent/landlady provided documentary evidence, including complaints to the police, denying running of a computer shop on that premises.
10.2 Regarding the alternative shop allegedly lying vacant, the learned Trial Court held that its location was not suitable for business purposes as it lacked accessibility and visibility from the main road, which are essential for attracting customers. The subject premises is located on the main road, and thus was found to be ideal for the intended business of the Respondent/landlady.
10.3 The learned Trial Court found that the Respondent/landlady had a genuine need to establish a proper business in the subject premises to support their large family and meet their financial needs, particularly given the advanced ages of their three unmarried daughters.
10.4 On the aspect of the landlord-tenant relationship and the ownership of the subject premises by the Respondent/landlady it was held by the learned Trial Court, that as per settled law the Respondent/landlady was able to show a better title than the Petitioner/tenant and hence was able to establish the ownership of the subject premises as well as the existence of landlord-
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tenant relationship between the parties. In light of the discussion, the three ingredients, landlord-tenant relationship/ownership, no suitable alternative accommodation being available and bona fide requirement was established by the Respondent/landlady and the Petitioner/tenant's application for leave to defend was dismissed.
10.5 Notice in the present Petition was issued on 23.12.2015 and since process fee was not filed, fresh Notice was issued by the Court on 29.02.2016. In the interregnum period, possession of the subject premises was received by the Respondent/landlady.
11.1 As discussed above, learned Trial Court has adequately addressed both these issues. Accordingly, no ground to interfere with the Impugned Order has been made out by the Petitioner/tenant before this Court in the Revision Petition.
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fruition as was executed and has already been implemented through execution proceedings. This was recorded by the Court in its orders dated 27.07.2016, 19.03.2018 and thereafter on 12.12.2022. In these circumstances, the Revision Petition has become infructuous.
TARA VITASTA GANJU, J
NOVEMBER 14, 2024/SA
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2 issues framed by the court
Whether a revision petition filed by a tenant is maintainable after the landlord has lawfully recovered possession of the tenanted premises through execution proceedings.
Whether the revision petition has become infructuous given that the impugned eviction order has gained fruition and been implemented.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
NC Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh RanaRelied on¶13
(2003) 1 SCC 453 · Who else cites this
Vinod Kumar Verma v. Manmohan VermaRelied on¶16
Civil Appeal Nos. 5220-5221 of 2008 order dated 19.08.2008
Neelam Sharma v. Ekant RekhanReferred¶24
2019 SCC Online Del 6487 · Who else cites this
Bhawani Shankar v Nand Lal and Ors.Referred¶24
2021 SCC OnLine Del 4284 · Who else cites this
Om Prakash Ashok Kumar & Sons v. Ajay KhuranaReferred¶25
2024 SCC OnLine Del 5228 · Who else cites this
Ashok Gupta & Anr. v. Deepak RaoReferred¶37
2024 SCC OnLine Del 7148 · Who else cites this
Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain DuaRelied on¶49
(2022) 6 SCC 30 · Who else cites this
3 provisions across 1 enactments
Munna
Om Wati
Tara Vitasta Ganju
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
Tara Vitasta Ganju
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